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▼SUMMARY
This thesis offers some empirical insight into the problems and 
possibilities of economic integration in West Africa with particular reference 
to Ghana and the Entente Council States (i.e. Ivory Coast, Upper Yolta, Niger, 
Dahomey and Togo).
As a background to the study, the historical evolution of the current 
problems of intra-regional trade and development is discussed with special 
attention to the economic structures and geo-political configuration of 
divisions and fragmentations inherited from the colonial past. These have 
affeoted recent integration schemes in the region whose performances are 
appraised and their failures highlighted.
Notwithstanding the structural problems of the economies of the area, 
the study sees a possibility of eoonomio integration. It selects and applies 
a revised version of the Andics-Dosser model in evaluating the impact effects 
(gains) of market integration based on selected, existing regional 
industries (i.e. cement, chemical fertiliser, footwear and petroleum products) 
in Central-West Africa comprising Ghana and the Entente States. These are 
industries in which economies of scale exist, which would justify an arrangement 
for gradual trade liberalization in the products of such industries within a 
regional context. Based on the aforementioned products the welfare benefits 
derivable from market integration in terms of four chosen variables 
(domestio value-added, national income, foreign exchange and capital sost) 
are quantified. The estimates, which utilise 19<>9 data, indicate that 
integration-induoed improvement in the region's growth rate of GNP will be of 
the order of 0.7# in 1975» increasing to 0.9% by 1980.
Integration by itself does not ensure an automatic equitable distribution 
of the benefits it generates. The text discusses the possible polarisation 
effects of integration as well as the revenue-loss aspects of tariff 
disarmament and goes on to make policy suggestions as to how these problems 
might be solved. The inherent political instability in the region is 
underlined as a major obstacle to integration but the limited scheme which 
the study proposes, since it will entail a minimal loss of political 
sovereignty from the standpoint of prospective member states, is seen as likely 
to work - if given the chanoe - and policy guideposts are offered to this end.
Abstract of a Thesis entitled "Economic Integration
in West Africa"
This study offers some empirical insight into the problems and 
possibilities of economic integration in West Africa with 
particular reference to Ghana and the Entente Council States (i.e. 
Ivory Coast,Upper Volta, Niger, Dahomey and Togo). Recent 
developments in integration analysis have shown that the traditional 
theoiyof integration is largely inapplicable to the economies of 
LDCs. Economic integration in the case of LDCs should be treated 
as a strategy of economic development rather than a mere tariff 
issue•
As a background to the study, the historical evolution of the 
current problems of intra-regional trade and development is 
discussed with special attention to the economic structures and 
geo-political configuration of divisions and fragmentations inherited 
from the colonial past. These have affected recent integration 
schemes in the region whose performances are appraised and their 
failures highlighted.
Notwithstanding the structural problems of the economies of 
the area, the study sees a possibility of economic integration.
It selects and applies a revised version of the Andics-Dosser model 
in evaluating the impact effects (gains) of market integration 
based on selected, existing regional industries (i.e. cement, chemical 
fertiliser, footwear and petroleum products) in central-west Africa, v 
comprising Ghana and the Entente states. These are industries in 
which the economies of scale exist, which would justify an arrange­
ment for gradual trade liberalization in the products of such 
industries within a regional context. Based on the aforementioned 
products the welfare benefits derivable from market integration in 
terms of four chosen variables, (domestic value added, national 
income, foreign exchange and capital cost) are quantified. The 
estimates, which utilise 1969 data, indicate that integration-induced 
improvement in the region*s growth rate of GNP will be of the order 
of 0*7$ in 1975» increasing to 0.9% by 1980.
Integration by itself does not ensure an automatic equitable 
distribution of the benefits it generates. The text discusses the 
possible polarization effects of integration as well as the 
revenue-loss aspects of tariff disarmament and goes on to make 
policy suggestions as to how these problems might be solved. The 
inherent political instability in the region is underlined as a 
major obstacle to integration but the limited scheme which the, study 
proposes, since it will entail a minimal loss of political 
sovereignty from the standpoint of prospective member states, is 
seen as likely to work - if given the chance - and policy guideposts 
are offered to this end.
Uka Iwuchukwu Ezenwe
University of St. Andrews, Scotland.
Ahmadu Bello University, Nigeria.
January 1976*
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CORRIGENDA
1# For Dahomey read the "Republic of Benin11
(Very recently, the former changed its 
name to the latter)*
2* The newly independent state of Guinea-Bissau
hag become the 15th member of the We3t 
African sub-region by ECA definition*

CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION
GENERAL
1* INTEGRATIONt An Overview of historical perspectives
Our study deals essentially with economics* But it might be useful to explore 
at the very start how history permits us to understand the problems of economic 
integration in West Africa better* History talks of the past; hence economic 
history focuses on economics of the past* It is retrospective9 whereas economics 
is prospective. To the extent that one is impossible without the other they 
speak the same language9 and they nourish each other*
2* (i) Background to Colonial Policy and Integration in West Africa
To a great extent, the present politico-economic order in Africa represents
the legacies of the colonial past* The vast majority of African countries, indeed 
all West Africa have attained political independence and statehood - real or 
apparent - but deeply ingrained habits, methods, artifical boundaries and structure! 
and, not the least, ways of thinking which the colonial system imparted and 
fostered were not suddenly blown away by the "wind of change**• It must be recalled 
that before the assumption of formal rule Western Europe had a long contact 
with Africa*
This is particularly so with West Africa* In fact, South of the Sahara, West
Africa was one of the first regions to have any contacts with Western Europe*
However, these early contacts, which were initially trade-motivated,^ frequently
interrupted the orderly development of politico-socio-economic life of the people*
During the lUth and 15th centuries pre-colonial civilizations are known to
have flourished in certain parts of West Africa,
1* K.O.Dike, Trade and Politics in the Niger Deltat 1830-1865,
Oxford (Clerendon) Press, 195>*>t P#1
especially In the area around Benin* African blacksmiths knew how to work 
gold, copper, bronze, and even iron* They had even developed the agricultural 
system of rotational bush fallow* But, this trend towards orderly and 
natural development was bruahquely arrested in the wake of slave trade* The 
introduction of thie iniquitioUs trade in the 16th oentury following the 
discovery and the territorial conquests in the Americas, which left rich 
lands to develop and exploit, was not only a human haemorrhage inflicted on
Africa but it destroyed the earliest chances of evolution and development of
2large economic units *
• * r .| * * - -4 7 V; ' '  •** •. ■ * . - ; * T . > *«, . '• ' **i *$4 %
There is no way of gauging where the agrarian or technical African 
civilization would be to-day if it had been able to follow a normal course
of development in contact with European techniques* History cannot be remade*
£The most one could say, in re-tropection, is that, perhaps, if these medieval 
African communities were left alone and undisturbed to engage in legal and 
peaceful trade with the outside world, they might have evolved into cohesive 
and integrated political and economic units*
(11) From Pre-colonial Dlatlnt*,option to Integration.
But soon the old order was changing* The fifty years between 1830 and 
1885 saw an epoch of change and revolutions it was in essence a period of 
transition from a predominantly slave-trading economy to one based on trade in 
the raw materials of the West African forest*
2* See Rene Dumont, False Start in Afrioa* Andre Deutsch, 1966 p* 35*
The frequent internal wars,vhioh fed slave trade, disorganised the 
fabrio of society and blocked progress towards polltloal and economic 
order* Past achievement in this direction was dismantled*
Prior to this era9 West Africa was the key slave market for Europe* But with
the abolition of slave trade through a complex variety of factors - political,
economic9 strategic, and humanitarian - Europe sought to establish in place
of slavery legitimate trade.
The buying and selling of commodities is almost always aceompai&ed by
the contact of cultures, the exchange of ideas, the mingling of peoples,
and this has led not infrequently to political complications and wars. In
so far as West Africa was concerned European traders initially limited their
activities to trade and avoided entanglement in African politics. The
African attitude to land^, the hostility and suspioion of coastal chiefs,
physical impediments and climatic barriers to penetration encouraged this
type of attitude. Bp to the beginning of the 19th century9 the hostility of
the well-armed coastal states was a factor in preventing European invasion
of their territories and of their politics^.
By the mid-nineteenth century, however, African opposition and
resistance had started to crumble in the faoe a concerted European movement
directed chiefly towards the invasion of the interior of West Africa.
3. In strict West African customary law tribal land was corporatively
owned. The chiefs - protectors of the tribal heritage - could not 
sign away lands of which in reality they were merely trustees. This 
being the case the alienation of land to foreigners was out of the 
question and tribal leaders were in duty bound to oppose any encroachment 
on their preserves. See T.O. Elias, Nigerian Land Law and Custom 
(London), 1950) pp.6-7
1*. See K. 0. Dike Op. cit.. P. 10
- 3 -
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Because the territorial struggle involved different countries, namely Britain, 
Prance, Belgium and Germany, intense national rivalries were generated. These 
colonial powers having realised that they were virtually getting at eaoh 
other's throat in their struggle for territorial claims decided to call a 
conference with the ultimate objective of settling once and for all future 
dispute with respect to territorial olaims in Africa.
This was the Berlin Conference• One aim - in a sense the major one - of 
the Conference, 188U-85, as defined in the third "basis"'*, was to limit the 
effects of future African disputes upon international relations in Europe 
by prescribing some new code of conduct. The final Act provided that any 
power acquiring territory or establishing protectorates on the coasts of 
Africa should at once notify all other signatory powers, and declared that 
possession of territory on those coasts implied a responsibility for "the 
establishment of authority #..«•..« sufficient to protect existing rights, 
and, as the case may be freedom of trade and of transit upon the conditions 
agreed upon"^.
Thus, having succeeded in cutting up the continent into narrow strips 
of territories each running from coast into the hinterland, the colonising 
authorities concentrated their energy on trade, tapping raw materials and
5* S. E. Crowe, The Berlin West African Conference. London. 19U2
6. John I). Hargreaves, Prelude to the Partition of West Africa.
MacMillan London, 1963, P. 337
m 5  m
enjoying unbridled monopoly supply of manufactures* Roads, railways and 
waterways were organised to serre these interests* No internal transport 
network was independently developed to connett different parts of the same 
territory and therefore no national or territorial economies were created as 
a matter of deliberate policy objective exoept of oourse where two adjacent 
territories happened to come under one flag and where such integration
o
lessened administrative costs *
The colonial frontiers, determined by distant and sometimes ill-informed 
negotiators and settled, in some cases, by ruler and compass alone, were not 
well-adapted to African needs* Even ethnic divisions of the area appear to 
have exerted very little influence on the colonial boundaries* Consider, for 
example, the following^ the Ewe-speaking people were divided between the 
Gold Coast (jnow Ghana) and Togo; some Yorubas live in Dahomey, whilst the 
majority of their kinsmen are Nigerians; Gambia and Senegal, though two 
different countries, are ethically one and the same people* Until the 
unification of the Cameroons in 19<>1| the south was a part of Nigeria under 
the British and the rest under French. True to their policies, the 
metropolitan authorities, nevertheless, tightened their grip on these territories 
by means of customs, tariffs and monetary arrangements; the invisible trade
of these territories was also confined largely to metropolitan countries*
7* In some instances formal administrative responsibilities were not directly 
assumed* Britain in 188$, for example, happily left the administration of 
the area beyond the Niger delta in the hands of the National African Company 
"as the cheapest and most effective way*1 of discharging the obligations 
to maintain free navigation which had been accepted at Berlin* See 
J* D. Hargreaves, Ibid* P* 338*
8* See R* Gardiner, Economic Conditions in Africa, Africa Contemporary 
Record* 1969-70, P* Cl*53
7
It was therefore within these new border-line a that the technology,
culture, and institutions of the several colonial powers gradually made their
impact during the twentieth century* Neighbouring Vest Africans with virtually
identical cultural traditions overnight found themselves subject to different
languages and different doctrines in school* Meanwhile, each of the major
colonial powers, Britain and France, tried to achieve strong in ter territorial
links within Its own area of authority, albeit for political and administrative
convenience* On this France was a remarkable success having pursued its
favoured eolonl&l policy of assimilation and direct rule with a missionary
seal* Indeed in 1895 Paris took the first step to co-ordinate the activities
of the individual colonial government, and to direct them towards common
objectives, by creating the overall government of French West Africa (AOP)*
The colonies were both de facto and de .jure an integral part of the French
Union, even to the point of getting seats in the French Constituent Assembly
to the overseas territories* The eventual formation of independent governments
in the colonies, even in the distant future, seemed ruled out* In effect, the
economies of the colonies were not Integrated, especially in relation to
9France, but there was also an automatic tendency to unification *
Thus the prevailing circumstances set in motion other forces making for 
Integration and unification* Within the French or British territories, trade 
and migration took no account of territorial boundaries*
9* R* Julienne, "The Experience of Integration in French-Speaking Africa in 
A, HazUwood («d«) African Intagcatlon and Plain ta/aratlon. O.U.P., 1967. 
This paragraph draws on the former author*
- 7 -
The spill-over effect of education also contributed in no small measure to 
reinforce this trend towards colonial economic integration* Institutions of 
higher learning were established only in a few strategic centres and they 
drew recruits from all parts of the dependencies* For instance, there was 
only one university, at Dakar, for the whole of French Africa from the end 
of World War II up to the period of Independence* British West Africa, though 
marginally better off, saw no more than three universities (Ibadan, Nigeria; 
Legon, Ghana; and Four ah Bay, Sierra Leone) by the close of the 1950s* 
Furthermore, there was the unifying influence and the spirit of belonging 
which the adoption of a common language in education created - although this 
has also created and fostered the polarisation between the Franeophone and 
Anglophone West Africa which to date remains an important divisive element 
in relations between the two*
In other aspeots of economic life, effective colonial integration was 
in vogue* As already noted the monetary systems in colonial West Africa were 
centralised* French West Afritfa had a common currency, whioh has survived^, 
a range of common services and a cuitoms union which served as a mechanism 
through whieh resources were distributed from the wealthier coastal states of 
Senegal and Ivory Coast to their less-endowed peripheral inland neighbours*
10* The West African Customs Union (UMAO), whioh includes all the francophone 
West African countries except Guinea and Mali, uses a common currency, 
the CFA franc and has a common central Bank (BCEAO)* Following a 
co-operation agreement in 1962 France now goarantees the convertibility 
of the CFA franc into the French franc*
Even in British West Africa which was less closely knit to the metropolis,
the procoess of colonial penetration interrupted!
(ii) the colonial boundaries, arbitrary and imposed9 were far more 
rigid than the pre-oolonial ones)
(iii) the colonial authorities, eaoh within its own area of jurisdiction 
often achieved a strong interterritorial ties through the 
application of politico - economic integration policies, 
essentially for pragmatic reasons of administrative economy 
and convenience*
3. PeooloPlMtlon and the Operation of Centrifugal Forc«6.
Given the level of economic integration in West Africa prior to Indepen­
dence, one might have expected an unimpeded progress, even if slower, towards 
closer economic co-operation after the achievement of self-rule* But this has 
not happened*
11* Prior to 19U7 the West African Produce Control Board handled the marketing 
and management of British Vest Africa9s agricultural products* Thereafter, 
however, national Marketing boards, whioh were set up, took over and 
shared out assets of the West African Produce Control board*
establishment of research institutes and the organisation of common services 
and marketing boards also operated on interterritorial basis* '
What therefore follows from the foregoing account can be summarised thusi
, « r  ' n r(l) pre-colonial West Afrioa saw a measure of civilization, and by
: . ' \ ... / '  - .
the 19th century there was an evident trend towards thi struc-
\
tlon of larger and mors effectively centralised communities, whioh
Evan on a continental scale, the study of economic integration between
African states since the end of colonial rule, with few exceptions, has been
the study of distintegration rather than integration* In spite of the present
state of affairs, there is almost a staggering unanimity of views among
African governments, in principle, on ths urgent need for none form of close
economic co-operation as exemplified in speeches, conferences and resolutions*
However, that has been appearance rather than substance*
One may now ask what the forces are that have encouraged distintegration
in Vest Africa? In particular, can ths identification of these obstacles to
integration lead to their removal? A cursory survey of the recent history
of integration in West Africa, whioh have been discussed above, would help
one to Identify some of the problems*
One of the most important factors here seems to centre around the
question of national sovereignty* The present cadre of African leaders, who
fought for independence, fought and won on the basis of nation state and
on the right of each country to govern itself* Hence there was a strong
feeling among the African nationalists that political and economic salvation
lay within the independent nation state. Hr* Nkrumah's popular slogan* "Seek
ye first the political kingdom", seems, if only controversial, to have
reflected the mood of the bulk of African leadership at the eve of independence*
See G*K* Hellelner, "The Fiscal Role of the Marketing Boards in Higerlan 
Economic Development 191*7-61" in E*H, Vhetham et al (ed)* Readings in the 
Appllad Boopoaloa of Africa. C.U.P. 1967
Whereas integration involves a oonscious surrender or at least pooling of a
measure of national sovereignty in policy formulation and execution, it was
therefore not hard to see how the consciousness of newly won independence
exerted strong influence on the general approach to economic integration*
Indeed, aside from the issue of whether economic integration holds out the
promise of improving the viability and performance of each territorial economy,
the key question insofar as the countries under examination is concerned, is
that of reconciling themselves to the economic (real or apparent) sacrifice
of part or all of WSv sovereignty - the degree of sacrifice being a function
of the kind of market arrangement* Thus the present weakening of economic
tie8 is justified on the grounds that political power, at independence, was
transferred to the territorial, not the supranational units - so maintaining
the status quo after independence was a natural corollary*
Furthermore, the post-independence trend towards disintegration has been
12rationalised on the grounds that unity under colonial rule was illusory •
As Hazlewood succinctly put its "it was a unity imposed from outside for the
administrative convenience of the colonial power - it was a unity of Europe
in Africa, reflecting the hegemony of the metropolitan country over its
various colonies* It was not to be expected that, with the removal of Europe
13from the scence, the unity would necessarily continue*" Although this is 
generally true, there is another side to the coin* In the case of French West 
Africa, for example, the sequence of measures introduced by the French government 
12# Arthur Hazl£wood (ed), African Integration and Disintegration 0*TJ*P*,
1967, P. 3 
13* Ibid.
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long before independence had a dismantling effect on the integration that ha* 
been established between the French Colonies*
The French Union was created under the 191*6 constitution of the French 
Republic which established territorial councils in the Federation of French 
West Africa (AOF) as well as in French Equatorial Africa (AfF)* The year 
1952 saw the transformation of these territorial councils into Assemblies of 
a political nature* This process was carried further with the establishment 
of universal suffrage under the loi-cadre of 1956, and a redistribution of 
power in favour of the territories!*4 Two years later the territories were 
asked to choose between three alternatives, naaelyi complete independence, 
independence within the French community or absorption as a Department of 
France* But although only Guinea opted for oo >pleire independence, all the 
others who chose independence within the community were granted full indepen­
dence by a stroke of pen in 1960* It cannot therefore be persuasively argued 
that independence was the only cause of disintegration. It was rather more 
of the effect than the cause*
Colonial critics tend to see in this chain of events leading up to
independence as the "colonial plot" or what Hodgkin calls "false decoloni- 
15nation". They argue that the process of disaggregation and fragmentation
prior to independence was a tactical move and clearly accords with the general
interests of the western powers* According to this view the present politico—
ffiggrephlq ga£ gf Afylpaj. .p.8 & raqgalc pf r»ettir etat*3 extremely Yolnerufclo to 
11** A* Hazlewood, Ibid* P.3U0
15‘ *' H* Gr80n *“d A88O0iato» Pnltr or Porertr?.
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external pressures, preserves the basic relationship of western dominance and 
African dependence by other means, after the transfer of formal political power* 
Again, the above statement seems to tell only half the story* It must be 
emphasized in no uncertain terms that the pressure for self-rule from African 
nationalists was an irresistible force and that the level of political aware­
ness varied from one territory to another hence different territories were 
ready for independence at different times* To this extent it could be said 
that the colonial authorities were motivated by the desire to ensure that 
independence was handed over to the right people at the right time and that they 
merely responded to this urge*
The doubts surrounding the net^ benefits from integration in LDCfs bring us 
to the second point* The apriori gains arising out of market integration , 
notwithstanding, it can be contended that, as a strategy of economic development, 
customs unions do not yield very large net benefits to the Joint economic area 
in the early years* While the qualification of net gains might be diffioult, 
and even contentious, it would seem that, generally, the net contributions from 
market integration to the economic development of Africa in the foreseable 
future are likely to be marginal* Green and Associate make the bold genera­
lization that "it seems highly unlikely that the net present benefit from any 
existing structure of African economic integration exceeds 1-2% of domestic
16* Ibid*Even the encouragement of such groupings and associations as the West 
African Customs Union, the Coneeil de L’Entente, OCAM or the EEC-Associa- 
teship by the West is regarded as not inconsistent with the neo-colonialist 
theory so long as their objectives are limited and in safe western leading- 
strings*
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17products", ' This no doubt steins from the structural imbalance of the 
economies of Africa which limits the volume of tradeable goods among African 
States, It may well be that, in spite of the large allocation of top level 
political, civil service, academic, and research time now directed to market 
integration studies in LDCs, the enchantment generated by the subject has 
only been equalled by the degree of caution with which African countries have, 
in reality, approached it.
The question of marginal net gains is often exacerbated by the problem of 
probable or real uneven distribution. For while the logic of specialization and 
of economies of scale centres on the general increase of welfare of the members 
of a free-trade community, the theory has no universally acceptable machanism 
for ensuring the equitable distribution of the welfare gains among the indivi­
dual members. There are, however, at least, two common distribution devices for 
tackling this problems the mechanism of fiscal transfers and the so-called 
"managed" specialization which details in form of a legislative instrument the 
formulas for equitable distribution of benefits. The trouble with these tools 
is that they tend to offer less than what the weaker eoonomies want - "revocable 
subsides" and licences for some new regionally-conceived industries instead of 
strategic growth points, though the former, under certain circumstances, could 
create linkages comparable to the latter. At the same time they hold back the
thrust of, and ask too much and expect a missionary spirit from, the relatively 
17* R*H, Green, et al. Economic Co-operation in Africai Retrospect and
Prospect, 0,U,P, 19^7* P,29, See also P, Robson, Economic Integration in 
Africa, Allen A Unwin Limited, London, 1968, P,91* Professor Robson in 
quantifying the contribution of integration in the economic development of 
the three members of the East African Economic Ce«nntinity'i(Kenya, Tanzania,
& Uganda) found that between 1965-70 the gains from integration would only 
imply an improvement in the regions annual growth of GUP of 0,2& over the 
period.
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richer countries which can only make limited sacrifices at the present stage 
of their development*
It *as on this issue of unsatisfactory distribution strategy that the 
West African Customs Union virtually disintegrated* The Ivory Coast, with 
about half of the regions exports and tax revenue but only a fourth of its 
imports and total expenditures, was unwilling to continue subsidizing the 
weaker economies, expeeially that of Senegal* It sought rapid industrial 
expansion and markets for its industrial sector* It therefore organised the 
Entente which excludes Senegal* Even so the less developed Entente members 
wish to have a lee-way in promoting a number of consumer goods industries to 
replace imports from their richer neighbours. Inability to realise this 
aspiration increased disillusionment and chances of withdrawal. The last 
African Economic Community faced the threat of disintegration between 1961* 
and 1965 for similar reasons but in the end wise counsel prevailed and the 
reshaped community under the 1967 treaty tried to minimise the sacrifices of 
individual members* •
However, the wishes of individual eonntries apart, the institution of 
checks and balances in a common market cannot be avoided if it were to survive 
to the mutual advantage of all*
Finally, another factor that might have affected the attitude of post-inde­
pendence Africa towards integration is the problem of institutional framework 
building. The establishment of a competent administrative body, flexible and 
devoted, whose function would be to ensure the equitable distribution of gains 
from customs union and to safeguard, sometimes conflicting, national interests 
is not very easy in the present technical conditions of Africa*
There is also a political fact to the matter* Again, consider the EAEC
- 1U -
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case, Under the ^^6^ Treaty, the three heads of state assisted by ministers
constitute the principal executive authority of the community* All bills and
annual budgets must receive the assent of all the three heads of state before
they are executed* This implies a considerable range of mutual and political
understanding txmorvc^  the three, especially with respeot to their foreign
policies in order to avert disruptive inter-state hostilities* In faot, the
recent coup in Uganda and the refusal of President Nyerere of Tanzinia to
recognise the new Ugandan regime of Idi Amin whioh in turn held up the passage
of the 1971-7? annual budget once more underlines the need for political
understanding amongst common market countries.
Needless to say that in one significant sense economic integration is in
itself a political issue* Economic integration is an aspect of the global
18strategy of economic development which is essentially a political goal. Thus
• ' i f-#'  * A A 1 ^ • i ' • 4 i t -v  'ip ’ ^  -V * .“* Hm v * A*** 4* "-' . ,■ t-*-1 v, f ^ \ * J ij; . r< t
the political or ideological philo5byid.es of the new states of Africa are 
likely, directly or indirectly, to shed some effect on their long-term economic 
policies*
On the whole, none of these barriers to integration is insuperable, given 
a genuine burning desire and political goodwill to overcome them.
18* See David Wall, Export Prospects for South of the Sahara, African Affairs* 
Vol. 68 Mo. 270* Jan. 1969.
j
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U. THB nsnKITIOM AKP BATIOKAtE OF IHTBGBATIOII
(i) THE CONCEPT.
"Integration" in ordinary usage seems unification or putting parts
together into a whole# In economic literature the term "economic integration"
is some times hard to pin down to a precise definition. 3ome authors include
social integration in their conceptualization! others define Integration from
static or dynamic standpoints* Prom the static point of view integration is
considered as a state of affairs vfoich would obtain, at the end of a fairly
long process leading to the complete merger of national Identities* The
dynamic view, on the other hand, sees integration as a process by which
discriminations existing along national borders are progressively removed
between two or more countries* Even further afield there are other definitions
which view integration as the mere existence of some measure of trade relatione
19between independent national economies*
Por the purpose of this study we intend to adopt the dynamic concept of
integration - though in the long run the tdge between the static-dynamic
dichotomy is blurred* In this sense, our operational definition 4f integration
is the gradual but steady process of complete tariff disarmament along side
with dthcr barriers to trade between the contracting parties to their mutual
advantage* This seeu& to us to be the mont feasible and achievable objective
19* Bela Balassa: "Towards a Theory of Economic Integration", Kvklos. No, 1
(1961) PP* 1-5« This at'Vi(Jw>£ oontains a critical survey of these 
definitions as 'well as useful references- indeed a really good appraisal*
of market integration in to-day's West Africa* A workable pattern of integration 
has to be realistic and pragmatic* It should embrace neither the doctrinaire 
attitude of the 1960a nor demand political union as a precondition for ecanomlo 
integration*^0
Indeed9 the first stage of integration which is much oloser to economic 
co-operation - a process of stage-by-stage lowering of tariff and other barriers 
to trade - seems a convenient starting point, politically and otherwise, for 
emergent LDCs* But, when and if, there is an uninterrupted progress towards 
the completion of the integration process, then the static concept could be 
applied* So in the West African context we are primarily concerned with the 
"integration path" whioh ultimately leads to the "integration goal" when every­
thing would be static and "dead" and not the other way round*
Furthermore, there is one more conceptual aspect of integration whioh should 
be put in proper perspective* The econoale sl/nifloanee of national borders is 
that they introduce discontinuities in the flows of commodities and factors of 
production* And it is these discontinuities which actually lead to effeotive 
discrimination in the economic sphere* But than the discriminatory tariff walls 
axe dismantled obstacles to intra-zonal trade will be lessened or even completely 
removed* However the degree of free movement of goods and factors would be a 
function of the stage of integration* In classifying the stages of integration,
O g  gajor oatoCTrlgatlons ar» uewlly wade.21______________________________
20* Of course, eoonomlo integration cannot operate in a political vacuum* In 
fact, a good many integration movements could have been primarily politi­
cally inspired* Also apart from ths interdependence between politics and 
economics, economic integration is not an end by Itself; it is a means to 
an end and the end is essentially a political goal* 2v*n so whilst, a 
successful integration would require effeotive political understanding and 
goodwill among its members, complete political unity need not be a alne 
qua non especially in the early phases of economlo integration*
21* Bela Balassa, Ibid*
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They includes
(i) the free trade area, whioh implies the removal of quantative 
restrictions and customs tariffs;
(ii) the customs union, which unifies the tariff of the countries 
within the area against outsiders;
(iii) the common market, where all restrictions on factor movements 
within the area are abolished;
(iv) the economic union, where economlo, monetary, fiscal, social 
and counter-cyclical policies are to some extent harmonised;
(v) the supemational union, where the respective governments
abandon completely their sovereignty over the policies listed 
above and a supemational authority issues binding decisions*
Like most classifications, these are somewhat arbitrary* Some forms of 
market integration may well fall within these categories* The first three 
stages concern mainly trade and factor integration but more often than not 
such measures require a complementary payments arrangement to make them work* 
And beginners in the field of integration usually start somewhere between 
the first two with or without some elements of the third category* West Africa 
squarely falls within the beginners class* The last two stages which are very 
advanced would have very little chances in most LDCs for a start*
Although these forms of integration mentioned above represent varying 
degrees of economic integration, they nevertheless share two basic characteri­
stics* First, they promote expanded intrazonal specialization and exchange 
through the reduction or elimination of trade restrictions among the union 
members; secondly they entail discrimination of one kind or another against 
non-member countries*
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(ii) THE RATIONALE OF INTEGRATION.
The driving force behind the widespread interest for economic integration 
in Africa is two-fold* The first motive is political* As noted earlier, 
colonialism in Africa left behind it a geopolitical configuration of divisions 
and fragmentations* Many of the new African states, although nominally 
independent, were so small and weak both politically and economically that they 
had very little prospect of rapid economic development on their own* This 
also made them extremely vulnerable to external pressures, which worked to 
perpetuate African dependence upon foreign powers* There was therefore a 
generally inspired feeling in Africa during the 19608 to free the Continent 
from its external dependence and to provide the safeguards and benefits of
interdependence through the achievement of economic integration of one kind on
22another*
The second, and by far more fundamental reason is economic* Given the 
micro-states and the export-oriented, lop-sided, poor economic structures 
inherited from the colonial regime, which needed reconstruction, integration was 
seen as a means of helping to overcome the disadvantages of small size and of 
making possible a greater rate of balanced economic growth and development* As 
the BN Committee for Development Planning put iti
22* At the more economlo level, regional economlo co-operation including 
inter-governmental organisations, on which the SCA has been on the 
vanguard, has been encouraged* But at the more ldeologioal plane, if 
only extreme, there was the Pan-African movement which had as Its goal 
continental government of United Africa* Achievement on both counts 
however have been minimal* See C* Legum (ed) Africa. Handbook, 1969*
P.5U1
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"The creation of unified multinational markets would make possible
faster expansion and greater economic diversification of the African
economy and particularly of its industry. It would also enhance
productive efficiency by permitting increased specialization and the
operation of industries on a more economic scale* Further, it would
help in overcoming barriers to development appearing in foreign
trade with the developed parts of the world*1*
To this one might add that wider markets, which integration is bound to bring
about, would, ceteris paribusf attract more foreign capital and create more
employment opportunities*
Thus it could be said, in a nutshell, that the key rationale of economic
integration in Africa to-day is to accelerate balance^growth in the partner
countries - whether in the short or in the long-run. Therefore, freeing trade
or factor movements is not an end in itself but a means to reach higher levels
of output* Indeed, the judgement on the benefits of the integration prooess
has to depend on whether, on balance, the area's growth rate is faster than
it would otherwise be or not. As already indicated, there is very little
doubt that the marginal growth contribution whioh integration holds out for
LDCs in the forseeable future underlines the cautious optimism with whioh most
African governments have so far approached economic integration issues*
Of course, it all depends on the future of the industrial sector in Africa*
Ironically enough^one of the major objective functions of central planners in
23* UN* Economic Co-operation and Inte gration in Africa,
Three Case Studies, New York, 1969, P. (iii) (ST/ECA/09).
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sLDCs is the expansion ef the indujfcrial sector, a policy which would have 
suggested a much a#re positive attitude to imtegratioa than the ease appears 
to he om the African eoatiaeat at the nememt.
5. Th> Objectlv »f the Studr.
The aim of the pro seat Ais aot to establish a gramdoise blueprint for a 
free trade area or customs union in Vest Africa. If anything, the objective 
is to assess the real gains or losses, resulting fron integration based on 
existing but under-utilised industries in vhieh economies of scale exist, 
which would justify any arrangement for trade liberalisation in the products of 
such undustries amongst the Central Vest African States of Ghana, Togo, Dahomey, 
Ivory Coast, Niger and Upper Volta. In order to identify, indeed to quantify 
the real gains fron integration, an estimate of the increase in intra-regiemal 
trade flows arising out of the integratien-indueed trade liberalisation amongst 
the six would bo made with a view to reaching a policy eonolusion that might 
be helpful in framing future policy. The study will also examine the implica­
tions for public revenues of multilateral tariff disarmament in the area.
Trade in manufactured goods amongst the six states in at present of minute 
proportions. Despite this, economic development within the "region” has taken 
place in a geographical uneven manner and integration is bound to exaggerate 
this tendency. An aspeot of our study will therefore bo devoted to the 
question of equitable balance of gains fron integration. In a nutshell, it 
is the primary objective of this study to explore on the basis of the technique 
of evaluation (explained elsewhere) employed and the industries studied what 
possibilities and problems there are for economic integration in
4
Vest Africa anacmcj the countries under review* Indeedv we seek to answer the 
question! Bo the aforementioned six states stand to gain from economic 
co-operation and if so» how can these gains be equitably distributed among them?
In view of the necessarily limited number of industries on whioh this study is 
empirically based, however, our findings, whioh is intended to be indicative, 
can be treated as provisional pending a wider study of old but potential
\ . - # \ .-■'ft** ’• , . . %. v , t,\ ' . ' * /"> , kft . \ :
integration industries in the area*
6# The Choice of Integration Candidates in Vest Africa*
One of the problems one faoes in a study of this nature is the choice of 
integration candidates* What factors should guide one in selecting the 
economies to be considered for integration?
Bike building a cathedral in the Middle Ages, the process of any fruitful 
eoonomlo co-operation requires hard work, long-term planning and persistent 
effort on part of the prospective members* There are no ready-made, simple 
solutions* Although the ECA?‘; wishes to see the emergence of a Vest African 
economlo oonummlty embracing all the 11* states of the sub-region, this, for 
political reasons, has not proved very feasible* In selecting and considering 
Ghana and the Hhtents States as the possible nucleus for a wider economic 
co-operation in Vest Africa we have been influenced by a number of factors*
Firstly, there is the advantage of a long tradition of eoonoxaic co-operation* 
As we shall see later the Entente States were formerly French colonial
terrltorlea and they inherited not only cordon external tariffs and fiscal___
21** With the exception of the vhite-ruled countries South of Zambesi river, 
the BN Economic commission for Africa divides up Africa into four sub­
regions and hopes to facilitate and indeed accelerate economic integration 
on a continent-wide basis by encouraging effective and purposeful 
co-operation in each sub-region* The countries comprising each subregion 
ares-
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systems and administrations but also formed the Conseil Be L*Entente at the 
eve of independence in 1959 in order to continue to enjoy the benefits of 
economic co-operation* They therefore already possess an institutional 
framework and administrative machinery for economic co-operation which could 
be tapped in reshaping and enlarging the existing body. It is often difficult 
to see how a multi-national economic community can come into being without 
several years of preparation and the achievement of specific objectives 
consistent with the over-all aim of integration. Even in Europe the formation 
of the EEC, which has prove a success story, was preceded by a number of 
co-operative endeavours, such as the Iron and Steel Community, the Coal 
Community, the Benelux Customs union, and so on.
Economic expediency and geographical continguity point to the desirability 
for the inclusion of Ghana in the nenlargedw Entente. Except for the southern
coastal strip, Ghana is surrounded by the Entente States. Bounded to the East
by Togo, to the North by Upper Volta and to the West by Ivory Coast; Ghana 
because of the differentials, has been caught up in the network of smuggling 
on both sides of its border.
North Africat Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia and
United Arab Republic.
West Africat Dahomey, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Liberia,
Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Seneral, Siena Leone, 
Togo and Upper Volta
Eastern Africat Botswana, Burundi, Ethiopia Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar,
Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Somalia, Uganda, Tanzania
and Zambia.
Central Africat Cameroon, Central African Repulic, Congo (B), Congo (K)
(Zaire Rep.) Chad, Gabon.
See UN ECA, Resolution 11*2 (VII), 7th Session, 1965
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By joining the existing Entente to remove the artificial barriers to
in tra-regional trade, Ghana would be saving itself not only the revenue it
loses annualy through smuggling but would bo in a position to increase its
volume of trade with Its Neighbours. To think that effective economic
co-operation can take place abruptly between countries in international
co-operation without a long period of gestation would be painfully unrealistic.
Secondly, economic integration calls for a good deal of political
goodwill among its members. The Entente seems to possess this political
goodwill. Having survived the first trying decade, however minimal its
achievements, the Entente has come to stay. It may be true that ecsnonlo
integration requires a certain amount of direct surrender of political
authority to the supreme decision-making body of a given economic community*
It is also true that the present inheritors #f political power in West
Africa - If not Africa as a whole - have an entrenched interest in n—
the authorities and boundaries of the national states, even whore individual
independent states can hardly ever satisfy their econonic expectations within
the natiom\boundaries they have inherited.However, it is idealistic to
regard political unity as an indispensable precondition for economic
co-operation in the circumstances of West Africa. It just oaxrnst work.
The experiences of the early 1960*8 show that this dootorinaire approach
25* The tiny state of Gambia is a case in point. Virtually sorrounded
by Senegal, Gambia, whioh has very little chances of developing on its 
own has so far rejected any form of integration with Senegal whioh might 
threaten or jeopardise its political independence.
which captured the imagination of the leaders of the so-called Casablanca 
group of countries was at best un&chleveable and at worst a mere pipe dream* 
Provided prospective members of an economic community are willing to 
delegate some political functions to the decision-making authority of the 
economic community which it might need to oarry out its funotions effectively! 
political union need not precede economic union at least in the early stage 
of co-operation. Within the Entente there is effeotive political unders­
tanding to permit fruitful economic co-operation. Ghana, for its part, though 
an anglpphone state, has developed a new bond of political friendship with 
ths Entente states. During the hey-days of Nkrumah regime relations between 
Ghana and its Ifatente neighbours were at their lowest ebb hut since the over­
throw of the radical regime in 1?66 the subsequent governments of Ghana had 
taken practical steps to normalise relations with the Entente states. In 
fact, Ghana and the Entente members have had a number of meeting at the 
hipest official level to discuss matters relating to economic co-operation.
Thus the present Btate of political relations among the six can be said
to be conducive to effective economic co-operation.
Thirdly, there is the problem of external influences to contend with. The 
granting of political independence did not fundamentally alter the eoonomic 
relationships between West African countries and their former colonial mastersf 
this is particularly true of France and her former colonies.
Because of West Affioa's different Social and political histoxy it faces
different sets of external influences and orientations and is subject to the 
8trains and stresses of external economlo and political pressures arising
therefson. It would bo difficult to quantify the degree of the so influences or 
oven their effectiveness hut fov would deny their existence* Of particular 
mention here is the relationship between the SEC and the Asseoiate states of 
Vest Africa. All the Trench West African countries except Guinea are associated 
with the SBC under the Yaounde Convention. Although the Convention does net 
debar the Associates they cannot alter their customs duties or charges without 
submitting the proposed measures and methods of applying thorn to the Association 
Council. ^  What this means in effect is that if the Vest African Associates 
want to form a customs union with ether African countries9 the consent and 
concurrence of the SEC with respeot to tariff changes must be sought. This 
imposes a limitation on the freedom of the Associates.
Even so with respeot to the six countries under review external influences 
axe likely to be a source of encouragement rather than a hinderanoe. All the 
Entente member states are former Trench eelonles and Trance is bound by its 
1961 Treaty with the Bntente to protect and fester the essential interests of 
the organisation. Although Ghana is neither a former Trench territory nor a
francophone state 9 yet the Trench government has lately shown a considerable
27interest in the eoonemio development of Ghana 1 and is therefore likely to 
take a permissive view of Ghana's accession to the firtente9 a move whioh would 
have a good chance of approval both by British and American governments.
26. C.ny«ition of Aaaoolatlon b«t.w»n th» _^g_and the Afelq
states g.osoclated with that jonnunity and Annexed Documents. 29th July9 (16 
16(2) and Protocol Be. 2,3(4). This has new been superseded by the Lome
Convention (see chapter 2).
27. It is known that the Trench government actively supports the recent studies 
aimed at establishing oleser economic oe-operation between Ghana and ths Bntente 
BtateSf In view of the close polltieo^ecomomic relations between Tronog and the 
Bntente States, the former exercises great influence ever the latter. Mere 
importantly, Trance has tacitly encouraged Togo and Dahomey to utilise Ghana's 
excess power at Akosombo Dan. See £conoaic duivajy, 19^9t P.80. Also see the 
Quarterly Bovlew, Bntente Afrlcaine. He. 6. March 19711 8-9*
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Partly because investors supported by the latter would be producing and selling 
to a larger market, and partly because they are not opposed to the idea of 
integration in principle in this region*
Fourthly, some emphasis is often placed on economies in similar levels 
of development in choosing integration candidates* Perhaps, the main justi­
fication for this emphasis derives from the desire to avoid the polarization 
of development and its oummulative effects in any part of an integrated market* 
Inevitably the formation of "laisser-faire" customs unions would set the 
market mechanism to work in a desequallzing manner* Because the disequalizing 
forces are likely to be sufficiently powerful for such unions to be unacceptable 
to the weaker countries, the hope for economic integrations appears to lie with 
"regulated" integration in which the gains can be seen to be not only large 
but in which an acceptable strategy of distribution of the benefits has been 
achieved*
In the context of the Entente-Ghaaa situation we envisage the emergence 
of a regulated union that would take adequate measures to ensure that the loss 
of revenues by, and the polarization of development in, some members of the 
union are kept within tolerable limits* Regulatory machinery for equitable 
distribution of the gains and losses arising from integration will definitely 
take into account the differences in the levels of development that might exist 
between the six countries under consideration*
The six share many common basic structural characteristics of underdeve­
lopment, although this is not the same thing as saying that the level of 
economic development as measured by per oapita output or income is everywhere 
the same*
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In terms of CNP per capita, in itself dubious index of development, the area 
would fall under three categories* Countries in the first category (ivory 
Coast and Ghana) have each a per oapita income of US #200 or more) the second 
group (Togo) has a per capita of ITS #100 or more whilst the poorest group has 
US #50 or more each* Beyond the disparity in per capita income levels there 
is also the faot that the majority of existing industries are to be found in 
the two most highly populated coastal countries, the Ivory Coast and Ghana*
In 1967 the Entente had a total trade turnover of around US #850 million* Of
this Ivory Coast accounted for 80& of the exports and 6($ of the imports* So
there are already disparities in economic development within the region*
But this is both the source of weakness and strength of ths case for 
economic integration in the region* By applying the appropriate distribution 
formulae a more even development can be achieved* It is of course important 
to realise that the quest for equality can be pushed too far* Inequalities 
within an economic grouping may not be solely caused by union) national 
characteristics and work habits do play some part* In fact, too determined 
a pursuit of equality in the distribution of gains within the union could 
result in generally slower rate of growth for the entire body*
Furthermore, it might be that integration is easier among many than
cxmOY\£j few states* In a larger group, the strains of integration can be 
more widely distributed and there is not the oonoentration of discontents that 
is probable in a union of ; very few states, although a larger union is not 
necessarily easier to form than a smaller one* Thus given the present set-up 
of the Entente, the other members other than Ivory Coast would want Ghana in 
as a counter-weight against the predominance of Ivory Coast since Ghana has a
manufacturing sector comparable to that of the Ivory Coast*
From the foregoing we can see that the criterion of similarity in the 
level of economic development, despite its merits can hardly be rigidly applied 
to Central Vest Africa in the selection of integration candidates* And in 
spite of the fact that the Entente does not conform to this criterion, it 
nevertheless has a good chance of being the ultimate building blook of a West 
African Economic Community.
Finally, the thorniest single problem in selecting the prospective 
members of a customs union relates to the availability of date for quantitative 
analysis* For unless the right type of data can be obtained in the right 
amount, it would be dlffloult to embark on a quantitative estimate of the 
possible effects of integration - both in the priori and a posteriori senses*
A
Although the paucity of data in most parts of the liDC9s is nothing new some 
areas are better than others* A preliminary investigation with respect to 
the availability of data for the present study is quite encouraging*
A considerable amount of information is obtainable, among others from 
souroes in Acora and Abldjah* And where data are lacking proxies in form of 
estimates might be used* On the whole it is important to remember that the 
geographical limitation of the Audy to cover six countries does not in any 
way oonfliot with the broader aims of economlo co-operation in Vest Africa) 
indeed, it is hoped that this study will make some sort of positive contri­
bution to the idea* In more ways than one, the geographical limitation was 
neoessary in order to keep the study within manageable dimensions and because, 
a priori, the opportunities for co-operation in development amongst the six 
states appear to be more a a d  easier to realise in the fairly near future than 
would be the case with a larger or more widespread group of countries like
the UDEAO or even with a smaller group without a tradition of economic 
co-operation. Even so it is intended that the study will draw attention to 
the possibility, or even necessity, of intergovernmental co-operation 
between the six and non-members.
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CHAPTER TWO
ECONOMIC SETTING AND DEVELOPMENT PERSBBCTIYSS 
The introductory chapter has tried to develop a historical link to this 
study, which in the present chapter focuseB on the “basic facts about the 
economic background of the West African sub-region. Our subject is Eoonomic 
Integration between Ghana and the Entente States. But to acquire, at the 
onset, a realistic appreciation of the opportunities, problems and prospects 
of economic integration in the aforementioned six states, one has to examine 
the economic setting, development perspectives and recent economic and 
political developments in the entire sub-region which have immediate bearings 
on economic co-operation.
1* RESOURCE ENDQVTONT 
West Africa is a vast region, as far as mere physical size goes and the 
fourteen countries^ of the subregion have a combined population of about 
108 million spread over an area of 6 million square kilometres (2,380,000 
square miles)* In spite of this size of population (about J of All Africa), 
the average density of the region is a mere 22 persons per square kilometre*
Even so the mean figure conceals the wide variations in local and national
2densities • On the international scale the density of population varies from 
one person per sq* km* (Mauritania) to 69 persons per sq* km* (in Nigeria) 
(Table 2*1)
1* The fourteen countries of the sub-region mentioned earlier are (by ECA 
definition)* Dahomey Gambia, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, 
Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo and Upper Volta* See the "Symposium of 
West African Integration"* In the Nigerian Journal of Eoonomic and Social 
Studies. Vol. 5 No* 1 March, 19^3, pp. 9-77*
2* The three land-locked countries, Mali, Niger and Upper Volta, together 
with Mkuritania, account for over 60% of the total area
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TABLE 2*1
BASIC ECONOMIC DATA
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DAHOMEY 2.6 2.8 nr 113 23 175.9 68-76 2.6 ’ 75 12 20
r
31 21,000
-------
1557.5
GAMBIA o.u 2.1* 10 ltO 26.it 66 n.a n.a 12 n.a n.a 16,000 261*0.0
GHANA 8.6 2.6 239 36 2071.0 21*1 2.6 61 29 25 n.a 12,000 8677.8
GUINEA 3.8 2.2 2i*6 15 232.7b 61 n.a 80 20 10 50 21,000 91*5.9
IVORY COAST U.1 2.3 322 13 t m . 5 286 8 n.a 25 20 1*9 19,000 361*. 6
LIBERIA 1 .1 2.9 111 10 300.3 273 n.a 75 n.a 5-10 n.a 11,000 2705. 1*
MALI It* 8 3.1 1202 h 295.0° 61 n.a n.a 10 5 28 1*0,000 21*5.1*
MAURITANIA 1.1 2.2 1806 1 169.U 15U 6 n.A n.a 1 -5 9 27,000 156.0
NIGER 3.9 2.7 1267 3 283.5 73t*90 8 95 5 5 10 65,000 223.7
NIGERIA 63.8 2.0 92it 69 1092.0 61*.—80 5.5 69 25 20 35 3i»,000 1*1*28.6
SENEGAL 3.7 2.7 196 19 703.6 190 It. 6 85 27 5 1*0 20,000 3589.8
SIERRA LEONE 2.5 1 .5 72 3U 300.0 120 n.a 80 11 10 n*& 19,000 8823.5
TOGO 1.8 2.6 57 32 208.6 115 6 n.a 17 5-10 1*2 31*, 000 3659.6
UPPER VOLTA t 5-3l
27Uj 18 I88 .1bi39-52 ^3*L,
9Ua : ’I 8 I9.5 j 63,000 *------- .* 686.5 ■ — "•—
NOTE* a = including livestock
b = figure is for 1962 
c = figure is for 196l*/65 
d = Defined as GNP per unit of area*
SOURCES: (i) UN*, Population Estimates (Map no* 1800 Rev* 2) May, 1970.
(ii) Plessz, Problems and Prospects of Economic Integration in 
West Africa*
(iii) P, Robson, Economic Integration in Africa (pp 61*-65)
(iv<) Legum (ed.) Africa Handbook*
(v) Legum (ed*) Africa Contemporary Reoord, 1968-69*
(vi) UN*, Economic Bulletin for Africa, Vol. V., 1965*
(vii) IMF, Surveys of African Economies, Washington D.C., 1970 
(viii) Jeune Afrique, Africa, 1971*
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Bren with adjacent territories there are groat constrasta* Coupare in 
this raspoet Niger's density of 3 persons per sq* kn* with the figure for 
Nigeria* To a loaaer extent the sane is true ef Liberia with its 10 persons 
per sq* kn* compared to Sierra Leone whioh has ewer 30 persons per sq* kn*
Within national borders the general characteristic feature of uneven population 
distribution pervades* Consider that whilst NortherrlHigerla has few persons 
per sq* kn* the Ibo heartland of the Bast has eae of the highest densities on 
the African oontinont*
Partly because of the lack of water in many parts ef the reglen and partly 
because of the over-concentratien of development projects In the Southern Urban 
Centres, which attracted rural drifters, one can find extremely high population 
densities in some areas of the South and very low ones In the North* A second 
reason, whioh centres store on historical and sooiologio&l than geographic and 
econoaio faotors, oan bo adduced to explain the irrational pattern ef population 
distribution in West Africa* The ora of slave trade, discussed in the previeus 
chapter, and the in ter-tribal warfare which it inspired mist have resulted 
in the depopulation of large areas and in the development of high concentrations 
of population in other relatively inaccessible districts* This tendency was 
reinforced by later developments*
but contain only 11# of the population* It nay bo noted that the 11* countries 
ef Bast Africa which have the sane size (6 million sq* kn*) as West Afrioa and 
a combined population of 70 million have lover densities still* Of course, 
Afrida as a whole is the most sparsely populated regloa In the world, apart 
from Antarctica and Oceania* With only of the vorldls population Afrioa has 
about a quarter of the world's land surface* Thus pookets of population 
concentrations derive largely from history and sociology rather than from the 
stark land/nan ratio that presses on moat of Asia today*
Although the establishment of the most important population concentrations 
took root before the colonial conquest, the institution of common tribal owner­
ship of land acted as a brake on large-soAle migrations of people to other less 
densely populated tribal lands without a recourse to war. When the tribal warfare 
finally disappeared, however, following the consolidation of colonial conquest, 
the arbitrary "sharing out" of the region by different European nations and the 
introduction of different national lavs and systems with respeot to trade and 
movement of labour doomed any future hope of mass redistribution of population, 
through migration, to failure, Hemoe this problem remains and as we shall see 
later in this study the question (together with its implication) of migrant 
workers from the landlocked to the Coastal countries has important bearings on 
economic co-operation in West Africa.
In terms of agricultural rdsources, the vast span of the Subregion provides 
arable land of varying degrees of fertility, ranging fron the rich rain forest 
belt in the South to the poor and dry, semi-desert soil in the North. Lying 
within longitudes 20° West and 1?° East, and Latitudes 17° North and 10° South, 
the most striking features of the subregion are its great diversity in ellmatle 
conditions and topography. It stretches from (over, 1,800 miles) the rain 
forest region on the coast to the landlocked Countries on the Saharan border. 
There is hardly an\J generally-aocepted geographical definition of West Africa.
The region is neatly separated, but some of the Southern and Eastern boundaries 
are less precise.
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However, for the purpose of this study the ECA definition referred to
3above is adopted .
In the area of primary agricultural production, West Afrioa contributes
about 72% of the cocoa entering world markets* Over 7^% of the volume of palm
kernels and over 32% of the volume of palm oil whioh enter into the world
commerce oome from the region. The bulk of groupdnuts entering international 
trade come from two countries in West Africa, Nigeria and Senegal. Other 
export products of the subregion includes coffee, cotton, hides and skin, 
phosphates, tobacco, rubber, timber, plywood, sesame, bananas, pineapples and 
kola nuts.
The endowment in other natural resources is equally impressive* Vast
reserves of hydro electric resources are present in certain parts of the region
(Table 2t2). Nigeria produces both coal and petroleum* In fact, the Nigerian
oil,industry is at present enjoying a boom. By 1969 production had reached an
all time height of 26.6 million tons. In the first quarter of 1970 it was 50%
higher than in the same period in 1969 and by July 1970 it was nearly 80% higher
than in July 19^9* The production level has now reached a new peak of over
2.3 million barrels per day and it is estimated to reach the three million
mark In 1980.14_____________________________________________________________
3. In a way to describe West Africa as a 'region1 le merely to use a geographical 
expression, and should not give the impression that it is already a single 
'international economic region* or 'market area'. The area has never been an 
integrated market.
U. ECA, Summaries of Eeonomlo Bata on Nigeria, 1970. Latest information shows 
that oil production as at end of September, 197U» has reached a new peak of 
2#33^#088 barrels per day and that the Nigerian National Oil Corporation in 
conjuction with Ashland Oil (Nigeria) Company have discovered oil South of Oguta 
Lake in East Central State. Already Petroleum revenue accounts for over 86% of 
federally collected revenue and this trend is likely to continue (See Barclays 
International Review. February, 197U* The Times. 11 June, 1973J West Afrioa, 9th 
September, 197ut Federal Republic of Nigeria, Main Report of the Public 
Service Review Commission, Lagos, September, 197U®
Table 2s2*
ELECTRICITY AMD GAS PRODUCTION IN VEST AFRICA
MILLION KWh MONTHLY AVERAGES OR CALENDAR MONTHS MILLION KWh
CHAD DAHOMEY TOGO GHANA IVORY COAST MALI NIGER NIGERIA SENEGAL
UPPER
VOLTA
1961* 1.31 1.66 0.98 1*0.7 15 .2 2.12 1 .21* 85.3 16.1* 1.55
1965 1 .1*8 1.80 1.07 1*1*. 0 18.3 2.33 1.37 98.1 17.0 1.71
1966 1.79 1.92 1.27 1*7.8 23.0 2.61* 1.61* 106.6 18.5 1.82
1967 2.16 1.9U 1.70 130.0 26.2 2.75 1.83 92.7 20.0 1.78
1968 2.56 2.20 1.60 215.7 31.0 2.90 2.10 92.1 20.6 1.90
1969 3.17 2.37 1.65 231.0 36.7 3.12 2.50 10l*.0 23.3 2.10
1970 3.1*9 2.79 1.88 21*3.3 1*3.1 3.31* 2.97 129.1 23.9 2.26
SOURCES UN, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, Deo* 1971
Other minerals axe also found In Vest Afrioa* Oyer 60^ of the world 
production of gold derive from Afrioa and the bulk of which outside South Africa 
come from West Africa; 93# of the world production of diamonds oome from Afrioa 
the bulk of which outside the Congo derive from West Afrioa* Over of world 
output of onianganese is produced in Afrioa with West Afrioa accounting for 3l$*
Also Vest Africa produces over 27% of the African output of iron ore* There are 
reasonable quantities of bauxite too* Extensive deposits of other minerals in 
ths region have been reported but the extent of these are not yet determinable* 
Thus it follows from the foregoing that the obstacle to integration and progress 
in West Afrioa cannot be seriously blamed only on sheer lack of natural resources* 
Obviously much of the problems are man-made*
2* BASIC STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS
In general, the level of development of any region is, to some degree, a 
function of the structure of its economy* And the level of development itself 
is reflected In the structure of the economy* West Africa, in the socio-economic 
sense, is typically an underdeveloped area, exhibiting the common characteristics 
of underdevelopment* Although these characteristics may be many, the three more 
Important ones upon which others relate with respect to integration are touched
- -  - -  -   —  -  - - - - - -  . .  .See R*H* Green and Seldman, "Unity or Poverty?" The Economlo a of 
Pan-Africanism, Penguin, 1968 p* 53* Also see R*A* Cox-George In The Nigerian 
Journal of Economic and Social Studies. Tol. S No. 1 Kftroh 1963
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First, the principal feature of the economic structure of Africa is the 
predominance of agriculture. West Africa is no exception.
The average share of agriculture, including livestock, forestry and fishing, 
in the total GDP of the subregion is between SO snd S5 percent^, though this 
average figure covers important variations among the countries. However, in 
three of them (Liberia, Senegal and Sierra Leone) the contribution of this 
sector is only of the order of 30 percent. The reason for this below average 
figure is not far to seek. Extractive activities are very important in Liberia 
and Sierra Leone whereas Senegal has one of the more developed industrial 
sectors of West Afrioa. There is also a second reasoni agriculture in 
Senegal is centred mainly on groundnut production, which is one of the victims 
of natural substitutes on the world market. The governments agriculture 
diversification programme, whatever its achievements, has not substantially 
altered the picture.
A further general feature of the agricultural sector, aside from its 
predominant position, relates to the dichotomy between the non-monetized or 
subsistence and monetized subsectors. In all the countries under discussion the 
non-monetized subsector acoounts on the average for more than half of agricul­
tural production, and for considerably more than half in most other LDCs.
Unlike the subsistance agriculture, the monetized subsector is usually smaller and 
is mainly oriented, directly or indirectly towards exports. Comparative data 
showing the importance of the non-monetized subsector is available for the Franco­
phone countries (Table 2s3)• The table clearly underscores the points made above.
- 38 -
6. UN ECA, Economic Co-operation and Integration. Three Case Studies, 1969 
(ST/BCA/109),>P. 50.
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T A B L E  2 i 3 
PROPORTION OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION IN GROSS DOMESTIC
PRODUCT AND NON-MONETIZED PRODUCTION IN AGRICULTURE
(percentage)
COUNTRY* YEAR
Share of Agricultural* 
Production in GDP
Proportion of 
Agricultural Productioi 
which is non-aonetized
SENEGAL 1961+ 28.9 1+U.3
IVORY COAST 1961+ 38.1+ 1+8.1+
TOGO 1963 51+. 5 51.2
MAURITANIA 1961 1+8 .1 6O.5
DAHOMEY 1959 52.2 61+.1+
MALI 1962 5 1.0 72.5
NIGER 1962 60.7 76.8
UPPER VOLTA 1961* 51.8 81+.1+
Note: a = Countries are ranked in increasing order of the proportion of
thdir agricultural production which is non-nonetiEed.
b = Including agriculture, livestock, fishing and forestry.
Source: UN. / Economic Commission for Africa\, Three Case Studies,
oT/ECa/109, 1969
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The second important structure of the West African economies is 
characterised by the weakness of the industrial sector. This of course follows 
from the first point. For the entire subregion, the share of the manufacturing 
sedtor in GBP, in 1966, was approximately 7$ (Table 2tU )» Again the share of 
this sector in total production for individual countries varies cjjiite conside­
rably. For three countries (Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone) the share of the 
industrial sector in GBP is around £>r above 3<$ (Table 215) • As already noted, 
thanks to the importance of extractive industries in these countries, There are 
also some other countries comp&rising Ghana, Ivory Coast and Senegal whose
manufacturing sectors are relatively more advanced than those of the rest.
\ -
Manufacturing has one notable characteristic in this regions it depends to a
7great extent on agricultural production. For almost all the countries, food 
processing accounts for between 60 and 80 percent of all manufacturing activities. 
Only in Ghana, Senegal, Nigeria and to a less extent Ivory Coast is manufacturing 
production relatively more diversified. This is illustrated in Table 2i6. In 
some cases the bulk of the processed food is, not surprisingly, exported. In 
Senegal, 62% of the gross output of the food industries was exported in 1962;
3C% of the food processed in the Ivory Coast was exported in 1961;.
7* This is probably the resultant effect of the policy of industrialization 
based on import-substitution. Historically this form of industrialization 
had always started off with the processing of agricultural rav-materials 
and simple manufactures essentially to replace import but, quite often, with 
a margin for exports. See Arthur Lewis, "Industrialization in Ghana,"
1953.
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T A B L E  2 < li 
RATES OF GROWTH OF GDP AND MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY, IN
DEVELOPING AFRICA AND SUB-REGION, 1960*66
COUNTRY GROUPING
DEVELOPING AFRICA 
NORTH AFRICA 
EAST AFRICA 
WEST AFRICA 
CENTRAL AFRICA
AVERAGE ANNUAL RATE OF 
GROWTH. 1960-66
GDP MANUFACTURING
(X) (*)
3.2 U.2
3.8 l*.6
3.2 6.3
2.9 5.5
0.5 -0.3
MAKPFACTURING AS a % OF GDP 
1960 1966
11.1
1U.8
8.9
5.8
1U.9
11.8
15.6
10.6
6.7
1U.1
Source * ECA SECRETARIAT.
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A third but more recent economic feature of West Afrioa derives from the 
level of under-utilization of resources. In the conventional but "unsettled" 
theory of Develppaent Economics, LDCs are generally categorized as "regions of 
disguised unemployment and underemployment" and both terns were meant to apply 
strictly to the traditional sector. But as further enquiries into these
g
concepts have shown, under-utilization of productive resources in West Afrioa, 
as indeed in most other LDCs, is not uniquely peculiar to the agricultural 
sector. It is now visible and undisguised in the modem sector as well. The 
key reason for this is deeply embedded in the sheer lack of equilibrium between 
the supply of, and demand for, labour (Table 2$7).
The excess supply of labour oould be blamed on a set of sooio-economic 
variables* (i) the general rural-urban wage differentials offer an added 
incentive to rural drifterf (ii) the rapid acceleration of schooling reinforced 
by high population growth in the countryside has speeded up the drift of young 
people to the towns; (lii) development and welfare expenditure have been 
concentrated disproportionately on towns; and finally (iv) "Capital deepening", 
in itself the by-product of derived development and borrowed automated technology, 
has tended to create some sort of technological unemployment. Disparities in 
the levels of unemployment range as shown in Table 2*7 between virtual full-
employment in Niger and Ivory CoastIto 26.6^ in Nigeria in 1966.^
For discussion on this subject see A. Lewis, "Economic Development with Un­
limited Supplies of Labour," The Manchester School, May 19514? G* Ranis and J.C.Pei, 
"A Theory of Eoonomic Development", American Economic Review, Sept. 1961, 511 
P*53358; and H.T. Oshima, The Ranis-Fei Model of Economic Development, AER. 1963*
9. This abnormally high figure represent the immediate result of the disturbances 
which errupted in Nigeria in 1966. In the wake of the senseless mass killings 
of Ibos resident in the North by the Northerners, the surviving members of the 
former returned en masse to their region of origin (East) where they created a 
pool of unemployed labour foroe. But when the crisis turned into a shooting war 
the economy was placed on a war footing and recruitments intq the army reduced 
the unemployment figure considerably. It is however not being suggested here that 
the figures for registered male unemployment, as in Ivory Coast and Niger, actully 
give the true picture of unemployment. The registration of unemployment in
- 10* -
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T A B L E  2 i 7
UNEKPLOYMi'KT (PERC'JITAGE UNEMPLOYED)
GHANA
IVORY
COAST NIGERIA NIGER
SIERRA
LEONE KENYA ZAKBIi
F E F E E E7 F
1961; 13.6 0.81 20.7 0.07 9.8 11.35 11.1
1965 11.3 n.a 20.9 0.08 11.5 10.80 17.6
1966 11.5 n.a 26.6 0.11 12.9 8.12 16.U
1967 16.7 n.a 20.0 0.09 13.6 n.a 12.2
1968 17.6 n.a 12.9 0.09 1U. 1 n.a 12.9
1969 15.0 n.a 12.2 0.19 1iu7 n.a 15.3
1970 16.5 n.a 13.5 0.13 15.2 n.a 10.2
Note* F * Registered unemployed; E * Registered applicants for
7work; E = Registered male applicants for work* 
Sources UN, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, December, 197*1 •
,/
On the demand side, a number of factors making for the sluggishness of 
labour demand come readily to mind. Nearly always the government Is the major 
employment sector partly because of its relative size and|partly because the 
sluggni8hne8s of the private sector forces It to go on expanding, sometimes Into 
areas more suited to the private sector. But the government •» ability to go 
on expanding is limited by its resources. Given the weakness of the indigenous 
private sector vis-a-vis the govenment to generate more employment, industria­
lisation is often carried out by private foreign enterprises attracted by 
elaborate government incentives. But it would be wrong to pretend that 
the foreign investor and the government will never conflict. Indeed the chances 
would be really considerable where foreign investors behaved like opportunist 
speculators. However, a workable balance of interests, even if sometimes 
delicate, oan be maintained between governments and foreign investors. It must 
be recognised after all that private capital seeks profit and tends to operate 
on commercial lines. As former 1.0.1. Chairman Sir Paul Chambers has said - "It 
is not part of the duty of any private enterprise company to use the funds of 
the stockholders to help the development of an underdeveloped country in such 
a way that the profits accruing to the shareholders are less than if the funds 
were used in some other way"^.
west Africa usually covers only the urban centres leaving out the rural areas 
and even in the cities a considerable number of the unemployed do not bother 
to register; they just live off their employed relatives. The available 
statistics have only been used as a first approximation.
10. P. Adamson, "UNCTAD 3* Make or Break for Development", Communications Ltd., 
1972, pp.22. But whether this is an acceptable policy in the light of the 
development problems of LDCs today is really debatable.
-  1*6 -
Another factor which militates against the expansion of the modern sector 
on national basis stems from the increasing competition between the countries 
of the subregion. Projects exist for the establishment of new factories even 
when existing factories producing the same products in neighbouring countries 
are operating at less than full capacity. In some cases, such as Ghana from 1961 
through 1965# under-utilization of capacity was also due to import restrictions 
which reduced the supply of necessary imported raw materials and components, 
but in many cases it is a reflection of the individual countries* desire to 
expand production to meet national demand and, within groupings like the UDEAO 
countries, to leave a confnrtable surplus for export to members of the Union,
There are, for example, three bicycle assemply factories in West Africa, 
in Ivory Coast, Nigeria and Upper Volta, The total capacities of the first two 
are 1^0,000 bicycles and 30#000 motorcycles. Production was 32,000 and 750 
respectively, in 1965# y«t new bioyole assembly plants are about to go into 
operation in UDEAO countries. Existing breweries in the UDEAO countries 
operate at 5096 capacity, yet new brewery plants are going into production.
Similar examples can be given for cigarettes, shoes, soap, matches and so on.
With regard to intra-regional trade in agricultural products, the same problem 
ha8 arisen.
Animal products - a case in point which are the traditional export of the 
land-locked to the coastal countries are now being produced, through official 
protection and subsidy,^ by the latter, at the expense of their suppliers from
the Savannah zone. Ironically enough, this has been happening in the name of
Tariff increases by Nigeria in 1966 on meat and meat products could be said 
to be Mclearly protective to encourage local production”• See Economist Intelli­
gence Unit. Quarterly Economic Review, Ghana. Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Gambia. 
(London) April 19667 --------
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diversification policy, a new article of faith for primary producers, which 
derives much of its force from production possibilities without due regard to 
the prospects for demand,r - * .
3* PATTERNS OF PRODUCTION AND TRADE
The patterns of production and trade have very important bearing on the
question of integration in West Africa, Despite the continued importance of
the subsistence sector, the sub-region is highly dependent on foreign trade.
Historically, as demonstrated in Chapter one, foreign trade has been the dominant
influence on the development of West African economies. Their dynamic, monetized
sector has grown out of and is still largely based on the production of a few
tropical agricultural products and minerals for export to the industrialized
countries, chiefly those of western Europe (Table 2*12 and 2*15)*
On a continental scale, professor Robson sought to identify the origins of
the African patterns of trade and development. He distinguishes two main pattern
12of development in African Economies • According to this classification the firs 
group of economies developed mainly on the basis of a growth of commercial 
mining or European agriculture, stimulated by large scale capital inflows from 
abroad.
These economies, it is argued, were characterised by the existence of 
European settler communities and Africans participated in economic life mainly 
as wage earners, Algeria, Rhodesia, Zambia, Kenya and Congo are among the 
best known examples in the category.
- 1*8 -
12, P, Robson, op, cit, p, 67,
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T A B L E  2 i 9
WEST AFRICAN SUBREGION* COMMODITY COMPOSITION* OF SUBREGIONALL>
IMPORTS. 1962-6$ AVERAGE 
(PERCENTAGE)
COMMODITY COMPOSITION OF IMPORTS FROM 
WORLD SUBREGION
SHARE OF 
INTRA-SUBREGIONAL IMPORTS 
IN TOTAL IMPORTS
TOTAL 100
FOOD, BEVERAGES AND TOBACCO 19.1*
INDELIBLE CRUDE MATERIALS 
ANIMAL FATS AND VEGETABLE 
OILS 2.1
MINERAL FUELS 6.2
MACHINERY AND TRANSPORT 
EQUIPMENT 26.I*
OTHER MANUFACTURED GOODS 1*5.8
100
1*9.1
11+.2
9.3
1.9
25.5
2.7
6.9
18.3
l+.o
0.2
1.5
A * Based on the UN Standard International Trade Classification.
B * Excluding the imports of Gambia, Guinea and Liberia for which no data 
are available.
Sourcej UN, ECA, Three Case Studies, ST/ECA/I09t 19^9 P* S6
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T A B  L E 2 t 1 0
TRADE BETWEEN GHANA AND THE ENTENTE
INTRA-REGIONAL TRADE OF GHANA. 1966 IN U.S. g»OOQ
EXPORTS
Agricultural Products
Manufactured Pfoducts
IVOPY UPPER 
COAST YOLTA NIGER
370 200
U50 1,000 100
TOGO
hSS. 1.370 300 1.360
960
1*00
DAHOMEY
20
20
IMPORTS
Agricultural Products
Manufactured Products
BALANCE
1.300 2,660 970
180 2 ,660 970
1,120
120
120
-850 -1,290 -670 1 ,21*0 20
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit and SEDES.
T A B L E  2 t 1 1
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PROJECTED RATE OF GROWTH OF VALUE OF EXPORTS 
OF LDCs, 1960-75 COMMODITIES OF INTEREST TO
WEST AFRICA
RATE OF GROWTH
COMMODITY LOW HIGH
BANANAS
COCOA
COFFEE
OIL SEEDS,
COTTON
RUBBER
TIMBER
TIN
IRON
PETROLEUM
etc*
3.7 l*.o
3.0 3.3
2.1 2 .3
2 .6  2.6
1.7 2.5
0.8 1.9
3.3 1*.9
1.1 1.3
5.6 6.2
Minimum of 6.0
Sourcet UNCTAD Document No. TD/3U*
Appendix A, (New York, 1968)
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T A B  L E 2 i 1 2
VEST AFRICAN DEPENDENCE ON MAJOR EXPORT CATEGORIES. 1965
One Category Countries 
(over 75% of Total Exports)
Two Category Countries 
(over 75% of Total Exports)
Raw Materials
Food 
Raw Materials
Raw Materials 
Fuels
DAHOMEY GHANA
GAMBIA IVORY COAST
GUINEA MALI
LIBERIA SENEGAL
MAURITANIA TOGO
NIGER UPPER VOLTA
SIERRA LEONE
NIGERIA
Sourcej Excerpts from African Research Bulletin, Vol. Vt 1965 P* 931*
- 51* -
T A B L E  2 i 1 3
VEST AFRICA I COMPOSITION OF EXPORTS. 1965
TOTAL % of
COUNTRY EXPORTS COMMODITY VALUE IN TOTAL
US jfan* US jbm. EXPORTS
NIGERIA 737.5 Oil Seeds and nuts 193.8 26.3Petroleum 190.7 25.9Cocoa Beans 119.6 16.2
Vegetable Oils 68.0 9.2
Tins and alloys 1*1.8 6.7Rubber 30.6 1*.2
GHANA 291.0 Cocoa Beans 191.1 65.7Industrial Diamonds 18.9 6.5Timber 18.6 6.1*
IYORY COAST 277.1 Coffee 11*6.8 38.3
Timber 60.7 21.9
Cocoa Beans 1*8.9 17.6Fruit (Bananas) 17.7 6.3
LIBERIA 131.0 Iron Ore 96.0 73.2
Rubber 29.0 22.1
SENEGAL 128.0 Peanut Oil 53.2 1*1.1*Peanuts 38.7 29.1*Peanut Cake and Meal 110i8 8.1*
Calcium Phosphate 10.3 8.1
SIERRA LEONE 80.6 Diamonds (ezl. industrial) 51.7 61*.2Iron Ore and Cones. 15.3 18.9Palm Keraals 8.0 9.9
MAURITANIA 57.6 Iron 53.9 93.7
TOGO 27.1 Ctlcium 8.9 32.9Cocoa Beans 6.8 25.2
Coffee 5.5 20.1*Palm Nuts 2.1* 8.7
NIGER 25.3 Peanuts 11*»6 51*.9Live Animals l*.2 16.1*
Vegetables 1 .5 6.0
MALI 15.7 Live Animals 1*.5 28.6Fish 3.1 19.9Cotton 2.6 16.6
Peanuts 2.2 11*.3
DAHOMEY 13.6 Vegetable Oils 7.0 51.2
Oil Seeds and Nuts 3.7 27.0
GAMBIA 13.6 Oil Seeds and Nuts 7.0 52.6
Vegetable Oils 1**3 32.1Fodder (Seed Cake) 1.9 11*. 3
UPPER VOLTA 11.1* Live Animals 5.9 52.3Oil Seeds (peanuts) 1.1* 12.3Hides and Skins 1.0 8.9Cotton Fabrics 0.6 5.0
Sourcet yearbooks of International Trade Statistics, 1965 and 1966 
(UK., New York, 1967).
U L J B L lB  2 1.1,4
EXPORTS AND IMPORTS OF VEST AFRICAN COUNTRIES, 1965
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EXPORTS IMPORTS
A* B C A 1 C
Vest Afrioa (Total) 20.9 17.5 19 20.7 19.U 22
Nigeria 8.3 13.3 13.3 7.6 13.7 13.7
Ghana 3.2 16.8 38.8 U.U 25.8 59.7
Irory Coast 3.1 36.9 72.9 2.3 31.6 62.U
Liberia 1.5 72.2 135.0 1.0 55.6 10U.0
Seaeral 1 .U 22.2 37.6 1.6 28.U U8.2
Sierra Leone 1.0 32.8 UO.O 1.1 U0.3 U9.1
Mauritania 0.7 52.U 73.3 0.2 18.3 25.5
Guinea 0.6 21.8 15.3 0.5 20.5 1U.U
Niger 0.3 11».0 7.8 o.U 21.3 11.9
♦©«• 0.3 19.9 16.9 O.lt 33.3 28.1
to il 0.2 5.5 3.5 o.U 1U.7 9.6
Daho«ey 0.1 8.7 6.1 0.3 21.1 1U.8
Gambia 0.1 23.1 18.0 0.1 30.8 2U.0
Upper Veita 0.1 5.6 2.5 0.2 11.6 5.2
* Cede t A s  Percent share ef African Tetal 
B m Percent share ef national GNP 
C ■ Dollars per eaplta
Source t ECA., Economic Balletia for Afrioa, Tel. IX, 
He. 1 (june, 1969)*
WEST AFRICA : DESTIHATIOBS OF EXPORTS. 1965 
(BY PERCENTAGE SHARES)
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DAHOMEY it 80.3 ' 1.5 1.5 •]  ^X' • *> 2.9 ' 9 1i- 1 ,5  ' • • 12.1* ’
IYORY COAST 61.2 3.U 0.9 15.6 2.1 . 0.9 0.1 15.8
MALI 5.8 1.3 . - - 3.9 - 89.0
MAURITANIA 69.0 25.0 “ 3.1* - - - 2.6
NIGER 58.3 1.6 - 0.8 - 39.3
SENEGAL 85.7 1.1* 3.3 2.0 o.U 1.9 1.2 5.8
TOGO 80.3 1.9 0.1* 0.7 2.2 1*.5 u.1 5.9
UPPER YOLTA 26.9 “ 7.5 - 1.5 - 61*. 1
GAMBIA 35.2 1*2.9 1.1 - - - 20.8..
GHANA 27.8 j 20.8 3.3 15.6 18.2 2.3 1.9 10.1
NIGERIA 36.1 38.0 U.5 9.8 j 2.9 1.2 0.1 7.3
S U R R A  LEONE 21.6 66.9 0.1 I 1.1 - 0.1 - 10.2
GUINEA 16.7 U.1 29.9 | 23.3 0.2 - 25.8 j
LIBERIA
*•" * m ■ j .* jps
53.7 11.0 0.8 25.1* 7.8 - O.U
. •* . 
Average
_______________ I
1*7.0 15.7 U.o 7.7 2.1
f
o.5 22.1 |
Sourcei Direction of Trade Annual, Be* U» IMP/IBRD 
(Washington 1967)
Source t 
CBS 
(Accra), Economic 
Survey 
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AFRICAN TRACE WITH DEVSLOPINC 
AFHICA AND THE WORLD. 1958-66 (PER CENT)
T A B L E  2 l 1 8
IMPORTS, c.l.f. EXPORTS, f.o.b.
YEAR AFRICA REST OF WORLD
TOTAL
WORLD AFRICA
REST OF 
WORLD
TOTA]
WORU
1958 5.8 9U.2 100 7.3 92.7 100
1959 5.6 9U.U 100 6.8 93.2 100
1960 5.7 91*. 3 100 6.8 93.2 100
1961 5.5 91*. 5 100 6.6 93.1* 100
1962 5.8 9U. 2 100 6.5 93.5 100
1963 5.6 9U.U 100 5.9 9U.1 100
196U 7.14 92.6 100 7.6 92.1* 100
1965 7.1* 92.6 100 7.7 92.3 100
1966 7.6 92.1* 100 7.6 92.14 100
1960-66
Total 6.5 93.5 100 7.0 93.0 100
Source: OS (ECA), Econonie Bullet1b for Afrioa, Vol. IX, No. 1,
The second group of economies, like those of Ghana and Uganda, grew on the 
basis of development of a peasant agrioulture9 producing cash crops for export* 
It is further pointed out that the economies falling into the first group have 
become more industrialised and have enjoyed faster rates of growth than the 
latter, part of the explanation being the concentration of foreign investments 
during the Colonial period in these areas* This would also mean that income 
would be less evenly distributed and economic activities would tend to 
polarise around the major cities in the absence of countervailing policy 
measures* But in the seoond case where the rates of growth are slower because 
the techniques of production are simpler, the income distribution seems fairly 
more even*
13Adopting this dichotomy only as a first approximation , we oan say that 
Vest Africa falls within the second category* But, even so, it is also clear 
from this classification that both groups share heavy dependence on foreign 
trade* And it is this export-oriented development together with the allied 
problem of low capacity-to-import, a structural but intractable phenomenon 
amongst African countries, that imposes one of the severest constraints on their 
rate of economic growth*
13* As Professor Hobson himself emphasises, this dichotomy is useful only 
as a first approximation* Some African eoonomles can conveniently come under 
any of the two categories* Ivory Coast is a oase in point, It is one of the 
fastest growing economies in tropical Africa but mining has little or nothing 
to do with it* Although the country has few French settlers but they are as 
active in industry as they are in agriculture. Dakar (Senegal) was until 
independence the administrative centre for all French West Africa but it does 
not seem to be growing a3 fast as Abidjan, let alone faster* Furthermore 
although Vest Africa as a whole does not have white plantation enclaves of the 
East African variety, there are inequalities in development both within and 
between the countries of the sub-region*
This matter of higfr rate of economic dependence has been further 
aggravated by the limited range of primary exports of most of the countries - 
in contradistinction to the wide range of their imports of manufactures and 
food-stuffs. One or two commodities contribute the major part of export 
receipts* In seven of the fourteen countries a single commodity group accounts 
for over 75% of total exports and in the rest two commodity categories earn 
that much (Table 2*12)* In some extreme eases a single commodity earns the 
bulk of the country's foreign exchange* Consider that for Ghana, cocoa accounts 
for 65% of export income; Liberia, Iron Ore (73%) I Senegal, groundnuts (80%); 
Sierra Leone, diamonds (6ij%); and Mauritania, Iron (9ij%) (Table 2s 13)• Given 
the instability and unplanned character of the capitalist markets of Europe 
and North America, the major buyers of West Afrioan exports, and the comptitive 
efforts of the developing nations to increase their output in the face of low 
income elasticity of demand for most of West Africa's exports and of high income 
elasticity of demand for manufactures, the long-run prospects in terms of 
existing patterns for the earning of foreign exchange, and hence development, 
are poor*
Aside from the fore go in^^ intra-sub-regional trade had one more outstanding 
feature* It is that West Afrioan countries are principally not "eaoh other's 
customer” *
The share of their mutual trade in total external trade is very negligible, 
a mere 3% for the sub-region as a whole^ (Tables 2i8 and 2s9)«
111* The intra-subregional trade figure is much lower than the continental 
average* Total intra^-African exchanges for 1960-66 (average) stood at ?%•
The comparable figures for Latin America and Asia are 9% and 25^ 6 respectively*
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The factor that have shaped the pattern of intra-regional trade are mainly 
of two kinds; traditional, climatically induced specialization in the 
production of food stuffs and certain agricultural materials; and the existence 
of preference systems and monetary arrangements among groups of West African 
countries* Table 2t9 illustrates that about half of intra-subregional trade 
consists of food-stuffs, and another 11$ is accounted for by fats and oils and 
some other crude materials* Even allowing for their relatively large volume of 
mutual trade in food-stuffs the countries of the subregion are able to supply 
to each other on the average only around 7% of their total food imports* But 
in spite of the limited scale of their intra-zonal trade, it is, nevertheless, 
very important for the landlocked countries whose major exports include live 
animals and meat (Table 2s 13)* For instanoe, intra-subregional trade accounts 
for over 80% of Mali's total exports* The corresponding figures for Upper Yolta 
and Niger are 61$ and 39% respectively (Table 2sl5t Col* 8)*
The only crude material of import entering intra-zonal trade in petroleum • 
With Nigerians oil bonanza petroleum has become an important item in trade* 
Nigeria now supplies a significant proportion of Ghana's petroleum 
imports - and the ratio is likely to go up in the future*
But it must be noted that intra-African trade represents the strongest component 
in the consumption of African exports by the developing world, being 7*6% of 
total African exports in 1966, compared with 1**1% for developing Asia and only 
0*6% for Latin America (See, ECA, Economic Bulletin for Afrioa, vol* IX, No* 1,
U June 1969t P* 21).
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As for sub-regional exchanges in manufactures they add up to only 1% of total
imports of manufactured goods (or 1,5% of toted excluding machinery and
transport equipment).
The other faotor affecting the geographical pattern of trade in Vest
Afriea derives from the existence of a preferential system and of monetary
arrangements amongst most of Franeo-phone Vest Afrioa, Reasons for this are
esentially historical, as noted earlier. Exchanges among members of the Vest
Afrioa Customs Union (UDAO), which will be discussed later, are relatively much
larger than trade between that group and the rest of the sub-region (Table 1s7)*
The exports of other West African countries to the UDAO group have to clear
the latter's non-preferential external tariff of 5-25% to which fiscal levies
and supplementary taxes are added. Perhaps, no less important than tariff
preferencee in stimulating trade among UDAO members and in discouraging the
latter9e trade with the rest of the subregion are the existing monetary
arrangements. The UDAO members have a common currency, CPA Franc, which is
15automatically convertible into Frenoh Franc, whilst the separate currencies 
of several other Vest African countries are not freely convertible into CFA 
France or into each other. As if this is not enough, some of the latter 
countries maintain quantitative trade restrictions.
However, we shall see later that there are some forces at vfcnk likely to 
reduce these barriers to increased intra-zonal trade in the not too distant future
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15, IMF, Surveys of Afrioan Economies. Vol, 3t Washington, D,C, 1970, p, 2lw
U, CONDITIONS FOR EFFECTIVE INTEGRATION IN
VEST AFRICA
On a rather general level members of a prospective economic grouping 
would require satisfactory assurances on three broad fronts prior to full- 
membership. First, each participating country should believe the benefit acfrulmg 
to it - regardless of how this was calculated (short-term or long-term) - to be 
greater than could be achieved by remaining outside the Soheme, Secondly, that 
the members of the grouping would be, individually and collectively, very 
willing to make the necessary sacrifices and compromises towards the adoption 
of certain policies to realise the aims of the community and finally that the 
physical infrastructure, especially transport was or could be made efficient 
enough to facilitate a well-ordered intra-zonal distributive network#
The issues invloved in the preceding pre-conditions are inter-related 
and their exposition somewhat twisted. Political considerations enter even more 
strongly into these matters. In what follows we shall reorganise them and 
try to highlight the more important questions affecting effective integration 
in West Africa,
The first factor relates to similarity in the levels of development 
amongst the prospective members. It is often argued that the extent of the 
benefits whioh an integration scheme can bring depends largely on the economic 
development already achieved by the partner countries, on the form of their 
development, particularly industrial development^,
16, Compare with F, Andie, et,al, A Theory of Economic Integration for 
Developing Countries, George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1971# P#
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Other factors, most of which have been discussed above , such as size of 
their subsistance sector, their natural resources9 climatic conditions as veil 
as the supply of labour and capital are also important• But here we want to 
concentrate on the place of the size of the industrial sector in integration 
schemes*
It goes without saying that where one or more of the integration partner
countries has a relatively large industrial sec tor , the partner countries
may well resist the introduction of free trade and equal competitive conditions*
They may, with good reasons, fear that their own industries would, unprotected,
not be competitive in^area or that, given the tendency of industries within
an integrated area to cluster in a few industrial growth points, their nascent
17industrial sectors would be unable to expand • Thus, a priori, it seems that 
integration is most likely to be successful where industrial sectors are of 
a similar size and composition*
In West Africa, as we have noted in the previous sections, the size of
the industrial sector (excluding extractive activities) is very small both in
relative and absolute terms (Table 2s5)« Although some countries (Ghana, Ivory
Coast, Nigeria and Senegal) have rapidly expanding industrial sectors, yet
their manufacturing output is scarcely up to 10% of GBP* For Ghana and the
Entente group of countries the picture is virtually the same*
17. This form of resistance has been very much in evidence in LAFTA, The 
failure of the LAFTA to reach agreement in 1967 ton the second stage of drawing 
up the "Common List" of products to be unconditionally freed of trade restrictions 
at the end of the transition period in 1973 was a glaring case* The Arab Common 
Market, where the TJAR has a more highly developed industrial sector thai any 
other, has had the came trouble*
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This is of course not to say that the level of development is everywhere 
the same but that the existing differences in structure and development seem 
to be within manageable proportions* Some kind of industrial rationalisation 
will certainly be needed in the less efficient countries before they can allow 
free trade in the products of their threatened industries* Also equally 
important here are the differences in tariff structure existing between 
prospective members prior to integration* We will discuss this in detail later 
in the study but it is necessary to underline the fact at this juncture that 
the larger the differences in tariff structures prior to union, the more difficult 
it will be to agree on the reduction and eventually the removal of tariff
1 * » * * S i  "Z-i ' ’ . **' V _ ^
protection among members*
Vest African countries, it would seem, stand a fairly good chance of
meaningful integration, if only because of the small size of their industrial
Squillsectors* For one thing, the small industrial sector means vested interestsA
that might oppose integration for fear of the painful adjustments possibly
resulting from the removal of protection inside the integration area* However,
if these vested interests are backed by governments - local or foreign - as
often they are, they might succeed in imposing exceptions for themselves that
would reduce the scope of possible benefits and the speed with whioh they can
be obtained* Secondly, the smaller the industrial sectors at the inception of
integration, the larger the eoope for capturing the benefits of specialization
through invesWnt regional planning.1 _^____________________________________
18. The tasl^of co-ordinating regional investment planning is by no means an 
easy job especially in a region where competing industrial sectors work below 
full capacity in the partner countries* The Maghreb countries are known to have 
faced this difficulty.
(See F* Kahnert, et*al* Economic Integration Among Developing Countries. CECD,
Pans, 1969)* On a smaller scale a similar situation is developing in West Africa*)
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But it must be noted that groupings in which one or more countries have a 
significantly larger and more efficient sector than the others, like the position 
of Ivory Coast in the Entente States, can still bfflng benefits* Provided the 
larger countries do not produce all the goods which could be economically 
produced for the integrated market, a regional pelioy for investment planning 
and a satisfactory compensation arragement could persuade the less industrially 
developed partner countries to abolish their trade barriers*
Another problem in relation to integration whioh West Africa faces arises 
out of the obstructing effects of extra-African, politico-economic ties and 
cleavti^&S„ On the economic front the economies of Francophone West Africa, encept 
Guinea, are still closely meshed with those of the founding members of the EEC, 
in particular that of France* This is basioally the by-produot of the colonial 
history but it is a relationship that has been kept alive until now by the 
post-independenoe association with the EEC*
Whatever for* eoonomic co-operation In West Afrioa or part of it may 
eventually take, promotion of trade among the countries of the subregion is 
dearly one of the major objectives* This is borne out by the little that is 
known at this stage of the provisions of the Draft Treaty of E0onomic Community 
of West African States (ECOWAS) currently being signed in Lagos by the Heads 
of States of the prospective member states* In brief, the Treaty, among other 
things, provides for the establishment of customs union among the member states
19through the progressive elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade*
-  66 -
19* For details see chapter 5(6) of this thesis* Also see Federal Bepublle of 
Nigeria, Third National Development Plqn, 1975-80, Vol* 1, Special Launching 
Edition, Lagos, March 1975t P* 36*
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However, the obligations whioh the Vest Afrioan signatories have assumed
20under the new Lome Convention which supersedes the second Yaounde Convention 
S^Oul^not hinder trade relations between the West African associates.
Up till now, it was feared that the association of some West African 
countries with the EEC to the exclusion of others impedes the establishment of 
an all-embracing common market arrangement in West Africa* This fear might 
have been justified under the first Yaounde Convention because it made no 
differentiation between African and other developing countries* Article 9 
of that Convention provided merely for such integration and co-operation 
arrangements with third countries if they did not offend the principles of 
any provisions for association* This meant that non-associated Afrioan States 
could not have been given more favourable treatment than that extended to the 
Community*
But no such constraint is embodied in the second Yaounde Convention* For
it olearly states in Articles 13 that "Each Associated State may maintain or
establish customs unions or free trade areas or conclude economlo co-operation
agreements with one or more African third countries at a comparable stage of
development, provided that this does not lead to any change in the provisions
21concerning origin for the purpose of Implementing this ConventisnN* Th£L
problem here of course is that the convention did not define the term
’•comparable stage of development;" henoe there has been some ambiguity as to
the countries in Africa to which this provision could be applied*
20. "The EEC - ACP Convention of Lome" in the Courier, No* 31, Special Issue, 
March 1975*
21* See "Convention of Association between the EEC and the AASM associated with 
the community and Annexed Documents", July 1969» Article 13*
The Lome Convention between the EEC and the African, Caribbean and Pacific 
state (ACPs) goes a long way to clarify this natter* The ACPs arc not required
under Article 7(1) of the Convention to reciprocate by giving preferential
  22 %customs treatment to EEC products but in 7(2a) they are required to guarantee
the community at least the raoet~favoured-nation treatment except, as Article
7(2b) stipulates, when there is a question of a relationship of privilege in the
form of trade or economic relations between ACP states or between one or more
ACP states and other developing countries*
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22* See The EEC^ACP CONVENTION OP LOME Oprcl^ The most important innovation in 
the ESC-ACPe agreement, as far as the ACPs axe concerned, is that the EEC has 
given up its insistence on reciprocity in commercial concessions. At the early 
stages of the negotiation the EEC members considered the principle of reciprocity 
indispensable in the light of the GATT definition of a free trade area. They 
argued that it would not only maintain the contractual character of the agreement 
but also would ensure its durability. In reoly, the ACPs called attention to 
the Generalised Systems of Preferences (GSPs), which had their origin in UNCTAD 
and in whioh no reciprocity is stipulated or given. In the end the ESC represen­
tatives piped down. The advantages of non-reoiprocity from the standpoint of 
ACPs can be viewed from at least two directions. The first relates to the 
revenue effects. More recent estimates of the actual margins of preference 
extended by the Yaounde countries to EEC are not readily available | but calcu­
lations made by the oomsnmity on the basis of 1961* figures, show that the average 
margin of preference extended by the countries then belonging to UBEAC (Cameroon, 
the Central African Republic, Conge and Gabon) was 17%. In the case of countries 
in the UDEAO (Dahomey, Ivory Coast, Mauritania, Mall, Niger, Senegal, end 
Upper Volta), the margin was 10%, and in that of Madagascar 6%. Given the 
volume and value of imports from the EEC to the ACPs, the revenue effeots of the 
principle of nonreoiprocity on the budgetary needs of the ACPs could be 
substantial. Secondly, free access to the EEC market for 99*2% of imports 
originating in the ACPc (products covered by the ESC common agricultural policy 
account for the rest (i.e. 0#8%) and are not affected by this poliey) might 
stimulate industries that export to the EEC (See EEC Information Bulletin ,
Feb. 1975)« This expansion, if it endures long enough, should stimulate an 
an inflow of a capital to the countries concerned, and so promote growth.
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This is generously interpreted to mean - as indeed Article ^ of Protocol No. 2 
annexed to the Treaty defines it - that either two or more ACPs or one or more 
ACPs on the one hand, and one or more neighbouring non-ACP C don tries on the 
other, would be free to form a regional economic co-operation on the basis of 
non-reciprocity of trade obligations.
Thus, with respeot to future trade relations in West Africa, it can be 
asserted that the Lome Convention is in some ways a "blessing" rather than a 
hinderanee• Firstly, it specifically provides, as noted above for the formation 
of integrative schemes in the areaj and the formation of such grouping should 
now be relatively easier since all the 15 countries of West Africa are signatories 
to the Lome Convention (see map 2.1). It is also hoped that the unconditional 
acceptance that all black African countries not just those which happen to be 
ex-colonies of EEC members should be party to the new convention would, through 
intercourse, usher in better understanding between Anglophone and Francophone 
West Africa.
Secondly, there is a provision in Title III of the convention for 
industrial co-operation. This envisages the formation of an industrial 
development centre with a mandate to undertake surveys and studies and make 
contracts with potential investors in order to organise technological developments 
adapted to the requirements of the ACP countries and their industrial diversi­
fication. Because rationalised industrial diversification and balanced 
development on a regional basis is in itself one of the major aims of economic 
integration, the establishment of the industrial develoment centre for the ACPs 
would greatly benefit integration moves in these countries. However, any 
adverse effect of the EEC link on West African Economic integration in the 
foreseeable future is probably likely to be smaller than the obstacles which
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exist among the countries of the region themselves.
On the political arena the Lome Convention offers ihe EEC considerable 
scope for political and diplomatic pressures on the ACPs. But this clearly 
falls outside the scope of this study? suffice it to say that former colonial 
nations of Europe who have influence on West African countries oould apply their 
influence in such a way as to impinge on the freedom of the latter in deciding 
whether or not to join an integration scheme. Surely, everything depends on 
everything else. What is lacking in West Africa is the political will to set 
in motion a serious programme of economic integration, involving categorical 
commitments rather than declarations of intent.2  ^ In spite of OATJ, the Lome 
Convention and the ECOWAS, Francophone West Africa still want to maintain its 
affinites oomplementatAes with Franoe, even at the expense of intra-West Afrioan 
integration initiatives. A real sense of conmunity and dedicated involvement 
in West African interests is called for? and once a decisive spirit is recognised 
the effects of external influence would be considerably reduced.
A third prerequisite for effective economic co-operation in West Africa 
turns on transport and communications. By definition economic integration 
between any group of countries implies easy acoess to eaoh other's market. 
intra-regional transport costs may give "natural protection" to a number of 
small-sised plants which outweighs the benefits of economies of soale. Similarly 
poor communications, involving time consuming procedures and insufficient
information sharing, can only retard eoonomic growth.
Although the Treaty of the Economic Community of West Africa la +.h» 
of writing being signed in Lagos, there is still fear in some quarters that it 
might be difficult to get the required number of states to ratify it to enter into force.
2l|. See West Africa, 5 May, 1975# p. 505.
As indicated earlier the traditional transport structure of the sub-region 
is based on the need to move relatively bulky primary materials to a major port* 
Thus, with the expeption of land-locked countries, road and rail Hidis normally 
lead from the interior to the coast while shipping routes oonneot ports to 
developed countries1 markets* It has for long been recognised that “an integrated 
transport system1* is the key to a rapid and comprehensive expansion of intra­
Vest African trade and industry and that the main feature of the transport
2Csystem is “the absence of satisfactory links between countries and territories*“ “ 
Improved transportation aids trade in two ways* First9 it allows for 
expansion in trade of products currently produced in the sub-region* Secondly, 
it encourages the growth in trade of new goods from subregional industries the
establishment of which will become possible as a result of integration*
Efforts geared towards the co-ordination of a new subregional transport 
network have been noticeable in the past* Several studies have been made 
followed up with little or no performances* At the first Bession of the 
West African Transport Conference in Monrovia in 1961 agreement was reached,
albeit tentatively, on a network of subregional roads* With later supplementary
26proposals by ECA this network provides for one road link between each neigh­
bouring country and covers a total length of approximately 2 0 ,0 0 0 kilometres 
(12,500 miles)* An effort was made in I96I4 by ECA and ICAO* to promote the
co-operative development of air transport* Countries agreed on the nedd for
co-operation but no further aotion has been taken*
25> ECA, Report on the First Session of the Vest African Transport Conference 
(e/CN* 1U/1U7e 1961), p*
26* ECA, “Inland transport in Vest African subregion" (E/CN. 114/TR>NS/17,
June 196U)*
* International Civil Aviation Organization*
An estimate 1 was made of the modifications to the existing West African
transport system which would be needed if the recommendations of the 1963 West
African Induatrial Co-ordination Mission were implemented*
It is of course true that new transport flows in the subregion cannot be
determined with any degree of precision until actual decisions have been made
on the siting of industries* However, the concentration of the market around
the Bight of Benin means that this area is likely to be the first choice of
large soale industries and it was suggested that studies would concentrate on
improving the limks between these countries and the rest of the sub-region*
It was therefore recommended that (a) road networks be improved, mainly between
Nigeria and Niger, Ivory Coast and Upper Volta and Mali, and Ghana and Upper Volta;
(b) a Ghana-Togo-Dahomey*Nigeria rail link be developed; (c) railroad
extensions from MaidugurA in North-Eastern Nigeria to Port Lamy and from
Ivory Coast into Mali be considered after a few years*
28Incidentally this report covers the transport problems of the special 
area of our investigation, Ghana and the Entente States* There is thus no 
shortage of proposals for improving the transport system in the area*
Indeed, the ECA report also considered the need for increased capacity in 
coastal shipping facilities and the harmonisation of port adminstration methods 
and further studies of port capacities were also suggested*
29On the basis of the ECA report and other three studies y some conclusions
could be drawn on the perspectives of West African transport system* _______
27. ECA, 0p.cit.(OT/ECA/109). p. 69. '
28. ECA, Ibid.
29# These include two bilateral studies of transport development - one by a 
team from the Federal Republic of Germanyf "Transit problems of African land-locked 
states" (E/CN.H4/TRANS/28, Aug* 1965); one by a French team; "Aspects of 
transport development in West Africa" (E/CN,1U/INR/118/ADD*1 October 1966); and 
an EEC Study of December 1966, "Possibilities d*industrialisation des Etata 
Africans et Malgache associes"*
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First, it is highly probable that most of the larfce-soale industry in 
any subregional industrial plan will be located along the coast and the expansion 
of coastal shipping on a co-operative basis should help integration in the area*S 
Seoond, the expansion on inland transportation would better concentrate on road 
facilities except for a few special cases such as a coastal rail link between 
the Ivory Coast and Nigeria* Third, it appears that most of the investment in 
the road network should be in the improvement and proper maintenance of existing 
routes with particular attention being given to the standardisation of trans­
port regulations and administration*
Although geophysical obstacles have often rendered transport connections 
prohibitively expensive the logic of economic integration in the subregion 
demands a balanced transport network*
The fourth problem likely to affect the expansion of intra-subregional 
trade revolves around the absence of a region-wide payments arrangement or union* 
As already shown, exchanges among members of the West African Customs Union 
(UDAO) are relatively much larger than trade between the group and the reet of 
the subregion (Yable 2t8)* One of the major reasons for this stems from the 
existence of a monetary union of the latter grouping known as the West African 
Union (UMAO)^ with a Common Central bank and institute of issue of the CFA 
Franc* The union concluded an agreement with France on May 12, 1962 under which 
the latter guarantee the convertibility of the CFA franc into the French Franc; 
and in 1967 it was made f r e e ly  convertible into other UMAO currencies for 
current payments*
30. We will discuss this body in greater detail later*
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As a result the UMAO countries need not bother about the problems of 
balance of payments in intra-union trade. Surplus countries can get away with 
non-inflationary policies and deficit countries can, if they vish^pursue 
inflationary policies for sometime.
In fact the advantages of clearing and payments union are many for intra-
31union trade among LjlCs . A simple payments union provides automatic credit to 
finance all or part of a member* s deficit with the other members of the union, 
thereby multilateralizing credits among its members. Also in so far as members 
do not spend their foreign exchange in intra-zpnal transactions it would permit 
some mefcber countries to conserve their reserves for trade with third countries. 
In other terms members experiencing deficits with their partners in the union 
can finance their deficits without drawing down their reserves. Furthermore, if 
members are not obliged to ear-m&rk their reserves for settlements within the 
union, they would have less incentive to restrict their imports from extra-union 
sources, henoe the expansion of intra-union trade need not necessarily mean a 
reduction in the volume of imports from the outside world.
There is however the reverse side of the argument. A surplus member
while having a surplus with the union oould not use its surplus to settle a
deficit with the re st-of-the-world. On the other hand if it had a deficit with
the union, it would be obliged to ourt&il its imports from outside or to draw
on its reserves. Given the low level of intra-African trade, it is argued that
31 • For further reading see, R.F. Kahn, et.al., "The Contribution of Payments 
Arrangements to Trade Expansion" in P. Robson (ed) International Economic 
Integration. Penguin, 1971* Also see (i) P. Robson. Qp.olt. pp. 2^7-2911
(ii) UN Committee (1966), "Trade Expansion and Economic Co-operation among 
Developing Countries'*, and (iii) UN Committee (1965)# "International Monetary 
Issues and the Developing Countries", United Nations.
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the feedback effect of a payments union mi^ht be detrimental to an LDC which 
depends largely on the imports of capital goods from outside for its industria­
lization programme. While the basic fact here is clear, the desirability of some 
kind of payments arrangement for the promotion of intra-regional trade cannot 
be in dispute. Provided the parties to any such arrangement are determined to 
see it work and would be willing to make the necessary saorifioes. For example, 
members can set up na common pool of foreign exchange" made up of contributions 
on a Cjaota, basis for the purpose enabling deficit oountries to make intra-union 
payments in foreign currency over And above an agreed maximum figure. Figures 
up to or below the maximum would be settled in local currency. This source of 
credit which could be administered either by a co-operation of members' Central
banks or a special union bank, certainly holds out some hope for the expansion
32of intra-zonal trade in West Africa.
Suoh other factors, like compensation strategy, which directly affect 
the success of integration schemes will be treated separately later in the study.
In conclusion some non-economic centrifugal forces operating on the 
sociocultural sphere, which can undermine co-ordinated economic relationships,
might be mentioned here. The African languages spoken in West Africa are as many
33as one hundred and fifty • Religions are many, nationalism (or what Western
32. This type of scheme would be without prejudice to the members' membership 
of the IMP and the credit facilities available to them as a result. See, F I. 
Robson, op.cit. p. 291* But it is important to underline the point that the 
credit facilities available to the LDCs from this body vis-a-vis their needs are 
highly limited, not to mention the bureaucratic procedure and terms of granting 
these facilities. See. T. Hayter, "Aid as Imperialism" Penguin, 1971» Chapter 2.
33* See Ethnographical Survey of West Africa by the African Institute, London, 
edited by Daryll Forde, Vols. 1-XIII.
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writers refer to as tribalism) is strong in the larger communities. Customs 
differ widely withir each country and among countries. The level of literacy 
varies widely, ranging from under 5 to cover 25 (Table 2*1). Political systems 
show pretences to western-oriented liberal democracy but they are yet "unpolished* 
and are undergoing an evolutionary process. Needless to say, the political 
stability of some of the regimes in the subregion especially the military juntas 
is very uncertain. English or French is spoken by the literate West Africans. 
Inter-personal and interjcountry contacts are greatly hampered by the Anglo- 
French cultural differences and outlook which have been inherited coupled with the 
marked absence of a lingua franca in West Africa. The strains and stresses 
arising out of these non-economic factors have tended to reinforce the 
economic obstacles to integration.
5* OPPORTUNITIES FOR GAIN FROM MARKET 
INTEGRATION IN WEST AFRICA.
In terms of pure theory, the basis for gains from economic integration is 
bound up with the opportunities for specialization and exchange of national 
markets. Although some of the conditions we have discussed above could help 
the course of integration, most of the potential gains from it rest with the 
exploitation of economies of scale. To gauge what potentialities there are in 
West Africa for gains from integration would involve elaborate quatitative 
estimates of real gains from market integration, taking into account present 
and future patterns of demand and supply for subregionally oriented products.
We will apply a quantitative approach later but that would be limited to the 
case of Ghana and the Entente State. Meanwhile we can examine in general terms 
the opportunities for economic co-operation in West Africa.
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As has been emphasized earlier (see table 2i9)i the greater part of the 
volume of intra-regional trade is made up of agricultural foodstuffs, including 
processed and semi-processed materials* This presupposses, given the predomi­
nance of agriculture in the economies of the region and the steadily 
increasing demand for food arising out of the steady growth of population, that 
opportunities for the exapansion of intra-regional trade in agricultural products 
are quite substantial* At present none of the individual countries in the afea 
seems to be self-sufficient in food production, though, admittedly, much of this 
could be attributable to faulty agricultural policies* Until the economy of 
the subregion undergoes a fundamental structural transformation during which 
agriculture will lose its preponderance to industry, the least that could be 
said is that agricultural products will continue to play an important role 
in intra-regional trade subject to some qualifications* The more important of 
these arei (i) the construction of feeder roads and the existence of efficient 
distributive network throughout the subregion j (ii) increased specialization 
in production rather than cut-throat competition in the name of diversification 
policy or nationalism - the present trend towards chauvinism should yield place 
to subregionalism|^ (iii) the setting up of adequate storage facilities 
else agricultural products have to be sold off cheaply or they become completely
unsaleable! this is particularly important for inland state^especially
3 Ghana's Aliens Compliance Order, and the Business Promotion Act, 1970 both 
tended to be anti-regionalist* The government ostensibly in an effort to deal 
with the problem of unemployment evoked the provisions of the Compliance Order 
to eject non-Ghanians residents out of the country - mainly West African were 
affected* Also the Business Promotion Act reserved exclusively for Ghanains 
several categories of business whose annual turn-over were less than US jfy  millior 
See, 'Africa Researoh Bulletin', June/July, 1970, p* 1736* Ironically, both 
measures proved counter-productive at least in the short-run* The indegenes could 
rot quickly replace the ejected immigrants* Because - as in the case of labourer! 
cm Upper Volta and Niger who worked the cocoa farms - the Ghanians despised their 
job or - as in the case of traders and businessmen - the natives had neither the 
skill nor the capital to take over this sector* The immediate effect of both 
measures was a fall in the level of economic activity especially in the 
affected sectors*
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Niger rice| and lastly (iv) a more judicious acceptance of ITS PL 1*80 Pood 
programme aid would help the growth of subregional trade in certain agricultural 
products* In this context, PL 2*80 shipments of cotton to Ghana may provide an 
obstacle to future purchases by Ghana from her immediate neighbouring countries 
where cotton production is growing rapidly*
In the long-run however food imports are likely to contract, especially 
if the potentials for increased agricultural production are fully exploited 
in individual countries* On the other hand the production of manufactures is 
expected to expand as the process of import-substitution industrialization 
gathers momentum* Table 2s10 shows that even at the present stage trade in 
manufactures between Ghana and the Entente States is not altogether insigni-
' , ; ’ * ' ■ , 1 MB . ■* j. • %ficant and it is easy to speculate that the long-range trend is expected to show 
increases* Of course, from the standpoint of integration benefits the long-run 
trend in the manufacturing sector in LDCs is generally regarded as a central 
question*
This reasoning no doubt is based on the controversial assumption that the
technical and economic optima for many kinds of plants are necessarily large
and that the extent of Individual national markets is usually too small to
sustain such plants* In somewhat path-breaking study, Professor Brown made a
35* A* J* Brown, "Eoonomic Separation versus a Common Market in Developing 
Countries", Yorkshire Bulletin of Economic and Social Research* May and 
Novembe r, 19&lT""
statistical analysis of plant size in the U*K* and its implications for 
industrialisation in what is now Commonwealth East Africa* The most important 
conclusion of this investigation is thet a country offering less than % of 
the market available for British goods would be unable to efficiently sustain 
heavy industries, such as engineering and chemical plants* Applying Brown*s 
argument to West Africa it is easily seen that only Nigeria and, to a lesser 
extent, Ghana can set up any heavy industry based on the home market, leaving 
aside the weakness of the statistics and the technical qualifications the 
application of the study rnl^t require*
However, Ksior36 adds a strong qualification to this point* He argues 
that, with respect to oil refineries and cement plants or the like, large 
I sipe nay be a feeoessaxy condition for the exploitation of economies of scale*
But in many industries economies of scale nay frequently be realised in plants 
of only moderate size, especially in the sector of light industry where fixed 
investment is only a small part of total costs* Besides, ths market which was 
previously confined to the Unit is not apt to be extended vexy much to the 
wider areas of the union unless the pre-union tariff differences were rather wide* 
In the West African case it is true that tariff differences may be 
considerable but it is unlikely that in the event of a union member a would 
expose their infant industries to "unchecked" competition* Indeed, one of the 
real tests of any integration scheme in West Africa would be its ability to 
rationalise and mobilise the existing level of excess-capacity through vertical
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36* G* H* Meier, "Effects of a Customs Union on Economic Development", 
SocAeq w J  "Bonomlo Stadlcs. i960, Vol. 1, 9» p. 33.
specialization of production processes between plants in the sane industry*
A sizeable proportion of industry in the sub-recion operates at less than 50% 
of capacity* Existing breweries in the UDAO countries and the bicycle assembly 
plants in the area can be cited as examples* Also in Ghana most of the country* s 
industries operate at less than half of full capacity* Given the existence of a 
wider market and a recource to specialization it would be possible for these 
industries to reap the benefits of economies of scale*
As indicated before, regional transport network is another area where the 
economies of scale can be easily realised* That a transport system linking up 
different parts of a subregion ega be successfully established only within a 
regional framework cannot be overstated* Other sectors which would offer 
opportunities for economies of scale to integrating countries include public 
utilities like rail and air transport, electricity generation, banking and 
research organisations* Investments in these fields are generally lumpy and 
indivisible hence the larger the market the more profitable and cheaper the 
operating costs of the enterprises. In fact, Joint ownership of common services 
was the order of the day during the colonial adminstration* British West 
Africa had a joint airways, a joint shipping line, common research institutes 
and a common currency issued by the West African Currency Board but they did 
not outlive independence. Ironically enough, public utilities happen to be 
the darling of international lending agencies wanting to provide assistance 
for integration. They generally prefer to support regional infrastructure - 
river basin development, large power complexes, international highways, transport 
and communications, and so forth*
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6. THE G2KERAL PERSPECTIVES OF DEVELOPMENT 
In concluding this chapter some general renarks regarding the perspectives 
of development in the subregion could be made* Between 1960 and 1966, the 
average annual rate of growth in West Africa was 2*9#, the lowest in developing 
Africa with the exception of Central Africa (Table 2tl*). It is a far cry from 
the first UN Development Decade target figure of %  (for all LDCs) for the 1960s.
It is even less thai half of the 1970s target of 6#. Even so it is not too bad
a record when compared with the historical growth records of the presently 
industrialised countries in the early stages of their development* 2% in the 
UK between 1790 and 1820; 2*7% In Germany between 1850 and 1880; about li# in the
07Japan between 1876 and 1900* However, when these figures are adjusted for 
differences in average rates of population growth, the net real rate of growth 
for West Africa would be very close to zero, hence this retrospective 
comparison is not particularly fruitful.
Under the present average growth rate of about Jfc and a weighted
population irate of growth of 2.6#, the population of the subregion would be 
doubled in 25 to 30 years time. The current rate of economiqfaprowth, if it 
were to continue, would merely keep pace with the rate of population increase 
without a substantial improvement in the peopled standard of living. This 
gloomy picture would certainly be unsatisfactory.
There are, however, hopeful indications th ± t higher rates of development 
in the future are feasible.
37. L. Pearson (Chairman), Partners in Development. Report of the Commission 
on Intemationalt Development, Pall Mall Press, London, 1969? P* 27*
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This is suggested, as noted earlier, by the general state of under-utilisation 
of natural and capital resources in the subregion* Having recognised this, meet 
governments have aimed at accelerated rates #f growth* It is true, as past 
experience shews, that the claimed targets have often not been achieved but it 
is equally true that lets ef capital have gone into infrastructural
activities which have not had thsir full impact on the subregional economy.
The possible corollary is that the eoenomies would generate excess savings over 
infrastruotural investment and export surpluses over imports - assuming 
reasonably increasing supply and demand for exports. Given the increase in
j *capital formation, it would be possible to devote more resources to investment 
of a productive and self-liquidating nature thereby mm achieving higher rates sf 
growth, while the consequent increase in the demand for imports, especially 
of eapltal goods, would not eause balance of payments problems which might 
exercise a constraint to growth*
In relation to population, it is quite conceivable to suppose that, with 
the increase in level ef literacy, urbanisation and family planning facilities, 
the present high figure (Table 1) might be reduced, if not radically, at least 
slightly* The Indian experiment^ in this field is a source of hope and 
encouragement. Per the slightest reduction in the rate of population growth 
augurs well for a faster rate ef economic growth*
38* This was particularly true of Ghana, under ths seven-year (1963-70) 
Development Plan* See, C*B.S., ISconomie Survey* Aeora, 1965# p# 1U*
39* Ths Indian Government reports with pride that the 1971 census puts ths
country1 s population at 5U7 million, less than official projection* It is 
reckoned that since 1967 family-planning programmes have prevented an 
estimated 1*3 million births per year (See, Time Magaslne, April 26, 1971)*
These optimistic predictions have of course been based upon a set of 
assumption which may not hold in the course of future developments* For 
instance, prediction on the increase of saving has been based on its behavior 
in relation to income, but the behaviour may be changed radically if the dis­
tribution of income undergoes a radical change* Export prospects have been 
based on the projections in Table 2*11, and biased in favour of the "high" 
figures* But again much depends on the income elasticities of demand in the 
developed countries, the market shares of, and the competitive conditions in, 
the subregion and above all the development of substitutes, with respect to 
some commodities of export interest to the area*
Furthermore, the capital-output relationships may be incluenced by 
the delayed effect of investment in infrastructure on the one hand and the 
drying up of obvious investment opportunities, especially of the import- 
substitution variety, on the other*
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE TRADITIONAL THEORY OF INTEGRATION 
In many parts of the world to-day some form of economic integration is 
either in existence or actively in prospect* This widespread enthusiasm for the 
formation of customs unions, free trade areas, common markets or economic unions 
among groups of countries, derives from a complex of motives and sentiments*
In Western Europe after the 2nd world war, the search for a permanent peace 
and world order gave birth to a spurt of integration initiatives some of whioh 
have been a success to date* In LDCs also political and psychological conside­
rations have always been mixed up with what may be regarded as an alternative 
economic policy1 designed, hopefully, to achieve satisfactory and lasting 
solutions to their trade problems* The urge for close economic ties is further 
reinforced by the growing realisation, as demostrated in the previous chapter, 
that the small size of some LDCs Is a real obstacle to rapid economic development, 
if not a handicap* But, although, a priori, it is generally agreed that trade 
liberalisation within a grouping maximises economic efficiency from the group's 
point of view vis-a-vis non-trade situation (autarky), it is possible, even 
likely, that some countries or groups within each member country will be hurt 
by the dismantling of trade barriers - in spite of the fact that the pie is 
larger for the members of the group as a whole* In other words, the gainB from 
economic integration are usually achieved at the cost of distributive effects 
within the group*
1* The other areas of trade promotion policy with respect to LDCs which have 
received much intensive consideration ares- (i) international commodity agreements 
(ICA); (ii) free market access beyond that (iii) preferences* But as the 
records of the 1st and 2nd UN development decades as well as the three UNCTAD 
Conferences (at Geneva, 1961+; New Delhi, 1968| and Santiago, 1972) show progress 
in these areas has not been very satisfactory* Neither the General Agreement
Thus, the cardinal issue, to which we shall now direct our attention, is to 
what extent does the conventional theory help to explain the effects of economic 
integration on actual or prospective members - the costs and benefits they derive
7from it, particularly in the case of trade groupings among LDCs*
A word should now be said at this point about the plan of the chapter* The
first part will consist of a static analysis of economic integration* The second 
part examines the theory of integration from a dynamic context and inquires into 
’ the relevance of the basic theory to the conditions of LDCs; while the concluding 
part looks at the role of harmonisation of economic policies within the frame­
work of economic integration.
1* THF, STATICS OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
The economic analysis of integration centres fundamentally on two things*
The first has to do with the effects of economic union on aspects of welfare* 
These, as discussed below, relate mainly to the static effects of integration*
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), where the DCs appear to take advantage of their 
majority voting strength, nor the UNCTAD, where, as an organ of the UN General 
Assembly cannot pass resolutions binding under international law, the LDCs 
dispose of § of the votes, has operated to adequately footer the trade and 
development interests of the LDCs (See Intereconomics (vi), June 1972, Hambuj^ ).
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The second area of attention concerns the effect of union on the pattern and
volume of trade* This is in many respects a question of dynamic economics,
2 . under given assumptions. The answers, which we ventilate in the second section
of this chapter, depend on the change in the relative prices brought about by
the realignment of tariff patterns between the union and outside countries.
1.1 The Main Focus
The static effects of economic integration between two or more countries
refer to the welfare gains or losses from a marginal reallocation of production
and consumption patterns, under conditions of static equilibria in which such
things as factor endowments, technology, demand, and population are assumed
to remain unchanged. These effects, conveniently summarised, include* (a) the
production effect or intercouutry substitution of trade (this effect is also
divided into trade creation and trade diversion); (b) consumption effect or
intercommodity substitution due to changes in relative prices; and (c) the terms
of trade effect which might result from trade diversion or the increase in the
bargaining power of the partner countries.
2. The dynamic concept relaxes the neo-classical assumptions of full 
employment, perfect competition, constant returns to scale, perfect internal
mobility of factors of production, and the equality of privates and social
costs (see Demas, The Economics of Development in Small Countries Vlth Special 
Reference to the Caribbean, McGill Uni, press, Montreal, 19^^# It
must be noted however that the dischotomy between static and dynamic economics 
seems blurred and no attempt has been made here to draw a sharp line between 
the two.
3* See T.A. Jabber, A Review Article* MThe Relevance of Traditional 
Integration Theory to Less Developed Countries,” Journal of Common Market 
Studies, March 1971, Vol. ix, No. 3.
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Taking its evaluative criteria from the static effects^ the primary concern
of the traditional theory of integration has been to examine the desirability
of a customs union from the worlds welfare standpoint. Viner*s celebrated
pioneer work distinguishes between two effectss trade creation and trade
diversion. Trade creation is said to occur if and when a pre-union high-cost
domestic producer is displaced and replaced by a low-cost intra-union producer
after the formation of customs union. Since the formation of a customs union
has brought in its wake the relocation of production in the least-cost location
within the union, trade creation has a salutary effect on the national income
of the integrated economies and, ipso facto, of the world. Conversely, trade
diversion occurs if prior to the union a high-cost (inefficient) producer
having been sheltered by a post-union discriminatory tariff wall captures part
of or the entire union market. This, in the traditional theorists* parlance,
would represent not only a loss in world national income but a •disaster* for
specialization on a world wide scale, and it may also be a loss or a gain to the
total national income of the union. Thus in its simplest form theVinerian
analysis leads to one important conclusion. That isI A customs union raises
the world*s welfare if its trade creation effect outweighs its trade diversion
effect. In other terms, trade creation, from the point of view of free trade,
is a move in the right direction, whilst trade diversion is a move in the wrong
direction; as the former occurs when the constituent economies are competitive
in products, rather than complementary, prior to the formation of a eustoms union
U* Yu-Min Chou, "Economic Integration in Less Developed Countries!
The case of Snail Countries," Journal of Development Studies, July 19^7, P*19*
5* Jacob Viner, The Customs Union Issue, Carnegie Endowment for International 
peade, New York,
In many respects, the emphasis on the static effects in the traditional theory
of eeononic integration is understandable. First, it is consistent with the
static approach in international trade theory of which econonic integration is
conceived as "that branch of tariff theory which deals with the effects of
geographically discriminatory changes in trade barriers."** Second, and aore
importantly, it is consistent with the relative importance of adjustments
likely to occur onee a group of developed countries decides to integrate. "The
theoretical literature of eoonomic integration dealt almost exclusively with
7customs unions of industrial economies," 1 whose problem is not primarily 
one of economic development but of relatively marginal adjustments in 
production and consumption patterns.
% 8Before the publication of Viner^ path-breaking work , the generally
accepted view was that a cubtoms union, since it represents a move towards
free trade in the Haberler - Marshall sense, increases world welfare. It was
in order to demonstrate the flaws implicit in this method of reasoning that
liner introduced the concepts of trade creation and trade diversion.
Even so, although Timer's contribution has remained one of the important
pillars on which customs union theory rests, and while we may derive some
guidance from it on the effects of integration on production both outside
and inside the integration area, it does not make it possible, as we shall
soon see, to judge the overal desirability of an integration scheme.
6. R.G. UPSET, "The Theory of Customs Unions A General Survey",
Economic Journal (September 19*>0), pp. 261-2.
7 Bela Balassa, Economic Development and Integration (Mexico! Centro De 
Estudies Monetarios Latinoamerieanos, 19^5}# ?• 16.
8. J. Viner, op.cit.
1.2 NBO?VINERIAH REVISIONS 
Following the analytical weaknesses embodied in the Vinerian model 
revisions and refinements of it have been made. Among others, Meade's 
contribution in this direction has been notable. He contends that the 
Vinerian trade creation/diversion effects should not be measured in terms 
of the size of trads diverted only. Instead Meade holds that a better
method is to compare the product of trade diverted multiplied by the rise
cin its cost, and the product of trade created Multiplied by the fall in its cost.
Another area of controversy derives from Yiner's own assumptions.
Viner confined his analysis to production effects only, assuming demand curves 
of zero elasticity and supply curves of infinite elasticity. Drawing
■ J . * ’'J . ' , ’ . ' ';.. , •:'* yv. A  •/ .-• .attention to this weakness, Gehrels brought up the consumption effects of 
a customs union as "the response of consumers to the drop in import prices 
caused by the tariff removal."^ He, of course conceived of positive 
consumption effects only which should be added to trade creation effect in 
evaluating the gains or losses of a customs union. The idea of positive 
consumption effect was criticised by Lipsey who suggested, and correctly too, 
that "in general, the consumption effect, like the production effect, can 
work either to raise or to lower welfare."^
9. J. E. Meade, The Theory of Customs Union (Amsterdam North-Holland 
Publishing Company, 1955)•
10. Franz Gehrels, "Customs Union from a single-country view-point",
Review of Economic Studies (1956-57), p. 61.
11. R.G. Lipsey, "Mr. Gehrels on Customs Union", jbid, p.211. See also 
R.G.Lipsey, "The Theory of Customs Unions* Trade Diversion and Welfare", 
Econonica (Feb. 1957)# P*M* Lipsey re-emphasized this xpoint that "when 
consumption effects are allowed for, the simple conclusions that trade 
creation is good and trade diversion is bad are no longer valid." Ala* 
see H.G.Johnson, Money. Trade and Economic Growth. H.U.P., 19671 PP*53-U*
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Scitovsky considered such effects, which have received little attention
in the traditional theory - as increased competition, economies of scale9
change in the volume and location of investment9 and terms of trade with
12regard to Western Europe* However9 all these considerations have been 
within the framework of the traditional theory. The sections which follow 
turn to the dynamic aspects with reference to LDCs.
12. Tibor Scitovsky, Economic Theory and Western European Integration. 
Stanford University Press9 1958.
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2. THE DYNAMICS OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 
WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO LDCs
Since the 1960s increasing attention has been directed to problems of 
economic integration among LDCs. Most writers (see 2.1) who considered these 
problems feel that the traditional theory of economic integration has limited 
relevance, if any, to LDCs. They point out several arguments which oan be 
classified^ as followss (i) Economic integration in case of LDCs should 
be treated as an approach to eoonomic development rather than as a tariff 
issue. Accordingly, it combines various aspeots which could improve the 
international trade position as well as raise the level of economic 
development of LDCs; (ii) The emphasis should be placed on dynamic rather 
than static effeots in evaluating the desirability of economic integration 
among LDCs. The dynamic effects refer to the various possible ways whioh 
integration affects the rate of growth of GNP of partieipating countries.
They includei (a) the eoonomies of scale brought about by the enlargement of 
the size of the market for firms producing below optimum oapaoity prior to 
integration; (b) the external eoonomies which shift specific or general curves 
downward; (c) the polarization effect which refers to the cumulative improve­
ment of the relative, or absolute, economic position of a member country or some 
regions in the integrated area due to concentrated trade creation or 
attractiveness of labour and capital; (d) the effect on the volume and loca­
tion of investment; and (e) the effect on economic efficiency and smoothness 
of trade transactions due to change in the degree of competition and change 
in uncertainty and \milaterality of trade policies of individual countries.
13. T. A. Jaber, op.cit. This part (2) draws heavily on this source.
The present economic structure, so the argument goes, is not acceptable
and each LDC is trying to introduce positive changes* These changes are
nor marginal but structural* Their net effect will not be felt over a short
period of tine* Therefore, any evaluation of economic integration schemes
should concentrate on the above potential or dynamic effects.
2*1 REFORMULATION AND EXTENTION OF THE
CONVENTIONAL THEORY
In view of the structural characteristics of LDCs and to render the convem* 
tional theory of integration useful in judging the desirability of integration 
in LDCs a reformulation and extention of the theory have been made* In resha­
ping the standard theory the contributions of many influential economists 
have been outstanding*
Seers and Balassa were in the vanguard among these who seriously
questioned the applicability of the traditional theory of custons union to
the problems of LDCs* But, in the protracted but heated discussion anong
the writers who have specifieially examined the problem of integration in
15LDCs, two schools of thought appear to have emerged* On the one hand there
16are some economists, like Allen, Meier, and Mikesell who have repudiated
the standard customs union theory as being relevant to developing countries*
11*. D* Seers, "The Limitations of the Special Case**, Bulletin of the Oxford 
Institute of Economics and Statistics* May 19^3* P* 83* B* Balassa, op.eit., 
p*35>* On a broader plane the applicability of Conventional Economics" to LDCs 
have been called into question* See H* Mforint, Eoonomie Theory and the Under* 
developed Countries, Journal of Political Economy* Vol* 75? 1965* This 
provides a searching analysis*
15* D. Dosser and Associates feel that there are infact two schools of thought 
but this dichotomy is imprecise as both camps - although differring in other 
ways - admit the basic limitations of the theory (See Dosser, et. al* ATheory 
of Economic Integration for Developing Countries* Allen and Unwin ltd* 1971fP»l5)* 
16 R* L* Allen, "Integration in Less Developed Areas", Kyklos (1U) PP*315*35? 
fee.3 1961* G.M* Meier, "Effects of a Customs Unions on Economic Development,"
does not repudiate customs union theory as completely irrelevant to LDCs
but it rejects that brand of the theory which is current as applicable only
to developed countries, recognising that there nay be ferns of customs union,
and Criteria of judging their success other than the conventional ones, whioh
may be of value in the analysis and policy of LDCs* This more sophisticated way
17of thinking on oustoms unions has been developed by Mikesell in a seoond paper,
and by Bhambri, Kitanura, Urquidi, Linder and by Cooper and Massell*
Prom the writings of these authors on a new customs union theory for LDCs,
three strands of thought can be distinguished* These ares (i) Customs union
theory should contribute to a more equitable distribution of income; (ii) Trade
diversion might be inevitable in a developing country; and (iii) The standard
18theory must incorporate dynamic aspects*
Social and 'Economic Studies* March 19^0* R*F* Mikesell. "The Movement Toward 
Regional Trading Groups in Latin America**, in Latin American Issuest Essays 
and Comments* (ed), A*0* Eirschman, The Twentieth Century Fund, New York, 1961*
It would appear that Mikesell has done some rethinking on this subject since he 
wrote the aforementioned paper hence his later writing reflects a more balanced 
argument*
17* R*F* Mikesell, "The Theory of Common Markets as Applied to Regional Arrange­
ments Among Dmreloping Countries", in International Trade Theory in a 
Developing World* (ed) R*F* Harrod and D.C* Hague, Macmillan, London, 1963*
R*S.Bhambri, "Customs UHions and Under-developed Countries," Econoaia Interna- 
zionale* xv, May 1962* H* Kitanura, Economic Theory and Regional Eoonomic 
Integration of Asia* (ed) M*S* Vionzcek, Praeger, London, 1966. V.L.Urguidi,
Free Trade and Eoonomic Integration in Latin America* University of California 
Press* Berkeley and Los Angeles* 19^2* ECLA, The Latin American Common Market*
UN Sales No* 59 II (G*l|)# New York, 1959* S.B* Linder, Trade and Trade Policy 
for Development* Praeger Series on International Economics and Development, New 
York, 1967* C.A* Cooper and B.F* Massell, "Toward a General Theory of Customs 
Union for Developing Countries, Journal of Political Economy, 73* PP* U61-67,
Oct. 1965.
18* F* Kahnert and Associates, Economic Integration Among Developing Countries 
OECD, Paris, 1969, p. 16.
On the other are those who have taken a different view. The latter group
It is worth demonstrating at this point why these conclusions are 
necessary* Firstly, Viner considers trade diversion a negative preduotion 
effect whioh necessarily reduces welfare* But it can be noticed that 
trade diversion is basically taking place on the individual country*s level 
through import-substituting industrialization* The ehoiee therefore is 
between trade diversion in favour of the domes tie producer at amy cost and ■ 
trade diversion in favour ef the most effieient producer in the region* In 
general, however, a pattern of industrialization based on greater specialization 
within the region will be more reUUarding than one based on production by
19each country for its own domestic market, particularly for small countries*
Secondly, in most LDCs there existi a situation of general low produetivit; 
and in some sectors marginal productivity might approach zero* Also, as we 
shall show in ohapter 6, unemployment is not uncommon* If trade diversion
moves labour from low-prcductivity to more productive activities, it will
20bring about a gain in welfare* In LDCs with considerable levels of unemploymei 
such as Central West Africa, this gain in welfare becomes more likely* The 
evaluation of integration among LDCs should not therefore be confined to 
production and consumption effoots, income and employment effects are equally 
important*
19* R.F* Mikesell, op*cit*, pp*209-10* Another but equally impressive version 
of this argument relates to the length of time required to assure optimum 
capacity of output* The rate of growth of domestic demand for small LDCs 
individually does not allow for a large volume of demand which would enable 
domestic firms to achieve real cost reductions over a reasonable period ef 
time* This is probably more obvious in the case of durable manufactured goods* 
Hence the thinking that economic integration among LDCs would make this process 
of trade diversion more efficient imtfcms of reducing real costs over a shorter 
period (See R*S* Bhambri, op*oit*p* 21+5 and Jaber* pp.cit* p* 258)*
29m W* G* Demas, Op.oit. p* 87*
Thirdly, when imports of LDCs are disaggregated, trade diversion appears 
to oeeur <r\cx\^  in nondurable, and to a less extent in durable, manufactured 
consumer goods. In a static situation, no trade diversion or creation is
likely to occur in their imports of capital goods which account for about
211*0$ of total imports* In a dynamic situation, it is argued that a higher
rate of growth conceived by an eoonomio integration scheme would require a 
larger investment* Since a large portion of this investment is imported as 
capital goods, the level of imports of integrated LDCs might then increase*« 
In any case, the longwrun impact of a regional trading arrangement is not to
decrease trade with the rest of the world but rather to change its pattern and
22possibly to enlarge it.
Put another way, some writers argue that economic integration among
23LDCs should aim trade diversion from DCs The effectiveness of such
economic integration then is to be indicated by the success of the trade 
diversion process* Bhambri expresses this point in stronger terms thust
'It is ••• reasonable to suggest that trade diversion will be doubly 
beneficial* Firstly, by enlarging the size of market for manufactures>• ' " -'sa » • . •* -C T ” ■ • !'■fiVvTrv •' ", ‘ • \-v' T ii1-: . • « ■ .. . ' •' . • . ■ ' . ■ 1 •
in both countries, increased trade will help to reduce costs in industries 
where scale economies are important* Secondly, import substitution over 
a wider area will enable the region as & whole to 6pend a higher proportion
of its foreign exchange on imports of capital goods and raw materials and
9khelp to increase the rate of investment and eoonomic growth*
21. B* Balassa, Economic Development and Integration* p*25. 
22* R.F* Mikesell, op.clt** p* 209*
23. S* B* Linder, op*cit*, p* 127*
2k* R. S. Bhambri, cm* cit., p* 2l*5.
Finally, trade creation, like trade diversion, should be looked at in
dynamic terms* The dynamic trade-creating effect results from the increase
2C>in income of the integrated area and through the foreign trade multiplier*
It is argued that this effect mould be large enough to out~weigh dynamic 
trade diversion of economic integration among LDCs* As Kitanura aptly stateds 
"The income effects, so far as t£ade with the outside world is concerned,will 
clearly tend to increase considerably the scope for beneficial exchange of 
goods with third countries, and this secondary trade expansion nay very well 
more than offset the possible initial reduction of this particular type of 
trade” * ^
To sum up, the foregoing arguments show the limited relevance of the
trade creation/diversion criteria, as defined by the traditional theory,cto
problems of LDCs' economic integration sohemes* These arguments suggest,
though without proof, that the dynamic effects of integration are favourable
to the welfare of LDCs and possibly to the world's welfare* Thus, when
economic integration is viewed from the standpoint of LDCs alone, the case
27for their integration becomes substantially persuasive*
25* See M*B. Kreinin, tne Dynamic effects of a Customs”,
Politioal Economy, April pp« 193*5
26* Kitanura, op.cit., p* 53*
27•7 The Pan-Africanist version of this thesis makes an interesting reading
(See R*H* Green, et*al* Unity or Poverty? The Economies of Pan-Africanism,
Penguin African Library, 1968, ppp 2£>U-ol)*
2.2 THE LIMITATIONS OF THE FACTORS •
AFFECTING THE RELEVANCE OF THE 
TRADITIONAL THEORY TO LDCb
2dBased on a number of factors , whioh the conventional theory has discussed 
in the context of DCs9 some generalizations are reached to judge the ddsirability 
of econonic integration* Sone writers take these generalizations to apply to 
DCs and LDCs alike* Allen, for instance9 suggested that although these criteria
were designed specifically for integration anong industrialized countried9 they
29are appropriate for application to less developed areas as well*** The 
following discussion will attempt to demonstrate just how' limited is the relevance 
of these generalization^to economic integration anong LDCs when looked at from a 
dynamic viewpoint* Six of these generalizations;, oone readily to minds
(i) Viner has raised the issue of competitiveness and complementarity in 
product markets and suggested that the more the partners are competitive (Comple- 
ment&ry) in the sense of producing similar (dissimilar) products9 the more (less) 
favourable eoonomie integration would be9 Makower and Morton added that the
larger the cost differences among partners the larger the gain from economic
■30integration*
By definition specialization in primary products by LDCs amounts to being
31more competitive in the Vimerian s e n s e y e t  this general state of eonpetiti-
veness, on balance , limits the welfare gain of economic integration among LDCs*
This is self-contradictory but the irony is clear* The plain fact is that most
28* For a summary of these faotors9 see B* Balassa, The Theor ■ of Econonic
Integration* pp.29-148; Meade, oe.oit** pp* 107-15s Alien* op,cit*. i»7319t 
and Johnson, op.cit** p*57*
29 Allen, Ibid*
30* H* Makower, & G* Morton, "A Contribution Towards a Theory of Customs Union," 
Sconomic Journal (March, 1953)
31* Mikesell, Os*cit** p*2l2*
LDC exports of primary products are oriented to DC markets; consequently economic 
integration among LDCs, in these circumstances, would not bring about a sizeable 
expansion of their intra-zonal trade (see chapter 2)* However, the category of 
primary products is too broad, and once it is disaggregated, potential expansion 
would appear quite likely.
But, even so, the criterion of competitionsss and complementarity is not
32particularly relevant at all to LDCs unless it is given a different sense. It 
presumes a developed economic structure which, when integrated, would readjust 
through a "creative destruction" process that ends up by the survival of the most 
efficient producer. These economic structures are not established in LDCs, let 
alone the creative destruction process. Evidently, the welfare gain or loss 
from these effects is relevant to manufactured goods and local foodstuffs rather 
than to traditional exports of primary products. It must be noted, of course, 
that "as industrialization proceeds, they (LDCs) are going to be more competitive;
but what (they)... should strive for is a pattern of investment whioh will
33introduce a substantial degree of oonplementarity for the future".
(ii) The standard, theory of econonic integration holds that the larger the 
sipe of the eustons union, the larger the gains in welfare. If GKP is taken as 
a measure, one implication is that the gain from integration among LDCs is snail 
or even negligible. Although this is understandable, a snail absolute gain night 
in a relative sense, be quite important for LDCs.
32. Balassa, Economic Development and Integration, p. 25*
33* Mikesell, Qp.cit.. p.212. Presently, African eoonomies are not "potentially 
very complementary"; their ratio of foreign trade to total is very high and 
their pre-union volume of intra-regional trade is low and in some instances 
zero. The sluggish performance of existing integration schemes in Vest 
Africa discussed in chapter 5 can be largely attributed to this.
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Moreover, the gain does not depend only on the given else of the union but also 
on the rate at which it increases.*^4
(iii) Inadequate transport facilities tend to limit the gain fro* 
economic integration among LDCs. This has been demonstrated in chapter two and 
elsewhere. As Hazlewood notes, "the removal of tariffs between Kenya and 
Ethiopia, for instance, would not add significantly to the market for industry 
established in either country •••• The reason is that there is virtually no ra 
means of surface transport between the two c o u n t r i e s . I n  his assessment of ths 
possibility of economic integration of the Vest Indies, Demas has also warned thal 
"without the development of cheap and regular interisland air and sea transport, 
customs union can have me meaning". ^
However, these may be extreme oases. In most cases, transport facilities 
do exist; but they were developed in the past with an eye 4e encourage the 
export of primary products to the industrial countries of Western Europe and 
North America and are today generally inadequate for intra-regional trade. As 
we shall see in Ghapter 7, lack of rail links between Njger and the other Entente 
member states has affected the volume and prices of goods traded between the 
landlocked former and the latter. Nonetheless, transport facilities should be 
seen only as a single parameter among many; though their improvement should be
3U. Balassa, The Throry of Economic Integration, p. 3d.
35. Arthpr Hazlewood in Qt.cit.. Hazelvwood (ed), p. 10.
36. Demas, "The Economics of West Indies Customs Union", Qp.cit.. p.13.Vest
Africa has its own transport problems as well. Transport difficulties 
dealt a serious blow to effective competition and free circulation of goods 
within the UDEAO. Transport problems and, particularly, high transport 
costs made it diffioult for the exports of the inland countries to compete 
with those of coastal states. The former were often compelled to reduee 
producer prices below those prevailing in the coastal countries and thus 
lowered rural incomes (see chapter 5).
included, as indeed ve do in this study, in evaluating the desirability of 
econonic integration in LDCs.
(iv) It is generally believed a priori that the higher the initial tariff 
rates and the lower the external cokmon tariff, the larger the welfare gain of 
eoonomic integration. More often than not tariff rates in most LDCs axe quite 
high either for revenue or protection purposes; hence the welfare gain would
tend to increase with integration. In reality, however, there are no good grounds
to expect economic integration to end up with a low external common tariff
because (a) the protective policy will be extended to the region, where partners
can reach agreement faster if protection is increased; (b) it is argued that
"customs protection (even in the case of SEC) is the only effective means of
securing the conditions assential to permit the co-ordination of national
37policies prior to their amalgamation" .
From the writing of some economists there is a suggestion that the external
38common tariff might have to be higher than the national tariffs of the partners.-^  
The obvious problem in this case is that it will conflict with the GATT rules 
according to fchich the external common tariff must not be higher than the initial 
national tariffs. Nevertheless, this might be justified during the early period 
of economic integration among LDCs, if it could be shown that successful economic 
integration would enable partner countries ultimately to lower the external 
common tariff due to real cost reduction and improved competitiveness.
(v) It is easily deducible from the conventional theory of integration that
"a customs union is more likely to raise welfare the higher is the proportion of
37# A. Marchal, "The European Economic Community and the Developing Countries," 
Annals of Public and Co-Operative Ecohony. 1965# P* 52.
38. Dell, Trade Blocs and Common Markets (New York, Knopf, 1963) PF« 2U2-50.
trade with the country's union partner and the lever the proportion of trade
39with the outside world”* As chapter 2 illustrates, intra-regional trade of 
LDCo is snails 'fit rarely exceeds 12% of their total trade (exoept in South-east 
Asia)”, while it is more than 3 ^  among EEC countries*^ The obvious implication1 
here is that welfare gains from static effects will be snail in the economic 
integration of LDCs* Surely, this can be confronted with enpirical evidence*
Several enpirical studies alned at quantifying the static gains of economic 
integration have been reported.^' The major results of some of these studies, as 
summarised in Table 3*1, indicate that the static gains of eoonomic integration 
are extremely small* These gains are calculated from the standpoint of an 
individual country or area* The static effects on the rest of the world equally 
show a very insignificant gain(or loss)* This comes out very clearly from the 
first case in the Table* Even allowing for some margim of error and for the
inadequacy of estimates, a basic implication of these studies is that they
provide no eoonomic support for the case of economic integration* Furthermore, 
there are some indications that the static gains from eeonomic integration among 
LDCs tend to be even more insignificant than for the DCs* The case for L4FTA 
in Table 3*1 bears eloquent testimony to this point*
However, we have to take into cognisance a set of factors which impedes 
the expansion of intra-zonal trade of LDCs*
39* Lipsey, MThe Theory of Customs tJnioht A General Survey”, op*oit«* p* 273
1*0* Bhambri, 0p*cit** p* 236
1*1 • For an impressive survey of such empirical studies see Bela Balassa,
”Trade Creation and Trade Diversion in the European Common Market",
Eoonomic Journal* (77) March 1967# PP* 1-5*
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TABjff JLtl
STATIC GAIKS OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION! EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
STUDY CASE GAIN % OP GNP
1* Scitovsky, T. BconomiO
2.
3.
k .
Theory and Weatern 
European Intenation 
Stanfords Stanford 
Bni. Press, 1958, 
pp. 6h -70
Johnson, E.G. "The 
Gains fron Tree Trade 
with Europe! An 
Estimate," Manchester 
School (Sept. 1958),
pp. 2U7-S5.
Wemel£> felder, J. *The 
Short-Term Effect of 
the Lowering of 
Import Duties in 
Germany*, Economic 
Journal (March, 1960) 
pp. 9I4-IOI1.
Singh, A. In 
Leibenstein, H. 
"Allocative Efficien­
cy1, American Econo- 
mio Review. (June 1966
19^). pp. 392-U15.
Effects on the pattern 
of trade of a customs 
union among EEC count­
ries Scandinavian 
Countries, and Britain 
based upon their 1952 
trade matrix.
Effect on the valuC. of 
British trade from 
joining ETTA, 
estimates for 1970.
Effects of Lowering 
German Tariffs during 
1956-57 by more than 
5 W  .
0,005 of GNP matched 
by equal loss to the 
rest of the world due to 
trade diversion.
About fc225 million, 
whioh is about 0.01 of 
British GNP.
DM 375 million or 
0.0018 ,
Gains from trade among 
LAFTA Countries, using 
Soitovsky method.
0.000075
The most important of these factors aret (a) the low level of economic 
development! (b) the inadequaey of transport facilities! (c) overvalued 
currencies which oanoel out significant dases of comparative advantage! (d) 
foreign exchange control and ether import restrictions! (e) lack of knowledge 
and inadequate marketing skills! (f) the historical ties of colonial eoonomic 
integration! (g) negative attitudes of nationalism!
and (h) the absenee of standard specification.^
Past experiences show that the removal of some or all of these obstacles 
might result in an increase in intra-regional trade. Some notable example are* 
the relatively high percentage of trade among the East African Common Market 
Members (16%); the relative increase in trade among Central American Common 
Market members where "nearly two-thirds of the total volume of (their) trade* • • 
consists of manufactured products". Trade between Egypt and Syria after their 
unity of 1958 showed a relatively larger increase than among any other two
1 n
Arab countries*
(vi) Lastly, the traditional theory ipfers that "a customs union is 
more likely to raise welfare the lower is the volume of foreign t r a d e a s  a 
percentage of GNP of member countries* The implied corollary here is that for 
LDCs economic integration does not promise a significant gain in welfare* It 
would, however, appear that the relative importance of foreign trade depends 
upon the size more than the level of economic development* Furthermore, the 
relatively large volume of foreign trade represents a potential for dynamic 
production and income effects.
From the foregoing it is easy to see that the traditional theory of economic
integration does not illuminate the structural and dynaaie problems of the LDCs*
1*2. See V.L. Urguldi. op.oit. no* 13-1l>* Balassa. Econonic Development and 
Integration, pp. 32-1*; and Bhambri, op.clt. pp. 237-8.
1*3* ECLA, Economic Survey of Latin America (Now York, 1965), p. 1*7? and T.M*A. 
Jaber, "Jordan's Position in Arab Economic Integration" (unpublished 
Master's thesis, University of Southern California, 1988), p. 32. All thing 
being equal, it is expected that the planned unification of Egypt and Libya 
will greatly increase trade between them*
1*1*. Lipsey, "The Theory of Customs Union* A General Sgrvey", op.cit.n. 273*
1*5. A* J * Brown* "Common Market Criteria and Experience", The Three Banks
Review. (March, 1963), p. 7.
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it does not furnish an adequate diagnosis for evaluating the rationale of 
integration among then* and its generalizations are of little explanatory 
value* This has led sone writers, like Linder, to assert that "the possibility 
of a universal theory of customs unions and economic development is automatically 
ruled out."^ But, taking a harder look at this problem, otheri^ have put forward 
a specific but more reasoned approach to deal with economic integration of LDCs 
which "accepts industrialization as a legitimate policy goal and considers how 
membership in a Customs Union may enable a less developed country to achieve
j pj
more economically the ends served by protection." In brief, the next 
section draws attention to the dependence of integration on protection.
1*6. Linder, "Customs Unions and Economics Decelopaent", On. JSii* t P* 32*
1*7* C.A. Cooper and B. F. Massell, Op.cit.. p. 1*62.
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2.3 THE DEPENDENCE OF INTEGRATION ON PROTECTION
It is argued that "if there is no ease for protection, there is in terns
*1 I Aof pure theory, no case for integration."4 This argument derives fron the
aoceptanoe of industrialisation as one of the legitimate policy objectives which 
integration is expected to foster and the post-war policy switch to inport- 
substituting industrialization. But the case for protection has a longer history, 
Pride of historical place goes to the "infact industry" argument, first 
advanced by Alexander Hamilton in 1791 later by Friedrich List, the latter 
being convinced that it was necessary for German development in the 19th 
century that she should protect her manufactures against the more experienced 
British. The United States evoked the same argument as a reason for protecting
its industries against European manufacturers who not only were older-established
h3but also paid lower wages.
Over the decades, however, the economic arguments for protection centred
more or less on static considerations. The more impertant ones arise from
imperfections in the price and wage structure.^ The first and most common
case in support of protection in LDCs is that unskilled industrial wages are too 
high; relative to those of agriculture. It is therefore contended that, since 
the cost of manufactured output exaggerates the sacrifices of output required in
1*8. P. Hobson, Eoonomic Integration in Africa, op.cit..pp. 37-UO.
1*9. Ian Little and Associates, Industry and Trade in Some Beveloping Countries
A Comparative study, O.U.P., 1970, p.118. In its simplified form the
infaet industry thesis is that & new industry is difficult to establish in
the face of competition from an established industry abroadt the workers 
amd managers lack experience which takes time to acquire. Thus, like a 
baby the new industry will be "petted" and "nursed up" to adolescence stajp 
through protection.
50. Ibid.
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other sectors, principally agriculture, industry needs some countervailing 
encouragement.
Another popular argument is that industrial protection generates "external 
economies," which may sometimes create a justifiable case for protection. For 
instance, a businessman who starts to use techniques which are new, say in his 
own country, may be unable to prevent the know-how he acquires from "spilling 
over", and thus benefiting others. By retraining his managers and workers to 
acquire new knowledge he spends some money; and may thereafter lose them or have 
to pay them more to keep them. Protection is seen as the obvious answer here.
However, the more recent espousal of protectionism in LDCs goes beyond the ^  
preoeding static reasoning. The desirability of liberal system of international 
trade as enshrined in the classical doctrine of comparative advantage has, as 
demonstrated earlier, been often taken for granted in traditional theoretical 
literature. According to the classical principle of comparative advantage; 
freedom of trade permits each country to specialise in the production of those 
goods which it can produce most efficiently, and to avoid wasting resources on 
producing goods that it can produce only inefficiently, instead of importing 
much goods from countries that can produce them more efficiently and paying for 
them by exports of the goods that it can produce efficiently."^
Today, the arguments of a liberal economic order capable of optimally 
allocating given world resources have come under a pungent attack bordering on
derision by some economists who took the view that "Static" efficiency conditions
62are not relevant to the problem facing LDCs.
51« Harry G. Johnson: The World Economy at the Cross-roads (Oxford!
Clarendon Press, 19^)# P*
$2. A, Lucid and persuasive exposition of this view appears in the writings 
of Gunnar Myrdal, Haul Prebisoh, Ragner Nurkse, Hans Singer and Dudley 
Seers, among others. See G. Myrdal, Economic Theory and Underdeveloped 
Regions. Duckworth, London, 1957* An International Economy, Harper &
As argued by Myrdal, the free play of international "market forces will tend
cumulatively to accentuate international inequalities9” "and" a quite mermal
result of unhampered trade between two countries, ef which one is industrial and
the other underdevelopedf is the initiation ef cumulative prooess towards the
impoverishment and stagnation ef the latter.^ The proponents ef this idea
emphasize 9 among ethers I the need for radical structural transformation ef the
economies ef LDCsv the existence of unemployment and underemployed resources,
the wide "trade gap" between the IDCs and DCs9 the narrow dependence ef the
former on foreign trade and the possible favourable effects which protection
might have on investment and capital inflows from abroad* Thus, appealing to
"dynamic" considerations ef economic growth and development, liberal lntermatlema
economic policies are blaned for the condition ef eoonomic stagnation in LDCs|
and protectionism is seen as an undisputed remedy for that condition* ^
But counterarguments have flowed* The classical conceptual apparatus has
been defended and indeed refined by other economists ef different persuation*
Harry Johnson, for example, oentends that the argument for a liberal economic
order is even stronger in the dynamic context ef growth and development than it
Brothers, 195^1 GMECIA, The Econonic Development of Latin America and Its 
Problems* (Hew York, 1950) I R* Hukse, Patterns of Trade and Development? 
Wicksell Lectures, A*&*W* 1959# PP* 60-Sij H*W* Singer, "The Distribution 
ef Gains between Investing and Borrowing Countries," AMR, 1950, pp. 1*37­
1*851 D* Seers, "A Model of Comparative dates of Growth in the World
Economy, loonomic Journal, March, ^ 6 2 ,  The general unanimity ef view, ef
course, dees not preclude nany differences ef emphasis in the various 
. arguments*
53* Myrdal, An International Economy, oo*cit* pp* 55 > 95*
51** Johnson, The World Bconeny at the Crossroads, oc*oit* p* 10*
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is in the static concept of efficiency*
• • • the process of international coupetition even if it is 
allowed to operate only imperfectly contains two automatic 
mechanisms that tend to transmit the process of eoonomic 
growth from the advanced countries to the underdeveloped or 
developing countries* the growth of demand for natural 
resource producii, and the growth-induced upward trend in 
the prioe of labour in the advanced countries.
Two growth transmission channels are referred to here. The first aspect 
of the transmission process derives from the growing pressure of demand on 
natural resources which would stimulate exploration for and exploitation of 
new sources of supply, and the development of other parts of the world
possessing such resources with the aid of capital, technology, and trained
56labour supplied by the centre. The second aspeots of the transmission 
process relates to the rising demand for labour in the developed centre and 
to the general tendency of technical progress to raise real wages. The high 
wage levels in the centre relative to the periphery makes it increasingly 
profitable to establish production facilities in the latter areas, first to 
service markets in the periphery formerly supplied from the centre and later - 
once the most advantage outweighed the transport costs back to the
55* Ibid,, p. 76
56, Balassa illustrated the operation of the grpwth transmission mechanism in 
his study of Britain and its trading primary producers in the 19th century. 
Because British agriculture was unprotected whilst demand for raw materials 
increased, the high rate of growth recorded by its suppliers in the 
temperate zone had been attributed to the free play of international 
market forces (see Balassa, Economic Development and Integration, 0p,clt,,
pp, I*!*—U5)•
<7centre - to export to the centre itself.
However, notwithstanding the impeccable logic of the orthodox model of 
international development - albeit based on heroic assumption - the protectionist 
policy of import - substituting industrialization rapidly gained adherents 
during the Post-War era and by the 1950c had captured the imagination of most 
intellectuals and planners in the LDCs. The traditional analysis with its 
alleged automatic growth-diffusion aspects was rejected on thejgrounds that 
changes in the structure of thw world economy had invalidated the notion of 
the international transmission mechanism. Rather the acceptance of the dire 
need for a deliberate policy interference in the allocative functions of 
international competition had became a corporate part of the ideology of 
economic development."*®
57* H.G. Johnson, Economic Polieies Toward Less Developed Countries (Washington 
D.C.B.I., 1967)t P. ?0.
58. The Policy of protectionism has also enjoyed the blessing of the United 
Nations which has advocated it through its regional economic commissions 
in LDCs (ECLA and ECA) and UNCTAD (Robson, Economic Integration in Africa, 
op.cit.. p. 36). There appear to be three strands in the argument 
supporting the protectionist viewpoint, namelyt (a) the unfavourable effeets 
of international factor movements, (b) the international operation of the 
"demonstration effect" and (c) the secular deterioration in the terms of 
trade between the LDCs and DCs. It is held that all three knd imparted 
retardatory effects on development. Meier, (international Trade and 
Development. Happar and Row, London, 1963 chapt. 7) provides a 
stimulating analysis on the subject*
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With respeot to Latin America Hirschm&n writesi
The phase of export-propelled growth in Latin America lasted foughly 
from the middle of the nineteenth oentury until the Great 
Depression; and it took another twenty years, fro® 1929 
to the Prebisch manifesto of before the end-of-expcrt-
propelled-grovth became official Latin American doctrine.
In Africa, the empirical examination of one of the most successful integration 
schemes has also highlighted the role of protection. The Raisnan Commission 
which was set up to look into the operation of the East Afrioan Common Market 
contended that with respect to LDCs "the growth of industry under protection, 
displacing imports • • ., does net simply divert resources from one productive 
use to another equally (or perhaps) less productive, as may happen when 
protection is applied in a highly developed country. It draws into employment 
labour which would otherwise be largely unproductive, brings in capital from 
abroad, and generally stimulates activity."^
Thus, it follows from the preceding arguments that the acceptance of 
integration as a strategy of industrialization strongly reinforces the case 
for protection in LDCs.
59* A.O. Hirschman, "The Political Economy of Import-Substituting Industria­
lization in Latin America", Quarterly Journal of Economics. Feb., 1968,
p. 3*
60. Robson,Economic Integration in Africa, Oo.cit.. p. 35*
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3. ROLE OF MEASURES OF POLICY HARMONIZATION
We now come to the final question of the role of measures and instruments
of policy harmonization in correcting imbalances in the distribution of costs 
and benefits of economic integration. One of the weaknesses of the traditional
theory of integration is that it does not generate satisfactory conceptuali­
zation or testable formulas which could be applied to ensure the equitable distri­
bution of the gains or losses of integration. Infact, it is & commonplace that 
there is nothing in the operation of a common market to emsure the automatic 
distribution of the gains it generates on equitable basis. On the oontrary, it 
is the inherent tendency of the market mechanism to work in a disequalizing 
manner.^ If we assune - as indeed this study does - that each member of a 
prospective or existing union is primarily more concerned not with the total
size of the pic but with its share of it, it means there is a dear preference
62for "regulated" union rather than a "laisser faire" union.
However, measures taken with a view to correcting imbalances in the 
distribution of costs and benefits must not obstruct the development of the 
region as a whole, so ah not to become self-defeating. Besides, it is important 
to remember that some measures necessary to deal with short-run problems may 
not be sufficient to oorrect underlying imbalances, while other measures 
appropriate for the latter purpose would not be useful for resolving immediate 
problems. Therefore exclusive pre-occupation with long-term measures should not 
allow short-term problems to assume such crisis proportions that would lead to
61. This point will be developed further at a later stage.
62. A. Hazlewood (ed.), Afrioan Integration and Disintegration, Op.cit..n. 11*.
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the dissolution of the grouping without having had the opportunity of taokling
the longwtem problems*
As we shall demonstrate in chapter 5# reluctance to accept the discipline
of subordinating national interests to those of the group as a whole has been
the major drawback of the existing integration arrangements in West Africa*
Although Article 1 of the 1959 Convention of the West African Customs Unions
stipulated that members should not levy customs or fiscal duties on trade with
63other union members, it was difficult for member states to adhere strictly to
the provisions of this Article* Against the background of post-independence
increase in government expenditure needs and the importance of duties and taxes
on imports as the largest single source of government revenue in these countries,
each member country modified its fiscal duties unilaterally in accordance with
its own fiscal needs*
Similarly, the partnership of unequal partners has often widened rather
than narrowed the "economic gap" between members of a grouping* Recently,
many existing integrative schemes among LDCs have experienced this tendency.
During the life of the West African Customs Union its aotivities were
dominated by Ivory Coast and Senegal, a factor which contributed to its
eventual collapse. Today, while Ivory Coasts share of intra-Entente exports
is 1*1%, its imports account for only 10^ 6 of total.^ In certain respects,
Kenya within the East African Economic Community occupies an analogous position.
63. IMF, Surveys of African Economies. Vol. 3, IMF, Washington DC., 1970, 
r ,  i£
61*. See Chapter 5t Section fJ.l^ Table 5*M
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Farther afield, similar experiences abound* In £>oudh America, both the
Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) and the Imtra^American Committee
for the Alliance for Progress (CIAP) have concluded that the major obstacle
impending the progress of Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) is
65the economic disparities among the members* After some fourteen years of 
co-operative regional development per capita inoome in the region still ranges 
from about $£179 In Bolivia to $£818 in Argentina and 0879 in Venezuela* With 
their greater capabilities to take advantage of tariff concessions and 
complementarity agreements, Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico have been able to 
increase their intra-regional trade at a faster rate than most of the less- 
developed members*^ Even in Central America, where differences in levels of 
development are somewhat less pronounced than they are in South America, new 
industry has tended to gravitate to the relatively more advanced centres in 
EL Salvador, Costa Rica and Guatemala, bypassing the two less-developed 
countries, Honduras and Nicaragua*
Thus any feasible integration arrangement likely to withstand the test 
of time will demand the assurance of an equitable distribution of benefits* 
Indeed, from the point of view of individual countries the formation of new 
unions or the durability of existing ones would depend largely on the prospect 
of gain - either directly, through faster economic growth, or indirectly, 
through structural transformation or both*
65* J.D. Cochrane, et*al*, "LAFTA and the CACMs A Comparative Analysis of 
Integration in Latin America", The Journal of Developing Areas. Vol* 8, 
No. 1, 1973t P. 18.
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In a laisser fairs eoonomic union industry tends to oenoemtrate in the
more advanced member te enjoy the benefits of its larger markets and ef the
external eoonomies end linkages produced by the existence of ether industries
and its more developed infrastructure • The lagging members suffer in more
ways than one* They buy the products of the partners at a higher price than
from the sutside world, and they do not have the benefits which the more
advanced member gets in the form of higher Income and employment in industry,
the development and growth of external economies and the contribution which
67industry may make to the structural transformation of the economy • For the 
lagging members of a union this is a serious matter*
Some of these writers (discussed earlier) - like Johnson, Cooper and 
Massell - who have concerned themselves with the reformulation of the traditional 
theory ef customs union with particular referenoe to LDCs have placed great 
emphasis on distributional consideration by building into their analytical 
framework some instruments for distributing the gains from integration* In 
their conceptualization the social objective function of industrialization 
among LDCs was generally recognised, a factor which explains the difficulties 
involved in negotiating and getting an integration scheme off the ground, 
especially among countries at different levels of development* It is, of 
oourse, a priori difficult to generalise on the polioy instruments of dis­
tribution best suited to any integration schemes as this is clearly a function 
of the type of integration arrangement adopted in each case.
67* P* Robson, tfThe Reshaping of East African Co-eperation," in The East 
^African Economic Review. December 19<>7» 2*
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However, there are at least four areas of policy manoeuvre* (i) PiBeal 
policy, (ii) Monetary polioy, (iii) Payment and Credit agreements, (iv) * *N
detail in chapter 9 i» relation to the region of our interest. Per now, 
no more than some general comments intended to underline the role which the 
harmonization of these policies and measures could be expected to play in the 
smooth running of economic groupings are presented here.
There is a case for the harmonization of fiscal systems (including fiscal 
incentives) within a union on conventional efficiency grounds. A priori the 
integration or harmonization of the various domestie taxes and duties of an 
economic union makes it possible to realise the full benefits of integration 
and also tends to ensure a more optimum allocation of resources, quite apart 
from being a useful anti-smuggling device. Lack of any measure of harmony of 
fiscal systems is likely to hinder intra-group trade or divert such trade to 
illegal channels, and ultimately lead to undesirable distortions and influences 
on the distribution of opportunities for productive investment.
However, fiscal harmonization need not necessarily imply the equality of
68tax rates. Indeed, as Professor Dosser argues, the standard tax union theory 
is largely inapplicable to most LDCs. He contends that the establishment of a 
common system of taxation for most groupings of LDCs would prove a very compli­
cated and, at any rate, largely meaningless exercise, given, among other things,
industrial These policy instruments are discussed in
68. D. Dosser, "Customs Unions, Tax Unions, Development Unions", Institute 
of Social and Eoonomic Research and Department of Economics, University 
of York, Economics Series, No. 1U5» PP* 86-101*.
their diverse structures, principles and rates of taxation, some or all of which 
night have to be brought into a common fom.^ Compared with the simple 
reduction of tariff rates of customs unions, the changes involved in a tax 
harmonization programme may involve equalization or planned differences in all 
these aspects* Besides, the effects of such changes need to be more widely 
evaluated than on the customary allocative efficiency of customs union thedry, 
including effects on growth, balance ef payments and the like. Thus, rather 
than embark on full tax integration or harmonization with its attendant problems 
Dosser suggests planned tax concessions either in form of rate of structural 
provisions as a supplement to tariff policy for chosmn sectordl development
which would avoid,such big and complioated questions as equalization, trade and
' * v »' ’ ■ ■ ' •• . . . ' ■
70welfare effects. In other terms, some instruments oan be used in a planned
way to achieve important aspects of the goals of tax integration without
{necessarily) a recourse to oomplete tax harmonization.
Similarly, members of a grouping require some degree of co-operation in
their monetary and payments fields in their own interest. The lubricating
function of a common ourrency may be of crucial importance in the advanced stages
of economic integration beeause single ourreney allows oomplete freedom of
payment by anyone place to any other place in the union. But before the stage
of ourrency union is reached compensation cam be provided to less developed
members within the framework of payments arrangements by granting of more liberal 
eredit to the less developed partners incurring deficits in trade with the rest
of the group. .
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69. Ibid. pp. 90-91
However, measures in the field of payments, while useful as a temporary cushion
to deficit countries in dealing with their intra-union commitments, provide only
narrow scope for correcting the structural imbalances of countries not deriving
their fair share of the benefits of integration. This suggests that the
surplus countries should progressively bear more and more of the burden of
balance of payments adjustment measures.
Industrial and investment policy issued differ in some respects from
monetary and fiscal measures. For while the former foouses mainly on preventive
or ex a*** measures desigmed to achieve desirable future pattern and allocation
of Investment, the latter concentrates principally on corrective or ex post
measures instituted primarily to correot existing uneven development and to
71strengthen the preventive measures. The importamee of a harmonized industrial 
and investment policy in an integration scheme cannot be overemphasized in view 
of the quest for rapid industrialization (fron the individual country viewpoint) 
among LDCs. And any acceptable investment policy must guarantee each union 
momber a fair share of potential industrial investments. Hence such a policy 
would necessarily involve the package approach which would be economically the 
most attractive and politically the most feasible. The package approach usually 
involves, as presented in chapter 9i intergovernmental agreement about the
establishment of designated new plants together with the accessary implementation
I ' . ‘ , . ■ ■ V. ' . ' r j
measures. That 1st it requires the participants to come to an agreement on a
71• Of course, the distinction between preventive and corrective measures is 
hardly clear-out. Preventive measures should allow for great flexibility 
in their application, so that they can be reviewed in the course of 
integration, which implies, to some extent, converting preventive to 
corrective measures.
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specific acceptably balanced package consisting of a list of industrial projects. 
The main merits of this package approach as compared to the single-industry 
approach is that it offers the possibility for each of the co-operating countries 
to get a fair share in the distribution of integration - induced projects and 
their benefits; and, ipso facto, provides a vehicle for a more equitable 
distribution of the fruits of integration.
In concluding this chapter, we recapitulate the main points discussed.
Ve have examined the traditional theory of integration and found its 
conceptualizations inadequate and largely inapplicable to LDCs. There are two 
main reasons for thist first, because they were based on heroio static 
assumptions associated with advanced economies; second, because economic 
integration among LDCs should be treated as a strategy of econonic development 
rather than a mere tariff issue. Consequently, attempts have been made to 
reformulate and refine the conventional theory with special emphasis on its 
dynamic aspects to render it more amenable to the problems of LDCs. Great 
improvements have been made in this direction but more than fifteen years 
of reformulating and redefining have not yielded satisfactory coherent 
conceptualizations with respeot to the evaluation of the dynamic effects of 
integration among LDCs. For one thing, the empirical evidence on the 
magnitudes of the dynamic effects is far from beincj conclusive and mostly 
related to problems other than economic integration. Indeed, as Leibensteim 
emphasises, there are some indications of a substantial increase in labour 
productivity in individual firms where dynamic efficiency measures were 
introduced such as plant layout reorganisation, simple technical alterations,
waste control9 workers training* and supervision* Anong1 the factors which
affeot the rate of growth (i*e* dynamic efficiency), Harberger has singled
out technical advance to be the most important* He states: "If there is
any key factor at all for achieving rapid development, I believe it is
73technical advance" • Thus it is the inescapable conclusion of this review
that the analysis of the dynamic aspects of economic integration among LDCs
requires further empirical studies and a more systematic theoretical treatment*
72* K* Leibensteinf "Allooative Efficiency vs. ,X-Efficiency,M, American 
Economic Review (June, 1 $ 6 6 ) 9 pp* 392-1+15*
73* A*C* Harberger, "Using the Resources At Hand more Effectively",
Anerican Economic Review* Papers and Proceedings, (May 1959)t PP* 13W*6.
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ANALYSIS
The propelling force behied econonic integration 1b LDCs, ms de*eastrated 
1b the preoeding ohapter, centres on whether the prespcotive aeabers er parti- 
eluants 1b am Integra tie* scheae can, en balance 9 grew faster individually - 1b 
terns ef one er acre ef eueh eceneaie indieaters as lneeae, enpleyaent, indust­
rialisation and structural transformation - than weuld otherwise be the ease If 
they were to renaln outside the union.1 They would therefore be well-advised, 
if they were to sake a rational pelley decision, to eraluate the lapaet ef 
integration 9 in quantitative terns upon the above parameters. Fron the stand­
point ef suoh an evaluatlen9 short-run eensideratien nay well net be eruoial9 
and indeed nay yield place to long-range goals, because gains fren integration 
if any9 are acre likely to be fully exploited in the long-run. Hence, with the 
introduction ef "cheeks and balance," tine dinensien tends to net as a basis for 
assessing ultlnate success er failure.
1. This is net to deny the political aspects ef integration. Indeed, a country 
nay want to join er renaln within an existing grouping for reasons other 
than eeenenis. Following the events ef the 2nd World War, as noted 
earlier, the search for a pemanent pease and werld order which weuld give 
Surope new political strength and stability and confidence likely to 
prevent the recrudescence of future nationalistic nil! tar is* played a 
part in the founding ef the SEC. But while net playing down the role 
ef political considerations in eeenenle groupings, the deninant activations 
in entering such seheaes in LDCs are generally likely to be acre eeenoale 
than political.
Conceivably, reeent developments im integration analysis with particular 
refereuce to LDCs cam be riewed free twe different, though mot mutually 
exclusive, anglesi the theoretical and quantitative aspects* By theoretical 
aspect we refer to developments ef a theoretical nature whilst the quantitative 
dimension pertains to ether recent developments involving attempts at measuring 
the effects ef economic integration, particularly among LDCs* Of course, this 
distinction however defined must be arbitrary* Since eoonomies as a discipline 
relies heavily on quantitative techniques as one ef its principal analytical 
tools developments in any branch ef the subject - such as international economic 
integration - bound to embrace both the theoretical and quantitative aspects 
as one and the same process rather than two parallel developsttmts* Indeed, nest 
ef those economists discussed in the previous chapter, who have contributed to 
the theoretical reformulation and refinement ef the conventional theory ef 
integration, have also tried at the same tine to develop some quantitative 
modelsto render their theoretical contributions as far as possible measurable 
and testable* However, we retain the distinction between the theoretical and 
quantitative aspects ef developments in integration analysis here for purposes 
ef emphasis, focus and analytical convenience*
This ohapter is in three parts* The first part briefly discusses the 
theoretical advances in integration analysis) the second part reviews seme ef 
the more recent attempts to measure the effects of integration on nacre-economic 
variables in LDCs whilst the third part presents a reassned synthesis of the 
hitherto disparate appreaehes to the quantitative evaluatien of the effeets ef 
integration*
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1. THEORETICAL DEYSLOPWEHTS 
Chapter three has fully elaborated recent revisions and reformulations of 
the traditional theory of integration* In order to minimise repetition we 
present below a brief em e r y  ef these developments with a view to highlighting 
their theoretical dimension*
The main concern of the traditional theory of economic integration is to
evaluate the desirability of a cue tons union fron the world9 s welfare viewpoint
2end using static effects as criteria* Prior to the publication of Timer's 
wo rk3, the generally accepted mievr was that a customs union, since it represents 
a move towards free trade in the Hr.berler—  Marshall sense, increases world 
welfare* Timer introduced the concepts ef trade creation and trade diversion 
into the orthodox theory, arguing that a o us tone union raises the world's welfare 
only if its trade creation effect outweighs its trade diversion effect. Meade 
contends that the Tinerian trade oreatioa/ diversion off sets should not bo 
measured in terms of the size of trade diverted only* Ho suggests that a better 
method is to compare the product of trade diverted nutiplied by the rise in its 
cost, and the product ef trade created multiplied by the fall in its oeot*^
Also Gehrels took issue with Timer's assumptions* Timer confined his analysis 
to production effects only, assuming demand curves of zero elastieity and 
supply curves of Infinite elasticity* But Gehrels drew attention to the consum­
ption offsets of a customs union and emphasized the tendency ef consumers to 
respond to the drop in import prices *
2* See section 1 of chapter 3*
3* J* Timer, On. eit*
k . J. *• Monde, Op*clt*
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oaused by the removal of tariffs*^ He of course conceived of positive 
consumption effects only and their consequent impact on welfare* This idea 
was criticised by Lipsey who argued that "in general, the consumption effeot, 
like the production effect, can work either to raise or lower welfare"*^ Such 
other effects, which have received little attention in the standard theory as 
increased competition, economies of scale, change in the volume and location
of investment and terms of trade with regard to Western Europe were considered
7by Scitovsky* Evidently, these considerations have been within the framework
of the traditional theory*
Since the 1960s a major development has taken place in integration
analysis* It is the increasing attention that has been directed to problems of
economic integration among LDCs* This stems from the fact that most writers
(including Seers, Balassa, Allen, Mikesell, Bhambri, Kitamura, Linder, Cooper
and Massell^) who considered these problems hold that the traditional theory of
customs union has limited relevance, if any, to LDCs* The kernel of their
thesis is that (i) economic integration in the case of LDCs should be treated
as a strategy of economic development rather than a mere tariff issue, given
that LDCs require structural transformation rather than marginal adjustments
in their production and consumption patterns which are the main concern of DCs|
and (ii) consequently, emphasis should be placed on dynamic rather than static
effects in evaluating the desirability of economic integration among LDCs
5* Chapter 3 (i)
6* Ibid (footnote 11)
7# Ibid (Footnote 12)*
8* Ibid (Footnotes 1U-17).
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because of the structural characteristics of their economies* Conceptually, 
the dynamic effects refer to the various possible ways (such as the exploitation 
of internal and external economies of scale, effects on volume and location 
of investment and on economic efficiency) in which integration affects the 
rate of growth of GMP of participating countries*
In view of the structural characteristics of LDCs and to render the 
conventional theory useful in judging the desirability of integration in LDCs 
some influential economists have reformulated and extended the theory* Among 
these scholars, whose names have been mentioned above, two schools of thought 
seem to have emerged* On the one hand there are some economists, like Allen 
and Meier who have repudiated the traditional theory of integration as being 
relevant to LDCs. But on the other are those, including Mikesell, Bhambri, 
Kitamura, Linder, Cooper and Massell, who #0 not repudiate customs union theory 
as completely irrelevant to LDCs but they reject that brand of the theory 
which is current as applicable only to DCs, recognising that there may be 
forms of customs union, and criteria of judging their success other than the 
conventional ones, which may be of value in the analysis and policy of LDCs*
From the writings of these authors a new customs union theory for LDCs appears 
to have emerged* It accepts, and indeed emphasises, among others, the 
inevitability of trade diversion in a developing country at the early stages 
due to its relatively less efficient production conditions, the incorporation 
of dynamic aspects to provide impetus to economic development and the need to 
evolve a system for a more equitable distribution of income/benefits within a 
grouping*
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The foregoing brief sketoh rehearses recent theoretical attempts to 
revise and reformulate the conventional theory of integration especially to 
suit the present-day needs of LDCs* The impression one gets from this is that 
some progress has boon made but some problems still remain* Undoubtedly, one 
of the striking things about integration analysis is that it has lagged behind 
comparable development in the theory of trade 9 for instance f with respeot to 
ite effects on factor incomes and also with regard to such matters as factor 
movements* Improvements are therefore still needed not only in the theoretical 
field but also in the quantitative analysis of the effects of integration on 
the eoonomies of LDCs* But improvements in the latter aspeot should t as ve 
discuss below, concentrate on developing more appropriate models of measurement*
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2. a soomlsijmB&am jmwm
There are a number of studies that have constructed various medels for 
the purpose ef estimating the effeete of integration en less-developed 
economies. In assessing the applicability of these models within the oentext 
ef a specified less-develeped area one begins to dissever their individual 
weaknesses. Even so with modifications and/er the incorporation of some 
aspects of two er more methods into one "new1* model the resulting estimates 
might indicate conclusions of reasonable reliability for evaluation purposes*
The succeeding paragraphs survey ths more important models.
In the Bast African Common Market (EACM)^, Ghai1®, drawing upon the conven­
tional trade-creation/trade-diversion dichotomy, explores ths relationship 
between a member country’s gain from the common market to the sine of the 
common external tariff protecting the country’s mpjor industries* The basis 
sf Ghai’s model is his use of tariff as a yardstick for measuring gains/losses 
from integration, given the level and value of intra-union trade* He argues 
that, since ths great majority of products traded lnterterrltorially enjoy a 
high tariff protection against imports from sutslds Bast Africa, Nlt seems 
appropriate to take the value sf inter-territorial exports by the three Bast 
Afrioan countries as an index of their gain, and inter-territorial imports as 
a measure of their loss from ths operation of the Common Market*"^1
His calculations, which were based on 1962 intra-BACM trade data, led him
to conclude that the tariff system has been considerably more protective ef 
Kenymaad Ugandan than Tanzanian industries.
9* Presently consisting of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania*
10* D* Gh&l, "Territorial Distribution of the B^neflte and Ceata of the Sa.et
Afrioan Canon Market" in The East Afrioan Sooaoalo Herlew. Vol. 2,
Ho. 1, Juno 1961*, PP. 29-1*0.
11. Ibid. P. 35.
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The inference thus ie that Kenya has been the greatest net benefloiazyt that
Uganda has on balance gained rather than lost; and that Tanzania haa suffered
a substantial net lose from the operation of the 3ACM*
Ghai’s analysis has been criticised, especially on the following grounds*
Firstly, Ghai’s analysis is based on intra-union trade in "visible** commodities
alone) but a thorough-going evaluation of the benefits derived ffom the SACK
must also take account of "invisible" services "traded" in ter-territorially*
Nor ie there any reason to suppose that the value of intra-area trade in
invisiblest would be very insignificant* On the contrary, Kenya’s entrepot
position and Nairobi’s comaeroial and Industrial pre-eminence suggest that
12trade in this area would form a sizeable portion of Kenya's benefits* Besides, 
Ghal considered only the direct benefits of intra-zonal exports, ignoring the 
indirect benefits likely to flow from the domestic multiplier effects of the 
Income generated by exports to other union members. Although such benefits will 
depend upon the level and character of in ter-territorial exports from each 
country, they can be substantial in certain eases*
Secondly, it has been pointed out that bis application of the nominal 
rather than the effective tariff rates tended to exaggerate the discriminatory 
character of the tariff and this must have affected hie results*1^
Thirdly, the allocative efficiency of integration may hare been over­
estimated in the Ghal's model* As noted in the previous ohapter, factors other 
than integration such as changes and improvements in input mix can and do
12* The moat important services of this kind inolude insurance, transportation, 
tourism, advertising, stock-holding (Nairobi and Monb&ssa wholesale 
merchants import for distribution in Uganda and Tanzania) and other 
commercial services such as auditing and accounting (See Ibid. P*37)*
13. Sm  S. S.g^, SMt African Common Mwfcat IaeaalUes of too 1960,.l An ,
Arbitration Schoae. an unpublished Ph. D. tb>.A«. Yale TJnlToralty. 1969. P.7.
contribute to the Increase or fall In exports or imports; hence it vould be 
unsafe to regard the total value of exports/imports in this case as representing 
benefits/oosts of integration*
Finally, Ghai did not give adequate attention to the revenue-loss effects 
of integration-indueed import substitution in his oost calculations, a matter 
which is important from the point of view of public capital formation - espe­
cially in countries lacking alternative sources of government revenue*
Nevertheless, Ghai's study provides some useful guidance as to how the gains 
and losses of integration have been distributed* For one thing, the study con­
firms what appears to have become a conventional wisdom in Bast Africat that 
Kenya has been the greatest net beneficiary of the common market arrangements, 
Uganda on balance has gained rather than lost, and Tanzania has suffered a 
substantial net loss. This conclusion differs sharply from that arrived by the 
Raisman Commission in an earlier study which says "• • • that the benefits
derived by the Territories have been unequal than that any one of them has 
suffered actual loss."^1 Even so, the limited scope of Ghai's study cannot be 
used as a conclusive evidence to support the withdrawal of Tanzania from the EACH, 
Approaching the same subject from somewhat different angle, Newlyn^ attempt! 
to estimate the gains or losses that vould be involved for Tanzania and Uganda in 
the event of their leaving the East African Common Market* He starts by identi­
fying a set of projects, which he calls "shiftable industries*" According to 
this concept an industry located in Kenya and exporting to Tanzania or Uganda is 
"shiftable" to one of these countries, if the averageJbf output per plant is
less than the value of exports to one or the other of the countries* Newlyn
1lu See "Report of the Economic and Fiscal Comraision," OtaSd 1279, P*62"
15* W.T* Newlyn, "Gains and Losses in the East African Common Market" in
Yorkshire Bulletins of Economic and ooci.-q Rosearcht November 19^5* In * 
way, Newlyn assesses the costs or benefits of integration in LDCs from a 
different perspective* He is not only interested in the gains and losses 
from integration but in the costs and benefits consequent upon alternative
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records 15 shiftable industries and argues that a large amount of Kenya's 1961 
industrial production vas transferable to the other two countries in the absence
■ * . P  '  ‘ V’N  -*■*; 9- V '
of integration* Using Kenyan value added figures by manufacture a calculation 
was made to show how much additional national product would be generated in the 
other countries if that amount of output ware instead produced*there*
The assumptions implicit in Newlyn1 s work are its major weakness* The 
model assumes that a shiftable industry does not enjoy a comparative advantage 
in Kenya* This would have been easy to defend if the statistical base of the 
computations were very strong;1^ that is, if the output of an industry in the 
census is homogeneous. But given the non-homogeneity of the output of indus­
tries covered in the census used, the identification of shiftable industries 
seems somewhat haphazard* There is also the assumption of constant returns to 
scale, which again is far from defensible since it underrates the external 
economies of industrial concentration in Kenya and their effeots on returns to 
scale* Besides, there is the question of the non-optimality of the tariff 
level employed in the computations from the point of view of individual countries* 
These criticisms notwithstanding, the Newlyn'e approach retains much of its
value* Although Newlyn himself recognises the pitfalls of his assumptions he
LEVELS OF UTILIZATION OF RESOURCES WITHIN A COMMON MARKET. Newlyn' a 
article is reprinted in P* Robson (ed*), International Economic Integration* 
Penguin, 1972, PP. 3W-361.
16* It is relevant to note here that, although Hazlevood supports the potion 
of 8hlftabllity, he takes issue with Newlyn's criterion of average plant 
size. He argues that if one takes into aooount the variability of plant 
size and heterogeneity of census categories within each of Newlyn1 a 
industries, then 11 out of the 15 industries fail to pass the shlftabillty 
test* In his submission, Hazlevood shows that there are insufficient data 
from whioh to make inferencee regarding the shlftabillty of the remaining 
four industries - textiles, paper, bicyole tires and painte* See, Arthur 
Hazlevood* "The shlftabillty of industry and the measurement of gains and 
losses in the East Afrioan Common Market*" Bulletin of the Oxford 
University Institute of Eoonomies and Statistics* 2ft(May 196l>) PP. 63-72*
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nevertheless believes that they do not significantly detract from his conclu­
sions* For example9 the charge of non-homogeneity of products within an 
industry is acknowledged especially in suoh industries as textiles but Newlyn
says • • • "it does not seem • • • that it is likely to cause any signlfi-
17cant errors in the relevant oases*n With regard to the external economies 
generated by the concentration of industries in Kenya Newlyn argues that in the 
short-run these could be offset by tax remissions whilst in the long-run the 
advantages of suoh external economies in Kenya would diminish with industrial 
development in Tanzania and Uganda*
In sum| what Newlyn is saying is that there are limits and conditions for 
a feasible solution to the problem of unequitable distribution of common market 
gains or losses* These requirements he gives as followst
V T ' ®  + G* ♦ 0*
Where is Kenya's loss from leaving the common market;GT 
and Gu are Tanzania's and Uganda's gain; and H is the cost 
of redistribution required to maintain the common market*
Other non-economic considerations (mainly of political nature) apart9 few would 
deny the value of9 and the logic behindv Newlyn's formulation for assessing 
whether members of & common market where gains are unevenly distributed should 
continue their membership or not* But whether his submission "that this pro­
position is capable of generalization to oover any common market in which there 
is a clear aggregate gain combined with instability due to dissatisfaction with 
the distribution of the gai^8 is really so9 in view of the weak statistical 
base of his analysis9 is another matter*
17. Ibid, vTJsT.
18. Ibid. P. 3 0^.
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Directed to Latin American integration initiatives is another study worthy
19of note* In this study Camoy x employs the conventional space location theory 
in estimating the welfare effeots of a Latin American Customs Union on the major 
countries of the area* The approach attempts to determine under certain restri­
ctive assumptions whioh country or countries within the region have an absolute 
advantage in producing the products studied* Once determined, the country is 
considered the "Optimum11 location of production in the region, and the supply 
price from the optimum location is taken as the "customs union" price of the 
goods* The cost to each member of the union of buying from the minimum cost 
(optimum) production points within the region is compared with the cost of 
importing from developed countries or producing the goods domestically. The 
methodology goes on to estimate the gain or loss to each country associated 
with buying the products in a customs union*
In a nutshell, the objective of the model is to find the combination of 
plants which would supply, at a minimum cost to L4FTA, the fixed demands for a 
given product at specified locations in the area* Therefore cost minimisation 
depends on the quantity demanded at each consumption point, the cost of
production at each production point, and the oost of transportation between
•. * 20 each production point and eaoh consumption point*
The model has something to commend it* It estimates the gains or losses
to union members from choosing imports from third countries, domestic productioh,
or imports from the optimum looatlon within the union as their source of supply
19* Martin Camoy, "A Welfare Analysis of Latin American Economic Unionx Six 
Industry Studies", R. Hilton (ed*), The Movement Toward Latin American
Unity* Praeger Publishers, N.Y* 1969 9 PP* 237-2^0* See also M* Camoy,
Industrialization in A Latin American Common Market, The Brookings 
Institution, Washington, 1972*
20. R. Hilton, Pp.clt*P*238*
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and therefore can give at a glance what a union member la losing or gaining by 
importing from the intra-union optimum poroduetlon points in terms of a single 
indicator.
However, it is rather questionable whether cost differentials between the 
delivered prioes of goods in the optimum production points and the alternative 
supply prioes in themselves constitute a satisfactory basis for intra-union 
distribution of industries* A more acceptable, evaluative oriterion for 
industrial location in an integrated region ought to build into itself a 
distribution strategy* Suoh a model could be a trade-off between economlo 
feasibility and political acceptability within the union to ensure the de con­
centration of investments in the more attractive parts of the region*
Indeed, strict adherence to the principle of optimum looation within a 
union is tantamount to operating a "laisser faire" integration scheme where 
industry, as noted in ohapter 3 (2*2), would tend to concentrate in the rela­
tively more advanced countries because of their greater capabilities - in terms
of larger markets, external economies and linkages and infrastructural develop-
21sent - to take advantage of tariff concessions and complementarity agreements*
The lagging members are the net losers both as importers and employers of labour* 
They buy the products of their partners at a higher price than frmm the outside 
world| and they do not have the direct benefits whioh the more developed members 
get in the form of employment in industry, higher income, the development and 
growth of external economies as well as the indirect contribution whioh industry 
may make to the structural transformation of their eoonomies* As indicated earlier
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21* Here we refer to complementary or supportive institutions suoh as Bank, a 
credit and payments scheme, common research institutes and the like whioh 
often accompany the formation of a common market*
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in this ohapter, the rationale of integration from the standpoint of individual 
members is the prospect of a faster rate of growth than would otherwise be 
possible outside the union* This hope is likely to be realised where the benefits 
of integration are equitably distributed rather than where the distribution 
strategy is baaed on a single "laissez fairs'1 economic indicator as in the Camoy 
model* Surely, unequitable distribution of the gains from integration is a sure 
source of dissatisfaction and a curb on its further activities and development* 
Aside from the propriety of the model as an industrial distribution strategy 
within a union, there is the problem of cost estimation* The mdthod of cost
estimation one might want to adopt will of course depend on data available and
22the country or region for which the estimate is made* Whereas the model is 
relevant to West Afrioa with which this study is ooncemed, we examine elsewhere 
what aspects of the model we shall incorporate into our approach as well as our 
methods of cost and demand estimations*
Furthermore, the model deals with only a few isolated industries rather
23than with the economy as a whole* This exposes it to All the limitations 
inherent in partial equilibrium analysis* Obtaining the optimum requires a 
general equilibrium analysis whioh would consider all industries and segments 
of the economy so that both direct and indirect impact a of eoonomic integration 
could be measured* The implication of Camoy1 a partial equilibrium approach is 
that the results do not give locations that can be properly oalled "optimum", 
but rather "minimum cost"*2^
22* Indeed, sinoe the availability and reliability of data vary from country to 
country and from product to product, the Latin American research Institutes 
which participated in the Camoy study did not adhere to a common methodology 
for estimating future demand for the chosen products* As for cost estimates 
theyjwere based on the oost profiles of the selected industries in countries 
where they already existed, allowance being made for eoonomies of scale of 
higher levels of outputs*(Camoy, Op*cit** P* 32)*
23* See Ibid* P. 3 6 .
2 k . M* Camoy, "A Welfare Analysis of Latin Amerioan Economic Unions Six 
Industry Studies", Oi>*cit** P* 2$ (Footnote 6)*
On the whole 9 the Camoy model has one moBt outstanding merit* It enables 
planners to find the cheapest way of supplying the projected demand from within 
a union, balancing the eoonomies of scalet made possible by the expansion of 
production at any point against the accompanying increase in transport costs*
But9 whether the distribution strategy Implied in the apprkch will satisfy the 
long-range objectives of all the member countries remains a moot point*
At a more macro-economic level a later UH study departs from the trade
* ■ * - _ * 
flows approaoh. Drawing upon earlier work by Professor Hollis Chenery, the
model employs multiple regression analysis utilising basio data for a large
*?
number of countries* Relying ohiefly on cross-section regressions, it tries to 
show the share of industry in GDP as a function of population and per capita
lnoome - two parameters assumed to indicate size and strength of the market*
.
Again, this model has been criticised on several grounds* First the model 
is simplistic and restrictive in its framework of assumptions* Deriving its 
force from Engel's law, the approaoh is based on the premise that an increase in 
per capita income in a country is normally accompalned by a rise in the share of i
26 ! industrial output•" Henoe it makes use of only a limited number of explanatory
- 13U -
variables* Certainly, one would be very cautious in attributing all changes in
27the industrial sector to integration alone* '
25* United Rations, A Study of Industrial Growth* (UN Publication, Sales Mo* 
63«11* B2)
26* Ibid*
27* McClelland has in a recent study thrown a good deal of light on this point* 
His methodology attempts to quantify the importance and share of the main 
forces contributing to growth in the CACM* He first considers the preinte­
gration period and then the post-integration years* His analysis led him 
to conclude thajf "of the roughly 7% annual growth in regional GNP in 
Central America from mid-1962 through 19^5, around 1$ was due to minimum- 
normal growth, 2% to the increase in export receipts, and 1# to the expan­
sionary effect of the Central American Common Market and related forces"
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Other autonomous changes in factor efficiency reflecting technologies! progress, 
industrial reorganisation, or the like might contribute to the expansion of 
the industrial sector.
Secondly, the data on whioh the analysis is based covered only a minority 
of LDCs and therefore do not provide a sufficiently strong atatlstioal 
foundation for any adequate generalization*
Thirdly, the model assumes that opportunities for intra-zonal trade in
LDCs are better in industrial than in agricultural goods* In the short-run this■
would be difficult to defend, especially in predominantly agrarian economies 
where transport improvements can foster regional trade flows in agricultural 
producds* Nevertheless, food imports, in the long-run, are more likely to 
oontraot especially if the potentials for increased agricultural food produotion 
are fully exploited in individual countries; whereas intra-regional trade on 
manufactures is expected to expand as the process of import-substltution 
industrialization gathers momentum*
And lastly, it also assumes that the technical and economic pptima for 
many kinds of plsnts are ^necessarily large and that the extent of individual
28national markets is usually too small to sustain suoh plants* But as Meisr
has noted while this may be true of oil refineries, iron and steel and cement
plants, in many industries eoonomies of scale may be frequently realised in
(P.528)* See, D.H.MeClelland", "The Common Market1 s.vContribution to Central 
American Economlo Growths A first Approximation11 in R.Hllton, op.cit.
PP*505-536* Minimum normal growth is interpreted to mean autonomous growth 
exclusive of external factors* Although the length of time, fours years 
upon whioh this study is based seems to be too short a period to form a 
basis for strong conclusions, yet the study clearly underscores the point 
that the bulk of the annual growth in GNP cannot be legitimately attributed, 
prima faoie, to integration and allied repercussions alone*
28* G*M* Meier, "Effects of a Custom Union on Eoonomic Development"
Social and Economic Studies. 1?60, Tol. 9t P* 33*
plants of only moderate else* This weakness, of course, derives mainly from
the theory of eoonomic integration Itself rather than the model*
For all its weaknesses, the UK technique has one obvious advantage* It
oan be applied separately and collectively before and after integration to the
union members* Also the model oan serve as a useful complement to a more
detailed integration study*
Finally, this brief survey would be eertainly \ r\complete without any
29reference to the Andies-Doseer technique, which was applied to the Caribbean 
integration experience* The model, purporting to give decision rules for invest­
ment policy, attempts to evaluate the allooation of integration industries in 
LDCs not from the narrow angler of intra-zonal trade flows of traditional theory
- 136 -
29* Also see D* Dosser, "Customs Unions, Tax Unions, Development Unions", Op.cit. 
In this later publication Professor Dosser reformulates the original 
Andlcs-Dosser thesis. He suggestee that their original criteria function 
for judging a customs or tax union oould be taken as a measure of welfare 
change in the development sense* This function in its revised form la 
given asi
* ■ * < *<*>.'(».'(«), * «  >•
where F and X represent, as before, foreign exchange saving and availability 
of capital resources respectively* K (formerly I m industrialization 
benefits) now stands for employment creation whilst T (previously T * 
national income loss sffeot of trade diversion) represents volume of trade, 
where all of these variables are functions of the tariff or tax whioh nay be 
altered by union* V « welfare, both in the original and revised versions 
but In the former the emphasis is on the welfare benefits of Integration 
industries while in the latter the focus is on ths development welfare 
effects of suoh industries* In LDCs this distinction in emphasis with 
respeot to V is very unclear* Obviously, both effects, if at all they are 
different, mean more or less the same thing In terms of their impact on 
economlo development* Similarly, one is not too sure whether ths revised 
criteria function represents a better measure than the original function, 
simply by replacing I and T with 5 and T. If anything, the definition of 
E is much narrower, though perhaps easier to assess but less inolusivs than 
I in its original definition* With respeot to T and T» both measure in 
essence the effect of union on volume of trade with particular reference to 
trade diversion* As Proftssor Dosser himself admits, views oan differ widely 
on what constitutes development welfare effect of union and the appropria­
teness of his criteria function in determining it (Ibid** p*95)« Much 
depends on the definitions of the four right-hand variables above, hence 
we have, as we shall show in chapter 7# redefined some of the original 
variables to suit our purpose*
but from the broad perspective of economic development* In this sense it parts 
company with the other models reviewed above* The principle of cost^benefit 
calculus is introduced. Before a potential industry is established within a 
union it must pass a certain test in conformity with the operative decision rule*
According to this rule of acceptability, "Protect all home activities where 
the benefit - cost ratio exceeds 1"*^ In other terms a candidate industry 
should be evaluated for each union partner according to the following equations
Aw - & - AT ♦ is  - AK
Where W * welfare, I = industrialisation benefits, T * national income loss,
P e foreign exchanges saving, and K * use of capital resources* If a given 
industry satisfies the criteria in one country only that country will have it; 
but if in more than one, "it is assigned to the country with the largest l ’l r ^  
though subjeot to "distribution" weights to safeguard against total concentration 
(polarisation) in one country* Perhaps, it may well be that the relative import* 
ance of P and K as a brake on development varies from one country to another*
In that case, the cost-benefit calculation with respect to the two variables 
should be done in the context of individual countries*
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30* Ibid, P.19. It is of course true that the costs of a project ought to 
be less than the benefits from it if it were to be a justifiable use of 
resources* -That is the benefit-cost ratio must be positive. But, never­
theless, the long range social welfare function of some LDCs may justify 
the protection of some marginal projeots whose benefit-oost ratio is one 
or less but not negative* See J* Clark-Leith, "The Coet Benefit Approaoh 
to Project Selection in an Aid Programme, A report prepared for the 
Canadian Porelgn Aid Division (1968)*
31* See F* Andie, et al, Qp.clt. P*39* By emphasising I instead of V here 
the authors assume that the other variables are held constant while the 
value of I varies in different countries* This is an unrealistic 
assumption in view of the differing opportunity cost of factors in 
different countries* It may be that I was loosely used to mean V*
The first Important consideration relating to the above equation concerns
the method of determining the value of the variables on the right side of ths
32equation. According to the authors^ the negative factor T represents the
national income loss likely to occur through the erection of a post-union
discriminatory tariff wall vrhioh protects inefficient intra^-union producers
vis-a/-vis efficient extra-union producers. Wiis in the traditional theorists's
parlance demonstrates the effect of trade diversion. The other negative variable
K is treated as the capital cost of a common industry (or industries) to a
particular country's account, given the absence of a Union Bank for loan scheme.
With respect to t  it is measured ast "the total value of imports (including
actual imports and any other reduction in imports through lowering of real
national income) minus the import content of home production minus the import
33content of required social overhead capital."-^  As for the so-called industria­
lisation benefits (I) they defy precise definition and measurement as the authors
3lithemselves were quick to admit.^
With the functional identification of the variables whose values have to be 
determined, it is now easier to comment on the formula itself. The model assumes 
two items on the cost side and another two on the benefit side. Henee T and K are 
treated as negative factors whilst 7 and I are considered as positive. Notionatly, 
Y and K can be treated as negative variables but there is no orlma facie case to
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32. Ibid, P. 36
33. Ifcid, P. 38 
3b. IMd.
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consider I and F as positive values* Their actual values9 which might be
positive, zero or even negative 9 would be a function of the interplay of
35factors at work under h given situation*
Insofar as the determination of the value of F is concerned, there might 
be some problems of estimation* As defined in the model total import values 
cover not just the actual import but also "any other reduction in imports 
through lowering of real national income• " To the extent that the latter stems 
from a deflationary policy9 the manipulation of exchange rates or direct import 
controls, it would not be very easy to estimate* It is of course possible to 
aPPly wshadow pricing** instead of the market price of foreign exchange here but 
even so this would take care of deflationary pricing of exchange rate manupula- 
tiens whilst proving itself incapable of dealing with the problem of direct 
import controls* And it is a fact of common experience that most IJXJs in their 
rationing of their foreign exchange reserves usually supplement fiscal policies 
with direct controls*
35* Infact, the findings of an empirical study in the manufacturing sector in 
Nigeria throw some light on this point* Arthur LewiB (in his "Reflections 
on Nigeria*s jfconomic Growth* 0EXJ(1967) P1-S5) reports that although 
large - scale manufacturing absorbs great amounts of capital it yields 
relatively little to Nigerian national income* Suppose we define I as value 
added by manufacture, he estimates that in 1963 the Nigerian GNP did not 
benefit by am much as 30% of the value added in the large - scale manufac­
turing) the rest went to expatriates through factor payments other than 
rent* Foreign exchange-wise, he came to the conclusion that Nigeria spends 
more in terms of foreign exchange (on machines, raw materials, expatriate 
salaries and profits) on making some produots at home than she would spend 
if she were to import the manufactured product itself* Besides many of ths 
home-produced goods survive only because they are protected by tariffs 
exceeding 30% of value added* The conclusion Authur Lewis reaches in his 
analysis is that Nigeria is still in the stage where to manufacture some 
produote at home is to reduce the current standard of living in the hope 
of future gain* Thus, at least, in the short-run there is no a priori 
reason why the values of I and F must be positive as the model assumes*
However, the induced portion of foreign exchange savings if it took the 
form of rejected imports applications or quotas by a central authority could be 
estimated easily from xeco^s but where, Importers were discouraged from applying 
for foreign exchange to flnanoe their imports, either as a result of a ban or 
withdrawal of lloences, the actual demand elasticity for imports would be 
difficult to evaluate*
On the question of applying the above formula in the ranking of home 
activities within a union, it must be noted that variables F and K may not 
necesaarily received equal weight In all member countries. Because the relative 
importance of F and K as brake on development might vary from country to country, 
though this is by no means a very serious weakness) indeed the two variables 
could, as a first approximation, receive equal weighting with respeot to 
resource availabilities in most LDCs*
One final word about the model relates to the definition of Indus trial!zatic 
benefits* As indicated previously, the definition of the variable (i) is 
imprecise and equivocal. The authors argue that the variables T, F and K
should be treated as of short-term importance end measurable whilst I be treated
37as "diffuse" and of long-range value • ^ This distinction hardly makes the deflnl 
tion of I any clearer* Although industrialization is by its very nature a long­
term objective and most of its benefits will be realised in the long run, it is 
equally true that these benefits are mainly structural affecting factors of 
produotlon directly and indirectly* Through the industrialisation effects on 
factors of production, T, F and K would also be affeoted in the long run) henoe 
their long-term growth is a major polioy issue* Indeed, their long-run
36* We will in our own model redefine this factor to render it more 
quatifiable (see chapter 7)*
37* See Andie, et al, Qp.cit* P. 38
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expansion path is no less important than their short-run value*
Furthermore, to say that I is of long-range importance does not Amply 
that it has no short-term dimension* Employment, whioh oan be considered as 
a short-term issue here, is a very important element in industrialisation 
policy and cannot be Ignored in favour of struetural transformation for its 
own sake* Building new factories oan increase job opportunities in the short 
run irrespective of the long-run struetural transformation effsots of the new 
industries on the economy* All these variables have their short-run and long- 
run aspects) hence the authors' arbitary distinction between short-term and 
long-term variables is not particularly illuminating*
However, on balance, we oan say that the Andios-Dosser technique for 
ranking integration industries represents an improvement on the previous models 
reviewed in this ohapter* For despite its weakness, it breaks from the old 
strait jacket of specialisation under tariff disarmament - whioh had beoo&e the 
preoccupation of oustoms union theorists - and seas integration as a strategy of 
economic development* Hence it incorporates some key issues (suoh ast resource 
availability and use and industrialisation objeetives) in the Eoonomios of 
Development in its framework of analysis*
3* A SYNTHESIS.
The above survey has discussed some of the more recent attempts to measure 
the benefits and oosts of integration* Evidently, these studies, despite their 
merits, highlight the disparate approaches and problems associated with the 
quantitative estimate of the oosts and benefits of integration among LDCs* 
Judging by their principal oharaoterlstios, the methodologies employed, oan 
be classified into three broad groups, namely*
(l) Approaches whose point of reference is national 
income/welfare;
(ii) Methods based on the pattern of intra-area trade> 
and (iii) Techniques focusing on the development and/or 
geographical distribution of industries.
This olasslfioation is by no means watertight nor is it a perfect one. The 
possibility of some overlap is there; yet, it has been adopted for practloal 
purposes to aid our analysis and for convenience*
To minimise repetition, the main groups mentioned above are briefly 
considered below, emphasising principally their common characteristics* No 
further detailed discussion of each method is attempted*
Studies which follow the first line of approach^® calculate a member 
country's gains/loss by ths increase/decrease in national income/we If are due to 
integration-induced industries settling in it under the protection of the protec­
tionist tariff* The benefits of the other member countries are assessed by the 
increase in exports to the first country* A variant of this "macro-method* is 
to determine the benefits by calculating the increased aggregate value produced 
by the expansion of intra-area trade arising out of integration and the conse­
quent increase in national income and in the volume of employment* Although 
there may be further variations of the national income/welfare approaoh, the 
principal focus is on considering the benefits and costs of integration from 
the standpoint of the economy as a whole* And the main studies in this group
38* A number of studies come within this broad group* They includei 7* Andie, 
et al, OT>*clt.. United Nations* Ou.oit*! D* Segal, Qp*olt*i A* J* Brown, 
"Customs Union Versus fconomic Reparation in develop!ng Countries", Op^cit*
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share the principal features of this macroeconomic model. The Andlcs-Dosser 
technique measures the welfare gains or loss from nsw industries, taking into 
account industrialisation benefits, national income loss, foreign exchange 
savings and use of capital resources* The welfare benefits of integration 
industries oan akso be measured in terms of value added per capita and the 
UN method approaches the subject from this angle* Segal assesses the gains 
from new large scale industry both in terms of the industry's foreign investment 
component and according to typical-year valuation methods* This, like the 
Andie s-Dosser model, will indicate the magnitude of gains or loss in national 
in come/we If are arising from the new undertakings*
Basloally, except for differences in assumptions, emphases and analytical 
tools, the macroeconomic models display minor divergencies.
The methodology of the second group of studies is based on the pattern of 
intra-area trade. Such studies include those of Ghai^ and Kead*^° In its 
most simplifisd form, this method computes the benefits and oosts obtained or 
incurred by a country in accordance with the pattern of intra-sonal trade* It 
is held, as Ghai, argues in ths first part of the present chapter, that oountries 
incur a loss by importing from other member oountries, since the protectionist 
common external tariff raises prices within the integration area* The revterse 
of course occurs where one country exports to the others. From this viewpoint, 
the decisive factor in calculating gains and losses from integration is the 
degree of protection afforded by the common external tariff and the destination 
of trade flows between member countries.
39. D. P. Ghai, oo.olt* *
1*0. D. C. Mead, "The distribution of (Spains in Customs Unions between developing 
Countries," Kvklos* Vol. XU, (1968), P. 713.
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The third technique that has been applied to the measurement of costs
and benefits of integration tries to estimate what the development of a
country’s industrial sector would have been if there had been no integration
and to compare it with the situation where integration exists* Newlyn’s
study^1 follows this line* Other studies, broadly similar but differing in
emphasis, are by Caraoy^2 and Schydlowsky.^
In his model, Newlyn assesses the hypothetical industrial development by
analysing the country’s imports, classified by goods ooming from the other
member oountries and the minimum size of plant required to produce these imported
goods* The inference being that if there were no integration, the country could
produce goods, the imports of which are equal to or larger than the output of
the minimum size of plant*
Camoy, on the other hand, applies the ooncept of absolute advantage in
determining the ’’optimum” location points of investments within a union* Once
determined, the ”optlmum” location price at each point is then considered the
intra-union price for the commodity in question* The cost to eaoh member of the
union of buying from the minimum oost (optimum) production points within the
region is compared with the cost of importing from third oountries or producing
the goods domestically*
1+1. W. T. Newlyn, On* clt*
1+2* M* Camoy, Op * olt*
1+3* D* M* Schydlowsky, ”Allocating Integration Industries in the Andean Group”, 
Journal of Common Karket Studies* Tol* IX, No* 1+ (June 1971) P* 299*
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Schydlowsky, like Carnoy, stresses locational considerations. He attempts 
to estimate the benefits and oosts of each of a set of projects based on the 
regional trade specifio value to the production factors used in the projects*
He then tries to determine the country in which each of the projects must be 
located to ensure that the benefits and costs are satisfactorily distributed*
Thus we oan see from the foregoing that the differences within each group 
of methods are more apparent than real* Conceivably, methods within each group 
whioh approaoh the subject of measurement from a common angle or point of re$eren< 
can be rationalised or integrated into one* Although our discussion of existing 
techniques is not exhaustive 9 their re o one true t ion may seem a worthwhile 
exercise in view of the necessity to develop more comprehensive and realistic 
methods of quantifying the benefits and costs of Integration in LDCs* To the 
old and prospective members of a grouping, this is a very important matter since 
the decision to remain or join hinges largely on the estimated net benefits 
aocruable to each member*
However, synthesising the hitherto disparate approaches to the evaluation 
of the costs and benefits of integration can, at beet, solve half the problem 
in this area* There are many general issues which, in varying degrees, affedt 
each methodology* Aside from the theoretio&l questions, attention should be 
drawn to the practical difficulties in the way of aocurate quantification. Some 
of these are briefly discussed^ below - though not neoessarily in relation to 
any particular approach ae this has been done earlier*
I'll* For a more detailed discussion of these issues, see UNCTAD Experts Group 
Report (A*F* Mohr (Chairman), P* Robson, Rapporteur), Current Problems of 
' f Economic Inte/cration, "The distribution of benefits and costs in integration 
among developing countries", lev York, 1973t TD/B/39U* 1* 3-1*5*
 -
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(i) One common problem relates to the kind of information required* Most 
of the methodologies developed necessitate certain statistical data, which are 
usually unavailable or of poor quality* Methods of measurement involving an 
estimate of multipliers, input - output matrices or marginal propensities, for 
example, call for a type of data vhieh, despite efforts so far made, is not yet 
available in many LDCs* Surely, this is a serious limitation, as it greatly 
reduces the practioal utility of most of the methods dlsoussed*
(ii) In some cases the analyses are based on a partial equilibrium frame­
work; the Camoy model is a case In point* They cover only aome of the specific 
features of Integration, such as industrial development, intra-zonal trade or 
fiscal revenue* Even If these partial analyses are accurate, they do not make 
it possible to assess the situation of a country within the integration scheme 
as a whole* A satisfactory evaluation from the point of view of overall costa 
and benefits must consider different aspeots of the question*
(ill) Attempts at measurement inevitably place great emphasis on quantifiable 
factors* This is a major weakness because other factors which are not measurable 
or are hard to measure are left out of account or ignored* It may be noted that 
the non-quantlflable factors oan sometimes be as significant as measurable 
magnitudes*
(iv) There is the danger of trying to apply a single criterion for benefits 
and costs to all member oountries alike, overlooking the hard fact that benefits 
and costs may not mean the same thing at the same time to all oountries* 
Undoubtedly, different levels of development, the special circumstances of 
each country and national objectives in an integration scheme are factors which 
require a different assessment of benefits and costs for each country conoeraed* 
Thus the development of methodologies oapable of taking into account the
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interests of each of the member countries 1b required*
(v) Quite often, the opportunity costs of factors of production are 
ignored* It is assumed that all the factors required for the production 
process are idle and that the production of goods oan therefore be increased 
without a reduction in any of them* This might be so in exceptional cases 
but, in general, ths crltloal factors of produetion (skilled labour and 
capital) are in short supply hence their relatively high opportunity cost*
(vi) Most of the techniques whioh have been developed place far too 
much emphasis on the Industrial aspect of integration and its effects on 
benefits and costs* While it is true that industrial development is a primary 
objective in programmes of economic co-operation in LDCs and should acoordingly 
be treated as suoh, this should not Imply that all the other sectors of the 
economy, suoh as agriculture and services, should be disregarded or relegated 
to the background* For they too are affected by integration and they too are 
a souroe of benefits and oosts to the member oountries*
(vii) Great Importance is usually attached to intra-area trade as a 
determining faotor as far as benefits and oosta of integration are conoeraed* 
This is beaause integration as a rule not only modifies the member oountries 
trade flows by Increasing intra-zonal trade but also may modify member countries 
terms of trade which in turn leads to the reallocation of factors of produetion* 
Such reallocation oould be either in order to take advantage of w new 
investment opportunities or beoause some industries are unable to compete with 
goods from other member countries*
There are also suoh other problems like the issue of convertible currencies 
and the development gap between member countries* The expansion of intra-area 
trade can worsen rather than minimise these problems, depending on the
particular circumstances of a given case*
(viii) Finally, the type of social structure may affect the evaluation of 
benefits and costs* In centrally-planned economies the mechanism for valuing 
the price of goods is the plan but in market economies it is the market mechanism 
It follows that if there are oountries in an integration scheme with diff siring 
types of social structure, difficulties may arise in calculating^ and especially 
in comparing, the costs incurred and the benefits obtained by the member oountriei 
However, these practical and theoretical difficulties, far from serving as 
a pretext to leave the problem untouehed, should stimulate the search for 
practical solution, imperfect as each msy be in and by itself* In the meantime, 
decisions have to be made on the basis of the best possible appraisal, and it 
is plain that even on the basis of the crude data available, quantitative 
assessments oan be made to show which countries are benefiting relatively more 
and in which fields oosts and benefits are ocourlng*
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THE PERFORMANCE OP EXISTING INTEGRATION SCHEMES 
IK VEST AFRICA
Before w  go on to assess the benefits of9 or, indeed, the basis for, 
future co-operation in Vest Afrioa, it is only natural at this juncture to 
review past efforts in this direotion since this vould provide some guidelines 
in shaping future integration schemes*
Despite the adverse legacies of colonialism, as demonstrated in Chapter 
one, on economic co-operation in Vest Afrioa, several sporadic efforts have 
been made in more recent years, especially by the francophone countries,1 to 
build on the foundation of past eoonomic co-operation* These attempts have 
had the blessing of the S*C*A*, in co-operation with the 0*A*U*, since 19&U 
because both organisations have come to regard economic co-operation as a 
pragmatic way of overcoming, or at least mitigating, the adverse economic 
effects of narrow national markets* Unlike East Affica, where the experiment 
in co-operation - though there acre now frustrations in the face of the 
politAoo-dlplomatic tangle between Taasanla and Uganda - has reached a more
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1* As noted elsewhere, French Vest Afrioa has advanced much farther in this 
respeot than British Vest Africa. This was partly because the franoophone 
territories, unlike the anglophone oountries, had the advantage of 
geographical oontigultyt but, perhaps, a more important explanation is that 
the French aspire, of which French Vest Afrioa was a part, was more closely 
knit economically than the British Stop ire to whioh the oountries of British 
Vest Afrioa belonged* Economic co-operation among British Vest Afrioa 
oountries took the form of a common ourrenoy, the Vest African pound and 
the sharing of a number of technical, research and commercial institutions, 
suoh as the Vest Africa Cocoa Research Institute and the West African Air* 
ways Corporation* But after independence eaoh country broke away, setting 
up its own institutions*
advanced stage, the on-going multilateral integration schemes and in ter-state 
organisations in West Africa, which may well provide a nucleus for wider 
groupings (see Chart 5tl), are still in their embryonic stages* Kenoe their 
contributions to the economic development of the region, whioh we do not measure 
here, are likely to be limited* This is not to deny - as we ishall show in 
chapter 8 - that some measure of welfare could be derived where integration has 
successfully induced the establishment of new industries or the expansion of 
existing ones* For the rest of this chapter we will discuss the experiences and 
performance of the most important ones*
5.1 TO? eg;;--QMS CKIOtt OF -'SST afuican states
(i) STRPCTnRB AKP ORGANISATION 
The former members of the French Vest African Federation (Afrique Occidental© 
Frencaise) having learnt from their common history .the benefits of corporate 
development, decided, as they were approaching independence, to form a customs $
union* The only dissenting voice was Guinea* On June 9, 1959, the Vest African 
States of Dahomey, Ivory Coast, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and Upper Volta 
signed a convention which established the first cuptons union of West African 
States (Union Douaniere entre less Stats de LfAfrique Gccidentale or UDAO)*
These seven oountries intended to maintain the customs union regime in effect 
before independence and to harmonize import taxation among member countries, 
Kssentially, the UDAO provided for the absence of customs duties and quantitative 
restrictions on goods in trade between its members but did not call for the 
elimination of other duties and taxes*
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WEST AFRICA t MULTILATERAL ECONOMIC ORGANISATIONS
CHART 5 * 1
*< W
COUNTRY .
DAHOMEY X X X X X X X X X
GAMBIA X X
GHANA X X X
GUINEA X X X X X X
IVORY COAST X X X X X X X X X X
LIBERIA X X
MALI X X X X X X X X X
MAURITANIA X X X X X X X X
NIGER X X X X X X X X K X X
NIGERIA X X X X X X X
SENEGAL X X X X X X X X X
SIERRA LEONE X X
TOGO X X X X X X X X
UPPER VOLTA X X X X X X X X
GUINEA*BISSAU X
ECOWAS = Eoonomic Community of West African States
ADB s African Development Bank
WACU ss West African Customs Union
WAMU SB West African Monetary Union
OCAM = Organisation Commune Afrioaine et Malgache
NRC = NIGER River Commission
CBC s Chad Basin Commission
CPA ss Cocoa Producer's Alliance
IACO a Inter-African Coffee Council
APC s African Groundnut (Peanut) Council
OCCGE s Organisation of Co-ordination and Co-operation for the 
fight against the Major Endemic Diseases (West Afrioa)
SRB a Inter-8tate Committee for the Improvement of the Senegal 
River Basin
OERS a Organisation of Senegal River States
MRU a Mano River Union (between Liberia and Sierra Leone)*
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2By the standard definition of a Customs Union, the UDAO had many essential 
characteristics to qualify as one. The Absence of tariff and non-tariff barriers 
between the partners, the establishment of a common external tariff and the
general harmonization of tax legislation in member countries were all provided
3for. The three Principles which governed the union can be outlined as 
followst-
(i) The convention stipulated that UDAO members sho*-4ld not levy
customs or fiscal duties on trade with other members (Article 1).
This provision has to be viewed against the background that duties 
and taxes on imports have been by far the largest single source of 
government revenue in these countries9 as indeed in most LDCs# 
partly because foreign trade can be taxed more easily than other 
sectors and partly because direct taxefc are difficult to collect in 
economies with relatively limited monetized sectors and weak fiscal 
machinery. Between 196)49 and 1966, average proceeds'from duties and 
taxes on imports accounted for about 60$ of total tax take in 
Dahomey, Ivory Coast, and Upper Volta; U5^ in Senegal; I4O96 in Mali;
3k% in Niger; and 33^ in Mauritania (Table 5t2).
2. The suppression of discrimination in the field of commodity movements 
within the union and equalization of tariffs in trade with non-member 
countries. See Bela Balassa, The Theory of Economic Integration.
op. olt.. P. 2.
3. See J. E. David (unpublished mono), La creation d*une Organisation de 
Co-operation Industrielle. Economique et Douaniere entre less Etats members 
de L’union Douaniere des Etats de LtOuest (UDEAO); also see IMF,
Surveys of African Economies. Op. cit., pp. 1U - UU*
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Over the same period, the ratio of revenue from duties <Jid taxes 
on imports to the value of total imports was estimated at U7% in 
Upper Volta; 39% in Dahomey; 35% in Ivory Coast, Mali and Seneral; 
20% in Niger; and 27% in Mauritania.
(ii) The establishment of a common external tariff extended to both 
customs and fiscal duties levied by the member countries (i.e. 
imports from non-member cduntries were made subject to a common 
customs tariff). The system, as noted earlier, involved the 
adoption of a two-tier tariff structure. But, although customs 
duties were livied for fiscal as well as protective purposes, 
they were not applicable to imports from France. And they also 
varied between goods imported from countries receiving most­
favoured-nation treatment (goods subject to the minimum tariff) 
and goods imported from other countries (goods subject to 
general tariff, usually three times as high as the minimum 
tariff). Fiscal duties in effect on March 31t 1959 and applied 
to imports from non-member countries were to be maintained, and 
all parties to the convention were to agree on any modification 
or introduction of new duties. The convention specifically 
precluded any member from changing the level of structure of its 
import taxes without prior concurrence of all other partners 
(Article 1).
(iii) The UDAO Convention provided for a Committee of Experts to study
the harmonization of the laws and regulations on internal taxes
in order to prevent illicit trade between the member countries
(Article 3)* This committee was also entrusted with undertaking
studies on other matters designed to facilitate the implementation 
of the convention, particularly problems of double taxation and tax, 
evasion. Measures dealing with such problems could be embodied in 
multilateral or bilateral agreements to be worked out by the interested 
parties. The convention did not specifically call for coordination of 
similar investment regulations; but this objective was partly implied 
in the expected harmonization of the fiscal systems.
The UDAO Convention also provided for the establishment of several common 
institutions with a view to settling problems arising from the implementation 
of the customs union (Articles 2-6). Apart from the joint commissions which 
were to determine the distribution of revenue from import and export duties 
and taxes and apart from the Committee of Experts which, as noted above, was to 
study fiscal harmonization, the convention established a Customs Union Committee 
vested with desision making powers (Article 5)* It was composed of one 
representative from each member state, and its decision were binding on all 
parties. The Customs Union Committee was to make decisions on important 
matters, such as the distribution of revenue collected from import and export 
duties and taxes and the proposals for fiscal harmonization submitted by the 
Committee of Experts. Disputes arising from implementation of the customs union 
could be brought before the Court of Arbitration of the French Community.^
Thus, on paper it seemed as if the UDAO would be very successful. But that 
was not to be. As we explain below the convention virtually became inoperative 
and inoperable in its original form shortly after it had come into force.
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(ii) PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL
The in-built weaknesses of the UDAO Convention of 1959 made it^orderly 
implementation extremely difficult. Its goals were overambitious, its 
provisions inflexible and its machinery too complicated to ensure smooth and 
effective implementation. Some of the more salient weaknesses of the 
convention are discussed in some detail here.
First, the system of revenue allocation^ias complex and dilatory. The 
convention states that receipts from imports and export taxation should be 
distributed in a manner so as to give eaeh country its appropriate share 
(Article 2). Joint commissions were to be set up in two or several member 
states for determining the distribution of receipts on the basis of customs 
declarations, investigations among traders, and other relevant elements of 
estimation. Disbursement of receipts was to be made quarterly. To deal with 
this, arrangements were worked out between member countries for a system of 
sharing proceeds from duties and taxes on imports. Senegal and Mauritania had 
an arrangement whereby such proceeds were distributed on the basis of 91*38% 
for the former add 8.62% for the later. Similar arrangements existed betveen 
Ivory Coast and Upper Volta and between Dahomey and Niger. Since the 1959 
convention did not settle the problem of originof goods or define the 
goods originating within the UDAO area, and whereas goods originating in non­
member countries were subject to taxation and reimbursement each time they 
crossed country boundaries within the UDAO area, the administration of the 
revenue allocation system proved cumbrous and woolly. There was also the 
additional factor that various regulations infringed upon the importers* freedom 
to choose points of entry and hence forced them to ij&ctionate their imports 
according to countries of final distination.
Secondly, the convention was very inflexible with respect to the right of 
individual member states to alter its tax structure. Given the fast growth of 
government expenditures in the post-independence era, it was difficult for 
member states of the UDAO to Adhere strictly to the provision of Article 1 
which forbade members to change or modify their import tax system to meet their 
revenue requirements without the concurrence of all the other members. In 
practice, eaoh member country did modify its fiscal duties in accordance with 
its own financial needs. The base of fiscal duties was broadened, rates were 
raised, and excise taxes were increased. Besides, products originating in 
member countries were subjected to fiscal duties, beginning in 1962.
Thirdly, the convention failed to provide for adequate consultation between 
its member states. Consequently, no progress was made in the field of fiscal 
harmonization. The single body vested with collective decision making, the 
Customs Union Committee, seemed to be too supranational and powerful to allow 
for a flexible and realistic approach. Unlike the Equatorial Customs Union 
established in the same year, UDAO did not call for varied and permanent 
institutions such as a general secretariat, an executive committee, and a council 
of heads of state or ministers. In the absence of adequate permanent institutions, 
none of the goals of the 1959 convention was achieved, except the establishment 
of a common customs tariff in all UDAO countries.^
5* Ibid. Thus as chapters 8 and 9 will show permanent institutions play a 
vital role in the smooth and effective operation of integration schemes.
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Even so, except between Senegal and Mauritania, whose trade links have 
been in any case, particularly close, the impact of the convention on the 
flow of intra-regional trade had been very limited. In the face of this 
disappointing performance, the UDAO members met in Paris in 1966 to seek ways 
and means of reshaping their near-inoperable union. Opinions came down 
heavily in favour of restructuring the organisation with a view to transforming 
it into a looser association so as to ensure its effectiveness and success.
TABLE 5.2
%JDEAO COUNTRIES1 RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF RECEIPTS
1 oFROM IMPORT DUTIES1 AND TAXES. 196l*-66
Import Duties^ 2and Taxes as a Per Cent of j
Imports
1965 1966
Tax
1961*
Receipts
1965 1966 1961*
Dahomey 60.1* 66.0 57.9 37.0 38.6 1»0,3
Ivory Coast 59.7 62.0 63.1; 3U.0 3U.5 37.3
Mali 51.0 35.6 37.6 36.3 29.1 1*1.1*
Mauritania 1*1.2 30.2 29.5 36.8 21.3 22.8
Niger 27.1 36.3 f-.
OO 30.6 26.1 26.U
Senegal 1*7.2 1*6.2 1*1*. 1 37.8 35.7 35.0
Upper Volta 60.5 63.8 n.a. U5.8 50.0 n.a.
Source! IMF. Surveys of African Economics, Vol#3, Washington D.C.1970, p.15
1. Fiscal and customs duties
2. Import turnover tax, and statistical and other surcharges on
imports.
THE RESHAPING OF THE UDAO 
The result of the Paris Conference was the signing at Abidjan in 1966 of 
a new convention, establishing with effect from December 15» 1966, the Customs
Union of West African States (Union Douanie*re des Etats de L'Afrique de L’Ouest,
cor UDEAO) • Taking into account the diverse fiscal interests of the different 
states, the UDEAO was more realiitic than the UDAO* Indeed, the reshaped union 
was more of a free trade area than a customs union. It is, however, ironical 
that while the UDEAC countries transformed their customs union into a broader 
economic union in 1966, the West African (UDEAO) countries were at the same 
time going in the opposite direction by transforming their customs union into 
a much looser customs grouping*
ESSENTIAL CHANGES INTRODUCED BY UDEAO 
In terms of scope, as noted above, the 1966 convention did not provide 
a complete customs union* It sought to ensure the free circulation of local 
products of members within the area, subject to a certain measure of protection 
for existing industries and a fiscal tax* With a view to facilitating this, 
the convention provided for a common customs duty; it also called for a further 
harmonization of legislation on other import and export taxation in recognition 
of the evolution of tariff legislation in each country* It excluded any tariff 
concessions below the minimum tariff on goods imported from countries outside 
UDEAO (Article 3)1 but allowed for concessions between the minimum and the 
general tariff and the origin of imported goods was defined. In a nutshell, the 
new agreement was more modest, less imprecise and more realistic in its 
provisions*
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The organisational s^ fc-up was also more conventions^ although this had
also led to bureaucracy* A number of permanent institutions consisting of a
council of Ministers, a Committee of Experts, and a General Secretariat were
established* The Council of Ministers was the supreme policy-making body*
The council met once a year in ordinary session and was made up of one member
of each government who was ordinarily the Minister of Finance. Its decisions
required a simple majority and were binding on all members. Beneath this was
a Committee of Experts which acted as an advisory organ of the Secretariat whilst
the General Secretary, based in Ouagadougou (Upper Volta), conducted the
day-to-day operations of UDEAO under the direction of the Council of Ministers* j
IMPACT OF THE UDEAO ON TRADE
Within the intra-union area, commodities grown, extrated or manufactured
were exempted from customs duty, but were subject to fiscal duties and other
taxes, which in total should not exceed $0$  of the aggregate of the most
favourable treatment accorded to similar goods imported from third countries
(Ac tide 6)* A higher rate amounting to 7<$ was authorized to protect an
industry that might be less competitive than a new, similar industry in another 
7member country* The convention even allowed pre-existing bilateral arrangements 
among member countries* For example, the agreements between Ivory Coast and
7* It is interesting to note the similarity between these provisions and those 
accorded to Tanzania under the Kampala Treaty of 19^7 (see P* Robson, The 
Reshaping of East African Co-operation, East African Economic Review 
December, ‘1967)9 Although this necessary safeguard is designed to diffuse 
development rather than encourage polarisation within the union, it makes 
for trade-diversion. In terms of pure theory, it is counter-productive 
because consumers in the protected infant industry area within the union 
pay higher prices for similar goods associated with the new industries than 
the consumers in the other parts of the common market where concessional 
protective duties are not enforced* This may, of course, be transient and 
could be defended on dynamic-effect grounds, namely revenue, employment and 
industrialization*
Upper Volta, signed on March 19t 19^3# and between Senegal and Upper Volta, 
signed on September 7» 1965» remained operative when the UDEAO came into being. 
Although these agreements were judged to be compatible with the provisions of
othe 1966 convention, the UDASO - until it ceased to function on June/1, 1972 - 
scarcely justified the high hopes of its founders. The volume of trade between
the member states from 1966 through 19^9 increased by 1% for imports and 2% for
9exports.
Several reasons can be adduced to explain this phenomenon. Generally, the 
economies of the former UDEAO members do not fulfil the conditions of traditional 
theory of integration. They are not "potentially very complementary*" their 
ratio of foreign trade to total, as shown earlier, is very high; their pre-union 
volume of intra-regional trade is low and in some instances zero whilst the 
scope of economies of scale is limited, especially where intra-union protective 
tariffs are conceded.
Planned complementarity seems to be a necessary process in the integration 
of developing economies. If industries are to be efficient, not only must 
they be assured of access to a wider market but also they must be specialised 
on the basis of factor endowments and availability of raw materials. Given the 
scarcity of resources, those resources should be utilized so as to maximize 
comparative advantages. Duplication of productive units could be avoided through 
harmonization of industrial development within the area and reconciliation of 
national development plans. Without complementarity, the volume of intra-union
trad* would continue to be low, as governments would often invoke safeguard
8. AFRICt RESEARCH HW.T.CTTK. P. 2375A
9. C. Legum and Associate (eds)t Africa Contemporary Record. 1969-70, p.CUi8.
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clauses or take fiscal measures to protect industries from their competitors in 
other member countries. Furthermore, given the present pattern of production 
and foreign-oriented trade, it is difficult to expand intra-union trade despite 
the existence of the customs* union. But, if market-oriented food production 
were expanded - within the framework of the modernisation and diversification of 
agriculture, and larger import-substitution indlstrles established within the 
UDEAO, the proper implementation of the customs union might have increased 
intra-union trade considerably. In other words, the expansion of the intra­
union market would have made it easier to realise the economies of scale.
Another visible problem, whioh bedevilled the UDEAO and contributed more
than any other single factor to its collapse1^ , is the question of disparities
in development levels. Ivory Coast and Senegal, the most advanced countries in
the area, have been developing much faster than the landlocked countries.
Available statistics monitor this "development-gap" very clearly* 1*1$ of
manufacturing units established in the area originate from Dakar and Abidjan,
both of which also account for 60% of electrical power generated and consumed
for industrial use. The share of Senegal and Ivory Coast in UDEAQ*s foreign
trade was of the order of 75% in 1965-67*^  Thus, the UDEAO*8 inability to
cope with the problem of sharing of its benefits and its tendency to polarize
development, to the disadvantage of the lesser developed countries must have
really contributed to its abolition. HoweVer, as we shall discuss in greater
detail later, the problem of polarization of development is nothing new to
integration literature. If there was really a strong political will among
members to overcome this problem, the introduction of some equitable distribution 
ICE See AFRICA RESEARCH BULLETIN, P. 2375*
11. IMP, Qp. oit.. P. 38
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measures could have saved the situation* There is much to learn from the EAEC 
experience.12
Finally, transport difficulties dealt a serious blow to effective competi­
tion and free circulation of goods within the UDEAO* Transport problems, 
discussed elsewhere, and, particularly high transport costs made it difficult for 
the exports of the inland countries to compete with those of coastal countries* 
The former were compelled to reduce producer prices below those prevailing in 
the coastal countries and thus lowered rural incomes*
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12* The EAEC has had its fair share of a similar problem. The problem of dis­
parity of benefits of the Economic Community has persisted, although it is 
generally agreed that its operation has been advantageous to the region as 
a whole* In 1961 the Raisman Commission recommended the introduction of a 
measure of fiscal compensation from Kenya to Tanzania and Uganda but this 
did not remove the dissatisfaction of the former. The Kampala-Mbale Agree­
ment of 19^5 represented a further attempt to meet Tanzania's claims and to 
some extent those of Uganda by three bhief means, namely* a selective 
system of firm production reallocation in favour of Tanzania; the imposition 
on an agreed basis of some quantitative restrictions on inter-country trade; 
and a formula for the allocation of new regionally - oriented industries 
such that Tanzania would get the most. This Agreement was not fully imple­
mented; hence it was ineffective. Partly, as a consequence, Tanzania 
resorted in 19^5 and 1966 to sweeping unilateral import restrictions against 
Kenya. In the light of this development, the Philip Commission was set up 
to examine and recommend ways and means of strengthening the EAEC and of 
diffusing development, particularly industrial growth, within the community. 
It recommended, inter alia, the decentralization of the headquarters of the 
common services in such a way that each country is allocated two headquarter* 
quantitative restrictions on basic staple foods or major export crops 
subject to special marketing arrangements and the imposition of the so-calle< 
transfer tax. The recommendations of the Commission were embodied in the 
1967 Kampala Treaty and their implementation greatly assuaged the fears and 
worries of Tanzania and Uganda (See P. Robson, The East African Economic 
Review, December, 1967)* For a similar reason, the Central American Common 
Market (CACM) is now in danger of collapse. Honduras suspended common 
market trading later in 1970 when her neighbours, Guatamala and El Salvador, 
which have attracted most of the industries in the region, had refused to do 
anything to help her attract new factories. During the second week of 
September (1972), the representatives of Guatamala, El Salvador and 
Nicaragua announced they had closed their borders to goods originating from 
Coast Rica. The action came after Costa ^ jlca decided to impose dual 
exchange rates, a measure her « neighbours claim amounts to a 30% import 
surtax (see New York limes News Service, 8 September, 1972). The three 
remaining members have agreed to limit trade among themselves to current 
levels.
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At the same time the landlocked countries paid higher prices for their imported 
good;, compared with prices in the coastal areas. This anomalous situation 
points to the urgent need for an adequate integrated transport network in this 
part of West Africa.
(iii) THS FINAL COLLAPSE OF THE UDEAO
On May 11, 1972, the Secretary-General of the UDEAO, Mr. Tamboura said 
in Dakar that the UDEAO would cease to function with effect from 1st June 
and would be replaced by the Communaute Economique de L'Ouest (CEAO).^ He 
argued that the three principles of the Customs Union (which was formed on 
June 9th, 1959)* free exohange of goods and persons between member states; 
the establishment of a common external customs tariff; and the sharing of 
customs receipts amongst all member states, had not been respected by member 
countries, "faced for the moat part with budgetary problems." In the light 
of this situation, he went on, the Heads of State decided on June 3rd, 1966 
to set up a new convention which would encourage the member states to respect 
UDEAO*s principles. But this decision did not apparently materialise since 
the Heads of State meeting in Bamako in 1970 gave the general secretariat the 
task of substituting UDEAO with another organisation having a wider area of 
co-operation objectives.
On June 3t a treaty insituting the CEAO was signed by the Ivory Coast, 
Dahomey, Upper Volta, Mali5Mauritania, Niger and Senegal at Bamako. Togo 
stayed out, though sent an observer. The signing of this treaty sounded the 
death knell of the UDEAO but marked the birth of the CEAfi, which Mr. Tamboura 
13. AFRICA- RESEARCH BULLETIN. V .2 % lk  (Sea Section 5.2).
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described as "an instrument of progress in the service of our peoples*"1^
But as ve shall seon see in our later discussion of the ECOWAS and CEAO, this
remark is no more than ana obiter dictum*
It can be seen from the foregoing reasoning that, & y e r before the final
collapse of the UDEAO, it had become obvious to observers that the grouping
needed thorough-going reorganisation and reorientation, if anything was to be
salvaged from the union* In this regard, mention should be made here of Je E*
15David, who made a careful study of the UDEAO problems and made a number of 
interesting suggestions as to how to reorientate the organisation into an 
effective organ of corporate development* J*E* David envisaged the creation of 
an organised zone of commercial exchanges, based on common interests and good 
faith, among the member states of UDEAO, which felt they would, on balance 
benefit from membership and would work hard to ensure the success of the 
integration scheme* Acoording to David the conclusion of inter-state agreements, 
which would ultimately lead to a Customs Union, would form the initial framework 
of co-operation* These agreements, however, should include the adoption and 
definition of the origin principle and a tariff structure conducive to intra^ 
union trade, the proceeds from which would go to a distributable pool* Further­
more, there was to be the creation of an "encouragement fund for indistrializatioi 
and for inter-state commerce"*
The merits of David's model are clear* The UDEAO might have gone never­
theless but the spirit and momentum of economic co-operation in the region 
would not only have been kept alive but also given a new lease of life*
11*. Ibid.
15* Je E* David, Oo* cit*
The emerging groupings might have been smaller but manageable* And the 
integrating economies might have been relatively in similar levels of develop­
ment that none would be in a position to dominate others. However, now that 
the UDEAO is no more, it will be interesting to see how far David's ideas 
influenced the formation of the suGcedding grouping (see Section 5*6)*
(iv) CONCLUSION
We have shown how the UDAO of 1959» plummeted fron its inadequacies into 
a restructured body in 1966 in a bid to rid the union of its ineffectiveness. 
But, although the reshaped UDEAO, as renamed, was both in orientation and temper 
very modest, it never fulfilled the aspirations of its members until it was 
scrapped in 1972. The difficulties, which faced the organisation, as demons- 
traded above, were essentially structural and organisational* the revenue need 
of individual states exacerbated by the disparities in inter-country incomes 
impeded the strict adherence to community principles; transport problems, 
especially those of landlocked members, impaired intra-union free flow of goods 
and services; and lastly, inadequate and ineffective administrative machinery 
rendered the enforcement of trade regulations difficult.
Even if, as noted above, David's proposals for a radical reorientation 
of economic co-operation in the area were accepted, some of the key obstacles 
to integration would still persist. This is because these problems (non-comple­
mentarity of primary production and trade, public revenue problems and 
transport difficulties) are fundamentally structural in nature and they are 
likely to face any future integration experiment in the region. It can there­
fore be said, without mincing words, that the logic of the situation demands a 
frontal attack on these structural obstacles.
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5.2 COMMONAPTE ECONOMIQUK BE L'AFRIQUE DE L1QUEST
(CBAO)
Francophone West Africa's newest grouping, Communaute Sconomique 
de L'Afrique de L'Ouest (CEAO), was formed to replace the defunct UDEAO* As 
noted in the preceding section, a preliminary agreement instituting the CEAO 
was signed by the Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Mali, Dahomey, Mauritania, Niger 
and Senegal at Bamako on June 3, 1972* Togo stayed out, though sent an 
observer* But the CEAO was not formally established until April, 1973 following 
a meeting in Abidjan, where the final treaty was signed*
(i) MEMBERSHIP
The CEAO has six members* They included* Ivory Coast, Mali, Mauritania,
Niger, Senegal and Upper Volta. These are the French - speaking states of 
Vest Africa which signed the final treaty. Although Dahomey signed the 
preliminary Bamako accord, it refused to sign the final treaty in Abidjan, 
opting for observer status instead. Togo never signed any* The new organization j 
was inteded to combine the Entente with the Organization of Senegal River States 
(OERS). With the exception of Guinea and Dahomey it covers what was untill 
1957 French West Africa.
(ii) STRUCTURE AND ORGANISATION
CEAO aims to create a free - trading zone among the Francophone Vest 
African countries. It is clearly based on the franc zone and Yaounde - type 
association with the EEC* Its stated aims are to harmonize and boost the economic 
activities of its members*^
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16. See AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL* May 11, 1973» Vol.lU No. 10 see Also Weat Africa. 
December 17t 1973*
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It provides for the joint promotion of agricultural and industrial development, 
and the co-opdination of transport and communications* There are special 
protocols on livestock production, fishing, the compilation of statistics and 
accountancy methods* A common export policy is envisaged, and complex internal 
trade arrangements are to be worked out*
The CEAO is not a customs union per se* A thorough-going customs union 
would have inevitably encouraged lopsided development within the union as the 
UDEAO actually did; hence there are to be special preferences* These special 
preferences - like the imposition of a transfer tax under the EABC Treaty of 
1967 - are designed to minimise the cumulative polarization effects of intra­
union free trade on the less developed members. Also the CEAO Treaty provides 
for the establishment of a development fund to compensate member countries for 
any revenue losses sustained through the substitution of CEAO - made goods for 
extra - union imports. The organization's headquarters at OugadoUgou will 
administer the fund.
Compared with the UDEAO, it can be seen that the CEAO is less ambitious 
in orientation and more realistic in its structure* It is smaller and looks 
more manageable* It would appear that Je E* David's ideas of a smallder, 
more manageable zone of commercial exchanges based on common interests and 
good faith influenced the founding fathers of the new organization*
Should the CEAO actually Succeed in creating a common market for the 
franc - zone countries of West Africa, it could become a closer-knit, better 
balanced and more effective economic integration scheme than its predecessor, 
the UDEAO*
(iii) CEAO PROBLEMS 
Butt the CEAO’s future is still very uncertain* Its problems are many 
and multifarious in nature* And they are not only economic but also political* 
In the first place, the creation of the CEAO is part of a complex 
manoeuvre to counterbalance Nigeria’s political and economic weight, and in 
particular to check her attempts to organise a larger West African economic 
community in which the former French colonies might achieve a greater degeree 
of independence* But recent developments in the trend «f ifoughts with
jg
respect to economic integration in West Africa do not favour the CEAO spirit*
Internally, the cohesion of Fmcophone Africa seems to be crumbling
(and with it some of France’s influence)* As pointed out earlier, Dahomey
and Togo disassociated themeelves from the CEAO by refusing to s}.gn the
Abidjan Treaty. Dahomey argues that it has commitments to its neighbours
and principal trading partners - Nigeria, Ghana and Togo and since none of
these belong to the CEAO, it would be very unrealistic to join it. Togo,
which has close ethnic and economic associations with Ghana • for its part -
has been more interested in working with Nigeria towards the formation
of a wider West African economic community which would embrace both
anglophone and francophone countries than in the CEAO* Indeed, President
EJyaddma of Togo and General Gowon of Nigeria had agreed in April 1972 to
17form the "nucleus” of such an integration scheme. It is widely believed that
this "nucleus" was an attempt by Nigeria to get in ahead before the
purely fancophone formation was announced* Conceivably, the CEAO was discussed
and planned during the first African tour in 1971 of the late President
Pompidou of France when lie advised francophone countries to "harmonise
18their efforts io as to counter-balance the heavy weight of Nigeria*"
17. Ibid.
Nigeria's reaction to this took the form of an intesified campaign for & 
wider west African grouping which has resulted to the signing of the ECOWAS 
treaty. This treaty is discussed in section 5,7.
Within the CEAO itself some members hare expressed strong reservations.
The erstwhile President of Niger, Hamani Diori, the first CEAO chairman, was 
quoted as saying that it would be very "unrealistic” to set up a West Afrioan 
Economic Community without the participation of English - speaking countries,
arguing that Nigeria was Niger's main African trading partner. Even Mauritania•. 1 ' *
had misgivings and wanted to reserve her right to extend to her Marred 
neighbours the same preferences she is to enjoy in the CEAO, Besides, her 
decision to have her own currency impeded the franc-zone arrangements with 
the CEAO,
Externally, too, the CEAO took off to a bad start. Officially, the
CEAO members say that their new grouping is open to "all African States, be
20they Francophone or Anglophone • , , to join us and adhere to the Treaty",
But, in fact, shat is meant here is that other African countries could, if 
they wished, join the CEAO - once established - in the future. The point 
is unmistakably implied in a remark on the absence of Anglophone represent­
atives at the Bamako Conference associated with President Houphouet-Boignyi
"Great Britain did not take part in the establishment of the EEC and has
21only later asked to join",
19. See Africa Confidential, May 11, 1973. Vol. 11* No. 10.
20, West Affica. 7 July, 1972. This statement is credited to President 
Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast.
21* Ibid. There is little doubt that the CEAO was intentionally designed to 
keep the Anglophones out* Ghana applied to attend the Bamako meeting but 
was told by Senghor it was too late - the intention was to invite the 
Anglophones to join "later" (A,C, Dp.Cit),
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To say the least, the analogy being drawn here represents a serious misjudgement 
The weight of Nigeria, relative to the membership of the CEAO, is enormously 
greater than that of the United Kingdom relative to the EEC# The entire 
population of the CEAO (indluding Dahomey and Togo which have so far refused 
to join) is less than JO million, clearly less than half the population of 
Nigeria# The GNP of the CEAO countries, except for the Ivory Coast and 
Senegal, is pitifully small, and so is their economic growth rate# Specifically 
the combined GNP of the present CEAO members accounted for only 52% of that of 
Nigeria in 1971*
Geographically, the Francophone CEAO is hardly a unit# As already noted, 
Nigeria is already Niger's major trading partner, whilst Ghana separates Togo 
and Dahomey from the other members of the CEAO and has strong economic ties
with Togo# If anything, the cirumstances of west Africa demand homogamic
22integration rather than anabatic co-operation* Thus it is really hard
to justify the importation of inter-state relations in Europe into the
fundamentally different local circumstances of West Africa#
Observers of the West African scene entertain doubts as to whether the
setting up of an exclusive francophone grouping is the right answer to the
logic of the situation in the sub-region. More recently, however, there
has been some evident rethinking on this matter. At their meeting in April
1975 - the first since the CEAO was established - the heads of state of the
six member countries invited the other countries in West Africa to join the
22. Homogamic integration takes place among neighbouring states while anabatic 
co-operation is formed by non-neighbouring states which are homogamically 
related by proxy (see Africa. No. 36, August 197U)*
organization on the founders1 terms. This invitation of course was not 
accepted by the Anglophones - and the founding fathers of the CEAO, Senghor 
and Houphouet-Boigny probably knew they would not.
The only published results of the two-day closed session at Niamey 
were the launching of the existing community, largely ineffective since its 
formation in 1973t into ”the operational phase” of francophone co-operation 
and the election of President Senghor as the Chairman of the CEAO. But 
nothing conclusive can be said at this early stage regarding the future of the 
CEAO. What is clear is that its formation has brought suppressed francophone 
differences to the surface in some respects* (i) for the first time some 
Francophone countries opposed the creation of yet another exclusive organisation 
of francophones which would tend to perpetuate the pre-independence cleavage, 
in the face of strong French encouragement, if not pressure; and (ii) the 
traditional conflict of interests between the relatively rich coastal countries 
and the impoverished, semi-desert landlocked states of the interior was brought 
frankly into the open.
(It ) CONCLUSION
Given these internal differences, the attainment of economic union through 
linquistic groups does not adequately take into account the stark realities of 
the sub-region. Surely, the recent signing of the ECOWAS treaty by all the w 
15 states of West Africa in Lagos indicates that the case for a wider and all­
embracing grouping in the area is still very persuasive, despite the existence 
of the CEAO. To some extent, the founding of the CEAO marks yet another mile­
stone ir> Houphouet-Boigny* s lifelong quest for an interstate organisational 
vehicle suited to his leadership.
23. West Africa. 5 May, 1975 
21*. Ibid.
23
5.3 WEST AFRICAN MONETARY UNION (UMOA)
Perhaps, the most successful post-AOF arrangement for economic co-operation 
in West Africa has been in the monetary field# Although in some respects the 
West African Monetary Union (Union Monetaire Ouest Africaine - UMOA) vould be 
regarded as the monetary arm of the UDEAO, the former, unlike the latter, has
2*5stood well to the test of time, despite the defection of Mali.
On May 12, 1962 a treaty establishing UMOA and providing for a common 
currency and a common central bank was signed by the member states of the
UDEAO. Togo joined later in 1963. As far back as 1959 the UDEAO members
had shared a central bank, the Banque Centrale des Etats de L’Afrique de 
L’Ouest of BCEAO, which issued a common currency, the CFA franc. However, 
the old BCEAO was dissolved on October 31t 1962 and was replaced by a new 
central bank of the same name but with enlarged responsibilities and an 
intergovernmental organization. On the same day the BCEAO countries concluded 
with France a co-operation agreement by which France guaranteed the convert­
ibility of the CFA franc, issued by the BCEAO, into French Franc*, and the 
members of the UMOA undertook to keep their external reserves in an operations 
account opened by the new BCEAO at the French Treasury, with which a special
relationship was established. It must be noted at this point that the treaty
establishing the UMOA and the agreement for cooperation are two separate docu­
ments; indeed the treaty providing for a monetary union and a common central bank
• 4
could continue in force even if the agreement for cooperation were to be abrogated
25. Mali did not ratify the treaty establishing UMOA and did not join in the 
cooperation agreement. However, after the 1967 devaluation of the Mali 
franc and negotiations with France, Mali established an operations account, 
with effect from March 29, 1968, and its agreements with France provide 
that it may eventually join UMAO (see IMF, op. cit.. P. 21*). See also 
Africa Research Bulletin. P. 2375A.
26. IMF., Ibid., P. 71
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The BCEAO has a closely knit but simple organisation run at two levels* 
Though with its headquarters in Paris, the central bank maintains an agency 
in the capital of each member country and has established sub-agencies in some
other place3 within the UMOA territory* The over-all management of BCEAO is\
entrusted to a Board of Directors in which each member country appoints k v jo
27directors, from whom one is elected President; and Prance, under the provisions 
of the cooperation agreement, appoints seven directors, or the equivalent of half 
of the total number appointed by the UMOA countries. As a general rule, the 
decisions of the Board are taken by a simple majority, but, in practice, ce&tain
important decisions must be adopted by a two-third majority - indeed, amendments
28of the statues requires the unanimous decision of the Board*'
Beneath the Board, a five-member National Monetary Committee, appointed, 
in each member country, by the government and including the two national
directors, implements the general credit and rediscount policy decisions taken
29by the Board of Directors* Day-to-day running of BCEAO is entrusted to a 
Director - General, appointed for an indefinite term by the Board of Directors* 
The Director-General attends, either personally or through a delegate, all 
meetings of the Board and the National Monetary Committees* He also represents 
BCEAO in all its external relations. All BCEAO personnel are appointed and 
removed from office by the Director-General, although appoint<T\£n\ ^ 'agency
managers requires the prior approval of the government of the country in which
30the agency is established.
27* Ibid., P. 72 
28* Ibid*
29. Ibid*
30.' Ibid.
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Generally speaking, the division of responsibilities between these two 
level8 of administration is that the Board is responsible for, namelyt fixing 
the overall supply of short-term credit in the light of resources and needs; 
fixing the discount rate; determining the ceilings to be granted by the local 
branches of the Central Bank to each economy in respect of rediscounts, 
advances and so on# The National Monetary Committees, in their turn, are 
responsible for advising the Board from time to time on the credit limits in the 
individual ??CEAO countries# When these have been fixed they are responsible for 
determining the ceilings for each local bank and for individual enterprises.
Also the Central Bank can sometimes delegate some power to the Monetary 
Committees to act on its behalf in certain matters.
Three most important functions of the BCEAO can be distinguished. These 
includes the monopoly of note issue; a depository of external reserves and 
credit creation.
BCEAO, in its capacity as a Central Bank, has the sole right to issue the 
CPA franc in each member country. The official rate of the CFA franc, which, 
as noted earlier, is fully convertible into French francs, was CFAF 613.25 = 
£11.00 (sterling) as at II4 August, 1972; but the relationship of the CFA franc 
to the French franc has always remained^ at CFAF1 = P0.02 (F1.0 = CFAP 50).
The effectiveness of UMOA with respect to overcoming internal payment problems 
has been remarkable.
31* The apparent constancy in the rate of exchange between the CPA franc and 
the French franc is explained by the fact that the CPA franc is, by 
ag agreement, automatically convertible into the French franc, hence they 
appreciate or depreciate simultaneously in value. For latest exchange 
rates, see Africa Research Bulletin. P.21+37•
Because notes and coins issued by BCSAC are legal tender in all member countries 
and circulate freely within UMOA Statistics, based on issuance of each country's 
notes and withdrawal of notes of other countries, reveal a fairly large inter­
country circulation of notes, particularly between Mauritania and Senegal,
32between Dahomey and Togo, and among Ivory Coast, Niger and Upper Volta.
The other function of BCEAO is that it acts as the depository of UMOA
members1 external reserves* These reserves are held in, what is termed, an
operations account at the French Treasury* As indicated above, the procedural
aspects of the centralization of BCEAO*s reserves in the operations account are
regulated by a convention between BCEAO and the French Treasury. A recent
amendment to this convention dated June 2, 19^7 makes it possible for BCEAO to
invest part of its exchange reserves in certain types of negotiable bonds,
maturing within two years, issued by international organizations of which all
33BCEAO countries are members. Since this amendment, BCEAO has invested part 
of its foreign reserves in short-term bonds issued by the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (World Bank).
Pursuant to the cooperation agreement concerning the operations account 
BCEAO can apply specific measures in case of a continuous and sizeable reduction 
of exchange reserves.
32* Ibid* P. 73* Although all the notes and coins circulating within UMOA are 
issued by BCEAO, identification of CFA notes by a letter following the 
serial number enables BCEAO to keep separate accounts for each country's 
currency in circulation* Coins are not identified by country and they 
account for roughly only i$> of total currency in circulation (ibid).
For example, BCEAO*a discount rate and charges on advances must be increased 
by 1% point if the operations account for the area as a whole with the French 
Treasury shows a debit for 60 days. Alsoy in the event that the deposits in
this account are exhausted, BCEAO may require public and private organizations
39to surrender their French francs or other foreign currency holdings to it
against CFA francs. But BCEAO, at its discretion, may restrict this requirement
solely to public institutions and banks and may implement it only in countries
whose external transactions through the operations account show a deficit.
The third major role of BCEAO relates to credit creation. Within the
framework of rediscount ceilings which are the principal means of control,
BCEAO is authorized to extend both short-term and medium-term credit.
Short-term credit is extended in the form of rediscount of short-term paper
and temporary advances (prises en pension) against private and government
paper, as well ad direct advances secured by either gold or foreign exchange
and securities acceptable to BCEAO. Normally the period for which short-term
credit is granted is limited to six months, but it may be extended up to nine
36months for financing crops and public contracts. Medium-term credits are
granted by BCEAO for periods not exceeding five years.
Furthermore, BCEAO may grant the Treasury of any UMOA country ways-and-
means or short-term advances for a period not exceeding 21*0 days, consecutive
or not, per calendar year, and in an amount, not exceeding 1004 of the
government’s fiscal receipts during the preceding budgetary year, 
lit. Ibid. PTfE
35* It must be stressed here that the Frenoh Treasury pays interest to BCEAO on
balances in the operations account at an annual rate at least equal to the
re rediscount rate of the Bank of France, but never less than 2.3%; in 1967/68
the effective rate was The BCEAO, on the other hand, pays intrest to
France on any overdraft balance at an annual rate between 1% and the redis­
count rate of the Bank of France, depending on the amount (see Ibid).
On December 10, 19^8, however, the BCEAO statutes were amended to enable
the Board of Directors, after reviewing developments in the cu±rency issue
and evaluating the effects of its decision on the development of the currency
issue, to raise the maximum amount of short-term advances to an amount
37equal to 1 ^  of fiscal receipts* In addition, BCEAO may discount Treasury 
customs duty bills, provided such bills have a maturity of less than four 
months, have been issued by a solvent debtor, and are guaranteed by a bank. 
Also Treasury bills of UMOA member countries with a maturity of less than 
six months say be (i) rediscounted or accepted for temporary advances; (ii) 
accepted as collateral for an advance within the limits fixed by the Board 
of Directors; and (iii) bought from or sold to the banks without endorsement, 
provided that banks do not act as intermediaries for the Treasuries.^
Despite the above credit facilities, the BCEAO*s provision of credits 
has, in general, been on a modest scale. Although practically all UMOA 
governments have at one stage or another taken advantage of the BCEAO*s 
way s-and-means advances, only Dahomey, Niger and Upper Volta could be said 
to have made really intensive use of this facility as these conn tries have 
experienced the most severe fiscal problems. Similarly, short-term credits 
in the form of advances secured by either gold or foreign exchange have not 
been provided so far.
Apart from technical factors, one probable reason for the limited use
of the credit facilities of BCEAO concerns the fact that UMOA member
government^have often been able to obtain any needed short-term advances
from the French treasury at reasonably low rates of interest. The French
attitude regarding financial support to its former colonies is relatively
permissive. For, as the Jeanneney Report statesi "France in effect renounces
the possibility of refusing to finance initiatives taken unilaterially by
African Governments, in return the States accept a certain monetary tutelage,
39particularly in the matter of deficit financing". The corollary here is 
that France would continue to finance, subject to its own financial limitations, 
development projects from these governments which appear to it to be sound.
Also it must be recognised that the primary objective of BCEAO*s credit 
policy is to facilitate orderly economic growth in member countries while 
maintaining an appropriate balance between financial and real resources.
Given this policy constraint, BCEAO*s credit expansion must necessarily be 
kept in constant check. It is against this background that the recorded 
average annual rates of credit expansion - of from 1962 through "ISGhf of 
from 196U to and of 13$> between 19^7 and 1969 “ could be regarded
as reasonable.
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39« Cited in P. Robson, Economic Integration in Africa, op. cit.. P.207 
UO. IMF, Op. cit.. PP. 8U - 89
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Aside from the three principal functions discussed above, BCEAO has 
a veriety of other responsibilities usually associated with a central bank.
They include the supervision of the national credit institutions in accordance 
with the national regulations, managing the accounts of national Treasuries, 
giving expert advice to the Treasuries and maintaining deposits for the 
commercial banks.
By conventional definition,^1 UMOA is a complete monetary union. There are 
not only a complete pooling of monetary reserves and the issue of a common 
currency for the participating countries but also a substantial integration of 
their financial markets and the removal of all obstacles to internal payments 
and transfers. In this way intra-regional balance-of-payments problems are 
altig&tcd* otr 3ven.;eliminated,^2 whilst extra-regional payments problems are 
alleviated since union members can add to their foreign currency holdings that
portion of their foreign exchange which would otherwise have been spent in
settling intra-regional trade accounts. Furthermore, UMOA through the operations 
of BCEAO facilitates the co-ordination of other economic policies of its 
members with respect to trade and economic development in general. These are the 
great advantages of a monetary union.
1*1 • See Chapter 6 of this thesis
1*2. Although the volume of intra-union trade among the UMOA members has not
fundamentally improved, over the past decade, nevertheless the existence of <3
comynon currency points the way towards the expansion of intra-zonal trade.%
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Ironically, these advantages are also a source of weakness. In the first 
place, a monetary union of the TJMOA variety robs its members of the power to 
pursue different monetary policies which their different economic problems might 
warrant. In particular, the limitation on the freedom of individual members to 
alter their competitive positions through exchange-rate manipulation vis-a-vis 
other members and the outside world can hurt the weaker union partners. Indeed, 
specific actions may sometimes be required to deal with the problems of such 
disadvantaged members. Thus%i unless all members are content to keep in line 
with each other in all aspects of monetary policy - credit expansion, evchange 
control measures, etc. - problems are bound to arise. Unhappily, some UMOA 
member economies are doing well while others are not; hence the latter group 
may not be completely satisfied with union-inspired common policies which do 
not allow for individual initiatives. Consider the figures in Table 5*3» It 
is evident from the Table that while the net assets of Ivory Coast roO steadily 
from 1962 to 1968 (with the exception of 19&0 those of Senegal showed a steady 
decline over the same period, except in 1966. Togo and Upper Volta also 
improved their asset positions continuously but those of Dahomey, Mauritania 
and Niger declined persistently during the period. Perhaps, the freedom to 
adopt the necessary monetary measures, in a given situation, could have helped
the reserve-scarce UMOA countries to improve their reserve position. Thus one
i
is bound to weigh the immense advantages of UMOA. against the likely pressures 
which would be brought to bear upon it by the seemingly divergent development 
policies within different member countries and by the effects of such policies.
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However, there are, at present, two strong stabilising factors at work
within the UMOA* The first is, as we noted above, the existence of alternative
sources of finance from the French government. The reserve-poor UMOA members
can meet their foreign exchange requirements outside the union, thereby 
mitigating the foreign exchange pressure. The second factor is the flexibility 
and vigilance, as exemplified in the 1968 amendement, which the B6EA0 has 
demonstrated in its credit operation. As pointed out already, this 
amendment increases from 10 to 1S& (of each member's fiscal receipts) 
the maximum amount of short-term advances which each member can receive 
from BC3A0. This, no doubt, shows that BCEAO watches very closely the 
oredit problems of its members in their prooess of development and is 
willing to accommodate them within its own limitations.
On the whole one can on general ground entertain doubts as to the 
ability of a monetary union to meet the credit requirements of all its 
members, given the possibility of differences in levels and rates of 
economic development among its members and the internal pressures which 
these differences are likely to generate. But when viewed from the standpoint 
of a particular case, as in thisi the UMOA, and the stabilising factors 
at work within it, one is tempted to oonclude that the advantages 
outweigh the disadvantages.
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5.1* THE ENTENTE COCNCII, (CONSEIL DE L'ENTENTE)
(i) STRPCTURE AMD ORIENTATION 
During the days of the AOP up to the formation of the UDAO, the Ivory Coast 
discovered to its ch&rgrin that it was contributing about half the region's 
exports and tax revenue but was receiving only a fourth of its imports and 
total expenditures,^ The Ivorian government was thus unwilling to continue 
subsidizing the weaker economies of the area, especially tha£ of Senegal, in 
this way. Also the Ivory Coast was anxious to counterbalance the then Mali 
Federation's appeal^1 to Dahomey and Niger and to protect its potential 
markets in, and commercial transport links with, the other countries.
Apparently, to give expression to these aspirations President Houphouet-Boigny 
spearheaded the founding of the Entente Council in 1959^* In setting up the 
Entente, Niger presented the fewest problems for Houphouet, for its then 
president, Hamani Diori, was one of his most devoted followers. But Dahomey 
and Upper Volta proved far more difficult. Indeed, it took all his skill as 
well as financial inducements to bring Upper Volta and Dahomey into the Entente 
under the Ivory Coast leadership. The foundation members thus included* the 
Ivory Coast, Niger, Upper Volta and Dahomey, Togo did not join until June 8,
In essence, the Entente is an "informal instrument" for the co-ordination 
of politico-economic policies based on political understanding among its members. 
It is an organization based solidly on self-interest. Because of the similarity
of their problems and of their backgrounds as former French dependencies,
U3* See H,H, Green and Associate, Unity or Poverty?Op, cit,,
14u Ibid
U S . Ibid
1*6 See P.Robson, Economic Integration in Africa, Op, cit,, P,2l*6, Also »ee 
Virginia Thompson, West Africa's Council of the Entente, Cornell 
University Press, 1972, P# 27U*
its members have over the past fifteen years developed a good deal of under*- 
standing and a spirit of corporate existence among themselves. The Entente 
hardly fits into any formal definition of an integration scheme, if judged by 
the conventional definitions discussed in chapter one. Nevertheless, the 1959
V  ?  V  u n Vi  ■ Svj-, v. i • V  ** * t T *  - Vilk , * ■ ' " 1 J? M ’ i  .. : \ ;• 'f it. ' >.. ' •/ ' s }agreement which established it did contain two potentially important eoonomic
I
provisions. The first envisaged the harmonization of the countries' develop­
ment plans but, lamentably, this has so far remained a pipe dream. The 
second provided for the establishment of a Solidarity Fund which is discussed 
below.
By its very nature, the organisation of the Entente Council is loose and 
personalised. The Heads of State of its members and their ministers meet 
regularly, at least twice a year, during which policy decisions are taken.
And there is a permanent secretariat headed by Mr. Paul Kaya to execute the 
decisions taken at the Ministerial level. In practice, however, much depends 
on how the creator and uncontested leader of the Entente, President Felix 
Houphouet Boigny of the Ivory Coast reacts to these decisions. It is contended
that his consistent moral financial support could be regarded as the major
»'■"* ■ ) ftreason for the survival of the Entente to date. As we shall see in the
course of this discussion, there is much to support this view.
1*7* R* Robson, Op. cit..
U8. See T. Golan, "What role for the U.S. in Africa"?, 23 October, 1972* 
Thompson asserts that "their chronic and imperative need for the funds 
which Ivory Coast has supplied is what has kept Upper Volta, Dahomey,
Togo, and Niger members of the Entente, for as individual countries they 
are not economically viable (V. Thompson, Op. cit.. P. 277)*
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(ii) HISTORY AND ACTIVITIES OF THE ENTENTE
As indicated above, the establishment of a Solidarity Fund was one of the 
key provisions in the Entente Agreement of 1959* Although the Ivory Coast 
has always insisted on a free hand in promoting private - mainly foreign - 
investment in industry, the setting up of the Solidarity Fund in 19$9 was prima 
facie, a tacit acknowledgement on its part of the fact that unbalanced regional 
development, especially within a grouping, has its dangers.
On paper the fund was to receive for redistribution 10$ of the revenues 
of each member state. But in practice members did not strictly adhere to this 
principle. Indeed, the Solidarity Fund seems to have operated informally as 
the means through which the Ivory Coast (or rather its President) has subsidised
the budgets of the other members as and when required, from resources not
V iiQsubject to public scrutiny in Ivory Coast. Hence no provision for payment
of the subsidies ever appeared in the Ivory Coast budget, though until recently,
Solidarity Fund receipts were recorded in the budgets of the other members.
The accounts of the Fund were not subject to audit. ^
However, despite the operation of the Solidarity Fund the disparity 
between the wealth of Ivory Coast and the indigence of its four partners
continued to grow. One indicator of this overwhelming economic superiority is
presented in Table 5*U •
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J+9. See P. Robson, Economic Integration in Africa. Op. cit., P. 2i*7
50. Ibid.
The Table clearly demonstrates that the Ivory Coast dominates the Bntente
61market even when Ghana is brought into the picture. While the former 
contributed about of the Ghana^-Entente exports its imports account for a 
mere 17«S^ of total. Apart from the Ivory Coast, the landlocked states of 
Upper Volta and Niger countribute relatively more than the rest to lntra-area 
trade. Their share of exports is roughly 16^ each whilst the import figures 
are 13*3^ for Niger but more than 33^ in the case of Upper Volta. As shown in 
Table 2.15 (Col. 8)t this is a reflection of their heavy dependence on intra^ 
zonal trade rather than their economic strength. Ghana buys almost as much 
as it sells to the area, and this is true of Togo, if only to a lesser extent. 
Dahomey exports less (8.6^) and imports more (11*.6^ ).
Aside from the share of Ivory Coasts trade, its composition is another 
source of discomfort to its partners. It exports predominantly manufactures 
but imports mainly raw materials and animal products; hence the aocusation 
that the Ivory Coast has been promoting its own economic development by 
treating its partners as suppliers of raw materials and markets for its
. . 52output.
To this end, a further attempt was made in 1965 to infuse a new life into 
the Entente. ThiB took the form of the Houphouet-Boigny*s Convention on dual
53nationality and economic harmonization.
51• Ghana is not a member of the Entente but it has been included in the 
table for comparative reasons as well as to show its close trade links 
with the Entente states.
52. See V. Thompson, Op. cit. P. 272.
53. See Convention on Dual Nationality and Economic Harmonization, Abidjan,
1965.
• - 186 -
Sourcei 
Computed 
from 
IMP, 
Direction 
of 
Trade* 
Annual, 
1968 
- 
J2
►tr*
o
ON
o
vn
00
ON
r-
00
ON
-4
00
I
*<o
g
a 5! 0 •
1 §
•
w ► § *o
2
co3^
VjJ O  -k• • • •
VA VjJ  VO VO |
ro
-a ro  vo• • •
ON —J ON
ON -4• •
O  I  - A
o
00
00
vn
o
ON
£“ -A • •
vn
o o• •■t" -A
—A O  VjJ• • •
- a VO VO
ro
ro
O VjJ
ON
ro
ro
O
vn
VjJ O  O• • •
O  -P“ VO
VjJ
vn
OO
vn
Vi)
-t- vn • •
ON ON
VjJ
vn
-0
vn
o
vn
g
►*
1
ap
1
o
8CO
<0
ON
F
ro
s
8o
pH
& .
vn 00
«
The economic harmonization provisions reflected the pressures which had 
been building up all along, from weaker Entente members, to encourage a more 
equitahle distribution of industrial development. As for the reciprocal citizen­
ship provisions within the Entente, they were primarily inspired by the large 
size of immigrant labour force from other Entente countries in the Ivory Coast 
(see ohapter 6). However, as events came to show, the double nationality 
proposal proved an error of judgement on the part of the Ivorian President.
He misjudged the reactions of his countrymen to the proposal, particularly 
the white-collar workers who bitterly opposed the idea on the grounds that it 
constituted a threat to their employment. Equally, the proposal was not very 
popular among other Entente states, especially Upper Volta. For given the 
attraction which the Ivory Coast offers as an island of prosperity and opportu-
* *r'k *■<*'. ' -j? 7 , ?: s .. • *" ■ ■ ‘ . • • • , • . ■ - / * ' .  *"T . ■ ' ‘ \ • "nities in a sea of poverty and deprivation, immigrants from other Entente 
countries would tend to settle in it. This in turn would deprive the poorer 
Entente states of an important element in their balance of payments account - 
receipts in form of transfers from their nationals working in other Entente 
countries, in particular the Ivory Coast.
In the end the President could not even achieve some foim of mondus vivendi. 
To his dismay, he was forced to withdraw his proposal by the Bureau Politique 
and the entire convention was not ratified.
51*. See "The Financial Times", December 8, 1971* Also see P. Hobson 
Economic Integration in Africa, op. cit.
- 188 -
In the continuing search for ways and means of st£enghtening the Entente
Council9 a Mutual Aid and Guarantee Fund was created in The establishment
of this fund formally superseded the Solidarity Fund. The Object of the new
fund was to stimulate private investment within the Entente area through the
55emtablishment of a guarantee fund. A secretariat under Mr. Paul Kaya aided
by three French and one American adviser, administers the fund. But policy
decisions are normally taken at the occasional meetings of the Management
Committee of the Fund. As with the old Solidarity Fund, the Ivory Coast has
been its principal source of finance. Of its capital of 1,300 CFAF million,
56the Ivory Coast provided 1,000 CFAF million. Despite its vastly dispropoiv
tionate contribution to the fund, the Ivory Coast - in order to enable the
less developed members of the grouping to reap the initial benefits - agreed
not to draw on the fund for the first give years of its operation.
In so far as the finaicial operations of the fund are concerned, they are
organised at two distinct, though not mutually exclusive, levels. The first
is the loan activities and the second relates to the management of the Inter*-
vention Budget of the Fund. By the end of 1969 loan disbursements of the Fund
57to its members had reached a total figure of 1,21+9 CFAF million. Of this 
figure 97*5 CFAF million went to the Chamber of Commerce of Upper Volta for the 
construction of storage facilities for its export products at Ouagadougou;
330.2 CFAF million was granted to Dahomey for the agricultural industrial
55. Ibid.
56. See T. Golan in Vest Africa. 23 October, 1972. Also see Entente Africaine. 
A Quarterly Review, (6) March, 1971» P* 7*
57* See Bulletin De L*Afrique Noire. Mo. 586. February 11, 1970* Also see 
Thompson, Op. cit. P. 270
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complex of the organisation of SODAK (Societe Dahomeene du Kenaf); 330 CPAP 
million was allocated to Togo for the improvement of its capital, Lome; 6U#9 
CPAP million was received by Niger for the sinking of wells; 223*9 CPAP million 
went to ICODA (industries Cotonnieres du Dahomey) for the construction of a 
textile factory at Cotonou; Upper Volta got another 75*8 CPAP million for the 
acquisition of material for public works and 127*2 CPAP million was allocated 
to the Public Building Society of the Entente for the construction of the 
House of the Council sited at Lome*
The Intervention Budget of the Fund, unlike its lean scheme, does not 
guarantee loans per se but it tries, within the resources at its disposal, to 
bell out - either by subsidising, underwriting whole or part of coats of 
projects or loans on concessional terms members who having started a project
are unable, due to financial reasons, to complete it* It can also intervene
,  ... -(-Q
to finance projects of general interest to the Entente* In practice, the
intervention budget is biased in favour of economic feasibility and other studies
of common interest to the grouping* This is deducible from the projects it has
funded over the past five years* They include the completion of the study on
Marble quarrying in Dahomey; an additional study on Meat production within the
Entente; the possibilities of an exchange of manufactured goods within the
member states; a study on endemic diseases and an advance payment to the state
*>9of Niger for its drilling programme, to mention a few*
58. Bulletin _De L*Afgique Noire* No. 586.
59* For further information, see Ibid.
I t  i s  undoubtedly c le a r  from the fo reg o in g  th at the main advantage o f  the  
In ter v en tio n  Budget l i e s  in  the fa c t  th a t i t  supports p r o je c ts  o f  s o c ia l  in fr a ­
s tr u c tu r a l mature which are not p a r t ic u la r ly  a t tr a c t iv e  to  p r iv a te  en terp r ise*  
For example, the study on the exchange o f  manufactured products w ith in  the 
Entente^0 i s  o f in t e r e s t  to  a l l  the member s ta te s  but i t  i s  u n lik e ly  th a t a 
p ro fit-m ax im isin g  prijrate e n te r p r ise  would have undertaken it*  The study  
a s s e s s e s  the tempo and areas o f  in d u s tr ia l  exchanges w ith in  the grouping and 
id e n t i f i e s  the in d u s tr ie s  l ik e ly  to b e n e f it  from expansion on reg io n a l sca le*
I t  n o te s  th a t in  1967 o i l  products represented  12*I|% o f  in tr a -z o n a l exchange o f  
in d u s tr ia l  products w h ils t  m echanical and metal p ro cess in g  accounted fo r  11*2%* 
I t  c l a s s i f i e s ,  in te r  a l i a ,  v e h ic le s ,  aluminium sh e e ts , c ig a r e t t e s ,  beer and 
cement products as p a s s ib le  areas fo r  the promotion and harm onization o f  
in d u s tr ia l  exchanges*
Thus viewed from the stan dp oin t o f  i t s  a c t i v i t i e s ,  i t  can be sa id  th a t the 
Mutual Aid and Guarantee Fund o f  the Entente i s  showing some e f f e c t  w ith in  the 
grouping but whether th is  would m a te r ia lly  and su b s ta n t ia lly  in flu en ce  the rapid  
development o f  the poorer economies w ith in  the Entente remains to be seen*
The l a t e s t  major i n i t i a t i v e  which the Entente has taken towards the 
stren g th en in g  o f  economic co -op era tion  among i t s  members was the c rea tio n  o f  an 
Economic Community o f  C a ttle  and Meat (ECCM)* In may, 1971» the P re sid en ts  of 
the Entente S ta te s  signed  the ordinance c re a tin g  the ECCM in  Ouagadougou*
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60. Bulletin De L* Afrique Moire. No* 591» March 18, 1970* This is su e  provides 
an impressive summary of the study*
/ ' i - ■
The goal of the ECCM is "to further together within a regional framework the 
commercialisation of cattle and meat within the boundaries of each country, 
between the member *> states and between the member states and third countries; 
whether they be neighbours or not and especially those of the OCAM group.
Quite naturally, the attainment of this goal falls squarely on the two 
bodies that implement the ECCM. First, there is a supreme policy - making body 
comprising the council of ministers* It has the responsibility of defining not 
only policy but of fixing the contributions of member states* It convenes at 
least once a year and its decisions are taken by a unanimous vote of members* 
Below the Council of Ministers is an executive secretariat at Ouagadougou, whieh 
is directed by an executive secretary, Dr* Roger Tall. The responsibility of 
the secretariat is limited to the execution of studies or instruction and to
the elaboration of programmes and propositions decided upon by the supreme
62decision - making body.
It is still too early to comment on the performance of the ECCM* Indeed,
there are still important questions to resolve before the ECCM becomes fully
operational, such as customs and fiscal regulations.^^ Despite several
conferences the Entente members could not reach agreement on all matters with
respect to the creation of the ECCM before the agreement was signed. The
usual conflict between the interior and the coastal states resulted in a 
deadlock at some stage. They remained squarely opposed on matters such as the
location of slaughter houses, fiscal and customs policy, prices for producers
and to consumers, and investment priorities.^
The situation was further complicated when the United States authorised its 
first large-scale loan of US #6 million to the Entente in early 1971 to
6 1-support investment in Livestock within the framework of the ECCM* With the 
availability of this substantial amount of money to spend existing differences 
among the members with respect to the preparation of protocols and selection 
of investment priorities gathered force* In the end the ECUM agreement of 
1971 was signed, without resolving such vital issues as customs and fiscal
regulations, only when it became clear that the United States loan would after
-y 66all not materialise unless some structure was set up to justify the loan*
In these circumstances, it can hardly be said that the ECCM got off to a
good start* Although each country had a long list of projects for which it
was soliciting loans, they tended to concern the country^ narrow internal
interests* Effective co-opdinated planning within the regional framework must
yield place to peti-economic nationalism if the cherished goal of the ECCM is
to be achieved*
65* The US aid to the individual Entente States (Dahomey, Ivory Coast, Niger, 
Togo and Upper Yolta) from i960 through 1968 amounted to US $59*9 million 
but only /5*7® of this was classified as regional aid, the rest being 
bilateral commitments* But since 1969 thmre has been a sharp policy shift 
from bilateral to regional aid, if only to minimise the political factors 
and to improve the economic effectiveness of aid* Total regional aid 
to the Entente from the United States stood at $6*6m in 19^9? in
1970* #13*8m in 1971 and jfeO.Om in 1972. See Ibid.
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(lii) POLITICAL JIMENSIOH AND 
INTSR - STATS RELATIONS 
In reviewing the past activities and future aspirations of the Entente, 
one should not lose sight <if the political dimension of the issues involved*
As we noted earlier, the base of the Entente is more political than economic, 
hence the dominance of political factors in its affairs.
Generally speaking, the Entente states display some degree of political 
cohesion. Their regimes are moderate favouring liberal economic policy and 
they tend to present a co-ordinated front on African and world isBues; they 
share the same colonial past; they all belong to the franc zone and, except 
the Ghananian "enclave", they form a geographically contiguous "bloc".
However, the degree of political cohesion existing between the Entente 
member states is more apparent than real. For one thing, the conflict between
the North and South or the Sahel and Coastal otreas has always been there*
• ■ 21
In more recent years, especially since 1970, a succession of crises has
thwarted whatever political cohesion that existed between the member states of
Entente. In November, 1970, the Ivorian government felt compelled - ostensibly
for security reasons - in the wake of the Guinea invasion and students*
68demonstrations, to expel some 500 students belonging to the Entente states,
&9. The 1961 agreement between France and the Entente states, whioh is one of 
the pillars on which the groupings stands, covered a range of issues, 
including defence, legal, social and economic matters. Upper Volta did 
not sign that aspect of the package deal which related to defence (see 
Africa South of Sahara* 1971» Europa Publications, P* 89 & 119)#
- 19U -
68* See T. Golan in West Africa* 30, October, 1972
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an act which did not endear the Ivorian President to his Entente partners* 
Instead of a thaw, a further rift in inter-state relations developed in 1971» 
when the Ivory Coast clearly failed to get the support of his fellow Entente 
members for its policy of "Dialogue with South Africa" at the OAU summit in 
Addis Ababa* Again, at the 1972 OAU summit, only Niger voted for the Voltaic 
candidate, Mr* Maiitk*
This political disharmony must be seen against the background of the 
personality of the Ivorian President within the Entente. As indicated already* 
he is the hub on which the activities of the grouping revolve and they merely 
seem to reflect his personal policies* This dominance has been resented in 
the past but not diminished. Indeed, the chief weakness of the Entente lies 
not so much in the inequalities of its partnership, the artificiality of its 
boundaries, or the lack of group goals and organizational structure as in 
its overdependence on one man whose principal objectives are personal and 
national aggrandizement*^ Given that Houphouet does not operate according to 
any fixed ideological guidelines, should he suddenly decide that the game of 
maintaining that organisation is no longer worth the candle or should Ivory 
Coast's prosperity falter and its subsidies cease, the Entente would doubtless 
dissolve*
But the most immediate danger for the Entente's solidarity is the 
resurgence of Nigeria and its increasing role and influence in West Africa 
and, to a lesser degree, Ghana's efforts to revive its economy and to repair 
the damage done to its neighbours by the expulsion of thousands of their 
nationals*
69* See V. Thompson, On* cit* P* 281*.
If the Ghana government succeeds in reasserting its attraction for Upper Volta
70and Togo, and if Niger and Dahomey are drawn into Nigeria's orbit, Ivory Coast 
may find itself relatively isolated in the region. However, whether this will 
happen or not depends largely on the existence of a more balanced intra-Entente 
development, the creation of the right political atmosphere within the grouping 
and, above all, the state of inter-state relations in the wider context of 
West Africa following the formation of the ECOWAS.
(iv) CONCLUSION 
What emerges from the preceding discussion is that the Entente council 
has operated as a loose grouping in the face of difficulties. It could have 
some impact on the economic development of the area but only to a very limited 
extent. To start with only in the case of Upper Volta does intra-area trade 
account for a large part (actually §) of its total exports. In no other case 
does it account for more than of trade; and in the case of Ivoiy Coast it 
contributes only 3^ of total exports.
However, it would appear that, irrespective of the limited contributions 
of a grouping of the Entente variety tc the rate of economic growth, it is 
important to diffuse development in the area, create the right political 
atmosphere and healthy inter-state relations that would make it possible to 
fully exploit whatever potentials that existed.
70. Nigeria has a railway link with Niger. Recently, Nigeria and Dahomey
agreed to establish joint cement and sugar industries. And both projects 
are to be cited in Dahomey (see West Africa. 20 January, 1975)*
5.5 THE ORGAMISATION OF SSHEGAL RIVER STATES (OERS)
(i) STRUCTURE AND ORGANISATION 
The short-lived Organisation of Senegal River States (OERS), whose 
founders comprised Guinea, Mali, Mauritania and Senegal, was established by 
Convention in 1968* Its objectives were the maintenance of co-operative and 
peaceful relations among member states, and the furtherance of economic 
development by co-ordinated planning and increased mobility of goods and 
people. It was intended to be a step towards the eventual creation of a 
wider regional grouping of West African states. The OERS hoped to realise 
its objectives by a common approach towards trade, fiscal and monetary
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policies, by a harmonisation of educational and training systems, and by the
71conclusion of an agreement to assure "the right of establishment".
72Until its dissolution in November, 1971» the OERS functioned on three
levelsi (i) The Conference of Heads of State and Government, (ii) the Council 
of Ministers, and (iii) the Organs of the Secretariat.
At the highest level the Heads of each Member State met in ordinary 
session once a year to make general policy decisions and to examine recommen­
dations made to them by the Council of Ministers. They could also meet in 
extraordinary session as often as was necessary. Each of course, had one 
vote and all resolutions were passed unanimously. The Conference established
and adopted its own by-laws, and approved those of the other bodies of the
73Organisation.
71. Statut de L*organisation des etats riverains du Senegal* amende (jakar,
1970), articles 1-5. Hereinafter, this document is cited as "The conventior 
Also see, R. Bomstein", "The Organisation of Senegal River States", in 
The Journal or Modem African Studies, 102 (1972), PP. 267-283
72. AFRICA RESEARCH BULLETIN. P. 2203B
73* Convention, articles 8-11.
The Council of Ministers operated on the intermediate level. It was 
compos8ed of three ministers or plenipotentiaries from each member state.
They normally met twice a year, but could also meet by request in extraordinary 
session. Essentially, the Council of Ministers was an institution of conception, 
execution, and control. It prepared and proposed policy measures, and was
responsible to the Heads of State. It too- made decisions upon the unanimous
7)vote of its members.
The OERS was managed on the day-to-day level by an emecutive Secretariat 
and three General Secretariats. These offices were located in Dakar, and were 
directed by an Executive Secretary who co-ordinated the operations of the three
7<Secretaries General and oversaw the daily activities of the OERS.'
The Secretary General for the Development of the Senegal River Basin was
charged with the promotion and co-ordination of studies and programmes for
improvement, in conformance with the International Conventions of 26 July 1963
76and 6 February 1961*, relating to the development of the Senegal River Basin.
The Secretary General for Planning and Development was charged with preparing, 
presenting, and executing harmonised and co-odinated plans for the economic 
development and integration of the member states. The Secretary General for 
Educational, Social, and Cultural Affairs was charged with parallel responsibi­
lities. The Executive Secretary and the Secretaries General were appointed
to terms of three years by the Council of Ministers to whom they were 
77responsible.
71** See R. Bomstein, op. cit.. P. 268
75. Ibid.
76. Ibid.
77. Ibid.
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Although not required by the Convention, it was the practice that each should 
come from a different member state.
The OERS budget was prepared by the Executive Secretary and the Secretaries 
General, but was adopted by the Council of Ministers. Financial contributions
were determined by the Conference of Heads of State, upon proposal by the
78Council of Ministers. The organisation had an Advisory Committee composed
of deputies from the four National Assemblies, and representatives of various
social and economic associations. But its functions were merely ancillary,
79and the committee had no actual power within the administrative hierarchy.
(ii) HISTORY AND ACTIVITIES OF THB OERS 
The history of the OERS is very short and chequered. Although it lasted
80for three years - 1968 to 1971 - only 1970 saw a period of intense co-operation.
As we shall see below, the objective - to bring about co-ordinated eoonomic
development by sub-regional co-operation - foundered in the face of political
odds. The economic activities of the OERS were limited almost exclusively to
the execution of feasibility studies for long-term development. Indeed, as of
81Mid - 1971* there were no major substantive economic projects in operation.
Consequently, the substantive economic projects of the OERS remained at 
the feasibility-study stages and were never implemented. Some of the more 
important planned projects may be briefly discussed here for interest sakei
78. The 1970-71 budget totalled 76 CFAF million (US £276.000) (See Ibid. P. 269)
79. Ibid.
80. Ibid PP.269-70. It may be that the OERS was over-ambitious in its 
aspirations hence its limited achievements. Although the OERS was the 
offspring of the Inter-State Committee for the Senegal River Basin, founded 
in 1963, the former had wider aims than the latter.
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81. Ibid. P.269
(a )  Development o f  the Senegal R iver Basin
Because o f th e ir  geograp h ica l p o s it io n , the former OERS members have
always been faced with great agricultural problems which have meant that none
of them can produce enough food for their peoples within their national
borders* Thus the co n stru c tio n  o f  a dam at M anatali in  Mali (and p o s s ib ly ,
82another at the delta of Senegal River) to irrigate the arid formlanda of the 
member countries was donsidered to be an important step towards the solution 
of the area's agricultural problems. By March, 1971# the result of studies 
commissioned by the OERS and executed primarily by UN experts covering all 
aspects of the project had shown that the project would cost a minimum of 
#100 million, and take at least six years to complete once work is begun. ** 
However, by the time the OERS ceased to exist no single organisation or
01
country had expressed serious interest in financing the dam.
(b ) Monetary P s l io y  
As d iscu ssed  e a r l ie r ,  M auritania and Senegal are both members of the 
UMOA and the BCEAO\ w h ils t  M ali has a separate arrangement w ith Prance which
85has enabled i t  to  regain  a p o s it io n  in  the franc zone. But the p o s it io n
of Guinea is quite different. It issues its own national currency which is
n o n -co n v er tib le . Although nom inally pegged a t the value o f  the CPA franc
before the 19^9 devaluation, the Guinean franc is considered to be one of
Report de la  ’Table ronde' sur l e s  p e r sp e c tiv e s  de development in teg re  du 
bassin du fle u v e  Senegal (Dakar, 1971)# p.3
83. For details see R. B o m ste in , op. c i t .  pp.273-75* Apart from the provision 
of controlled irrigation, the project, it it were implemented, would 
contribute to transport improvement as well as provide additional power 
resources for industrial development in the area.
81*. Ibid.
85. See Ib id . p.277. The final step, Mali's re-entry into UMOA and BCEAO, i s  
anticipated in the near future, perhaps by the end of 1972.
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86the weakest currencies in Afrioa. Thus, during the life of the OERS, the 
currencies of all its members were not freely convertible into each other.
In recognition of this problem for trade and payments, it has been hoped
that a system of inter-state payments within OERS vould be worked out.
R7Article 3 of the Convention, clearly states that "The Government of the
Member States of the OERS pledge, in the absence of a common monetary zone
and free convertibility of their currencies, to facilitate inter-state payments
in order to developstrade among Member States". Undoubtedly, Mali and Guinea,
particularly the latter, would have greatly benefited from the implementation
of such a pledge. However, the implementation of this pledge eluded the
88organisation. Given the instability of the Malian and Guinean franco 
and the large French influence in CFA monetary policy, the establishment of 
a monetary union or zone of free convertibility within the OERS proved a 
very difficult task. Besides, the level of inter-OERS trade (see Table 5*5) 
is very low; hence the effect of such a monetary arrangement, at least in 
the short-run, would be exceedingly marginal. Perhaps, in the long run, 
things might have changed but time was not on the side of the OERS.
Eventually, the organisation made no substantial progress in the field of 
monetary integration.
86. The current black market value of the Guinean franc is roughly 1/5 of the 
CFA franc. Illegal currency transactions often give a crude indication of 
the real value of the currencies involved. See I. Diallo, Enquete sur 
L*immigration des guineans a *Dakar (United Nations Institute for Economic 
Deve. & Planning, Dakar, 1971)*
87* The Convention.
88. In 1967 the Malian franc was devalued to 5 of the CFA franc, with which
it had formally been nominally at par. In 19^9 she devalued her currency
once again when the French CFA francs were develued by 12.5&6 (See
Bomstein, Op. cit. p. 276).
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TABLE 5 « 5
MALI AMD SENEGAL* TRAPS STATISTICS. 1967-691 (OS *000)
1967 1968 1969
MALI*
EXPORTS
Total 8,21*8 10,733 17,310
Guinea 11* - 85
Mauritania 96 108 76
Senegal 2,61*1 1,653 823
Total OERS 2.751 981*
MALI*
IMPORTS
Total 25,853 31+, 298 38,912
Guinea 17 25 55
Mauritania 92 122 153
Senegal 1,052 2,1*66 3,262
Total OERS 1,161 2,613 3,1*70
SENEGAL*
EXPORTS
Total 137,286 151,381* 123,696
Mali 92 1,908 1*,066
Mauritania 1 ,1*50 1,671* 1,866
Guinea 236 216 516
Total OERS 1,778 3,798 6,1*1*8
SENEGAL*
IMPORTS
Total 157,558 180,990 198,666
Mali 692 381* 617
Mauritania 3U 118 33
Guinea 1* 151 179
Total OERS 720 653 829
1# Complete statistics are not readily available for Guinea and Mauritania, but 
their Q5RS trade figures may, to some extent, be gathered from this table* 
Imports are calculated at c*i*f* and exports at f*o.b.
SOURCE* Statistical Office of the European
Conmumity, Associated Foreign Trade Yearbook (Brussels), 1967-69 
cited in R* Boraatein* on* oitV*
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(c) Industrial Development
As noted already, it was the goal of all the OERS oountries to achieve
greater industrial development. To this end, the Ministers of Planning and
Industry, in order to overcome the narrow base for growth within each country,
89decided in June 1970 to co-ordinate their plans in the industrial sector.
Since they wished also to avoid unnecessary competition of similar products, 
they adopted a resolution calling for integrated and complementary development, 
as follows (Table 5*6)i
TABLE S , 6
Country t I N D U S T R Y
Guinea s Paper, Tyres, Aluminium, Chemical electrolysis from marine
salts.
Mali t Metalworks, Nitrate*, Sugar refinery, flour mill, alumina.
Mauritania t Metalworks, Copper, Cement, Plasterworks,
Senegal t Petrochemicals, Pharmaceuticals, Chemical electrolysis from
marine salts, Polymers,
Sources R, Bomstein, Ibid,
The Secretary General for Planning and Development called for the "oomplete 
denationalisation of these industries, whatever their geographical locations", 
and further suggested that measures be taken to provide for the followings
- Free circulation and consumption priority within the sub-region for 
goods produced by these industries,
- Effective protection of these products from foreign competitors,
- Reinvestment of these profits in OERS-integrated industrial projects, 
their distribution in equal shares to the Member States,
89* See R, Bomstein, Ibid. p, 278
- Common management of these industries by responsible nationals
90appointed by the Council of Ministers*
Attempts were made to translate these proposals into action* In December
1970 the OERS concluded an agreement with the UN Industrial Development
Organisation (UNIDO) to promote and accelerate integrated economic development,
with special reference to the complementary proposals (see above) made by the
91four Ministers of Planning and Industry* ; But integrated intra-zonal 
development required time to be accomplished* The political differences of 
the OERS members reinforoed by the diversity of national economic policies 
and problems acted as a brake on any meaningful progress towards co-ordinated 
intra-area industrial development*
(d) Livestock and Animal Programmes 
The OERS countries possessed great potential for the development of 
meat-processing and training industries (see Table $*7)* In 1968, an 
Inter-State Commission for Livestock and Animal Production was formed to 
co-ordinate the efforts of the four nations in evolving more efficient 
management, and among the questions studied were breeding techniques, feeding
systems, marketing methods, disease prevention, applied research, and personnel
92 - *trainings The Council of Ministers later approved a recommendation for common
legislation to combat animal disease which, if enacted by the National Assemblie 
would have been the first co-ordinated effort to enact harmonised ligislation
for the grouping. _____________
90* Bomstein, Ibid* P.27991. However, this did not commit UNIDO to specific financial support and
technical assistance outside its normal practices and procedures (see Ibid,
92. ibid* P* 280* Also see Beunion de la Commission inter-Detats de l*e
levage et des production animal©s (Conakry, 1970)*
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Country Bovine OtIj m Equiae Asinine Caaal
Guinea 1,1*50,256 605,559 51 759 -
Mali 1»,063,900 7,813.900 603,290 203,011 77,700
Mauritania 1,800,000 6,000,000 15,000 150,000 700,000
Senegal 2,525,000 2,520,000 191,000 172,000 8,000
Total 9,779.156 16,938,1*59 809,3U1 525,770 785,700
Source t R* Bernstein, Op*cit*
Before the disintegration of the QKRS some Measure of success had been 
achieved in the live stock scoter* A bilaterAl Mali-USAXD poultry pro joe t was 
expanded to the sub-regieaal level* Similar projects involving the oeaatruetiea 
ef hatcheries aad the iatreduetiea ef modem breeding techaiques were being 
built aad mere espected to be eporational by the ead of 1971* ^
▲side from the sectors discussed above, the QKRS Secretariat developed 
auaerous ether proposals ia educational, cultural aad social fields for 
co-operation• But, like ethers, these projects were very ambitious; and neither 
time nor a conducive spirit ef harmony existed long enough to set * then 
materialise*
93* R* Bernstein, Ibid*
(iii) POLITICAL DIMENSION AMD INTERSTATE RELATIONS 
The familiar but debatable maxim that political co-operation must precede 
regional economic development seems to have been vindicated in the precarious 
existence of the OERS. Its truncated life was spotted with recurrent political 
disputes which eventually sounded its death knell. Insofar as these political 
disputes affected and/or impeded the growth and progress of the OERS, three 
phases in the crises oan be distinguished; The period of non-operation, 
1968-695 the period of intense co-operation, 1970; and the road to disintegra­
tion, 1971.
Shortly after the Convention was signed at LabA in Guinea on 2k March
1968, the Organisation was confronted by its first political crisis.
On November 19th, 1968 the Socialist Government of Mali and its President,
Modibo Keita, were overthrown in a military ooup d*etat which installed
95Lieutenant Moussa Traore as the new Head of State. Although military coups 
had become a common feature in post-independence Africa, this was the first 
(and, to date, only) coup experienced by the four oountries under discussion.
It therefore had profound psychological and political effects on the other 
OERS member governments. The fall of the Keita regine was particularly of 
special concern to Sekou Toure of Guinea, who had previously (in 1966) lost 
another close sooialist ally when Dr. Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana was deposed.
Having lost his most trusted comrade and finding himself in a "political 
wilderness", Sekou Toure tactically but tacitly withdrew his support for the
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91*. Bomstein, Ibid, p. 270
95* Africa Research Bulletin, p. 1332A
OERS - sub-stituting verbal rhetoric and political shibboleth for positive
action. The (Juinean policy of non-oo-operation effectively paralysed the new
organisation for the rest of 1968 and all of 1969*^ Thus, in practical terms,
very little, if any, was achieved by the OERS during this period, essentially
because under the Convention, as notei above, all major policy decisions of
the OERS must be taken on the unamimous vote of all the four Heads of State
97but all four never met between November 1968 and end of 19^9*
The second phase in the OERS inter-member relations was marked by a 
determined effort to resuscitate the organisation. Through a vigorous 
diplomatic campaign on the part of other members, spearheaded by Mauritanian 
President, Ould Daddah, the four Heads of State met in the Guinean capital
98of Conakry on 3 February 1970, and the convention was reaffirmed and amended.
It was thought that after the conference members would forget their political
differences and that the organisation was on a new era of harmony and progress.
Indeed, there followed a proliferation of specialised meetings to draw up
OERS programmes in a wide range of fields (see above). All four countries
regularly reaffirmed their commitment to the organisation beneath disguised
political bickering (this time, between Mauritania and Senegal), However,
this spell of intense activity did not last very long. The invasion of
Conakry on 22 November 1970, by a small outside force tinder Portuguese
96, Ibid See also R, Bomstein, Op, cit, p, 270
97* African Research Bulletin, P, 1583C
98, Ibid, This was the first meeting of all four Heads of State since the 
signing of the convention in 1968,
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officers, signalled its end. Although the Council of Ministers, whioh99
met in extraordinary session a few days after the attack, unanimously deplored
the "barbarous aggression",^00 the solidarity which the incident generated
quickly proved ephemeral.
The invasion and its aftermath having halted the phase of intense 
co-operation, precipitated the phase of disintegration. Several weeks after 
the invasion, Guinea accused Senegal of massing troops for the purpose of 
launching a new attack. This was strongly denied by Senghor18 Government but 
the allegation created a serious political rift between the two nations.
Sekou Toure did not attend the Conference of Heads of State held in Bamako, the 
capital of Mali, on 18 January 1971* Not surprisingly, the Conference was a 
flop since no decision could be taken on the numerous projects drawn up in 
1970 and no plan could be charted for the future. Until Senegal resigned,
presumably out of frustration, from the OERS on 30 November, 1971» no durable
101detente existed between the two members*
Realising that the OERS in its form at the time was no longer an effective 
body, a Ministerial Conference of the Organisation was called. It took place 
in Nouakchott (Mauritania) on 29 November 1971» again without Guinean represent 
tatives. It was at this two-day Conference that Senegal resigned. The remnants
merely formalised the death of the organisation when they satisfied themselves
102that the OERS no longer answers to the needs it was founded to satisfy" In
March 1972 the Heads of State of Mali, Mauritania and Senegal formally signed
103an agreement winding up the OERS.
99* A UN investigation has confirmed that this force originated from the neigh­
bouring Portuguese colony of Guinea (Bissau)* Although the invading force, which 
was beaten back, included some Guinean exiles, the UN has blamed Portugal for 
the ill-fated invasion (See Europa, op. cit. p. 373)
100. See Le Soleil (Dakar), 25 November, 1970
101. Ibid. It is doubtful whether Guinea would join the new organisation since 
Sekou Toure has declared that he preferred security to foreign currency
(see Ibid, P. 2320B).
102* Ibid. P. 2293 
103 Ibid.
(iy) NEW ORGANISATION CREATED!
ORGANISATION FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ..EKEGAL 
RIVER (OCTS)
To salvage whatever that could be salvaged from the defunct OERS, a new 
organisation for the Development of the Senegal River (OMVS) was established 
in Nouakchott on March 11, 1972 after discussions by the Heads of State of the 
founder members (Mali, Mauritania and Senegal). The Organisation is "open to 
all states through which the river flows provided they accept the spirit and 
letter of the Convention"
In many respects, the orientation and structures of the new organisation 
are more modest and depoliticised. Having learnt from their past experience, 
the OMVS founders opted for a less ambitious goal. Though calling for the 
co-ordination of activity of its members in almost every possible field, the 
OMVS "only fixes one definite economic objective* the planning and development 
of the Senegal river".
The structures of the OMVS are lighter than those of the OERS. The 
General Secretatiat is the key structure but it is capped by a ministerial 
council which has more of a technical than political influence, and inherits 
most of the powers of the former Heads of State Conference, which had to meet 
obligatorily every year. In future, the member Heads of State will only 
meet when it is felt necessary*
10U* Ibid. It is doubtful whether Guinea would join the new organisation since 
Sekou Toure has declared that he preferred security to foreign currency 
(see Ibid, P. 2320B).
The seat of the OMVS is in Dakar and its first Presidenty for a two-year
term, is President Ould Daddah of Mauritania. The President of the Ministerial
Council is the Malian Minister of Industrial Development and Public Works,
M. Robert N'Daw whilst the Secretary General is M. Mohamed Ould Amar of 
107Mauritania. Desirous to ensure its effectiveness, the new body has a strong
legal foundation since the new convention determining the statute of the
Senegal river (which has been declared an international waterway) and its
108tributaries, cannot be denounced by its trustees for the next ten years.
Thus, it looks as if the OMVS has got the proper orientation to ?*get off to 
a good start.
(▼) CONCLUSION
The OERS - whatever its aims - achieved very little. It ought and could
have done better but the framework of political and ideological understanding
between its member states was very tenuous to bear the strains of international
co-operation. In the end, it died a victim of politics rather than economics.
Its failure is a further lesson for the future of economic integration in Vest
Africa. Although a new organisation has been set up in place of the OERS and
special arrangements made to ensure the success of the OMVS, no guarantee at
109this stage can be offered regarding the sudcess of the OMVS. Ultimate
success must reside in a workable machinery for co-operation, and more
importantly in the existence of solid political detente among members of the
grouping.
107* Ibid. 
108. Ibid.
109* Indeed, secret talks are reportedly being held to defusd a potentially 
dangerous crisis threatening to damage the OMVS. Senegal and Mauritania are both 
claiming Todd Island, a small strip of land in the Senegal river on Senegal'S 
northern border. Exdept for its lucrative cattle trade the island is of little 
importance but the future of the OMVS may well depend on how the crisis is 
resolved (see West Africa, 9 June, 1975)*
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5.6 THE SENEGAMBIAN CASE
(i) THE RATIONALE OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION BETWEEN 
SENEGAL AND GAKBIA 
So far we have been discussing various forms of economic co-operation 
between the former AOF countries* This section briefly discusses one of the 
earliest attempts to bridge the co-operation gap between the anglophone and 
francophone states of West Africa*
The anomalous geographical position of Gambia reflects colonial policy 
in West Africa which we have discussed earlier.^^ Completely encompassed 
by Senegal except on its seaward margin, Gambia froms an irrational intrusion 
into the much larger country of Senegal and largely isolates the southern 
region of Casamance from the rest of Senegal (see map)* Because of this 
strange geographical position of Gambia, some form of integration with 
Senegal has often been suggested to be the natural destiny of the Gambia.
Following the Senegalese independence in i960 and the prospect of early 
independence for Gambia, the urge for closer relationship between the two 
countries gathered force*
110* See Chapter one, Ethnically the people of Gambia and Senegal are the same* 
Indeed, for a brief period, between 1765 and 17$3f much of what are to-day 
Gambia and Senegal formed a single British Colony of Senegambia* That 
they are too separate countries now is explicable mainly in the context 
of colonial rivalries between the European colonisers (see also P* Robson 
in A* Hazl£wood (ed), op* cit* p* 115)*
111. Even during the colonial rule several abortive British and French proposals, 
which envisaged the exchange of some other french colony for Gambia so as 
to permit her incorporation into Senegal, were put forward. But they were 
all doomed to blatant failure due to differences between the two colonial 
powers (see J.D. Hargreaves, Op. cit. PP. 11*5-95) •
T h e  Region o f Senegam bia
Source: Reprinted from A. HazLfi-wood ( e d . ) ,  op. cit. P. 116
The ease for the Senegambian integration centred on three main considerations*
First, there was doubt as to whether Gambia by herself is economically viable*
This fear is by no means unjustified* For, as the summary data in Table 2*1
shows, Gambia is a tiny poor country by any standards* At present Britain
provides more than 60% of Gambia's development budget finance and this financial
113dependence on the U.K. for development expenditure is likely to continue*
Second, as an enclave within a country of twenty times its own area, the
Gambia is an incovenience to Senegal, both because it divides the latter
physically and because it is a smuggling base* It was estimated that around
1960 smuggling through Gambia into Senegal accounted for something of the order
of 2$% of Gambia's total exports of domestic produce.Although the amount
of goods so smuggled is very small in relation to the imports of Senegal - less
than 1% - the practice, which has become Gambia's economic life-blood, shows
little signs of declining* In fact, far from being stamped out, smuggling
is assuming a new dimension* "Transitors go to Senegal, groundnuts oome to
112* See Hazl£wood (ed), on.cit.. PP. 115-128.' This article provides a well- 
informed discussion on the "Problems of Integration between Senegal and 
Gambia" and this section (5*6) draws heavily on it* Also see A* Hughes, 
"Senegambia Revisited" in Senegambia* Proceedings of a colloquium at the 
University of Aberdeen, 197^ 4# PP* 139-170*
113. Of the ^5 million required for the 1967-71 development programme ^3«2 
million were provided as an interest-free British Loan, and in the last 
three years 90% of development expenditure had been covered from British 
souroes (see Europe Publiactions (1971)i op» cit* p*333)* Britain is 
also committed to meeting some 50% of the outgoings of the Third 
Development Programme, 1971/72 to 1973/7U* But as we shall show later 
British aid has been redirected away from the recurrent into Development 
Budget (A* Hughes, Op* cit.)
11U N.G* Plessz, Problems and Prospects of Economic Intenation in West Africa* 
McGill University Press, 19^8, P* 62*
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Gambia, both ways the Gambia makes money” because of Gambians' freer access
than the Senegalese to the world market* As the Senegalese Finance Minister,
Jean Collin recently remarked* ”If the Gambians had all the transistors they
imported there would be 212 transistors for every 1,000 Gambians compared
116with 5 for every 1,000 Senegalese”* Consequently, illegal border trade has
become a constant, if not a permanent, source of irritation and fricition
between both countries for long.
Besides, the present economic frontiers are disadvanteous to both
countries in some other respects. For Senegal they mean a partial insolation
of the southern province of Casemance and inability fully to use the Gambia
river. For Gambia, on the other hand, it is argued that she cannot exploit
her main natural asset-the river basin - and that Banjul (until April 1973
known as Bathurst) is deprived of the opportunity to serve as the port for a
large economic area to which it is properly suited. Briefly put, it is held
that adequate use of the economic resources of Gambia and Senegal requires
close co-operation between them, if only to overcome the artificiality of the
existing political and economic frontiers.
The third factor is political. There has been some fear in Senegal that
Gambia could become a staging base for the operations of banned political
117parties or for subversion from outside. For her part, Gambia, which lacks 
an effective army, recognises its extreme vulnerability from a military 
standpoint - in the event of an attack.
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115* JtUne Afriquei Afgica 1971# op. cit p. 259 
116. Ibid.
117# HazL&wood (ed), op. cit. P. 117
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?**' ’ 'fci ' v‘ • ; ’■»/ “jup -‘Jfa * j{l. v •• fraWm n 4‘V'. . ’** wfo&k*. It • ■ ;«A$ it f  ‘ iKi** * &S#*4^ a jL V  ' • *It is against this sombre background of fears and mutual suspicion that
talks on the possibility of closer economic co-operation has often been held
since the early sixties. An Inter-Ministmri&l Committee was set up in 1961
118by the two oountries to discuss makers of joint interest among them. This 
Committee, which is still maintained, has not achieved a real thaw in the field 
of economic integration between the two countries. Nonetheless, it initiated 
discussions on the subject which invariably led to the commissioning from the 
United Nations of a report to consider the various possibilities of 
association between the two states.
(ii) THE UNITED BATI0N5 REPOBT119 
During the later part of 19^3# a UN Technical Assistance Mission was 
sent to Gambia and Senegal at the request of their respective governments to 
investigate the possibilities of a oloser association between these countries. 
The UN report9 which was submitted early in dealt with political, economic
and fiscal aspects of association. It was followed by a supplementary report
. 120 by FAO on co-ordinated agricultural development in the Gambia river basin.
On the political front, the UN report suggested three alternative forms
which association between Gambia and Senegal might take. The first was the
full integration of Gambia as the eighth Senegalese or Senegambian province.
But this option was ruled out as unacceptable to Gambia and not to be
entertained Huntil a long period of friendly and fruitful collaboration between
121the two countries has elapsed11.
115. Ibid.. and S. Sy in Senegambia.Op. cit. P. 127.
119# UN, Department of Economics & Social Affairs, Report on the Alternatives
of Association between the Gambia and Senegal, March 19^Ut for commentaries on
the report, see N.G. Plessz, op. cit.. pp. 120-128. The latter offers a good
analysis of the report.
120. Ibid.
121. Ibid.
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The second alternative envisaged the formation of a loose Senegsunbian 
federation. The report recommended a federal government with powers for 
the initial period limited to defence and overseas representation and with 
complete autonomy in other respects for the federated states. Progress 
after the initial period would depend on the wishes of both states.
Evidently, the authors of the report favoured this alternative but they
122entertained reservations with respect to its acceptability by Gambia.
Assuming that the first two alternatives would be considered premature 
and/or unacceptable, the report advocated the establishment of a Sengambian 
entente which would involve meither the creation of a new state nor the 
impairment of the sovereignty of each state. The establishment of a mere 
entente - possibly in form of a treaty relationship - was seen as a practical 
step and prelude to eventual closer integration.
In the economic sphere, which is of particular interest to us here,
total economic integration was not seriously contemplated in the report
since this vould require a considerable degree of political unity which had
been ruled out as unfeasible. Thus, the form of economic integration
advocated in the report was customs union, embracing fiscal harmonization,
and ultimately monetary integration, with Gambia making the adjustments.
But the immediate practical problems of a sudden economic integration, such
as the administrative difficulties arising from the introduction of the
complicated regulatory system of Senegal into Gambia overnight and the
effects of such changes on cost of living, were clearly recognised.
^22. Ibid. Also see Sy in Op. cit.. P. 128
123. Ibid.. P. 121
<
This led the UK report to endorse a gradual economic association of the two
oountries beginning first with areas in which agreement is feasible and easy
to reach and gradually building up to a more advanced form of association.
Probably, because it was thought that a developing economic association would
help promote a gradual rapprochement in the political sfchere as well.
What eventually emerged as the practiable form of economic co-operation
between the two countries in the transitional phase was a free-trade area
12iiwith import restrictions in Gambia. Under this customs frontiers would be 
abolished and Gambia given an overall import quota, based on recent import 
levels, to which reduced rates of duty would apply, corresponding initially to 
the rates hitherto levied. Provisions would also be made to curb smuggling.
Concerning monetary matters, the report took the view that while 
ultimately the currencies of Senegal and Gambia would have to be united, this 
was not considered urgent. Partly because Senegal, as discussed already, 
is a member of UMOA and therefore not autonomous in the <nctnetary field whilst 
Gambia belonged to the West African Currency Board, now defunct, at the time. 
Even so, the report did not deem the long-term technical problems of 
monetary unification imsuperable.
However, as we shall soon see, these proposals failed to satisfy the 
governments of Senegal and Gambia and very little has come of them ever since.
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(ill) THE BENEFITS OF SCOKOMIC INTEGRATION IN SEHECAMBIA 
In theory, there are many economic gains to be derived from the 
integration of Senegal and Gambia* To begin with, the Gambia river could 
be used to transport the Senegal groundnut crop down the coast for export* 
Although the use of the river does not necessarily require the vertieal 
integration of the economies of the two countries* Many other African 
countries, especially the land-locked ones, use the transport system of their 
coastal neighbours without formal tariff unification*
Another important case for closer association concerns the integrated 
development of the Gambia river basin in relation to irrigation and 
hydrological development* The PAO report, mentioned above, discussed the 
benefits that will accrue from the construction of m storage dam in the 
upper catchment area of the Gambia river, with particular reference to 
irrigation facilities and power supply* Again, there is no prima facie case 
to presume that the development of the Gambia water resources can only be 
undertaken within the framework of a customs union* It vould equally be 
undertaken by an inter-govemmental agency* In fact, experience in the region 
bears eloquent testimony to this view* The Inter-State Committee for the 
Senegal River Basin, founded in 19^3, and later replaced by the OERS - all 
discussed already - had similar functions*
Eowever, the more important consideration insofar as the Gambia river 
projects are concerned relates to their economic feasibility* Prom a 
technical point of view they may appear relatively practicable but, given 
the limited market base in the area and the difficulty of financing such 
projects, their economic feasibility may be called into question*
Thus, it appears that the PAO report, whioh proposed these projects, assumed 
that a customs union vould be a good thing for all. But, if experience is any 
guide, whether a small country like Gambia would really benefit from an inte­
gration scheme in terms of additional incomes will depend on the intra^-union
125"backwash and spillover effects”. On balance, these oan be unfavourable 
for a very tiny country joining a larger area. Unless, of course, an adequate 
system of compensation is btilt into the integration agreement to reverse 
such a trend, Por example, under the transitional arrangement proposed bjr 
the UN report, it would be necessary to introduce rationing in Gambia to 
control prises which would in turn mean increased cost of administration on 
Gambia, not to mention the revenue effects of tariff disarmament. These 
oosts may not be easily offset by the gains accruing to a "junior” partner 
in a laissez faire integration scheme.
Commenting on the recommendations of the UN report, Professor Robson 
concludes that "a transitional free-trade area as the prelude to a simple
I •; *  'j* y % r . • ■ , - f  ^ •customs union offers Gambia no obvious advantages and some evident immediate
disadvantages in the form of higher administrative costs. It vould not be
sensible to enter such an arrangement without some more equitable distribution
of the direct costs and benefits of the Ahange-over to the two countries •
He suggested in place of the UN recommendation the establishment of a full
free-trade area which would permit each country to maintain its own tariff
or, alternatively, the institution of a free-trade area in local agricultural
125* Por a discussion on these effects see G, ftyrdal, Economic Theory and 
Underdeveloped Regions, Op, cit,, PP,23-U9* Also see A,0. Hirsehman,
OP. elt. PP.187-90.
126. A. Hazelwood (ed)., Op. cit.. P. 126
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produce only, ' The former alternative, unfortunately, fails to allow for
the fight against smuggling and Robson admits this, retorting that "even
the United Nations proposal involves accepting the continuance of snuggling
12 8for an indefinite period". This weakness notwithstanding, it is contended 
that either of the two alternative suggestions vould offer a reasonable 
expectation of long-term advantage and no immediate disadvantages to both 
countries. While realising that a free-trade area may be regarded as a second 
best solution to a customs union, it is clearly underlined that realism demands
no closer economic Integration between the two countries at this point in
4.4 129time.
When viewed from a detached angle, it is difficult to escape this verdict - 
though the search for a more satisfactory arrangement continues as discussed 
below,
(It ) RECENT PROGRESS TOWARDS INTEGRATION 
More than ten years after the UN report, Senegal and Gambia are still 
not very close to uniont but some progress has been made, especially in the 
Sooio-cultural field.
The report was transmitted to the governments in March, 1961* and talks 
were held between the two governments in Dakar in May to examine the alternative 
proposals. At this meeting Gambia came up with proposals on the political-— * 
analogous to the third alternative in the UN report— * whioh called for a 
confederal structure in which would be vested responsibility for defence,
127
130foreign affairs, and overseas representation* This was admittedly
unacceptable to Senegal, whioh countered with proposals envisaging the eventual
131political integration of Gambia with Senegal* But this, too, was not
acceptable to Gambia* In the impasse that ensued, the two countries settled
on a treaty relationship* They agreed to enter into treaty agreements on
132foreign affairs and defence only*
The defence agreement, which was worked.out, provides for mutual assistance
in the face of any form of external threat, the establishment of a joint
Senegal-Gambia Defence Committee with a permanent Secretariat, and Senegalese
assistance in training any Gambian military or paramilitary units* As for the
foreign-policy agreement, it provides for an exchange of resident ministers,
representation of Gambia by Senegal as directed by Gambia, and a Joint
Committee on Foreign Affairs with a Secretariat which will meet once every
three months to harmonize the approaches of the parties to all matters of
133importance in foreign affairs* Whilst providing a useful framework for
co-operation, these agreements do not in any significant sense impair the
sovereignty of either country*
The Gambia's rejection of the recommendations for a transitional free-
trade area with quotas seems to be based on the fear whether integration
would offer sufficiently increased trade and economic activity in Gambia to
accommodate the consequent extra administration costs and loss of revenue
130. Ibid* P. 126 
131* Ibid*
132. Ibid*
133. Ibid*
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through tariff cuts* For Senegal any acceptable form of economic association 
that vould not lead ultimately to full integration of Gambia seems out of 
the question*
Thus the 196U Agreements were not UBed as stepping-stones to closer
relations; the two countries positively dragged their £eet over implementing
13Ueven such modest acts of co-operation* The foreign policy agreements, for 
instance, have never really workeds the joint committee has elapsed; there 
is no joint representation overseas; and the two states pursue separate and 
sometimes contradictory policies* Similarly, little has come of the Defence 
agreements*
In accordance with the UN report's recommendations, two governments signed,
on 19 April, 1967t & treaty of association defining the bodies Responsible for
promoting and extending coordination and co-operation between the two
countries in all fie Ids*
The treaty provides for the setting up of three bodiest the Conference
of Heads of State, the inter-state Ministerial Committee and the permanent
Senegambian Secretariat* The conference of Heads of State meets, in principle,
once a year, in Banjul and in Dakar alternately to define general guidelines
and survey the stook and state of co-operation between the two countries*
Within the framework of the policy so defined, the inter-state Ministerial
Committee's task is to study all measures to strengthen co-operation and 
13li* See A* Hughes* Op* cit** PP* 11x9-50
135* A defence meeting was called in 1971 in order to implement the earlier 
promise8 but at the time of writing nothing has been done (see I^id)*
136. See Sy, Op. cit** PP. 128 - 129.
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solidarity between the two oountries and to subnit then for approval to the
two governments. The Committee aeets at least once a year. In practice, it
has net twice a year, alternately in The Gambia and in Senegal.1^
The Ministerial Committee is assisted by a Secretariat whose headquarters
would be at Banjul. The Secretariat is a permanent investigation, liaison
and information body entrusted with the implementation of the decisions of
the Ministerial Committee to which it is responsible.
Senegal has agreed to pay 75^ of the cost of the Secretariat, out of its
provisional budget of 31,360,000 CPA francs. The rest will come from Gambia.
This was ggreed at the second Conference of the Committee which took place on
29 January, 1968.^
When these institutions were set up, a series of agreements covering
wider and wider fields were concluded. The permanent Secretariat endeavoured
to implement such agreements and still continues to do so but there have been
139implementation difficulties. On 10 June, 1967# the two governments signed 
a cultural agreement to develop as far as possible the relations between the 
two countries in the following fields* University, School, Science, Technical 
matters, sports and culture, in order to contribute to a better understanding 
of their respective cultures or of their activities in these fields.1^
138* C. Legum & Associate (eds.), Africa Contemporary Record. 1968*69, 
London, PP. 1*86 & 583.
139® The Secretariat itself was not set up until a year after it had been decided 
upon in the 1967 Treaty and the Gambians do not seem to have been consulted 
in the selection of its Senegalese director (See Hughes Op. cit. P. 150)
11*0. S. Sy, Op. cit. P. 129
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Since 1968 the Secretariat has drawn up an Implementation Protocol to 
this end each year and certain cultural and social activities have been carved 
out within the framework of the Implementation Protocol to the cultural 
agreement. The Secretariat, working im close co-operation with those respon­
sible for education, contributed to the setting up of an Advisory co-ordinating 
Council for Youths and Sports. Its achievements, which have been modest, 
include the building of & Senegalese School, containing 1+50 pupils more than 
60% of whom are Gambians; organisation of sports; and the annual organization 
of youth caravans towards one country or the other.
Notwithstanding their importance, sociO-cultur&l affairs represent only 
one aspect of the Senegambian co-operation. There ie the more complex field 
of economy. The only project worth mentioning here is the development of 
t^ ie Gambia's river basin. The purpose of this project as indicted earlier 
is to make an hydrological assessment of the Gambia river with a view to 
developing this basin for hydroelectricity, shipping and irrigation. The 
study was initiated in 1970 with the aid of funds from the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP) and was expected to be completed by the middle 
% 1&1of 197U* Although the role of the Secretariat in directing this project
has been notable, it is still a far cry from the optimistic forecasts of
massive dams providing unlimited power and vast acres of irrigated land.
11+J*. Ibid. ?y the middle of May, 1975 this study has not been completed. The 
Senegalese Prime Minister, K. Abdou Diouf during his official visit to The 
Gambia on 19th April, 1975 expressed the determination of the two govern­
ments to conclude the study to enable them implement the related projects 
(see Africa Research Bulletin, April 15 - May 11+, 1975# P» 3U82).
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The move towards oloaer co-operation between the two countries has been 
remarkably slow. Indeed, the associational relationship, which has characterised 
the position between them in the post - 196U period, has undergone stress 
recently.
One important factor here has been a certain amount of disenchantment
with integration on the part of the Gambia, accompanied by a period of coolness
and distance from its putative federal partner. The reasons for this change
of heart date from around 1969 and have led to permanent changes in Gambian
11+2thinking on ultimate union with Senegal. The perennial 'smuggling* issue 
and the related border *crisis* of 1969-71 confirmed Gambian fears that 
Senegal was bent on dominating her smaller neighbour and, although little hard 
evidence was offered to substantiate these fears, they have been sufficient 
to lead to departures in Gambian foreign policy.
There is also the fact that the Senegambian idea from the Gambian point 
of view has been more of a pragmatic response to a set of difficulties facing 
the colony-state in the early sixties than a self-negating idealistic commit­
ment to the goals of continental unity. The prime impetus was unquestionably 
a concern for the economic viability of the colony following a British 
withdrawal together with its Srants-in-Aid. The anxiety and uncertainty created 
by this situation turned Gambian eyes towards Dakar for Senegal seemed to offer 
a way out and the latter seemed anxious to form a close political and economic 
union with its tiny neighbour.
11+2. See A. Hughes, Op. cit.. p. 150
However, in the very year of Gambian independence (18 February, 1965)
the groundnut crops - the mainstay of the country* s economy £ increased both
in size and value, and despite later fluctuations, this steady growth has
been maintained* The Gambia was thus able to manage without a British Grants-
in-Aid in 1966/67 and has had no recourse to it thereafter* The emergence
of this spirit of self-sustenance ha^»had a dampening effect on the desire
for rapid and close union with Senegal*
Furthermore, Gambia, as we noted earlier, has justifiable reservations
about the immediate benefits of economic integration with Senegal* Given the
Senegalese relatively more developed and export-oriented industrial sector,
Gambians feel that the Senegalese would be the immediate beneficiaries of
economic integration since this would mean the abolition of Gambia*s cheap
import policy and the subsequent ending of the clandestine trade with Senegal*
Meanwhile the associational relationahip between the two countries continues
at its undemanding level leaving The Gambia to run its affairs and to maintain
its important ties with Britain and forge new and countervailing links with
other West African States* Unless one of three things dramatically alters the
status quo, the integration of the two countries seems remote in the
foreseeable future* There could be a positive rethinking on either sidef the
groundnut orop might cease to prosper and external aid slashed; and Senegal
might contemplate a military intervention in Gambia* Attitudes towards
closer integration of The Gambia and Senegal could be changed by eithr of
these but there are no good grounds to entertain any of these possibilities yet*
1U3. Fear about the termination of British aid after independence tumed-out 
to be unfounded* It was merely re-directed into the Development Budget 
(see footnote III)*
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5.7 ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES (ECOWAS)
(i) BACKGROUND TO ECOWAS
In pursuance of its notion of unity through regional groupings, the 
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) oonducted researches in 
a selected number of West African Countries between the early and mid-sixties* 
The findings^^ of these studies suggest thati-
(a) there was considerable scope for increased inter-penetration of 
each country by goods that could be supplied competitively from the 
other countries;
(b) the Government should be assisted in making the necessary 
organisational and legal changes to facilitate this trade;
(c) enterprises identified to be potential exports to neighbouring 
countries should be assisted to organise their commercial contacts 
and exporting arrangements;
(d) a long-term programme of policies favourable to exports and import 
promotion with particular emphasis on training was required*
To discuss these and other issues related to economic co-operation in
West Africa, a number of meetings were held under the auspices of ECA which
culminated in the signing of articles of association for a West African
Economic Community in Accra on l*th May, 1967.^^ Signatories comprise
Dahomey, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria,
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo and Upper Volta* Gambia and Guinea did not sign*
11*1*. C* Legum & Associate (eds), Op* cit** P*C 1*1*8*
11*5. Africa Research Bulletin, Vol* IV* P* 731*
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According to Article 1 the aims of the community will bei1^
(i) To promote, through economic co-operation of member-states, a
co-ordinated and equitable development of their economies,
especially in agriculture, industry, transport and communications,
trade and payments, manpower, energy, and natural resources;
(ii) To further the maximum possible interchange of goods and services
between its member-states;
(iii) To contribute to the orderly expansion of trade between member-states
and the rest of the world;
(iv) To contribute by all these efforts and endeavours to the economic 
development of the continent of Africa as a whole.
Other sections of the Treaty spelt out in minute details how a permanent
community would be brought into being. It was to be the responsibility of an 
Interim Council of Ministers, the composition of which was also agreed upon.
It was decided to hold a summit in Monrovia in April, 1968, at which it 
was intended to formally set up the community but that summit was not parti­
cularly successful.1^  The absence of delegations from Ivory Coast, Togo,
Niger and Dahomey, whose official reason for not attending was that the pace of
ftthe whole project was being rushed, and they needed more time to consider it, 
downgraded the outcome of the conference. Consequently, although the Monrovia 
meeting produced a protocol (signed by nine of the fourteen; Sierra Leone was 
also absent because of coup) setting up the West African Economic Community, 
11*6. Ibid.
11*7. See West Afrioa, 7 July, 1972 (P. 81*9).
11*8. Ibid.
and made provisions for a further treaty-signing summit to be held in 
1U9Ouagadougou, the grouping was put on ice. And - except for occassional 
verbal declarations from a number of quarters in the region on how important 
it is to reactivate it - there it has remained.
The 1968 Treaty was to have been discussed at a Ministerial and then 
Heads of State meeting "before the end of 1969"* But the meeting was repeatedly 
postponed and on October 16, the Late President Tubman of Liberia, who was then 
chairman of the Council, announced that the "French-speaking nations who were 
to attend the meeting had asked for postponement and that "certain elements" 
did not want the proposed Vest African economic grouping to work",^^ There­
after, very little was heard of the grouping until towards the middle of 1972, 
11*9. Ibid,
150, There is a feeling in some quarters that the French had reservations about 
the formation of a grouping they felt might be "Anglo-Saxon" dominated.
And it is thought that French influence and/or pressure had something to 
do with the attitude of non-co-operation of the Francophones. Although 
conclusive evidence is hard to come by, some recent developments hame 
strengthened the hands of those who share this view. During the Bamako 
conference of June 1972 - noted earlier - at which the Franoophones 
established their exclusive CEAO, the French Ministry of Co-operation was 
conspicuously represented as well as the EEC Commission but, strangely 
enough, no Anglophone country was invited, even as an observer. But 
more revealing is a statement made by the late French President, George 
Pompidou during his visit to Niger early in 1972, On the effect of the 
British entry into the EEC on the African continent, he said, "It is only 
logical that Francophones, and Anglophone, should co-operate more fully" 
but that relations between Anglophones and Francophones should not be a 
"one way relationship; there must be a just equilibrium". This equilibrium 
could be achieved, according to the President, only if the Francophones 
"harmonise their efforts so as to counter-balance the heavy weight of 
Nigeria" (see Tamar K, Golan in Vest Africa. 7 July# 1972 (P. 866). Also 
see C, Legum and Associate (eds), Op. cit.. P. cl*l*8. However, as we 
have shown in section 5*2, there has been a change of attitude on the 
part of the Francophone states in this direction.
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(ii) THE TREAT!
The birth of the Economic Community of West African States on 28 May,
1975 in Lagos marked the beginning of a new ema in the history of economic
co-operation in West Afrida, Its birth came after eight years of action and
inaction. The period from 1967 through March 1972 was characterised by
hesitation, vacillation and "politics" whilst the last three years marked by
series of meetings and difficult negotiations initiated in April 1972 by
President Eforadema of Togo and General Gowon of Nigeria finally brought the
community into existence. The two Heads of State revived the idea and
supe&rheaded the successful campaign.
As we noted in section 5*2, both leaders had agreed to form the
"nucleus" of a West African Economic Community which would embrace both
anglophone and francophone countries. It was feared that the CEAO members
would not join the wider regional grouping because of the "great francophone-
191anglophone divide" in West Africa but surprisingly all embraced the ECOWAS. 
Indeed, ten Heads of States indlucing such influential francophone leaders 
as Felix Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast, Ould Daddah of Mauritania and 
Eyadema of Togo were present for the signing of new treaty in Lagos, confounding 
earlier expectations of a poor showing and raising hopes for the organisation
know as Eoonomic Community of West African States to the franoophones.
151* West Africa, 7 July, 1972. This has been discussed earlier (see Chapters 
2 4 5 ( 2 )  ).
The ambitious 65-clause ECOWAS Treaty is expected to standardise 
tariffs and trade procedures among the 15-founder members* These arer 
Dahomey, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau (hewly independent), Ivory 
Coast, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal,Sierra Leone, Togo 
and Upper Volta*
Specifically, the aim of the community is to promote co-operation and 
development in all fields of economic activity particularly in the fields 
of industry, transport, telecommunications, energy, agriculture, natural 
resources, commerce, monetary and financial questions and in social and 
cultural matters for the purpose of raising the standard of living of its 
peoples, of increasing and maintaining economic stability, of fostering closer 
relations aaong its members and of contributing to the progress and development 
of the African continent (Article 2 (i) )• To this end the Community will 
by stages (emphasis mine) ensure among other things* (i) the elimination as 
between the member states of customs duties and other charges of equivalent 
effect in respeot of the importation and exportation of goods; (ii) the 
abolition of quantitative and administrative restrictions on trade among the 
member states; (ill) the establishment of a common external tariff and a 
common commercial policy towards third countries; (iv) the abolition of 
restrictions on the free movement of persons, services and capital; (v) the 
harmonisation of agricultural, industrial and economic policies; (vi) the 
implementation of schemes lor the joint development of transport, communication, 
energy and other infrastructural facilities; and (vii) the establishment of 
a fund for co-operation, Compensation and Development*
1f>2. Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States* Lagos May 1975 
reprinted In the NEW NIGERIA*. 3 June. 1975. The Treaty is diTided into 
1U chapters and contains 65 clauses.
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Article U of the Treaty establishes five institutions to run the ECOWAS. 
They compriset
(a) The Authority of Heads of State and Government;
(b) the Council of Ministers;
(c) the Executive Secretariat;
(d) the Tribunal of the Community;
(e) Technical and Specialised Commissions.
The Authority of Heads of State and Government is the principal governing 
institution of the Community. It will be responsible for, and have the general 
direction and control of the performance of the executive functions of the 
community, and its decisions will be binding on all institutions of the 
community. The Authority is to meet at least once a year and will determine 
its own procedures and conduct of business.
Below the Authority of the Heads of State and Government is the Council 
of Ministers which will consist of two representatives of each member state.
The responsibilities of the council of Ministers are* (i) to keep under review 
the functioning and : > development of the community in accordance with the 
Treaty; (ii) to make recommendations to the Authority on matters of policy aimed 
at the effioient and harmonious functioning and development of the community;
(iii) to give direction to all subordinate institutions of the community; and
(iv) to exercise such other powers oonferred on it and perform such other 
duties assigned to it by the Treaty. The decisions and directions of the 
Council of Ministers, whioh will meet twice a year with a provision for extra­
ordinary meetings, will be binding en all subordinate institutions of the 
Community (Article 6).
The Executive Secretariat is the executive organ of the community. It 
is to be headed by an Exeoutive Secretary who will be appointed by the Authority 
to serve in such office for a term of four years and be reappointable for 
another term of four years only. According to Article 8 of the Treaty, the 
Executive Secretary will be the chief executive officer of the community and 
he will be assisted by * two Deputy Executive Secretaries who will be 
appointed by the Council of Ministers. There is also a provision for the 
appointment of a financial Controller and other officers in the Secretariat.
The Executive Secretary is responsible for the day to day administration of 
the community and all its institutions.y.t -i *
Conscious of the complex problems which would arise in the process of 
harmonising the economies of 15 different countries which have different 
systems and are at relatively different levels of development, the Treaty 
envisages the establishment of the Tribunal of the Community (Article II).
Its work is to ensure the observance of law and justice in the interpretation 
of the provisions of the Treaty and to settle disputes referred to it.
Also it is proposed to establish 1; Technical and specialised Commissions 
consisting of*
(a) the Trade, Customs, Immigration, Monetary and Payments Commission ;
(b) the Industry, Agriculture and Natural Resources Commission;
(c) the Trensport, Telecommunications and Energy Commission;
(d) the Social and Cultural Affairs Commission.
Each commission is to consist of representatives designated one each by the 
member states. The function of each commission is to submit from time to 
time reports and recommendations relating to its vwn field of investigation 
through the Executive Secretary to the council of Ministers either on its own
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initiative or upon the request of the Council of Ministers or the Executive 
Secretary* In addition the Treaty could impose other functions on each 
commission*
Other important provisions of the Treaty inoludet the appointment of
an External Auditor of the Community to be responsible for the auditing of
its account; the setting up of a Committee of West African Central Banks,
consisting of the governors of the various central banks to oversee the
system of payments within the grouping; and the establishment of the fund for
co-operation, compensation aid development as a mechanism for the equitable
distribution of the benefits and costs of integration* The fund is to be
financed from the contributions of members, income from community enterprisesl
external receipts, and subsidies and contributions from all other sources
(Articles 10, 38 & 5o)*
Essentially, the ECOWAS Treaty is an ambitious but detailed document*
Despite the temptation to rush things, the Treaty envisages the gradual
achievement of a customs Union of West African states over a period of
15 years*Aoticle 62 states that the Treaty and the protocols which will
be annexed to it will respectively enter into force provisionally upon the
signature by Heads of State and Government and definitely upon ratification by
seven signatory states* The Treaty does not however commit the signatories
153* Within a period of two years from the definitive entry into force of
the Treaty, member states are to "freeze” their customs duties and other 
charges on trade* During the next eight years members will be required 
to progressively reduce and ultimately eliminate such duties whilst the 
existing differences on their external customs tariffs would be abolished 
according to a recommended schedule over the last 5 years (see Articles 13 
and 1ii)*
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to political or even monetary union* It further binds them to taking measures 
which may in its own view conflict with the interests of a signatory state* 
Particularly interesting is the commitment to exchange industrial feasibility 
studies and information about their industrial experience as this would help 
to minimise the duplication of feasibility studies in the region*
(iii) PROBLEMS AND THE FUTURE 
There axe however problems to overcome. The provision to ensure that all 
states have a similar "industrial climate" to make industrial development smoother 
is admirable. Tet it is difficult to imagine how this can be easily achieved 
in the foreseeable future in a region displaying such eoonomic diversities as 
West Africa, especially between the undisguised capitalist mode of Ivory Coast 
and the thorough-going socialist system of Guinea* To achieve this would 
require profound political and ideological changes*
Also the determination of the appropriate level of common external tariff 
might not be easy. In fixing the level, consideration must be given to the 
need to protect the community^ industries and to compensate its members for 
the loss of revenue from the abolition of duties inside the community. It is 
desirable that the height of the common external taxiff should not be so low as 
to negate the above considerations nor should it be so high to the point where 
the community beoomes simply a high-cost area where inefficiency is protected 
and richly regarded whilst the benefits of integration accrue to a few*
But the most immediate problem is one of definition* Article 62 (2) of 
the Treaty permits any West African State to join the community* But "West 
Africa" is not defined* President Senghor of Senegal is reported to have said
Also Dr* Adedeji, Nigeria's former Commissioner for Economic Development, who 
has just taken up his new post as Executive Secretary of ECA in Addis Ababa, 
opined after the signing ceremony that "all other African States” were free to
153join. Althougft there is nothing wrong with a continental customs- union, 
the community Secretariat must know exactly what area it is dealing with if the 
officials are to get down to practical work* Besides the area of the 15-founder 
signatories looks like, and can be made into, an economic unit (Spanish Sahara
is the only obviously desirable addition)* If it were to spread southwards to
Zaire and beyond or eastwards to Chad and the Sudan, it would become unmanageable - 
- though one does not rule out the development of economic ties with the 
community's neighbours.
Another issue relates to the standardisation of prices paid officially 
for agricultural exports* There seems to be no specific commitment to 
harmonise these prices and their disparities are a major cause of smuggling*
This is a serious omission but it is hoped that under General Undertaking 
(Article 3) members must do something about it.
Perhaps, by far the biggest danger facing ECOWAS is the existence of
other rival integration schemes in West Africa* Aware of this and desirous
to accommodate them, the Treaty allows member states to belong to other
economic groupings provided that such membership does not "derogate from the
obligations of that member state under this Treaty” (Article 20 (3). But
there are other problems* Obviously, such organizations, which appear to be
15U* West Africa* 16 June, 1975*
155. Ibid.
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that he wanted all African states facing West to the Atlantic to be eligible*
"complementary” in nature, as the organisation for the Development of Senegal 
River or wider bodies like the ECA can only help to develop the new community. 
But the incorporation of the CEAO whieh is essentially a miniature ECOWAS 
of the francophones may be less easy. Although a spokesman for the ECOWAS 
in Lagos emphasised that there would be feo conflict of interests between the 
two organisations,^*^ it remains to be seen how this will be so. Since their 
long-term aims are basically the same, the region as a whole stands to gain, 
at least in the interest of economy and effective co-operation, if they could 
be merged. The sooner the over-%11 problems of the sub-region are taken into 
consideration, the sooner will factions give way to determined collective 
effort.
Furthermore, ECOWAS presents another glaring case of a partnership 
of unequal partners. Nigeria, one of the 15-founder members, has about 61% 
of the population of the area. Its GNP accounted for 1*9% of the sub-regional 
total in 1973; and it has the largest and most diversified industrial sector, 
at least in absolute terms. As already illustrated in chapter 3t the partner*- 
ship of suoh unequal partners has often widened rather than narrowed the 
"economic gap" between members of a grouping. A satisfactory distributive 
system has to be devised to ensure that the fruits of integration are equitably 
distributed among the members, if the weaker ones are to stay in the community. 
Finally, although the ECOWAS oame into legal existence on 27 June, 1975
after it had been ratified by nine oountries (i.e. Nigeria, Liberia, Togo, Ghana
\ 157Ivory Coast, Guinea, Upper Volta, Gambia and Dahomey in that order), nothing 
else, can be said at this point in time about its future - except that it really
156. Ibid.
157. See New Ni/rerian. 27 June, 1975.
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represents a milestone in the continuing search for effective co-operation 
in West Africa. But the success of the organisation depends on the course of 
future developments.
5#8 IHTER-STETB FUNCTIONAL ORGANISATIONS
Aside from the more formal forms of economic integration discussed abovef
there exist some inter-state functional organisations. The more important
ones which are discussed in broad general terms here - are the Mamo River Union9
158the Chad Basin Commission aad the Niger River Commission. The functional 
organisations9 unlike the other integration schemes9 are generally specific 
and limited in their objectives, sometimes involving little or no integration 
in the field of fiscal, monetary and labour policies. As we show co-operation 
is often centred on a development project.
(1) MAMO RIVER ONIOM 
Liberia and Sierra Leone signed the Mano River declaration on 3rd October,
1973 thereby bringing into existence the Mano River Union of economic oo-opera^
159tlon between them. It provides for the gradual establishment of a full
customs union in two stages between the two neighbouring countries by 1977 and of
a permanent joint commission charged with implementing the agreement. The
first phase to be completed not later than 1st January, 1977 included the
158. Por a note on these commissions see Europa Publications, op. cit (1971)t 
P.120} Also see UNECA, Natural Resources Newsletter. No. 2, January,19^5 
and Pierre Renier, La mise en valeur Commune du bassin Tchadie. in 
Europe-Prance Outre-Mer. Paris No.lt12. PP. O^-l!. See Further. UNECA,
Report of an ECA Economic Co-operation Mission to West Africa, E/CN. 12+/U78» 
18 May, 1970.
159* See Africa Research Bulletin. Vol, 2, No.9# 197U P.3252A; African Contem­
porary Record. 1973-71*. P.B 690} Africa Confidential. Vol.15>, No.o,
March 22, 197U, P. 71 T.E. Mswaka, "Tariff Structure and Economic 
co-operation between Liberia and Sierra Leone" in The Economic Bulletin 
OF Ghana. Vol.i* No. 1, 197Uf PP. 33 - U8.
liberalisation of mutual trade in local products, the harmonization of rates 
of import duty and other fiscal incentives. The 1l*-point agreement also 
envisages among other things the establishment ofi a Ministerial Committee 
for Economic Union whose main responsibility will be the co-ordination of 
various committees of Experts (these Expert committees are expected to be 
engaged in various studies connected with the preparation and establishment 
of the shheme)) a joint Development Fund for Co-operation; and joint economlo 
planning.
But at the centre of the proposed economic union is one key project.
It is the construction of a bridge across the Mano River, linking the two
countries by road. The African Development Bank (ADB) approved a loan of some
160US )£1.61* million in 1973 to cover the foreign exchange costs of the project.
The successful completion of this project is expected to increase the present 
low level of trade between the two countries as well as facilitate economic 
co-operation in other areas.
One important issue in the proposed customs union of course is whether 
the two governments will be able to agree about the unofficial export of 
Sierra Leonian diamonds through Liberia. This smuggling costs Sierra Leone 
dear in both foreign exchange and local government revenue; but the Liberians 
have much to lose if the illegal trade is stopped.
_ g _  1 '... ■ 1 ■ . ■ i ■.
160. Ibid.
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(ii) lake chad basing commission
Lake Chad Basin Commission was established in May, 1961* and now has 
its headquarters in Port - Lamy (Chad). The member states are* Cameroon,
Chad, Niger and Nigeria. The Commission is composed of an Executive Secretary 
and two Commissioners from each Member State and its responsibility is the 
co-ordination of the development of the Chad Basin, particularly the exploita­
tion of the subterranean and surface water resources in relation to agricultural 
development, animal husbandry and fisheries. The Commission decided recently 
to establish a Development Fund (to enable it to proceed with priority projects 
for which i t  at present lacks foreign assistance) and two specialised agencies 
of the Commission. ^  ^ One of the Agencies would be concerned with cattle 
and foodstuffs and the other with agricultural produce.
(iii) NIGER RIVER COMMISSION 
Niger River Commission was founded in 1963 by the Act of Niamy (Niger).1*’2 
The members includes Cameroon, Dahomey, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Mali, Niger, 
Nigeria and Upper Volta. The responsibility of the Commission, which meets 
annually, covers navigation and general related economlo activities along 
the whole len&th and breath of the River Niger, the longest river in the 
region. The administrative Secretariat in Niamy is under an Executive Secretary. 
American and Canadian assistance has been received to build a bridge over the
Niger River to link Gaya in Niger to Malanville in Dahomey, and to build a
163river port near Gaya. ^
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161. Africa Research Bulletin. P. 2l*03B
162. Europa Publications, Op. cit. P. 120
163* Africa Research Bulletin. Vol. 9t No. 2, 1973
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To sun up this ohapter, we recapitulate some of the more important factors 
affecting economic integration in the West Africansub-region. Internal 
political and economic differences, overblown integration schemes, especially 
at the initial stages, external pressures and influences and pre-occupation 
with territorial sovereignty of the nation state have all hampered the orderly 
development of eoonomic co-operation in the area. Although the general bases 
for effective integration in the area are still not very strong, it can surely 
be expected that, with the increased monetization of the economies in the region, 
the opportunities for effective co-operation would progressively increase.
Meanwhile, some progress has been made, albeit slow - compared with 
East Africa. Already the UMOA members have an effective currency union and, 
despite its weaknesses, the Entente still keeps alive the spirit of co-opera­
tion within the rank and file of its members. More importantly, the all­
embracing ECOWAS has finally oome into existence. But the observed limited 
success of integration schemes in the region, as revealed above, raises 
serious questions as to whether West Africa, at this point in history, can 
attain its goals of regional economic integration and development.
5.9 CONCLUSION
CHAPTER SIX 
TARIFF STRUCTURES ANI) ECONOMIES OF THS SIX 
Economic integration necessarily invAlveB trade liberation either through 
tariff harmonization or elimination, over an agreed period, of tariff and non* 
tariff barriers restricting intra-union trade. The present ohapter tries to 
examine the general tariff structures and import policies of the six countries 
under review and to survey their economies. Also the implications of tariff 
structures for possible economic integration of the six will be briefly touched 
upon but a quantitative analysis of customs revenue loss arising from integra­
tion-induced tariff disarmament will be postpone$until‘ we come to chapter 9.
In what follows section A discusses the tariff structures and import policies 
whilst section B makes & broad survey of the six eoonomies.
A. TARIFF STRUCTURES AND IMPORT POLICIES 
Tariff structures and other trade taxes together with their effects on 
trade between prospective members of a customs union and/or trading partners 
have been the main hub on which conventionalcustoms union theory revolved. 
Indeed, customs union theory had until recently been viewed as essentially a 
tariff issue, "that branch of tariff theory which deals with the effects of 
geographically discriminatory changes in trade barriers".1 However, the 
recent shift in emphasis regarding customs union theory appreciates and 
recognises its wider implications for resource-allocations (and development 
in the case of LDCs). These tariff resource-allocation effects, whatever they 
are, derive from the existing tariff structure hence the existing pattern of
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1. R.G. Lipsey^ "The Theory of Customs Unions A General Survey", The 
Economic Journal. September, 1960. p. 261.
tariffs would haws a direct but lasting effect on any given (developing or
2developed) eoonomy • For the rest of this seotion, ve shall address ourselves 
to the tariff structures and import policies of Ghana and the Entente Stated 
with particular reference to harmonization.
Among the manj obstacles (indicated in the introductory chapter) milita­
ting against increased trade between Ghana and her immediate neighbours are the 
divergencies in import policies and tariff eyetems. Three nain factors explain 
the present situation. First, the historical orientation of trade towards the 
former metropolitan oountries has imposed some constraint on tariff manipulations. 
Since each of these countries has its former oolonlal master as its biggest 
customer, there has been tendency to operate a preferential tariff system with 
respect to imports from the metropolitan countries. Although Ghana and Togo 
have now abolished discriminatory, in favour of non-discriminatory, tariff rates, 
Ivory Coast, Niger, Dahomey and Upper Volta still offer preferential tariff
charges to goods originating from France or the other EEC countries or the
3Franc zone. Goods from these countries are exempted fron customs duty, 
though they are subject to fiscal duty.
2. The extent to whioh tariffs and other trade taxes can affect resource - 
allocation of course depends, to a great measure, on the volume of traded 
goods. From the point of view of intra-regional trade in Vest Africa the
effects are likely to be small, given the low level of trade bitween the 
countries of the region. With respect to the way tariffs and other taxes 
affect resource allocation, they reflect themselves in input prices which in 
turn affect value added via input-output relationships. See chapter 7*
3. This may now have to cease. For under Article 7(1) of the ACP-EEC Conven­
tion of Lome the ACP countries (inoluding the Entente States) are not
required to accord reciprocal tariff treatment to imports originating from the 
EEC (See EEC, The Courier. No. 31, March 1975).
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The second explanatory factor relates to the state of regional monetary 
arrangements and eoonomic eo-eperation# The Entente States (ivory Coasty Niger, 
Dahomey and Upper Volta), which were formerly members of the UDEAO but mow of 
CEAO, enjoy a 5C$ reduction in minimum tariffs on trade among themselves# This 
means, in effect, that exports from Ghana to the Entente countries would bear 
a heavier duty than those originating within the latter# Even Ghanaian goods 
have to face a higher duty than those of EEC when imported into Entente States 
except in the oase of Tege^ which operates a non-discrimInatoTy tariff as does 
Ghana#
The third and last point originates from deliberate policy measures. The 
frequent urge to restore balance of payments equilibrium and the protection of 
national industries together with the monetary and fiseal measures consequent 
upon them have often increased rather than reduced obstacles to trade among the 
countries under examination. Consider, for example, the oase of Togo and 
Dahomey. Tariff differentials between the two hslghbours have often led to a 
kind of tariff war. The low levels of duty in Togo encourage snuggling to 
neighbouring countries. Dahomey, either with a view to encouraging suoh illicit 
trade, or in order to partleip&te in its benefits out its tariffs by 15 points 
in February 1968 only to receive a riposte in the form ef selective cuts in Tege 
in June 1968. Such activity leads to considerable Instability in the pattern 
of trade flews while the very foundation for the lew tariff policy Is itself 
an obstacle to legal trade.
U. It is instructive to remember that although Togo became a member of the
Entente Council (Conseil de L,Entente) on June 8, 1966# it did not join 
UDAC or its successor, UDEAO (whioh came into existence under a new convention 
with affect fron December 15* 1966). Three UDEAO members (Mali, Mauritania and 
Senegal) also are not members of the Entente Council. See Chapter Five for 
details on the existing integration schemes.
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We shall now go Into greater detail country by country examining the inport 
policies and tariff structures of the six, starting with the former.
1. IMPORT LICSN8ING AKD EXCHAMGE CONTROL REGULATIONS 
1.1 GHANA.
In 1961 the government of Ghana introduced a regime of import and exchange 
controls in an attempt to deal with the worsening of the country's (once healthy) 
balance of payments'*. These measures have remained in existence ever since they 
were introduced with some "stop-go" tightening up of the regulations in recent 
years. The system of import licensing and exchange control was initially being 
useds (a) to control the level of imports of each type of commodity as well as 
the total value of imports into the country and (b) to alter the country's 
pattern of trade9 more specifioally9 in favour of those countries with which
gGhana has trade and payments agreements. Under the system specific amounts of
5* At the eve of independence in 1957» Ghana had foreign reserves totalling well
over ^ 200 million but by 1959* only two years after independence9 the country 
had started to run deficits in its balance of payments. By the end of December 
1961; the reserves had dwindled to an all time low. The net external reserves 
stood at ^ G27«5# the equivalence of about two and a half months imports. One of 
the major reasons behind this trend was the sharp rise in public spending. In ; 
19^0-51 total government expenditure amounted to ^G17.2 million and with revenue 
running at ^ G20.9 million. But ten years later (in 1960-61) government expendi­
ture had increased more than six times to nearly ^ G11l* million. The economic 
logic of the situation therefore demanded some form of policy action. See 
Economic Survey. 196i*t pp. 21-23*
6. Between i960 aad 19^3 Ghana signed long term trade and payments agreements
with 11* countries consisting of the 10 centrally-planned eoonomies of Eastern 
Europe (including U.S.S.H. ahd China) plus Isreal, the United Arab Republlot Mali 
and Guinea. In each case goods to be bartered in on a non-cutrency transfer basis 
were specified. It therefore follows that import llceoing and controls would have 
been instituted in any case after 19^3» even if the reserve position of the country 
during the early of sixties was in a healthy state. See9 Econonic Survey.
196U, P. 33.
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the estimated amount of foreign exchange available were allocated by the 
government to various categories of imports and import lioemoes were then issued 
accordingly. Very recently licences were bfring issued under three headings!
(l) Open General Licence (OGL) whioh has of late been subject to frequent
changes but now covers a considerable range of articles9 in particular,
7machinery, building materials and raw materials. At present, imports 
under an OGL are subject to an imports surcharge which on certain items 
may be high as 73#* This surcharge is discriminatory in favour of
(11) essential materials.
3
(ii) Special Lioemoes, whioh eover all other permitted commercial imports. 
Speoial licences are issued on application by the importer, who must 
be registered with the Ministry of Trade. Importers of consumer goods 
are required to deposit 15# of the value of the licence with their 
bankers at the time of issue of the licence.
7. This reflects the latest changes up to early 1972. It must be borne in mind 
that the whole system of import lioenoing and exohamge controls in Ghana has
been very sensitive to the political barometer of the country. Given the persi­
stent pressure on foreign exohange, which has been exacerbated by heavy external 
debt obligations and the scarcity of badly needed imported items, successive 
government since the overthrow of the Nkrumah regime in ^^66 has found it a 
useful too for galvanising political support.
8. The range of items that could be imported under specific lioemoes were greatlj 
increased by the military government of Col. I.K. Acheaapong. With effect
from 8th February, 1972 more than 350 items came under specific licences (See
African Research Bulletin. February 11*# 1972, P. 2272). Surprisingly enough, 
some of these items like milk, baly-food and beef, were importable on OGL under 
the regime of Dr. K.A. Busia whioh was overthrown in a military coup by the 
former on 13 January 1972. The military extended the range ef imports under 
speolflc lineence as a counterblast to the by-product of their own action. When 
Col. Acheanpomg assumed power one of his first measures was to repudiate oettain 
external debts and to declare a unilateral moratorium on others - a move whioh 
ap^kred very popular in Ghana. To this the oountries mostly affooted - Britain 
and' the European Eoonomic Community - quickly restored by withdrawing export 
credit insurance from goods ordered by Ghana. To prevent panic buying and 
ensure uninterrupted supply of essential imports, ths military government set up 
a committee - the Essential Commodities committee - to import and distribute the 
vast majority of essential commodities. It could therefore be said that the 
reduotion of items importable under OGL while at the same time enlarging the
(ill) Special un-numbered licences, which cover goods (other than those 
prohibited er restricted) for which payment has been made by the 
importer in the country of origin or consignmsnt, sc that no transfer of 
foreign exchange by the Bank of Ghana is involved. Imports in this 
category are mot permitted in commercial quantities except in very 
special cases.
Until very recently a large number of consumer goods were subject to easier
licencing conditions. The civilian government of Dr. Busia had planned a pregre—
9ssive relaxation of import restrictions^ to stimulate competition with local 
producers which would have had the effect of lewe^ipg prices for the Ghanaian 
publio. However, this trend was reversed following the intervention of the 
military. Hew nest items require specifio licences and importers are required 
to nake applications, which must cover requirements for one year, (in duplicate) 
to the Ministry of Trade. Even so most of the imports are currently being handled 
by the Essential Commodities Cemmittee, although this is likely to be a temporary 
arrangement. Most of the goods listed for specific licences are mainly these 
produced by developing domestic industries whioh Ghana naturally wishes to be 
protected.
Other features of the Ghanaian import licencing system oannot be ignored. 
Licences, when approved, are normally issued on a e and f. basis, it being 
stipulated that insurance must be covered In Ghana. Additional import lieenoes
are Issued under an export incentive aohene to Manufacturers who use the goods
list under specific lieenoes mas intended to strengthen the hand of the government 
in regulating imports at a somewhat critical time.
9. '/hen the Busia regime devalued the cedi by 1*3*9# (from US jfO.98 to 55 oents), 
an act which wae to prove politically suloldal, it was a|so followed by the / 
abolition of surcharges on imported goods. But the emergence of the military 
saw a reversal of both measures. The cedi was revalued by 1*2# (from 55 comte to 
78 cents) and import aurcharges were reimposed with tighter Import procedures.
(See The Financial Tines, December 29, 1971 and Africa Research Bulletin.
February 11*, 1972. F. 2272).
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imported in the manufacture of goods for export* With respeot to the methods and 
terms of payment efforts are made to ensure that all licences are covered by 
foreign exchange* As a common practice payments for imports must be made on an 
180 day credit basis9 except that payments for certain essential food item and 
for imports made under foreign aid agreements may be made at sight* However, 
delays in releasing foreign exchange of about two to four months after the due 
date are not uncommon*
1*2 IVORY COAST* DAHOMEY* TOGO* BIGER AND UPPER VOLTA
The (Entente countries, which are also members of the West African Monetary
Union (WAMU), sharing a common Central Bank, the Banque Centrals des Etats A*
L*Quest (BCSAO)1^ , have similar import licencing and exchange control regulations*
It is therefore more oonvenient to discuss them as a group*
Exchange control applies to all currencies other than the CFA franc and the
Frenoh franc* In general all Imports into the Entente States fron foreign
oountries outside the Franc zone are subject to import authorization* For a small
sector of the economy which has been "liberalised"^, only an import certificate,
which is readily granted is required, but for other goods import lieenoes are
controlled by quotas* Foreign exchange is made available under three main
10* Three BCEAO/WAMU members (Mali, Mauritania and Senegal) are not members of 
the Entente Council*
11* This refers to those importable items liberated for oountries outside the 
franc zone (including OEEC members, the United States and Canada) prior to 
independence with the collaboration and approval of France but have^Daintained, 
apparently with no additions, ever sinoe* The commodities concerned Include 
salt, perfumery, lime, coal-tar and galvanised iron sheets* Sees IMF, Surveys 
of African Economics* Vol* 3t 1970 p* 108 and U.K. Department of Trade and 
Industry, Hints to business mens Dahomey and Togo* 19711 P* 22* Togo, in riew of 
its policy of nondiscriminatiori, is the only Entente state that did not issue 
any liberalization lists*
headingss
The Coaaoa Market (EEC)12 
Bilateral Trade Agreements 
Global Quotas^
The quotas specify the to4al foreign exchange available for purchases from eaoh 
of the groups and, within eaoh of these quotas, the available exchange is 
further allooated in groups of commodities.
The commodity groups are divided and import lioemoes are Issued to licenced 
traders and, in exceptional oasoe, to industrial or agricultural producers. The 
amount allocated to individual traders are decided by a points system based on 
the amount of trade done in the commodity concerned and the else of the trader9 s 
investment in the country. Persons or firms entitled to hold foreign currency 
abroad may seek permission to Import goods for their own use to be paid for out 
of these holdings.
12. SoOa after the associate membership of the EEC - before the First Yaounde 
convention - the markets of the BCEAO eoumtrles started to open up progre­
ssively to imports orlglnatimg outside the Frenoh Franc area. The liberalisation
has occurred primarily through (i) relaxation and eventually elimination of 
quantitative restrictions on imports from ISC oountries other than Franee,
(Ii) reduction and then elimination of oustoms duties on commodities originating 
in those countries, and (ill) gradual dismantling of the ceiling and floor systems 
under which imports of Frenoh origin had been guaranteed preferential access. As 
required under the Yaounde Convention (Protocol No. 2), the BCEAO countries 
awarded all SEC States duty free entry from December 1, 1961* and liberalized 
imports of SEC origin on or before June 1, 1968. Today, the EEC ia the dominant 
trading partner of the Sntente Statee, accounting for over 60# of total trade.
See IMF, op. cit. P. 110
13. Trade agreements entered into have been few and far between - not only small 
in number but simple in structure. Most provide reciprocal assurances with
respeot to market access, but any commodity lists that are attached are usually 
of the indicative type, stating the types of commodities which the partner 
countries expeot to exchange rather than listing binding licencing or purchase 
■f commitments. Hence, bilateral agreements have had little Impact on the 
dirsetioa of trade (ibid, P. 115).
11*. For aoa-EKC .sabers who have ao trade agreeaeats with the Entente oountries, 
exports to the latter can only take place under this category.
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As a general rule, import licences are valid for 6 months. But for consumer 
goods they can be extended for 2 consecutive periods of 3 months and for capital 
goods for 3 consecutive periods of 6 months eaoh. Licences are made readily 
available for the import of capital goods necessary for the development of the 
Individual countries. Suoh goods are oalled biens d1equipment (equipment of 
welfare) and are not subject to the annual quotas outlined above. Tojpard 
against fraud, licences are issued for specifie types of goods and substitution 
of 6ther types is strictly prohibited.
In practice, however, the structure and Implementation of most import 
programmes are affected by ome or more special arrangements. Imports of certain 
sensitive items (suoh as alcoholic beverages, distilling equipment, live animals, 
arms and amunitlons, rough diamonds, obscene publications or films, drugs, 
narcotics, paints, coin operated amusement apparatus, detergents, scouring pastes
and povdere, living plants and seeds, eggs, plastic articles including footwear,
15\ ,rags and used olothing ) oould be subject to a celling applicable to all
countries outside the French franc area or a floor for imports cf Frenoh origin.
Also imports of specified other commoditos, mainly textiles, could be subject to
a coiling when originating in "low-wage" countries or "countries with abnormal
competition", which might imolude suoh souroes as Hftng Kong, India, Pakistan,
Portugal, the Republic of China, and Japan1**. There have also been ceilings
on imports from Eastern and mainland China.
75* See 'Economic Report> Ivory Coast. 1971 by Lloyds Bank Ltd.. Overseas
Department; and Dept, of Trade and Industry (UK), On. cit (ivory Coast, 
Togo, Upper Yolta), P. 1*0.
16. See IMF, op. eit., p. 109. Niger has had no special quotas for "low wage" 
countries because it preffered to import from the cheapest souroe. Ivory 
Coast prohibited certain imports from such countries administratively amd also 
applied the triple oustoms tariff (general tariff) to them. Togo's polley of 
nondiscrimination precluded the use of ceilings and floors.
The usual methods of payment for exports to the Eateate council members axe
17by irrevocable letters of credit* Documentary oolleetioas are also used, aad 
are becoming more common. Exchange is made available through authorise banks, 
though advanced payments for imports requiring a licence are not normally 
permitted*
One final work must now be said* One of the most important but unique 
features of the policies of the Entente oountries is the speoial position of 
Prance vis-a-vis other suppliers* The Entente Council States (ECS) still find 
their eoonomies closely meshed with that of France* This is so in spite of the 
fact that the six members of the EEC now have free access to the market of the 
ECS, and in spite of the fact thAt eaoh of the six has equal rights of 
establishment for business, enterprise and investment in the ECS; and also in 
spite of the fact that purchases of equipment under the European Development 
Fund, are open on equal terms to all the signatories ef the Yaounde ComT.mti.oi8, 
whioh ham been replaced by Lone Convention* The importance of France as a 
major trading partner stems from several factors, most of which have a very long 
history* The maintenance of cooperation arrangements for comprehensive eld from 
colonial rule to independence, the predominance of Frenoh firms or their subsidi­
aries, the existence of a strong preference for Frenoh products and a measure of 
cultural attachment to French values have all combined to keep France in its 
preponderant position*
17* For inports on a oolleotion basis aad on open account, foreign exchange may 
be purchased only after the goods have cleared customs and no sooner than eight 
days prior to maturity in the oase of time drafts and eight days prior to the 
payment date specified in the commercial contract in the case of open account 
transactions*
18* It is not being denied here that these factors are beginning to have their 
impact* Trade with EEC countries other than Frames expanded considerably over 
the period 1960 through 19^7* These oountries took about 18& of total exports 
and supplied almost 1996 of total imports of the area* Imports from other sources 
such as the TJ*S*A* are also growing, due partly to aid and trade arrangements*
Japan, too. is becoming a more important source of supply* But even allowing for tnese developments, France still accounts for half of the ECS trade and it 
will really take some time to reverse this trend*
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Although, as indicated above, ESC oountries outside Frafcce as veil as non-EEC 
countries are gradually increasing their trade with the ECS, a really breakthrough 
is yet to be achieved* France's strong economic and monetary ties with the ECS 
tend to accord the former a secure position in its trade with the latter* And 
from the standpoint of integration this has an important bearing since 
co-operation with Ghana might usher in some adjustments, albeit slight, in the 
pattern, and direction of trade with respect to simple manufactures in so far as 
Ghana would be in a position to supply some of suoh items currently imported from 
France*
2* TARIFF STRUCTURES AND TAXES
A consideration of the differences in tariff structures between Ghana and
the Entente Council States(GECS) is Important beoause the possibilities of
economlo co-operation oemtre largely on the possibilities of harmonising the
disparities in their fiscal systems* A common system of classification is going
to be useful here* Fortunately, the classification system adopted by all six
19countries is the Brussels Tariff Nomenclature (BTN), hence tariff rates among
GECS are comparable, though this does not detract from the differences in tariff
charges* In fact, one of the more widely accepted obstacles to the expansion
of trade within GECS is the existing level of tariff discrimination in the ECS 
20against Ghana* In our discussions of their tariff systems, we shall flrsi
19* This is one of the two Internationally recognised and standardised classi­
fication systems* The other is the United Nations Standard International Trade 
Classification (SITC)*
20* As indicated earlier all ECS members with the exception of Togo operate 
preferential tariff system both in favour of themselves as members of the UDEAO 
and in favour of goods originating fron EEC Countries while discriminating against 
others. Togo like Ghana has son-preferential tariff rates* But UDEAO has been 
replaced by CEAO*
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outline the haeio tariff structures of the individual oountries and then, on the 
basis of a chosen produot, compare the ECS tariff with those of Ghana*
2*1 GHANA
Ghana operates a one-column customs tariff with import duty rate applied
equally to goods from all eoumtries sxespt between end-users* The customs tariff
oontalms both spsoifie amd ad valorem duties average from 10 to 66§%, with luxury
items as high as 100%. Purchase tax is levied on motor earn at rates vazyimg
between 10% amd 200% of the value, amd on commercial vehicles at rate graduating
fron 5% to 33j%J on motor cyoles amd scooters the rate is 12j%* On most other
goods there is a sales tax of 11-}% on the duty inclusive cost* Sales tax has
some strange features* It enters into ths prioes ef imported goods in the same
way as the value added tax in the Ivory Coast yet it is not specifically an
import duty but it is, nonetheless, levied on imports* There are, also tenpo-
21rary import surcharges ranging between 5% amd 150% levied on most goods 
imported under open General Licence* While there are exceptions in eaeh 
category, some of the more important examples ares chemicals, spare parts for 
machinery (5%)t printed matter (10%), vehicles (25%)t naohimery (1*0%), textile 
fabrics (79%)» footwear (100%), olothimg (125%)22«
Like Ghana, Togo has mom-preferemtlal duty rates averaging approximately 
20%2 ,^ although, unlike the foxaeer, the latter has ldwer tariff charges than its 
immediate neighbours. In general, duties are lowest on essential consumer amd 
eapital goods amd highest on t;. non-essential and luxury items* Most duties
are om am ad-valorem basis amd are levied on the e*l*f* value of the goods*
21* The last civilian government had abolished this following the devaluation 
of the cedi in December, 1971 but with the military take-over that followed a 
few weeks later it was restored amd the oedl revalued upwards*
22* See (UK) Department ef Trade aad Industry! Ghana, op* cit*.
23* This is variable amd could sometimes be as low as 10%*
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Apart fro* customs duty, other taxes on trade are levied *2^ There is a 
standard surtax on imports and a standard surtax on export transactions; these 
taxes are fixed at 18% on imports and 6*5% on exports* This is often referred 
to as transactions tax* A set of other fees are collected on the goods at the 
time of entry or exit including a customs stamp duty, a statistical fee of 3% 
on the proceeds of import and export taxes, an earmarked surtax levied for the 
benefit of the Road Fund (taxes au profit du Fonds Routier), and a surtax on 
alcoholic beverages*
Other indirect taxes include a turnover tax, which applies only to sales 
of manufactured products (10%) and services rendered (8%)* A special tax is 
imposed on certain goods which are to be re-exported*
DAHOMEY
Until recently Dahomean tariffs were many and administratively complicated* 
On January 1, 19^7 the authorities reviewed the existing system of duties and 
taxes with a view to simplifying the entire structure* As a result of this 
reform substantial changes have taken place*
For the purpose of levying duties the c*i*f* concept is considered as the 
basis of value* The tariff rate structure differentiates among (1) essential 
foods, raw materials and capital goods - all generally exempt from duty; (2) 
commodities regarded as nonessentiality; and (3) certain commodities subject 
to higher duties for protective purposes*
Similarly, the fiscal fee, the turnovet tax, the statistical tax, the
fiscal tax and the "condition" tax, which were formally separate items, were
25eliminated and consolidated into fiscal duties * __ _
2h» IMF, Op* cit*, P. 6j>3* The stamp duty tax was raised from 3% to in 
the 1971 Budget*
25* Ibid, P. 181*.
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Curently, imports are subject to (i) customs duties, (ii) fiscal taxes, and
(iii) certain minor taxes*
(i) Customs duties are applied ad valorem on all imports* A four-column 
customs tariff is in vogue* The lowest tate applies to imports from other ! 
members of WACU (half the EEC rate)* A higher rate applies to goods from 
EEC and non-WACU members of the Franc zone* Still higher rates apply to 
goods from other countries having a formal trade relationship with Dahomey* 
The highest rates (usually three times the minimum) are applied to imports 
from all other countries* However despite its discriminatory tariff struc­
ture, Dahomey has drawn up on a unilateral basis a list of products which
receive the benefit of the minimum customs tariff even though most-favoured-
26nation treatment is not granted to the country of origin of such imports •
(ii) Fiscal taxes are applicable irrespective of the country of origin of imports 
except that imports from WACU members are subject to a preferential tariff 
which is 5096 of the fiscal tax normally applied* It must also be mentioned 
that Dahomey has entered into a bilateral convention with certain other 
WACU members to exempt specific products from the application of fiscal
tax (e*g* the convention between Dahomey aad Niger)*
(iii) Other forms of import taxes include a customs stamp duty of 1$ levied on 
the total amount of fiscal taxes and customs duties assessed; a specific 
tax (taxe specifique au profit du fonds de soutien des produits a ^expor­
tation) levied for the purpose of the stabilization Fund for Agricultural 
Products; and a special tax (taxe speciale d'amortissement), which is levied 
on the import value and is earmarked for the Amortization Fund* The 
special tax usually is a tax on both imports and internal consumption; at 
the import stage, it is 2% o f the c*i*f* value*
W . IbidT
Export d u tie s  are a lso  imposed. Export taxes are le v ie d  on o er ta in  goods
for revenue purposes. Since January 1f 1967 the various export duties have been
consolidated into a single levy concerning the previous fiscal duty, export
turnover tax, statistical tax, fiscal tax and "condition" tax. Furthermore,
exports are, in addition, subject to a customs duty stamp of lj% assessed on the
amount of payable customs duties and taxes as well as to a specific tax for
the purpose o f  the S ta b i l iz a t io n  Fund fo r  A g r icu ltu ra l P roducts.
The Dahomean government r e l i e s ,  l ik e  most other LDCs, very h e a v ily  on
customs duties and other indirect taxes. In 1967» total government revenue:
amounted to 12% and tax revenues to about 11% of GDP. For the same year,
customs duties and other indirect taxes amounted for nearly 65% whilst, taxation
on imports alone accounted for 51% of the total budget revenue. Benause of the
importance of the foreign trade sector, whioh accounts for about 30% o f the
GDP, control and prevention of smuggling is an important consideration in the
administration of customs duties in Dahomey. Smuggling had occurred in the
past mainly because of the tariff differentials in the duty structures between
27Dahomey on the one hand and its two (western and eastern) neighbours, Togo 
and Nigeria on the other. The contribution of inport-export taxes to the 
Dahomean government chest underlines the consequences that would follow in the 
event of the formation of a tnriff-cutting union without other compensatory 
arrangements.
27. In early 1968, the government of Dahomey was so concerned with the level 
of smuggling from Togo that it substanially reduced its import tariffs in 
line with the Togolese tariffs in an effort to deal with the problem. In the 
case of Nigeria official consultations with a view to tighter border checks 
had taken place.
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I# could be said that Niger has four main groups of indirect taxes. These 
arei import taxes, export taxes, turnover taxes, and spedifio excise taxes.
As in other entente states, import taxes fom the major part of indirect 
tax receipts. They comprise (i) customs duties; (ii) fiscal duties and other 
fees (statistical fee, examination, sealing and warehouse fees, and an earmarked 
surtax to the £oad Fund); and (iii) a standard surtax on import transactions 
(taxe fortaitaire) levied on the total value of imported commodities inclusive 
of customs and fiscal duties.
Import taxes vftry according to the origin of imported commodities. Fiscal 
duties and fees (including the statistical fee of 1% ad valorem) and the standard 
surtax, ranging from 10 to 25% ad valorem, depending on commodities (essentials 
or nonessentials) are levied on imports from the franc area and EEC countries. 
Imports from WACU (CEAO) countries are subject to the same taxes but receive a 
rebate of 50% on their rates, exoept on import duties levied for protective 
purposes, this rebate is limited to 30%. Imports from countries for which the 
minimum tariff is applied are subject to customs duties, in addition to fisoal 
and other import taxes applied to countries in the franc area and the EEC.
Imports from other areas are subject to the general tariff; the rateB of the 
customs duties under this tariff are normally three times as high as those 
under the minimum tariff.
With respect to export taxes, fiscal duties and other fees (statistical, 
examination, and sealing and warehouse fees) and a standard surtax on export 
transactions (tax forfaitaire) are levied on the total value of exported commo­
dities including fidcal duties. The contribution of export taxes generally 
represented a fifth of the amount raised from import taxes.
2.U NIGER
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Turnover taxes are levied on production and services activities that are not 
subject to the import and export turnover tax* The rate of the tax on production 
is 1096 of the value of imports of industrial enterprises; collections from this 
tax are usually negligible* The rate of the tax on services has increased from 
its pre-1963/61* level of 696 to 1396 in 1966/67*
Furthermore specific excise taxes are imposed by the Customs Administration 
on alooholic beverages, tobacco, cigarettes, and petroleum products* In the
281967/68 budget , the tax on alcoholic beverages was raised from an average of 
20% to 100% and taxes on tobacco and cigarettes from an average of 33^ to 6096*
2.5 UPPER VOLTA 
Upper Volta's tariff structure is essentially the same as that of Niger, 
except that the former has "temporary" taxes* Fiscal and customs duties, which 
account for over 66^ of all indirect tax proceeds2 ,^ are the most important 
oategories* Fiscal duties on imports ranging from 1 to 3096 apply to all imports 
except those!Originating from the countries forming the WACU* Those imports, as
.. #- z ■ . 1 f - * • . *
noted earlier, are subject to a taxe unique, which ammunts in principle to half 
the amount of the minimum import tax applicable to imports fron third countries* 
Most capital goods are exempted from fiscal duties*
Customs duties are not imposed on imports from countries of either the EEC 
or the French franc area* Imports from countries with which Upper Volta main* 
tains a trade agreement and those which have such agreements with France (e*g* 
Brasil, Denmark, the U*S*S*R., the United Kingdom, aad the United States) are
28. Ibid. P. U58
29* In 1968 all indirect taxes contributed ST% o f the total budget revenue 
(Ibid, P. 723).
subject to a minimum tariff with rates ranging from 1 to 25^ of the actual 
value of imports* However, for certain consumption and capital goods a statis­
tical value, usually lower than the actual value, is used for the computation 
of duties*
Aside from the two categories mentioned above, Upper Volta levies other
indirect taxes* Imports are also subject to a surtax, which generally amounts
to 25^ of the actual value regardless of the origin of the goods* Basic
consumption goods and capital goods are either taxed at a lower rate or exempted*
Other indirect taxed (levied ad valorem on imports) include a statistical tax of
1%, a development (temporary) tax of 1096, a compensatory tax of 3$t and *-
support (temporary) tax of 1*5^ 6 plus other small taxes on specific commodities*
Exports are subject to a fiscal duty of 0*5-/6%to a 1% service tax, to a 5*ij?6
surtax and to the temporary subsidization tax* Similarly a special tax is
levied on cattle exports which constitute a vital aspect of the export trade*
The unwieldy tax structure of the Upper Volta has been considerably
simplified and rationalized following the setting up of a special tax commission
in 1967* This Commission, which was assisted by a team of experts from the
30IMF, has made its recommendations^ and some of them, including the regrouping 
of customs and fiscal duties, had already been implemented and further improve­
ment based on the recommendations are in the pipe-line*
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30. Ibid. P. 726
In the Ivory Coast there are two basic tariff chargest (i) non-preferen- 
tial fiscal duty fixed at 2096 and (ii) a customs duty on imports, averaging 15% 
The former is levied on all imports regardless of origin but the latter is a 
variable duty applied to goods, aocording to origin, from sources outside the 
EEC and its Associated Overseas countries.
The additional indirect taxes oonsist of a special import duty at the rate 
of 1096 of the C.I.F. value and the so-called valued-added tax which averages 
2896 on imported goods and at least 25% on most locally produced goods. The 
value-added tax in the Ivory Coast has the same effect as the .surtax (taxe 
forfaitaire) in the Upper Volta.
Typical of many LDCs, indirect taxes account for about 75% of all public 
revenue and import-export taxes alone account for some 56% of ordinary budget 
revenue. Fron i960 through 1965 the growth of government revenue exceeded the 
growth of the economy! the ratio of total government revenue to GDP rose from 
1096 in i960 to 20% in 1965* However, this ratio declined £\- to 19% from 
1966 to 1967t but catapulted again to 21% in 1968.
2.6 IVORY COAST
2.7 IMPLICATIONS OF TARIFF STRUCTURE AND 
IMPORT DUTY DEPENDENCY
Although the present study does not envisage an immediate conventional 
customs union among the GECS which would normally involve the unification of 
national tariffs, it is nevertheless important to discuss the possible implica­
tions of integration-induced tariff adjustments between the GECS states.
One important aspect of the question relates to the revenue loss effects 
of tariff disarmament. This of course depends on the structure of imports of 
members of the proposed grouping amd the ability of intra-union producers to 
capture the entire intra-union market in those commodities which were imported 
from other countries prior to integration. But as we noted in chapter 2 West 
African countries trade mainly with the advanced countries of the West; hence 
integration is unlikely to lead to a drastic reduction of imports from developed 
countries at least in the short-run. Table 6.1 broadly demonstrates the imports 
structure of the GECS. Three important Standard international Trade Classifi­
cation (SITC) commodity groups alone (manufactured goods, machines and transport 
equipment and chemicals) constitute between 60% and 75% of their total annual 
imports and are almost entirely imported from outside West Afrida. Most of the 
remaining items excluding food and live animals are also imported from non- 
African sources. Even in the case of food items GECS states still import a size­
able proportion of their food. For instance, Ghana's imports of food items 
accounted for 19% of its total imports in 1970. The corresponding figure for 
Upper Volta from 1969 through 1971 i* about 17%* In the other countries the 
range is between 9% and 15% (Table 6.1). The Table suggests that similarities 
exist not only in the composition but also in the origin of imports of the 
GECS. Given this structure and the present low level of intra-GECS trade, it 
seems that any tariff reductions affecting this small volume of trade will not
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drastically reduce government receipts.
However, since the GSCS states like moat developing countries - display
1 •' ; •
characteristic high dependency on import duties proposals which may affect
customs revenues should be closely examined for their revenue implication (see
chapter 9)* The extent of dependency on import duties in the six countries under
review is shown in Table 6.2. Because the figures are presented as averages
for comparative purposes and convenience, the year-to-year variations are
concealed. The year-to-year data however do not vary markedly from the mean
31hence they would not significantly alter the picture . Comparison is also 
made between the proportion of import duties in government revenues and the ratio 
derived from direct taxes and other sources of public revenue.
As the table indicates import duty contributes between 2li96 (Bhana) and 
75% (in Togo) to public revenues. The reason for the seemingly low figure for 
Ghana is that 23.9% represents the contributions of import duty alone. But 
the figures for Ivory Coast, Upper Volta and Togo include export taxes as well.
No separate import taxes data for these three countries are readily available. 
Although the inclusion of export taxes has exaggerated the contributions of 
import duties in these three states, it is unlikely that import taxes alone 
would contribute anything less than i  of public receipt in eaoh sane. The 
corresponding data for Dahomey and Niger are 1*9% a»d 36 respectively.
In comparison direct taxes contribute less than import duties. The share 
of the former, as shown in Table 6.2, ranges from 18% in Ivory Coast to 36% 
in Niger. The ratio of direct tax receipts to total revenue is expected to 
increase with economic advancement. Svem at this Stage in the eoonomic 
31* See Table 6.2 sources. «
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development of the area it is conceivable that the share of direct taxes will 
increase with improvements in tax administration, the introduction of additional 
sources of revenue and a general acceptance of civic responsibilities by the 
populace of the area.
Perhaps, it may be more difficult to introduce new sources of revenue than 
to eliminate inefficiency in tax administration and to minimise the incidence 
of tax evasion and avoidance. Ghana*s Central Bureau of Statistics, in its 
survey of the Eoonomy of Ghana, confirms this impression. It concludes that 
the difficulties of tax collection facing the government revenue authorities
account mainly for the small contribution of direct taxes; and it recommends
32improvements in tax administration as a solution^ • This conclusion can be 
uniformly applied to other Vest African States for they face essentially similar
problem. Indeed, other independent studies carried out in different countries
33of the region arrived at similar verdicts and prescriptions. ^
At present these countries are retiring very heavily on import and export 
taxes, both of which are easier to collect than direct taxes. In the case of 
Ghana export taxes principally from cocoa form the most important single source 
of government revenue, accounting for 30% of total receipts in 1969 • **
32. See Central Bureau of Statistics, Economic Survey. 1969» Accra, 1970, p.26
33« Byron Tarr concluded that the elimination of inefficiency in tax adninistra* 
tion in Liberia could raise total direct revenues by as much as 1*0%. He 
came to similar conclusion in the case of Sierra Leone (See S.B. Tarr, Efficiency 
in Revenue Generations A Measure of Ability to Promote Economic Development,am 
unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Illinois, 1972). 1.0. Dina in his
article entitled "Fiscal Measures" had a similar thing to say about Nigeria 
(i.O. Dina, "Fiscal Measures" in A.A. Ayida and H.A. Onititi (eds), jleconstruc- 
tion and Development in Nigeria, NISER, Ibadan, 1971» PP« 37W*00.
3U* See Footnote 32, p* 25«
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view of the inherent export instability of these countries, particularly with 
respect to cocoa, receipts fron export trade are bound to fluctuate as the prioes 
of their prinary export products fluctuate in the world market* Besides, it is 
anticipated that with advancement in industrialization and integration intra­
union trade will be extended to certain commodities that are presently exclusively 
exported to countries outside West Africa* Ceteris paribus, this would further 
diminish the contributions of export taxes* It is therefore reasonable to expect 
that in the long-run direct taxes will furnish the bulk of public revenue*
To be able to do this the machinery of tax administration must be improved aad 
strengthened so that the additional revenue collected due to improvements in 
methods of collection will be large enough to offset or minimise the revenue- 
loss effects of integration*
The other factor whioh night shed effects on government revenues turns on 
the rates of duty* Because of their importance as a source of capital formation, 
it seems that tariff levels in the GECS are intended as revenue raising devices 
rather than as means of protection for local production industries* Even so it 
is difficult to draw a sharp dividing line between revenue-raising rates and 
protective tariff levels* Objections to such rigid distinctions may be stronger 
and apply more to the tariff structures of LDCs* For one thing, a protective 
tariff pressupposes local production of the commodity in question* But such 
assumption cannot always hold with tariff structures of LDCs where high tariff 
does not, as we shall show later, lie on the height of tariff alone but also on 
effective rate of protection, i*e* the protection of domestic value added* It 
also depends on the existence of non-tariff barriers to trade, in the form of 
curreney exchange control, import quotas, import licencing, and cumberous 
customs delays whioh are not of interest to us here*
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Table 6*3 presents the tariff structure of the GECS states based on three 
chosen SITC commodity groups (i.e. 0,6,7)• The choice of these items is based 
on data availability, coverage of as muoh of each country's import trade as 
possible, and, On the case for potential competition among the six countries.
The period 1971 was a typical year for which import data were available to 
permit comparisons.
The traditional methods of measuring the height of tariff barrierss aim at 
calculating an average of tariff rates, either by taking an unweighted average 
of tariff rates or by using weights derived from import volumes - which is 
equivalent to dividing tariff revenue by total value of import. The statistics, 
defects of these methods of averaging are well known; they stem from the 
arbitrariness of the tariff classifications that give rise to the individual 
tariff rates in the first place, and from the inter-correlation of tariff rates 
and trade volumes in the second place. Furthermore, recognition of the input- 
output nature of production, and of the fact that tariffs may both subsidize amd 
tax domestic productive activities, raises the question of the meaningfulmess 
of an 'average1 tariff rate as an index of the protectiveness of a national 
tariff structure. The most fundamental criticism of tariff averages, however, 
is that the objective is to measure the extent to which the tariff structure 
restricts trade and this depends on the relevant elasticities as well as on the 
tariff rates.
3fi>. See Harry G. Johnson. Aspects of the Theory of Tariffs, Allen St Uwin, London
1971» P* 3Wu Also see W.M. Corden , "The Effective Protective Ratei The 
Uniform Tariff Equivalent and the Average Tariffs", Economic Record. Vol. 1*2 
(1966), pp. 200-^ 16; - "The Structure of a Tariff system and the Effective Prote­
ctive Rate", Journal of Political Economy. Vol. 7U 0966) pp. 221-371 H.G.
Grubel, et.al. "Nominal Tariffs, Indirect Taxes and Effectice Rates of Protec­
tion* The Common Market Countries, 1959H» Economic Journal. Vol. 77 (19^7) PP* 
761-76; and B. Balassa, The Structure of Protection in Developing Countries.
The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1971*
These weaknesses notwithstanding either of the two methods of calculating 
an average of tariff rate is often employed for analytical convenience and ease* 
The formula used in calculating average tariff rate as presented in Table 6*3 
is as followsi
X = X 
N
where X is the tariff rate and N is number of observations*A
The items examined in each country were theset Ghana, 621; Ivory Coast, 
566; Dahomey, 592; Niger, U9kt Togo, $88; and Upper Volta, 607. It must be 
noted that all the GECS oountries levy both specific and ad valorem rates, the 
latter being imposed on fewer items than the former* To compute the arithmetic 
average tariff rates, specific rates were converted to ad valorem ones, by 
multiplying the quantities by the rates, and expressing the result as a 
proportion of the c*i*f* value of the imports*
The results obtained from this exercise reveal a number of interesting 
features* There is a considerable, though understandable, degree of similarity 
in the tariff structures of the Entente countries* On the average Ghana has the 
highest nominal tariff rates whilst Togo, the former*s immediate eastern neigh­
bour, charges the lowest rates within the GECS* Not only are individual rates 
relatively lower but also there are more duty-free items in Togo than can be 
found elsewhere in the area* This explains in £art the perennial problem of 
smuggling across the Ghana-Togo border*
Within the GECS the average duty imposed on Machinery and Transport 
equipment ranged, as Table 6*3 shows, from 19% in Ghana to 21$. in Niger and were 
uniformly lower than the rates applicable to the other commodity groups (0,6^* 
Unlike manufactured consumer goods, industrial machinery and transport equipment 
are mostly imported from outside the West African region; and governments of the
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area encourage the importation of the latter category of goods as an integral 
part of their industrialization state/ogr, hence their low tariff rates* Not 
surprisingly, manufactured products carried higher average tariff duties than 
Food and Live Animals excepts in the case of Togo*
Table 6*3 covered only three commodity groups (0,6,7) which accounted for 
between 69% and 72% of the imports of individual countries under consideration*
To this extent any findings based on the Table must be treated as inconclusive* 
Nevertheless, one or Vo conclusions - albeit tentative - are inescapable*
Ghana*s average rate of tariff is higher than those of other members of the GECS* 
Togo on the other hand has the lowest rq.te; whilst the rest have marginally varying 
rates in between those of Ghana and Togo* The observed differential rates of 
tariff have wide implications for market integration* Intra-union tariff adjust­
ments or disarmament with particular reference to the products of integration 
industries must therefore precede any effective integration scheme in the area*
2*8 THE EFFECTIVE RATE OF DISCRIMINATION BETWEEN
THE ECS AND GHANA
Presently Ghana faces a stiff discriminatory tariff in its trade with the
Entente states vis-a-vis these nations aocorded "most-favoured-nation" treatment
by ECS* It is expected that the picture will certainly change once the new
Lome Convention, which is yet to be ratified, enters into force (See Chapter 2)*
In the mean time, Ghana enjoys neither the ’'Special" minimum tariff
charges in force within the former UDEAO members nor the duty-free entry rights
accorded to EEC goods nor even the fringe "free" mobility of goods from member
36states within the Entente c o u n c i l .  Consequently, in the case of a number of
- 269 -
36. See E. I. IT. Bt.al, op.clt. Vol. I, P. 228
Source: 
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products (Table 6«I*) there is very little prospect of Ghana being able to 
eoapite without being offered duties on exactly the same terns as the EEC* Of 
course, the aotual level of tariff discrinination varies not only fron product 
to product tut also fron country to country* In Togo9 for example, there is no 
discrinination at all while the "effective rate" of discrinination is of the 
order of 11$. in Dahomey (Table 6.14).
Having touched upon the present tariff structure in each state, we shall 
go a little further to examine the cumulative effeots of the various duties amd 
taxes imposed by the Entente on traded goods* To do this it seems more convenient 
to choose a commodity tradable between Ghana and the ECS and the EEC on the other) 
and then eompare the tariff differentials* Garments fit this category of 
commodities very well* The tabular analysis is presented in Table 6*1*
From the standpoint of discrimination. Table 6*1* shows that two tariff charge* 
are mainly responsible* These are customs duty, which is uniform at in all 
except Togo (1<$), and fixed charges (surtax) - value - added tax in the case of 
Ivory Coast - on Ghanaian goods for which the average figure is around 30%* Again, 
Togo is the only exception, charging a non-discrininatory rate of only 17%* It 
therefore follows that any move towards the equalization of intra-regional trade 
opportunities in Central Vest Africa should concentrate on standardising the 
aforementioned two duties* But even so tariff disarmament issues - to which we 
shall return later (chapter 9) - are very sensitive aad fraught with difficulties* 
Although it is theoretically easy to advooate tariff reductions in the interest 
of increased zonal trade, it is in practice difficult to formulate ways of ending 
tariff discrimination between economies that are not in an equal competitive 
footing unless one was sure that the "gaining" members would "recompense" the 
losers into a "unanimous” support for such a scheme*
B. INTERCOUNTRY SURVEYS OF THE SIX 
Chapter two focused on the economic setting in West Africa in general terms 
without going into a detailed discussion of the economic profile of the indivi­
dual countries* The present section of this chapter is intended to provide some 
basic information about the economies of the six selecied countries* It is 
neither purely descriptive nor purely analytical, but tries to combine the two* 
Duplication and unnecessary statistics are avoided and only the essential 
elements, which dre pertinent to later analysisjare highlighted*
1. GHAHA (Table 2|1)
Until since the early sixties, Ghana had been the economic pace-setter in 
West Africa* During the early years of independence, which shetuas the first to 
attain in Africa south of the Sahara, Ghana enjoyed the highest level of GNP per 
head in the sub-region; her economy prospered as the emphasis on imp®**-substi­
tuting policy of industrialization gathered force and her reserve position was 
admirable* However, this momentum of rapid economic development which had 
started to show could not be maintained after the mid-sixties* The level of
public spending withnessed during the first half of the sixties fell beyond the
37capacity of the economy, a situation which was not helped by the collapse of
the world ooooa market and the inadequate economic management which characterised
this phase* In these circumstances, the government took a recourse to heavy
external borrowings* The cummulative spill-over effects of these developments
have affected current growth; it has been patchy and the rise in per capita
38income has slowed down or stagnated*
37* Set, CBS, Economic Survey* 19^5» P*
38* CBS, Economic Survey, 1969* P* 10U*
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(i) AGRICULTURE (Table 2*5) Agriculture contributes just over 51% of the 
GNP and emplp^6l% of the total labouf force, most of whose are subsistence 
farmers* About 22% of Ghana's land area is used for agricultural purposes but 
productivity is low and only a few farms operate on a large scale. By far, 
cocoa is the most important crop accounting for the employment of about U0% of 
the total working population; it is also the biggest cash crop and largest 
foreign exchange earner (Table ^ 13)* Indeed the dominant position of cocoa 
in the economy of Ghana coupled with the inherent price instability and volati­
lity of the product in the world market places it in a position such that its 
performance in the woilA,market sheds great influence on the economic performance 
of the country as a whole. This has been a cause for concern on the part of
successive Ghanaian governments, particularly since the determination of the
39world prioe of cocoa falls outside their control*
Apart from minerals (industrial diamonds, bauxite, manganese and gold),^
39* Developments in the coooa market have often worried the Ghanaiqnauthorities* 
Little progress has been made towards reaching an international agreement between 
the cocoa producer countries and the consumer oountries, although negotiations arc 
expected to commence again in the autumn(of 1972)* (See Barclays International 
Review (BIR), June 1972, p* 8)* The trouble with cocoa is that fluctuations, whei 
they occur, could be very wide to throw the balance of payments situation out of 
gear* For instance, the year 1965 started with an average January price of j£192 
per ton* But, by Aid-July, it had reached its lowest ebb of ^ 87i per ton since 
the 2nd World War, representing a fell of over ^ 100 per ton within Bix months 
(Economic ftirvey, 1965* P* 90)* Similarly, wjAile the average world prioe in 
1969 was ^ 0+22, in 1971 It fell to just under jfe50 per ton (West Africa, 1i+, Feb*, 
1972* p* 117)* These fluctuations affect the entire econoaj^ie&uctions in foreigi 
exchange receipts, investment and maintenance imports and public revenue* In a 
bid to place the marketing of Ghana's cocoa on sounder footing the military gover* 
nment has announced that Ghana would henceforth market its own cocoa on the 
London Market* This terminates, after eleven years, the two sales agency agree­
ments between the government and a United States and a German firm and a London 
office of the Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board is to be opened (B*I*R* op*cit* p* 8)* 
But, although this may improve the marketing system, it is unlikely to stabilise 
the world prices which is the crux of the matter.
1*0. Of these gold is currently the most important foreign exohange earner but 
bauxite has the greatest potential* Oil was discovered off-shore at Saltpond in 
July 1970 but the evaluation of its commercial importance is still continuing and 
no definite conclusions have yet been accounced (B.I.R* Op * cit* p* 8)*
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other primary exports of any moment include timber and kola nuts. The former is 
another important source of primary wealth, second only to cocoa but the latter is 
traded only at the sub-regional level and its contribution to total export 
receipts is rather marginal. Coffee and rubber can be grown and erops like 
cotton, rice, maize, yams, cassava, tobacco, vegetables and kenaf need be expan­
ded to cut down on imports. Imports of paddy rice amounted to 80,000 tons in 
1971 and whilst the country's textile mills require about 12,000 metric tons
1 <*
of cotton a year, only some 10% of this is produced locally. With respeot to
the expansion of rice production action is already being taken. Currently, a
' team from Taiwan has been supervising the start of a rice-growing project and
it is hopecLthat Asian growing methods can be introduced into Ghama.^
Conscious of the agricultural potentials and needs, the military regime has
declared the years 1972-7U agricultural years aad is to implement a crash
programme known as "Operation Feed Tourself' with the aim of making the country
self-sufficient in providing basio food supplies and in the production of the
raw materials required by the industrial s e c t o r . N o  doubt, the expansion aad
diYersi/ic^tipn, of agricultural products augurs well for the economic recovery of 
5 1. Ibid.
1*2. Lloyds Bank ltd., Economic Reports Ghana, Jan. 1971* P* 8.
1*3. BIR, op.cit. Indeed, the government has taken the view that Ghana's future 
growth rests very largely on the strength of the agricultural sector and 
has concentrated on developing it. With the assistance of the International 
Development Association (IDA), the government has launched a U.S. #15*6 million 
project to rehabilitate the cocoa industry which has suffered a decline since 
1965* Under the scheme some 36,OCX) acres are to be replanted with high-yielding 
varieties and 51*000 acres are to be restored having suffered damage from direase. 
Also planned are the establishment of better credit faoilities, training of 
farmers in modem techniques, improving of co-operatives and the establishment 
of fifteen new ones, and the improvement of farm maintenance (See Lloyds Bank 
ltd. Pp . cit. p. 9)«
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Ghana but the success of the new campaign will depend on the effectiveness of 
the measures, outlined elsewhere, which the government has introduced to back its 
agricultural policy. Meanwhile, a resuscitation and enlargement of previous trade 
in certain agricultural commodities with her immediate neighbours might prove 
advantageous to Ghana. Trade in agricultural food stuffs such as beans, onions 
and potatoes could be expanded and commercial exchanges developed with respect 
to : maise amd cotton.
As noted earlier, the main hinderances to trade generally between Ghana amd 
her neighbours relate to high costs of transport and duties. Even so these 
obstacles are not insuperable. Given a more mmenable system of tariffs and 
improved transport network, these impediments could be rendered inoperant; amd, 
at least, in the short-run Ghana stands to benefit by importing beans from 
Upper Volta, onions from Niger, potatoes from Togo, maize from Dahomey and 
cotton from Ivory Coast and Dahomey, in all at cheaper prices than from sources 
outside the area.
(ii) INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTIONt (Tables 2il* and 2«5) Ghana's industrial sector 
has expanded steadily during recent years and Ghana exports more processed and 
semiprocessed goods than any other West Afrioan Country. In 19^9 the gross outpul 
of manufacturing production accounted for over 11% of the GDP. But despite this 
development productivity remains low and unemployment is still a major problem^ 
One of the key problems of industry in Ghana is that the majority of indus­
trial ccjkerms still require to import their basic raw materials - of course, this 
would cease to be a serious problem if there were enough foreign exchange to 
import them - and until these are locally produced, as many of them easily could 
be, the full benefits of the industrial sector to the economy will not be realised
The present level of under-capacity utilization, mentioned previously, will have
inn See J.L.S. Abbey. Population Growth and Problems of Economic Dewelopnent.Sta 
Seminar Paper, No. 5 , 19^9/70, Department of Economics University of Ghana.
to be reduced.
The industrialization objectives of Ghana had been very succintly outlined 
in the country's most comprehensive development plan to-date, the Seven-Year 
Development Plan, I963/6I* to 1969/70.^ There weres
(a) to produce domestic substitutes for imported consumer staples;
(b) to process agricultural and mining commodities before export;
(c) to start the development of machine manufacturing and the production 
of electrical equipment amd electronics;
(d) to develop industries to serve Africa.
To achieve these aims import lloencing, tax concessions, protective duties amd 
other concessions were being used to assist the development of manufacturing 
industry. There was also a National Investment Bank amd a Capital Investment 
Board to assist amd encourage development.
Good progress ham been made in pursuance of the above goals, although more 
could have been achieved had better economic management prevailed in the early 
sixties. Table 6s5 compares the increase in output from 1963 through 1968 by 
Sub-sector in the manufacturing industry. The figures in the Table show a 
steady upward trend amd the growth rates of output in real terms are computed to 
bet 1% from 1961* to 1965, 12% from 1965 to 1966, 12% from 1966 to 1967 amd 21% 
from 1967 to 1968.
The increase |m the output of the industrial sector between 1963 a*d 1968 
was £<G63 million (NCI26m.) but a considerable portion of this increase will have 
been due to price rises. This increase, however, fell short of the plan
1*5* Seven-Year Development Plan. Government Printer (A£cra, October, 1963)
Chapter 1
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target.^ The target of the Seven-Year Development Plan had been for an
Increase valued at ^ G98 million in the output of manufacturing industry 
(including gold refining amd aluminium production) with imported materials 
supplying ^ G32»7 million of the raw materials. But as the difference between 
the expected amd actual increase in manufacturing output shows, there was a 
wide expectation gap, even allowing for the early abandonment of the seven year 
plan.
Further afield, the study of the economy of Ghana in the sixties is full of 
ironies amd contradictions. The two year that followed the attainment of
independence (1957-59) were regarded as a period of consolidation, during which
the first post-independence plan was formulated. This plan, intended to cover 
the years 1959-61*9 contained a programme of public investments but within two 
yearsof its launching it was shelved. This was due not necessarily because of aaj 
inability to carry it through but because of a fundamental change in the political
J rj
and econonic priotities of the ruling Convention People's Party (CPP). A 
radically different but all-embracing style of planning was evolved to reflect 
and embody a substially revised set of policy objectives. The outcome of this 
new approaoh was the launching in April 2961* of the Seven Year Development Plan. 
In many ways, the seven year plan had unique features.
Firstly, unlike all previous "shopping list" plans, it was very comprehensive
"with a wide concern for the growth of the economy as a whole in cmntrast to
1*6. It is important to mote that the 7 year^evelopment plan was scrapped well
before the end of its terminal period on the groundsthat its projections and targe 
were over ambitious and unattainable. In fact, by the time the plan was discarded
after the overthrow of the Nkrumah regime in 1966, it had become obvious that the
plan targets were difficult to achieve amd that it would be better to reconsider 
the entire plan.
*7. See A. Killiek aad R. Szereszewski in P. Robson aad Associate (eds) The 
Economies of Africa Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1969* P* 9lf* Also See CPP,
Work and Happiness, Acora, 1961*
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GROSS OUTPUT OF MANUFACTURING INDUSTRYI 1963-68
TABUE 6t5
(XH MILLION HEW CEDIS) (HC/C - U.S. % approx.)
SUB-SECTOR 1963 1961) 1262 1266 12£L 1268
Food Industries I*. 33 U.71 9.62 10.79 18.52 21.78
Drink 13.89 11). 26 17.72 2 1.1*8 18.1*9 23.06
Tobacco 11*. 56 16.1)6 18.01) 20.50 20.99 26.20
Textiles 1.71* 2.55 3.97 7.00 15.29 25.76
Clothing and Footwear 3.32 U.36 5.81) 7.06 11.3 2 21.32
Furniture and Fixture 2.79 3.1*8 3.06 2.90 2.35 2.36
Wood and Corka 20.17 21.59 23.35 22.71 23.65 21*. 39
Paper and Products 0.85 OW98 1.1)2 2.81 1**98 6.15
Printing etc. U.09 3.12 3.38 5.1*1* 5.62 6.15
Chemicals 10.06 13.U7 11.1)5 16.51 20.35 21.17
Petroleum Products ♦
and Coal 2.0lt 1*.93 5.13 5.22 6.06 6.38
Rubber Products 0.53 1.1*1) 1.99 1.53 1.58 0.21)
Non-Metalic Minerals 1.31 1.09 1.1)1* 2.97 3.39 9.25
Basic Metal 0.51* 0.71 1.50 0.86 1.50 1.01
Metal Produets n.e.s. 7.15 7.81 6.01) 7.70 7.98 10.32
Transport Equipment U.25 3.83 1).22 U.78 5.1*2 7.U3
Miscellaneous 1.1)2 2.23 1.95 2.1*2 3.22 5.61*
TOTAL 93.01) 107.02 120.13 11*2.68 170.72 219.20
VALUE ADDED (TOTAL) 59.1 69.5 85.1 93.9 118.7
Hotel a = excluding sawmills.
SOURCE! ECA* Su— ariea of Econonic Datai Ghana, 1969
previous planning which has been largely United to progrannes of public works* 
and social development".^*®
Secondly, the seven year plan represented a clean break with pre-independence 
objectives* It was ideologically reoriented, away fron a liberal-capitalist 
system, towards scientific—socialist type as emphasised by the opening sentence 
of the plant "With this first Seven Tear Plan Ghana enters upon a period of 
economic reconstruction and development aimed at creating a socialist society...".
Thirdly, in its fundamentals the operative strategy can be summed up in one 
word* "industrialization", the only qualification being the modernisation of 
agriculture to give industry a flip.
Lastly, the plan appeared to reflect "too much of political excesses" and 
"too little of cool economic appraisals" aad in the end the Nkrumah regime dvlined 
to accept the political discipline that serious development planning would 
normally entail, if there were to be a successful and an orderly implementation.*^
The ideological orientation of the seven year plan was both itn strength and 
weakness, and it was this too, that, ironically, killed it. The ideological 
distaste of Nkrumah*s CPP for private enterprises, indicated in the foregoing 
paragraphs, meant an ideological reshaping of the existing capitalist set-up.
Also it meant, in the circumstances of the political psychology of the CPP, a 
radical policy of industrialization. The accelerated, and sometimes badly planned,
Seven Year Development Plan. Government Printer, Accra, 1961*, p. 292
1*9* A Case in point was a decision a few weeks after the launching of the plan 
to sign a protocol with an eastern European Government for the construction of a 
N# 11* million "Olympic Sports Complex". If this had been carried out it would 
have been incompatible with the investment programmes of the Plan (A. Killick, 
et.al Op. oit.. p. 98 (footnote).
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programme of Industrialization of the government imposed intolerable strains on
the economy. The magnitude of these strains was such that by the closing days of
^^6h the level of inflation and general dislocation of economic activities had
50quickly rendered the plan inoperable* Import restrictions - imposed to permit
the creation of yet more local industries - badly disrupted industrial produc- 
51tion. By 19^6, when the effects had fully started to show, modern industrial
52output was a mere fifth of the single-shift capacity of installed plant.
What is morel The poor performance of cocoa in the world market during the
mid-plan period made things worse. The planners had based their calculations
on an estimated average cocoa price of per ton over the plan period but,
as noted already it fell to less thw^JO by mid-July in 1965* The target growth
rate of 5*2# per year over the plan period greatly diverged from the actual
53average growth rate of 2.1% between 1963 and 1965* Thus, by the time the 
Nkrumah regime was overthrown the policy of rapid industrialization had in fact 
left serious industrialization bottlenecks, which impeded further growth, and, 
when the new regime came, they saw both political (because of its tendency 
towards "abrasive** capitalism - The New Statemam, Jan. 21, 1972) and sound 
economic reasons to scrap the plan.
The next two years (1966-68) saw a period of downswing in economic acticity, 
especially between 1966 and 1967. This is reflected in Table 6i5» While the 
rate of increase in the output of industry was 1296 from 1965-1966, the figure
for 1966-1967 was exactly the same.
50. Ibid. P. 11li
51. The introduction of import licencing, designed, in part, to ensure the 
optimum allocation of limited foreign currency earnings, aohieved limited success, 
if any. Overt irregularities in the issue of import licences created shortages 
in essential gP o<\$ (Economic Survey, 1965* P* 10U) •
52. Ibid.
53* The year-to-year growth rates from 1963 through 1969 were! 3.2# for 1963#
2.6 for 1961+, 0.7 for 1965, 0.6# for 1966, 1.6# for 196? 9 0.6# for 1968
and 3.6# for 1969*
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The slow-down In economic activities arose out of the government's deflationar 
and rationalization policies ostensibly to cheok inflation. The government took 
advantage of this "economic interregnum" to prepare a Two Year Development Plan 
which was to raise the GNP to 6# per annum. Import licencing, tax concessions, 
protective duties and other concessions were being used to assist the development 
of manufacturing industry under the plan. There was also a National Investment 
Bank and a Capital Investment Board to assist and encourage development. In 
December, 1970 a five-year "rolling" National Development Plan covering the 
period to 1975 vas launched. Like its immediate predecessor, the central aim 
is the acceleration of the rate of growth to a target of 6#, almost double the 
present growth record.
It follows from the foregoing that a good deal of planning and effort has 
gone into the development of manufacturing in Ghana but the behaviour of other 
economic variablep, whioh have not particularly been amenable, have affected 
industrial production.
(iii) TRADE AND PAYMENTSt With a backlog of external debts totalling well over
56£350 million coupled with fluctuations in foreign exchange receipts in the 
face of rising demand for imports, Ghana faces an extremely serious trade and 
payment problem. The settlement of current trade debts, even in the case of 
180-day bills of exchange, are currently being met some months after due date.^ 
56* "West AAfrlca? 28 January, 1972, p. 87
55* Ibid. The attitude of creditors to Ghana's plight has come under sharp 
criticism by "West Africa"* The paper argues that in order to cover the cost of 
the credits and their risks suppliers have put up prices, some say by as much as 
19#« The Ghanaian consumer has been living largely on expensive credit, supplied 
not only by overseas firms, but by insurance institutions like Britain's Export 
Credits Guarantee Department (ECGD), which pay the suppliers if, after a specified 
period after 180 day credit is exhausted, Ghana still does not meet the obligation,
Towards the end of 1971 foreign creditors experiencing increasing delays for 
payments of goods exported to Ghana had started to express concern. The turning 
point cane when on 5th February 1972, the National Redemption Council (NRC) of 
Col. Acheampong repudiated a US# 96*6* (^37») debt incurred to British companies 
under the Nkrumah regime. The NRC also rejected US#72m of accrued
interest on the debts up to February 1966 when Dr. Nkrumah was overthrown. It 
described these debts ms "tainted and vitiatdd with corruption" (The Times,
7 February, 1972). Ghana's creditors quickly replied with a retaliatory move.^
The British ECGD and other European government-backed credit institutions decided
57not to provide further cover for exports to Ghana.
In the face of these difficulties, the NRC w&s compelled to tighten the
system of import restrictions which the Busia regime had tried to liberalise.
As demonstrated elsewhere, many commodities are now placed on the Banned list
and very few remain on Open General Licence. Two different bodies have been set vxj
to deal with essential imports not on Open General Licence. The Essential
Commodities Committee imports and distributes essential consumption goods, mostly
foodstuffs, some of which are subsidised by the State; while the importation of
certain raw materials required by local industry is handled by a Central Agency.
56* In the case of Britain, the ECGD stressed that its decision not to provide 
further cover for exports to Ghana was based on the steadily deteriorating trade 
situation and was not a retaliatory measure (See BIR, op.cit.p. 10). However, 
since trade deterioration in Ghana dates back to the mid-sixties and whereas the 
withdrawal of credit cover took place soon after the repudiation, it would seem 
that there is more to the British action than it is prepared to admit.
57* In a bid to stave off the unpleasant consequences of this measure, the Gover­
nor of the Bank of Ghana has had discussions in the U.K. and West Germany regard­
ing credit insurance for future exports and financial support for the continued 
shipment of essential foodstuffs, machinery and raw materials for local industries
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The effects of the Measures are yet too early to eraluate slmce they were 
introduced a few months ago* However* given the anount of strain which a 
foreign-trade oriented econony can stand, the policy of import restrictions will 
pay off* Of course, much will also depend on future export earning with 
particular reference to cocoa and government expenditure* If cocoa narket slumps, 
as it often does, and if the government fails to ensure strict discipline on 
its own spending, then paper import regulations will achieve very little.
(iv) DEVELOPMENT PROSPECTS AND OUTLOOK I In recapitulation, the major 
economic problems facing Ghana ares (a) heavy pressure on foreign exohange 
exacerbated by a back\x>g of external debts; (b) the decline of agricultural
i • ' ’• * ■ * * * • ‘production while the demand for imports of substitutable agricultural foodstuff 
and raw materials accelerate; (o) the co-existence of high level of urban 
unemployment with under-utilization of industrial capacity,^ and (d) the 
instability J£nd unpredictability of cocoa, the major foreign currency earner, 
which, to some extent, holdB the econony to ransom* The future growth of tha 
economy depends on how these key questions are tackled, whether the natural 
behaviour of the major economic variables is closely watched and whether the 
government can impart a contrived stability to otherwise unruly magnitudes*
58* The enforced reduction of foreign trade often tends to seek other outlets*
In the cftse of Ghana, the new measures have increased the level of smuggling from 
the neighbouring countries, especially Togo* The governments of Ghana and Togo 
have responded to this challenge* The first meeting of a new Ghana-Togo Joint 
Commission for co-operation was held in Accra on May 29» 1972* The two countries 
have agreed to examine various areas of co-operation, including trade with a view 
to stamping out smuggling (See Africa Research Bulletin* p. 2379A).
59* J*L*S. Abbey, op.cit* In 1970 the official estimate of unemployment was 
600,000 persons in an economically active population of nearly 3»U million* 
Although a more recent estimate is not immediately available, it is not strongly 
felt that the employment situation has radically improved to fundamentally alter 
the pioture* A World Bank mission which visited the country the same year estima* 
ted that open unemployment had reached 30$ of the labour force in urban areas 
and that urban populdHon had grown at the rate of 996 a year over the past decade, 
a figure three times the national average (See Finance and Development* (9)* 
March, 1972 P. 11).
To restore balance of payments equilibrium, particularly with respect to 
visible trade, requires action on imports and exports. In both sectors the 
room for manoeuvre is not very great. Ghana really faces a grim short-term 
situation whioh is not easily amenable to long-range plans, like a policy of 
export diversification, quite often advocated. On the other hand a stringent 
cut on imports and government expenditure can backfire in the short-run through 
the slowing down of economic activity and employment. Already, the desperate 
debt repudiation measure has boomeranged.
Another issue facing the government, on whioh may well depend the success 
of the "Operation Feed Yourself" campaign, will be whether the pool of unemployed 
urban population can be persuaded to return to the land.^ As noted in the 
previous chapter, the drift of agricultural workers and school leavers attracted 
by higher wages and better facilities has become a serious matter for most LDCs. 
For Ghana large afeas of urban density with serious housing problems, unemploy­
ment and poverty have been created whilst agricultural production has naturally 
suffered, resulting in imports of food and raw materials which could have been
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60. The question of returning the urban unemployment to the rural area is fraught 
with problems. One possible approach is to employ moral suasion through political 
speeches and propaganda. But this would be of doubtful consequence in a political 
system that guarrantees individual rights. Besides, the tendenoy to move to urbai 
areas is a matter of self-interest, and few people can normally abandon their 
self-interest for social ends without a quid pro quo. However, it night achieve 
a measure of success if the government could convince the unemployed urban labour 
force that they would be absorbed once they went back to the villAges. In that 
case a thorough-going rural development programme would be called-for-including 
investments in cottage industries, electricity, pipe water^ clinics and the like - 
in order to reduoe the relative attraction of urban areas. The Tanzania's 
"Enforced back-to-the-land Movement" represents another attempt to deal with the 
problems of urban unemployed. Under this scheme anybody who does not possess a 
stamped employment card in a town is sent to his home (rural) area. Aside from 
the cumbrous administrative questions involved, the success of the policy has 
been patchy. (See J.K. Nyerere, Socialism and Rural Development".Bar es Salaam).
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avoiddd (BIR, JuAe 1972, p. 10). However, given the determination of the 
government to reactivate and expand agricultural production, food supplies and 
raw materials night increase. The expansion of the latter will not only stimu­
late industrial production but will also increase demand for labour and reduce 
under-utilization of capacity. Fron the standpoint of econonic integration, 
the expansion of the domestic production beyond domestic demand points to the 
need for trade co-operation.
With respect to the crucial role of cocoa in the economy, entailing Ghana's 
dependence upon one crop for its economic health, a position of some danger is 
recognised. But the government has taken effective measures to reorganise the 
purchase and marketing of cocoa, to ensure a maximum return of foreign currency oi 
the sale of this commodity. Although no International commodity agreement has 
so far been reached, efforts to reach one are continuing.
All in all, it must be said that Ghana's plight is obviously quite serious. 
But the new government is making a determined effort to find a reasonable and 
permanent solution to the economic malaise which has seriously retarded growth 
during recent years. The critical phase of readjustment required to restore the 
economy to a viable position is not going to be easy. Nonetheless, provided the 
cures applied to the economic malaise of the oountry are not worse than the 
disease itself, the government, can ride out the storm and restore the economy to 
its former healthy state but it has to count on the understanding and forbearanoe 
of external creditors.
Dahomey is a long, narrow strip of land running north fron the Gulf of 
Guinea with a coastline of 78 miles and covering an area of l+3»232 square miles* 
Its size and population of 2.6 million condemn it to the status of a "mini-state"; 
aad it is from this perspective that its economy can be properly understood.
(i) AGRICULTURE* Like other West African oountries, agriculture is the hub 
on which the Dahomean economy revolves. It employs over 75$ of the working 
population, contributes one half of the GDP and accounts for almost all exports. 
This is so, in spite of the fact that, during 1965-67, only one out of the nine 
million cultivable hectares w<CLS estimated to be actually used for agriculture.^ 
But in the teeth of this heavy dependence on agriculture, productivity is 
still very low. The relatively low yields are attributable to defficiencies in 
cultivation methods, and inadequate extension services, storage facilities, and 
marketing channels. The implied corollary being that agricultural yields could 
be substantially increased if modem techniques of farming, including the wide­
spread use of fertilisers, were introduced. Aware of the potentials for
expansions, the government with the assistance of foreign specialised institutions
62has undertaken to develop the cultivation of cash crops.
Dahomey's main agricultural exports are palm products - which account for 
nearly 75$ of all exports - followed by cotton, groundnuts, she&nuts, copra and
61. I.M.F., Op. cit., p. 150.
62. Ibid, The government's agricultural policy seems to be paying off. Agricul­
tural production in 1966 aad 1967 showed record increases over the previous years. 
But the effects of uncontrollable variables, such as weather and soil factors,
on agricultural output make it difficult to attribute increased production to 
policy o effects only.
-  286 -
2. DAHOMEY (Table 2*1 aad map)
- 287 -
coffee* Other agricultural exports include coconuts, tobaoco, castor beans and 
kapok* The government's recent agricultural policy has had a two-edged contra­
dictory effect on the economy* Although, in absolute terms, agricultural 
production expanded, during 1965 through 1968, this was in fact an expansion 
of agricultural exports, especially palm products, cotton and groundnuts, at 
the expense of 3taple food crops* Since the growth of both agricultural sectors 
is complementary and naturally reinforcing, policy measures should be directed 
towards balanced growth*
Of course, whether factors also play a part in agricultural production 
process* The effectiveness of policy measures is limited to the controllable, 
leaving the rest of the harvest of food crops by 10-20$*^ Under normal weather 
conditions the production of food crops is sufficient for domestic needs but 
Dahomey imported in that year (1968) foodstuffs totalling 7 million CFA francs* 
More recently, it has embarked upon a co-ordinated agricultural development 
effort* Two organs have been formed* The National Rural. Development Agency is 
charged with the function of encouraging farmers in the area under its super­
vision to organise into cooperative to grow food crops; over I4O cooperatives 
were operating in 1968, while the Regional Rural Development Centre try to 
promote food crop production in the southern provinces, where improved culti­
vation methods are most urgently needed because of the rapidly growing popula# l 
tion*^ A substantial portion of the EEC assistance had flowed to agriculture* 
This ansistance is of two types 1 (i) price subsidies for groundnuts, cotton,
and grated coconut and (ii) support for structural improvements and diversifi-
65oation for oil palm products, groundnuts, cotton, coconuts, and coffee*
fo. Ibid. P.~Tgl 
61*. Ibid.
65. Ibid. P. 157
Obviously, this support has helped agricultural production.
(11) INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTIONi If the pal* oil ellls amd eottom ginning plants
are excluded fron consideration, industrialization is only beginning* The first
66census of industrial production of 1965 counted 39 manufacturing enterprises 
which sold products worth 2,5U3 million CFA francs and enployed 1,1*81 persons.
The wages paid in 1965 totalled 320.6 million CFA francs. The division of 
products was as shown in Table 6.6.
Svldently, industrial activity in Dahomey has been confined mainly to the 
processing of agricultural exports. The snail size of the internal market only 
allows the establishment of a very limited number of industries of a purely 
national character. Nonetheless, the period after 19671 has Seen the establi­
shment of several new manufacturing plants. The most notable of then was the 
Kemaf factory whidh was jointly financed by an Italian suppliers* credit and 
the Dahoaey government. At full capacity, this factory would employ about 
1,200 workers and would produce 16,000 tons of Kenaf fibre and 5#000 tons of 
bags.^
Smaller industries include a plant for freezing shrimps, a clinker grinding, 
footwear, cycle and motorcycle assembly and a paint manufacturing plant. A 
foundation stone for a cement factory was laid in 1970 and new factories are 
planned. Mining activities are virtually non-existent. Small deposits of 
alluvial gold, however, were being planned on an experimental basis. Prospecting 
for other minerals continues. In February 1968, the Union Oil Company of
66. Of this only 30 could be seriously regarded as good size firms| the figure 
rose to 36 in 1970. a sluggish rate of expansion (See Africa Research 
Bulletin, P. 2276B).
67. IMF, Op.cit.. P. 162
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California found petroleum deposits offshore, some 29 Vilometres Southeast of 
Cotonou| work was proceeding toward their commercial exploitation. The results, 
so far, were considered sufficiently encouraging to justify installing a 
production platform.**®
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TABLE 6,6
Manufacturing Production in Dahomey. 1965
Subsector
Agricultural industries 
Bread, Flour, etc.,
Drinks
Chemical Products
■ ; r‘ *i v;*Machinery and electrical
Hardware and metal products
Vood and furniture
Textiles
Printing
Construction Materials 
Other
MUlloa CPA Fraaea 
1,180 
96 
775
138 
37
21
29 
7 
51
ii*6
 52
2,51»2
Source* ECA, Snwarlee of Ecoaoaic Data, Dahomey, 1970, p. 6
68, ECA, O p . cit. P, 2
Industrial lares turn t la Dahomey had for sometime aow beea plaaaed hut the
"expectation gap" be twee a targets aad aohleremeats reveals the problems that
bedevil developmeat plaaalag la LDCs* The first National Development Plaa9
19^2*65# provided for am average annual increase la GDP of 6*5$6« But# like
Ghana's Seven Tear Plan for essentially the same reason# this plan was scrapped
before its terminal date* It was abandoned la I96U as It became evident that
"the size of the proposed Investment programme' exceeded available resources
and was not in line with the ability of the existing administrative structure
69to prepare and Implement development prejeots*" 7 The two main achievements of 
the plan were the launohimg of a palm planting programme and the oons true tion 
of the port of Cotonou# completed In 1965*
The targets and projections of the Second Development Plan# covering 1966*70# 
are a lot more realistic than Its predecessor* Its general goals are three*feld?^ 
(i) Increase and diversify the productive capacity# especially in the rural 
sector! (ll) balance the current budget by the end of the plan period and 
consolidate the floating debt of the Government| and (ill) lay the foundations 
for long-term growth within a framework of regional cooperation*
The Plvemyear plan envisages a modest over*all annual economic growth rate 
of 106# based on an average annual Increase of nearly 106 In agriculture, 8% In 
the secondary sector# and 396 In services* Although the 1966*70 plan was 
prepared as a comprehensive investment programme# including both the public and 
the private sectors# its targets for the private sector were only indicative*
Thus when a shortfall in foreign financing occurred performance lagged behind 
69. IMP. Op*cit., p* 1666
70* See Dahomey# Le Plan de Development feonomique et Social* 1966*1970
-  290 -
plan targets.
Nonetheless, the 1966-70 plan cannot he fairly described as a couplets 
failure* Far fro* that* Data on ths implementation of ths plan axe not readily 
available* However, indications fro* partial dato^ point to the conclusion 
that, although there is a considerable gap between plan targets and actual 
perfomanoe, tangible progress was aade, particularly in agriculture* In 
1967* as noted earlier, agricultural production targets were exoeeded in 
cotton, groundnuts, sheanuts, kapok and foodstuffs* In fact, by 1970 the 
plan target for cotton production was raised fro* 1l|,000 tons to 18,000 tons*
In other sectors, notably fishing and Manufacturing, production lagged 
substantially behind plan objectives in the first two years of the plan*
Between 1966 and 1967 the short-fall in investment was so serious that the 
realization rate in manufacturing was a mere 26* $6 and only 29% in infras­
tructure* None of the industrial projects included in the plan (a cement 
factory, textile mills, a briok-yard, and a groundnut oil factory) were 
established during the first two years of the plan*
It follows from the foregoing that much of the failure of the plan could 
be explained by financial constraints* The government, whioh planned to achieve 
a balanced budget by 1970 - it had in the past operated on budget deficits -
71 • The authorities had estimated foreign financing from offioial sources at 
CFAF U.1 billion a year* Also the private sector was expected to generate an 
average annual investment of CFAF 2*0 billion over the plan period* Although 
these estimates were in line with the amount of foreign funds committed in the 
recent past, the amount of foreign assistance anyone country receives hardly 
correlates with what the country envisO0€$ as against the absorptive oapaoity 
and the attraction it offers plus the disposition of foreign financiers* The 
Investment Code of 1961 oontains elaborate guarantees and concessions to foreign 
capital but political instability appears to have affected the confidence of 
investors* With an all Afrldan record of six military coups in seven years, 
it is difficult to see how foreign investment will remain un&ffeoted*
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liiplying’ a substantial out in public Spending had relied heavily on foreign 
financing. This source fell short of expectation and the second development 
plan fell short of expectation along with it. Even so, what the plan lost in 
the industrial roundabout it partly covered in the agricultural swings to 
bring the real growth rate of the GUP ef not far fro* the »odest plan
target of 1$ in 1970*
(iii) TRADE AVJD PAYMENTSt For Dahomey external trade deficit is a co m m o n  
phenomenon. It is the rule rather than the exoeptlon under the present struc­
ture. The recorded balance of trade deteriorated persistently over the decade9 
1959 to 1969* Reliable earlier figures are not immediately available but the 
figures for 1961 through 1969t shown belowt demonstrates this trend.
Between the years 1959 a*d 19609 exports covered imports to the extend of
TABLE 6.7
Dahomey; External Trade Balance. 1961-69 
(I» Pillion CPI. Fraaca)
- 292 -
SUMMARY
t 1961W 4 M M W 1262 1963 1961* 1 12£6 M L 1968
EXPORTS 3,581 2,700 3,155 3,251* 3,367 3.585 3,859 5,503 3,055
IMPORTS 6,276 6,627 8,21*9 7,762 8,1*90 8,270 11,983 12,211 7,31*7
BALANCE -2,695 -3,927 -5,091* -U.508 -5,123 -5,685 -8,133 -6,706 -1*,292
♦Figures for the first half of the year only.
SOURCE: ECAy Summaries of Eoonomic Data* Dahomey, 1970 and IMF9 
Surveys of African Economics, 1970*
66%, but this deterioration has exacerbated ever since and 1967 expert 
earning financed just under a third of all impofts (Table 6.7). In spite ef the 
fact that 1968 was a record year for export receipts, they covered only about 1*9# 
of inports for that year. Of course9 one qualification nust be entered here. 
Until 1967# unrecorded trade was estimated at about 20# of recorded exports and 
15# of recorded inports annually. ^  This high incidence of snuggling occurred, 
as noted elsewhere9 because of the differences in custom duties and taxes9 which 
were considerably lower in the neighbouring countries than in Dahomey. As a 
result of the ohanges introduced, in 19689 in the taxation and customs duty 
structure of the country, the incentive to snuggle has declined. It would, 
however, appear that radical measures rather than temporary palliatives are 
called for in dealing with snuggling in Dahomey.
One najor anxiety in the trade picture of Dahomey is that the permanent 
deficit in the balance of trade is attributable not to massive importation of 
capital goods, as in the case of Ghana (capital equipment and raw naterials 
represented 69# of inports in 19^9) t but to large-soale inports of ordinary corns- 
uner goods. Two inport categories - food and beverages and other oonsuner goods 
(e.g., textiles and leather articles) - represented about 69# of the value of i * 
imports in 1968, compared with 59# in 1961. The two commodity categories accoun­
ted for only 29# of Ghana's import bill in 1968. For the cause of industrialisa­
tion in Dahoney, the prevailing composition of imports is a drawback.
Vith respeot to balance of paynents, foreign aid has been financing the 
deficits, thanks to France. Few oountries vould depend more on foreign
72. 0  UI, SC A, Soonomic Bulletin for Africa. Volume VIII, 1971# p. 92.
73. IMF, Op. cit., P. 207.
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assistance than Dahomey. In the nine years from i960 to 1968 the country 
received an annual average of 3*900 nillion CPA francst representing about 8*7%
•71
of the GDP* In addition to this volume of official external aid, the inflow 
of private oapit&l over the sane period averaged 1,200 nillion CPA franos plus a 
number of private transfers amounting to a yearly average of 2,700 nillion CPA 
franos. Thus, to & considerable extent, Dahomey*s trade deficits were merely 
the counterpart of the fairly substantial inflow of net transfer payments and 
capital into the country.
Chart I provides a graphic illustration of the contribution of the various 
ltens discussed above to the Dahomean balance of payments fron 1965 to 1969* As 
can be readily observed ffom the bar chart, expenditure on Imports is the most 
intractable problem on the balance of payments account. Although export receipts 
showed a persistent upswing from 1965 to 1969» they still covered only about 
half of imports on the avergge during this period. Tears of overall surplus 
alternate with those of deficit, the latter being greater in volume.
There is one salutary aspect of Dahomey's foreign debts. It is that most of 
its foreign assistance has been in the form of grants rather than loans. At the 
end of 1967» on the basis of commitments, Dahomey's external obligations amounted 
to 10.1 billion CPA francs,^ of which 9*3 billion had been disbursed. Most of 
these consldted essentially of official debts owed mainly to Prance.
(iv) DPVPLOPMEWT PROSPECTS AMD OUTLOOKi The key economic ills of the
&CPDahomeam^are easily identifiable. The industrial development of the country is
held up by the lack of natural resources, small else of the internal market and
narrow export base. The tendency to push with development in the face of these
dimcqltles has resulted In ehroalo budgetary deficits.___________________
71*. See S. Amin, "Dahomey 1 Economic", Africa South of the Sahara, 1972, Europa 
Publications Ltd., pp. 26L-266.
75* IMp, OP.cit., P. 219* Still this is a heavy burden for Dahomey. Interest
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Furthermore, there is a shortage of emtvepremeurship and urban unemployment
remains & serious social problem. Prior to independence, Dahomey provided civil
servants to other Frenoh West Afrioan Countries who were repatriated after
independence. The government absorbed a large proportion of the civil servants
into the public sector| however, many repatriates remained unemployed. Efforts
to redeploy some of the unemployed into other activities have net with little
suoeess as there is a general reluotanoe to acoept agricultural employment. The
government's virtual freeze on new recruitment in the public sector which began
in 1966 - in a bid to out down on administrative costs - and the continued mlgw
ration from rural to urban areas, especially to Cotonou, have not helped matters
either. In 1967* the estimated number of the urban unemployed was 10,000
persons! whilst the number of wage earners stood at 28,1*55* compared with a
figure of 30,138 i* 19$5. 76
The government of Dahomey is well aware of its immense problems but easy
solutions are hard to oome by* A programme of "ruralization" has been launched
to foster a reverse migration of the unemployed from urban to rural areas. An
elaborate training programme in modern agricultural methods is being financed by
77the Aid and Co-operation Fund in co-operation with the UNICEF. It is still 
too early to assess the effeot of this programme on the "back-to-land" eompaign
but it seems unlikely to arrest the rural-urban migration trend.
And amortization of external debt represented some 11^ of the country's 
earnings in year, 1967*
76. Ibid., p. 175* About 6796 of total wage earners in 1967 were employed in the
publlo sector, mostly in the central government.
77* U.K., Eoonomic Bulletin for Africa. Vol. YIIX, 1971. 9U*
An attack has also been made on the chronio budgetary deficits by insti­
tuting austerity measures, even if this has boomeranged via deflation 
rising unemployment. Dahomey’s major donors have in recent years actively 
supported a policy of divers if ioatlon to reduce the extremely high dependemee
on oll-product exports. But little progress has been made in this direction.
More importantly, Dahomey actively seeks economic co-operation vith its neigh-
78bours, if only to make a wider narket accessible to its domestic producers.
However, in spite of all these efforts, the future of econonic development amd
growth is replete with problems and difficulties. Internal resource base for
development is poor. Even the available human resources oamnot be fully
utilised without a massive ingestion of foreign aid. In these circumstances,
the rate of internal development will oontimue to be dictated, to a reasonable
extent, by the volume of foreign assistance Dahomey attracts.
78. Although Dahomey belongs to Francophone Vest Afrioa and is a member of 
the various organisations formed by this group (see ohapter 6), it has 
recently started to seek effective trade links with Nigeria. On April 20 
(1972), Dahomey reoeived an interest free loan of j£l million from Nigeria, 
repayable in 30 years with a five year grace period. Part of the loan is 
tied to purchases in Nigeria (See Africa Research Bulletin, P. 23U?)*
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The record performance of the Ivorian econony holds pride of a place not 
just in West Africa but on the African continent. The Ivory Coast "miracle", 
as it has come to be called, is all the more impressive because it has been 
achieved without reliance on mineral resources. Whereas other African countries, 
in a similar econonic bracket, owe their growth to explosive foreign demand for 
minerals (oils, copper, iron,) fron their sub-soil, the progress of the Ivory 
Coast rests primarily on political stability, economic liberalism with an open 
door policy on foreign investment and immigrant labour force, and a vigorous 
agricultural policy of expansion and diversification. Because of the agricul­
tural base of the Ivorian "two decades of success", doubts are being expressed
80in certain quarters whether the growth rate of 8 - 99^  between 1950 and i960
81and 10 - 1296 between 1960 and 1970 (in real terms the figures are slightly
Qplower) could be sustained in the future by relying principally on agriculture.
In the succeeding sub-sections we enquire into the state of the Ivory Coast 
economy with a view to identify the growth-promoting and growth-thwarting factors 
in operation.
79* See S*yir Amin, The Development of Capital!art in the Ivory Coast, les e 
Edition de Minut, France. 19^7. Also See The Financial Times. December
8, 1971 and West Africa. 11* July, 1972.
80. S. inln, Op. cit.
81. H. E. Bedie, Ivorian Minister of Economy and Fimamoe, "Realistic Policy 
for Growth", The Financial Times. December 8, 1971* a
82. In spite of extensive surveys, no significant mineral resources base so far 
been discovered to enable the Ivorians to diversify their economy and put it on a 
more stable footing. A new oampaign for copper and molydbemun prospecting was 
announced in 1970 and a meeting has been held with large oil companies for the
purpose of petroleum prospecting (See West Africa. 11* July, 1972 and ECA, 
Summaries of Economic Data).
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3. IVORT COAST (Table 2|1)
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(l) AGRICULTUREi (Table 2t5)t The contributions of other sectors notwith­
standing growth over the past decade is firmly rooted in the performance of 
its agriculture and, for some tine to come, the country will continue to depend 
on agricultural exports, to a great extent, for its prosperity. The primary 
seetor employs over 80% of the working population, accounts, for 8996 of the 
value of to tad exports (nearly all this (80%) is earned by three commodities 
alone; coffee, cocoa, and tibber)(Table 2s13) and, in 1969* contributed 1*2% 
of the GBP (Table 2t5)» Above all, according to the Ivorian Chamber of 
Agriculture, agrioulturn-based industry produced 51$ of the industrial sector's 
overall output in 1971*
Some features of import, whioh the agricultural seotor of the Ivory Coast 
displays, help to explain its dynamism and expansion.
First, subsistence agriculture, llvestook and fishing (including rice, 
nalse, millet, plantains, yams, cassava, taro, meat and fish) make up about 
half of the output of the seotor whilst cash crops and forestry (embracing 
ooffee, cocoa, timber, bananas, pain oil, pineapple, kolanuts, and fruits) 
provide the other half.
The estimated annual increase in produetion of food erops between 1960 and
of oertain foodstuffs. The production of rice, for example, has more than
83. During the period 1960-65 the agricultural seotors as a whole expanded at an 
annual rate of 7%« 3% for subsistence agriculture, 9*10% for agricultural exports 
and almost 20% for forestry (See Africa South of Sahara. 1971* P# 389)*
81*. The Ivorian birth rate was estimated in 1969 at 2.3% (Table 2|1). But ie 
also calculated that some 1*0,000 persons migrate annually to the Ivory Coast so 
the actual growth rate ie about 3% per annum (See ECA, Summaries of Ecomoalo Datai 
Ivory Coast, 1969, P» 1),
Although this barely keeps pace with the population
Ol
growth rate of about 3%t faster rates of growth have been recorded in respeot
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doubled between i960 and 1968 (fron 160,000 to 365,000 metrio tons). But given 
the rapid growth of population and ite changing distribution between cities and 
country, future denand for locally produced foodstuffs will grow rapidly. How­
ever, a review of the ourremt food production sot-up does show that a faster 
rate ef growth weuld be possible if adequate incentives and assistance were 
given to the farmers. The existing setbacks, as iAentifled,^ aret- (a) farmers 
generally plant only enough for their requirements, allowing a small margin for 
emergencies; (b) many farmers in the south rely on coffee or cocoa for money 
income since these require less work than food crops; (o) most of the land 
available for expanding the output of foed is in the northern and central 
regions, where, however, the population is sparse and nany young parsons 
migrate to the more prosperous south; and finally, (d) lack of outletB for 
agricultural surpluses in the north also discourages expansion of the 
cultivated area.
It is estinated ihat only about 10% of food produoed in the Ivory Coast
86(except rice) is marketed and this has often caused seasonal shortages in
urban areas, causing wide fluctuations in prioes. Happily enough, the Ivorian
government recognises end tries to rectify the situation. A government body,
the Agricultural Modernisation Agency, has been created with full powers to
set up infrastructure, train farmers, provide seeds aad fertiliser, and to
87arrange for collection, processing and marketing of agricultural products.
The exports picture has also been good. The rapid expansion in production 
of the principal export crops - oof fee, 0000a, timber and bananas - in 1960-61*
85. IMS, Op. cit.. P. 228
86. Ibid.
87. Ibid. P. 229
was obviously one important factor in the country's development 6f those years. 
Mors recently the expansion has generally slowed down and in 1970 export 
revenues, for the first time since 1965* actually dropped fron 130,200 nillion 
CFA francs to 126,558 nillion CFA francs in 1971*^ It must of course be 
emphasized that this drOp in export earnings did not represent an overall decline 
in production. It was rather the result of a sharp fall in the world cocoa prioe< 
The second notable feature characteristic of the Ivorian agriculture 
concerns its vigorous policy of diversification. The Development P^an, 1960-70 ? 
considered agricultural diversification as an essential requirement for raising 
standards of living and lessening the country's dependence on traditional 
exports. Diver edification effort was conoentrated on a few major products; ell 
pains, to provide new export produots in future years; rioe, to improve nutrition 
and eliminate costly imports; cotton and rubber, to supply domestic industries 
and for exports; pineapples, for both local consumption and export; and sugar, 
to satisfy domestic requirements. During 1960 - 66, however, investment in 
agriculture legged behind plan targets. Of the 38 billion CFA francs planned
over the plan period, only 11.1 billion CFA francs had been actually invested
QOby the end of 1966. 7 Nevertheless, certain seotions of the diversification 
programme were implemented with considerable success. The oil pain programme - 
largest project, under the agricultural diversification scheme - in particular, 
has proceeded well. Output catapul&ted from 22,800 metric tons in 1960 to over 
63,000 metric tons in 1970. Production of rioe, cotton and pineapple has also 
reached expected levels, but the sugar scheme has barely started.
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88. West Africa. July 11*, 1972 
89- IMF, OP. cit. P. 236
Lastly, the Ivory Coast government has actively embarked cm a training
programme in modern farming methods for young School-leavers* The Serviee 
Civique (the Vatiemal Teuth Service) modelled on the Isre&l Nah&l units was 
•moated in 1962 to serve as a "School of Modernism" for rural youths. Under 
this ingenious device rural youths are quartered in army-type camps located 
mostly in rural areas where they are taught, among other things, modern methods ef
farming. On graduation the young graduates return to their villages whore eash
90 /receives a cleared plot of land, prepared for sowing, from the Motoragri (the 
State Knterprise Organ charged with extending large scale mechanised farming).
This system has much to its credit. It is a direct effort to stem the flow of 
unemployed rural youth to the towns | it fosters greater utilisation of arable 
land in the sparsely populated and loss favoured regions; and above all, it 
ensures that the skill acquired by the graduates are immediately put to good 
use. At the sane time the Motoragri is assured of a permanent souroe of employ* 
ment, and oan deploy its heavy and expensive equipment well in advance. Although 
this arrangement is by mo means "error-proof" for more lack of adequate super* 
vision ef the serviceman by the Motorggri oould load to inefficiency or lisinass, 
yet the scheme represents a new dimension in the efforts of Vest Afrioan 
governments to encourage the youth to go "back to the land".
(ii) TMDTTSTRIAL PRODUCTIONf While it is true, as observed earlier, that 
Ivory Coast owes much of its eoonomic growth over the past dooado to agriculture 
the most Spectacular aspect of the so-called "miracle" has boon the influx of 
foreign investment and the emergence of a light industrial complex centred chiefly 
around the capital of Abidjan. Luring the 1950s the chief impetus came from
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90. See T r  * friT "<a? DaoeMber 8, 1971
public investment in inf ran true ture y whioh nade up 50% of the total but9 at the
turn of the deoade9 the lead was taken by industrial investment when the propor-
91tion of industrial investment rose from 12% to 25% of all investment* And 
between i960 and 1966, total manufacturing production increased by about 25% 
annually with higher rates for vood industries (more than 30%) I and other 
industries (33%)* Over the decade9 1960-1970, industries share of the GNP rose
from 6% to 16?6, while the GXP itself grew by some 125%* The number of individual
92companies operating in the Ivory Coast rose from 180 to 335* However9 the
annual rate of expansion was less than the overall average in the chemicals9 oil 
aad fats industries (19%) end in textiles (23%)*^
Table 6*8 gives a general but clear picture of the rate of industrial 
expansion in sectors during the 1960*8* It is clear from the Table that the 
largest relative increase occurred in the energy sector and the development of 
production at the Abidjan oil refinery9 opened in 1965i was the major contribution 
Similarly, food, drink and beverages group has also done remarkably well*
It is generally agreed that the relatively large inflows of foreign capital
ohhas been the main factor in the expansion of manufacturing in Ivory Coast* It
is further argued that this inflow has been attracted by liberal tax and other
benefits granted to approved industries under 1959 "permissive" investment code
and by government participation in the capital of certain industries, especially
those processing raw materials for export*
91* Buropa Publications* op*clt** P*
92* See The Financial Times, December, 1971• Also see Repartition Des Prinolpale 
Enterprises Selon Leurs Activltes Sn mars 1971*
93. IMF. Qp.cit* P. 2U7
9U. Ibid* Also see Afrioa* Annual Review, Africa Journal Ltd*, 1972*
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The net effect of the Ivorian pattern of industrial expansion has been
to create a lop-sided industrial £&t~up, where foreigners hare virtually
95monopolised the entire noderm sector. The situation has recently generated 
a measure of political and econonic uneasiness. As the official party daily9 
and sole Ivorian newspaper^ aptly put iti ”• • • there are two distortions, 
whioh seen to us< today too important and heavy risks for the present and the 
future to be ignoredi these ard the inequality anong the regions and the weak 
representation of nationals in the industrial and commercial apparatus, for 
exanple, in the modern sectors of the econony where 95$ remains in the hands 
of foreigners.”
In fact, Amin, who had earlier made a pungent oriticisn of the Ivorian
economy, went a little further. In his book, "The Development of Capitalism
97in the Ivory Coast” he denounced the Ivorian "miracle” as merely a form of
"growth without development”. No doubt, Mr. Amin might have overstated his
case nevertheless there are sound elements of truth in his thesis. And the
indignation and rancour whioh Aninvs work triggered-off plus the acrimonious
retort it received from the Ivorian government had done very little to detraot
from Mr. Amin's central tenet.
In a very simplified form, what Amin is saying is, given the country's
over-dependence on agricultural export earnings, the over-dependence on foreign
95* It is estimated that nbout 95% of the modem sectors of the Ivorian economy 
are in foreign hands (see Pratemite Matin. June 9t 1971 )•
96. Ibid.
97* Samir Amin, op.clt., Mr. Amin's thesis set off an emotional thunderstorm 
in the Ivory Coast and for a while the book was officially banned, At one 
stage the Ivorian Minister of Planning wrote a rebuttal (see The Financial 
Tines. December, 8, 1971 and Vest Africa. 1U July, 1972).
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capital, the growing import needs of the light industrial sector and the volume 
of foreign exohange required to finance the repatriation of profits, it is 
unlikely the econony will continue indefinitely to generate enough exohange to 
neet its requirements at its present rate of expansion. He foresees a fall 
off in foreign investment in the future, asserting the economy was already 
beginning to show signs of a slow-down.
Ivorian officials do not share Mr. Amin's gloomy forecasts. The^maintain, 
and marshall the statistics in their support, that the debt payments are well 
within the absorptive capacity of the economy. M.H.K. Bedle , the Finance
Minister has repeatedly stressed that the national debt oo-efflolent was only
98U.9« As for such slow-down signals like the recent shortfalls in export
receipts (fron 130,200 million CFA francs in 1970 to 126,558 million in 1971)»
the government does not conoeal the figures but it argues that the decline was
due to a fall in world prices for oocoa and oof fee, the principal exports of
the country. Even so the drop has not badly affected the balance of trade.
However, polemics apart, the truth of the matter regarding the state of the
economy of the Ivory Coast is that the government is well aware of most of the
"danger signals'1 hinted by Mr. Amin. And it is certainly not complacent about
them. Already the Ivorian government is cautiously moving towards breaking
99French monopoly in several areas. Meanwhile, new state enterprises for
98. Vest Africa. 11*. July, 1972. In 1970, national debt payments represented 
b.2% of exports of goods and services (Financial Times. December 8f 1971)•
99* It must be emphasized that the Ivorian government favours a policy of 
"friendly persuasion" in order not to frighten off foreign capital. The elite 
and the youth of the country would prefer a crash Africanisation programme but 
the government resists this urge (The Financial Tines. December, 1971)*
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transport and marketing have been created. From now on bakeries would be 
reserved exclusively for Ivorians and new timber concession will be granted to
CLnationals only. More or less, Ivorianisation is a main pre-occupation in the
country to-day and the government now insists on local participation however
small - in most new projects except the big ones.
In addition to Africanization, which encourages local saving and channels it
into the domestio economy to reduce the country's dependence on outside capital,
the government gives high pirority to building up exports as a source of foreign
exchange. This is seen as a further means of decreasing reliance on external
capital. To this end there are plans for a pulp industry, motor tyre production,
100manufacture of light electronic equipment and synthetic fibres for sale abroad.
It is recognised that a more export-oriented industry could be best achieved by 
signing bilateral agreements with neighbouring countries1^ 1 and by developing 
exporting industries with a large local manpower input.
On the whole, it seems clear from the foregoing that some of the criticisms
of the Ivorian industrialization are true. But there is no reason to suppose that
the primary export problems of the Ivory Coast are any different from those of 
most LDCs. It is true that financial strains are likely to develops over time} 
they might not fundamentally threaten the economy. It might slow-down but a 
breakdown is difficult to contemplate in the immediate future.
100. IMP. Op.cit.. p. 21+8. See also Plan Quinquennal de Development Economique,
Social et. Cultural, 1971—1975# Minister® da Plan, Republique de Cote D'Ivoire.
101. It is against this urgent need for market expansion in individual countries 
that the issue of market integration in West Afrioa has to be viewed. It is not 
so much that the basis for market integration is lacking, at least not in the 
long-run, but that the spirit of commitment to the idea of integration, if any­
thing, is tenuous*
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IVORT COASTi UTDPSTBIAL PROTOTCTIOR 1960-69 
(In Million Pra»08 CFA)
1960 1965 1968 1969
TABUS 6.8
OUTPUT m OUTPUT TAB OUTPUT m OUTPUR m
Pood, drink A 
Tobacco U#5U9* 1,868 12,820 l*, 776 21,170 7,1*61 25,138 9,705
Energy and 
Water 2,U63 2,082 6,719 U.939 18,812 11*,012 20,31*6 15,171
Mining 1,208 91*9 1,808 1,357 1,338 872 1,1*69 995
Metal indus­
tries 3,655 1,828 10,1,28 3,999 11**51*6 5,511 17,1*9U 6,867
Wood Industries 2,352 1,021* 9,070 3,860 10,113 3,659 11,135 3,895
Building and 
Public Works 11*,157 7,189 28,326 13,385 37,500 17,929 1*3,219 21,979
Textiles and 
Peotvear 5,086 3,078 9,257 l*,831t 15,988 8,001* 18,087 9,101*
Chemicals, Oil 
and fats 3,028 1,056 6,61*2 1,968 9,1*20 2,817 10,1*12 3,1*96
Other 1,155 803 2,192 1,1*72 3,1*61* 2,110 3,859 2,353
TOTAL 37,653 19,817 87,262 1*0,590 133,351 62,375 151,159 73,565
Votes Output m Gross Output; VAD m Value added*
SOURCEi ECA, Summaries of Economic Data* iTory Coast, 19^9, P* 8
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(iii) TRADE AND PAYMENTS (Chart 2)i In spite of its very rapid growth 
during the past two decades, the Irory Coast econony has experienced! f \o  serious 
external payments problems* The reasons for this, some of which hare been out­
lined already, are that development policies focussed on expanding the export 
seotor, the attraction of foreign capital, the establishment of favourable 
investment climate and, perhaps, to a lesser degree, on the automatic converti­
bility of the CFA franc into the Frenoh franc • Thus, in an era that elsewhere 
in Africa has been marked by disappointing results on the economic front, the 
Ivory Coast has had a very different story*
But there is the reverse side of the coin* The Ivory Coast has had to
finance a growing volume of capital imports as its new industries Increase in
102their size and repatriate their profits* Today, the principal features of
the Ivorian balance of payments are the relatively large surpluses on trade and
nonmonetary capital transactions and the large deficits on services and unrequited
transfers* During the period, 1963-69 there was an overall surplus in the
103balanoe of payments on a year-to-year basis, except in 1967*
Between 1963 and 196U trade surplus approximated the deficit in services
and unrequited transfers and the overaall surplus was proportionate to the net
inflows of nonmonetary capital* Because of the collapse of ifche cocoa market in
102* The sun of industrial profits and personal savings transferred back to 
France (and there are nearly three tines as many French people in the country to­
day as before independence) from the Ivory Coast annually is estimated to be of 
the order of 1*0 CFAF billion (^58 million; or the equivalence of some 19J6 of GNP. 
(The Financial Times* Deoember 8, 1971)t Another calculation shows that for eaoh 
100 CFA? of Frenoh Official aid, the private French businessmen take out of the 
Ivory Coast between 80 francs to 1$0 franco; (See West Africa, July 1U» 1972)* 
Currency transfers uhtil recently was free, but since April 1972 certain restric­
tions have been imposed in a bid to oheck this financial haemorrhage*
103* IMF, On* cit* P. 301*.
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1965# the trade surplus for the year declined. The deficit la services rose, 
leaving a deficit in combined goods and services and a sharply reduced overal 
balance of payments surplus. Chart 2 offers a diagrammatlo Illustration of the 
balance of payments trend from 196$ to 1969*
There was a considerable recovery in the balance of trade in 1966 but it 
was not sufficient to offset growing deficits in services and unrequited transfers 
and a decline in nonmonetary capital inflow; therefore the balance of payments 
surplus remained small. The ovsraall deficit in the balance of payment for 1967 
resulted from the decline in the trade surplus, together with continued trends 
in the movements of Other elements. In 1968 a record trade surplus (25.7 billion 
CFA francs), together with a larger inflow of nonmonetary capital (6.6 billion 
CFA frmncs), produced the overfall balance of payments surplus of 8.7 billion 
CFA francs, even with slightly greater defioits in the other dements (16.7 
billion BFA francs in services and f>.L billion CFA francs in unrequited trans­
fers.) The surplus figure on balance of trade for 1969 stood at 32.0 billion 
CFA francs, exceeding that of the previous year by 6.3 billion CFA francs.
Hence the 1969 over-all surplus on balance of payments reached the 10 billion 
CFA Francs mark.
Svldently, it is dear from the foregiing that the Ivorian economy so far 
has had no trade and payments problems but the present order of things poses 
some danger for the future.
(iv) BBVSLQPMEHT PROSPBCTS AND OUTLOOK» Ivory Coast has not lost its 
momentum of economic boom. Yet the country finds itself today in a somewhat 
complex situation. After years of admirable performance the government naturally 
does not wish to see the economy slow down. But it oan only continue to grow by
—  308 -
- 309 -
attracting more foreign investment, by depending on immigrant labour force, and 
by reliance on agricultural exports to generate Che foreign exchange required to 
finance the large volume of foreign factor inoome transfers* Above all, urban
10Lunemployment, which hitherto was unknown, is becoming a problem in Ivory Coast*
As demonstrated earlier, the government of the Ivory Coast is well aware of these 
future problems and is oertaimly not complacent about them* The key question is 
whather or not the policies pursued with respect to these issues would yield 
the desired results to permit the economy maintain its momentum of expansion 
Uninterrupted*
The policy of "Ivorianlsation", which alms at \nereasing the role of the 
indigenous population in the economy so overtly dominated by the foreigners has 
reserved some agricultural and serrice sectors exclusively to Ivorians* It is 
expected that this will stimulate local saving and investment* Also the building 
up of exports, including manufactures, as a source of foreign exohange has 
received top priority in the 1971*75 development plan* An attack has been laun­
ched on urban unemployment through the rurallaatlon scheme of "Service Civique", 
increased technical training and on- the-job training programmes but the immigrant 
labour force in the Ivory Coast complicates the employment picture*
Although official figures are not readily available, there is a large number 
of seasonal and permanent migrant workers residing in Ivory Coast* Modest
105estimates have it that almost a third of the country's population is foreign*
10li* IMP* On*cit* P* The available estimates indicate that employment has
been increasing less rapidly than GDP in redent years, owing chiefly to oapital 
in^nslty* Although GDP rose by an average of more than 1096 a year during 1960­
66, the total number of wage earners rose by only about & year*
105* Suropa Publications, op.cit* P* 389* Also see Vest Africa, 28 July, 1972* 
The number of foreigners in the country includes between 7^0,000 and 1 million 
Voltaics, 250,000 Guineans, about 200,000 Ghanaians and over 50,000 Malians*
The majority of these are migrants - about 1*5 million strong - chiefly from the 
Mossi districts of Upper Volta, amd they have provided vital manpower for the 
plantations and newer urban activities* About half the population of Abidjan is 
said to be foreign with the result that a certain level of unemployment exists 
in the towns among unskilled workers, whilst shortage of skilled workers conti­
nue*1^  The offioial policy towards alien workers is very liberal.10  ^ Work 
permits, though required for all foreigners, and generously given* However, the
Ivorian citizens are increasingly growing jealous of the alien work force in the
108face of rising urban unemployment amd inflation* The alien element in the
Ivorian economy poses a real test for the government* It cannot easily resort
*to the simple, and perhaps natv/e, devloe of mass expluslon, which would be 
counterproductive as in the ease of Ghana, nor turn a blind eye to the "itchlngs" 
of unemployed nationals* Obviously, a blend of "protective" restrictions and 
accelerated job creation through economic expansion would seem a better solution* 
On the whole, the economy of the Ivory Coast should continue to enjoy its 
present prosperity, even if on a declining scale, provided the major bottlenecks 
in the path of the future growth, whioh we have identified, are smoothed over 
before long,
106. IMP, Op * olt** P. 260.
107* This is basieally due to their importance to the economy since they supply 
some two-thirds of the planation labour force* Indeed, it was in recognition 
of this hard fact that the Ivorian Head of State, President Houphouet-Boigny 
proposed, at one stage, to establish the dual nationality for citizens of the 
Entente-States* His offer, however, was rejected by the members for fear of 
losing their own citizens, aad the revenues "injected" into their poor economies 
from money transferred by the migrant workers to their families back home* (See 
T.K.Golan, Ivory Coasti "The Importance of Agriculture", Vest Africa* 28 July, 
1972.)
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108* Lloyds Ba&k Ltd*, Ivory Coast Economic Report. February 1971» P. 11
k K1GSR (Table 2«1)
Niger, the largest state ia Vest Africa with about twice the size of France,
scarcely seems economically viable. It is landlooked* And its sparse population
of 3*9 nillion is largely explained by its geographies! aridity and remoteness*
Over 2/3 of the country is steppe and desert, most of the north-east being
uninhabitable* Hence the bulk of the population is concentrated in the south,
along the Nigeria-Dahoraey border*
(i) AGRICULTUHB: (Table 2*5)* Traditional farming and stockrearing
generates over 60% of the GDP as well as more than 90% of the country's export
receipts* About 80% of the population are farmers, the majority of the remainder
109being Fulani or Tuareg stockbreeders* y But for all this, the cultivated land
represents a meagre 3% of the state's area*
Food production ooouples most of the cultivated land, about 90%. The most 
important ones are millet, sorghum and beans, Others are cassava, rice, onions, 
sugar-cane, potatoes and maize* Produotion of these crops is usually adequate 
for domestic needs and, in good years, small quantities of millet, sorghum, and 
beans are available for export*
On the export side, the dominant products are shelled groundnuts, cattle 
and groundnut oil* Groundnuts are the principal cash crop but they are also used 
as food. The locally consumed portion is of the order of 10% of total output. 
Shelled groundnuts and groundnut oil furnish about 79% of the export earnings!
the past decade the growth of groundnut production has averaged around 7% per
199* Europa Publications, op.cit*, p. *3*0* Livestock is estimated in 1970 at
U*9 nillion cattle, and 9 million sheep and goats* Extensive stockrearing is
making appreciable progress, having been stimulated by demand from the high- 
populated coastal region, southern Nigeria and Dahomey*
110. IMF, On. oit* P. 1*06.
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year Vat aggregate fare output has increased at am annual average ef 396 enlyl 
Oattle experts to neighbouring oountries (Nigeria, Ghana and Dahoney) account 
for 1*96 ef recorded experts.111 Gotten cultivation, though gaining in inpertanee ! 
during recent years, contributed only 396 of total export earnings in 1967*68.
Mining is another primary sector that is becoming Important. Until recently 
the only minerals exploited were cassiterite, gypsum, limestone, silica, and gold. 
But these too have so far made a Negligible contribution to the GBP. Tory recen­
tly, however, uranium was discovered at irlit by the Frenoh Atomic Energy 
Commission and plans were made to start preduotlom at the mine by 1971 • with
initial output reaching 750 million tons and perhaps 1,500 million tens in 
11 o197U* With 6I496 ef the earned profits going to the government, it is new an 
important source ef revenue for the country. Vigor's proven uranium reserves 
will make her the fourth world producer of this mineral.11^
(ii) INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION! Industry plays a small part in the Nigerlen 
economy. Manufacturing coumtributes less than 1096 ef GDP. The government's 
pelley of encouraging industrialisation began during the First Development Plan 
(1961*61) when 57% of the total investments went to basic infrastructure improve* 
ments.11^ Subsequent development plans (the 1965*68 and 1968*72 ones) also placed 
a great premium on industrialisation. But by 1966 there were hardly more them 
17 manufacturing enterprises of any consequence, comprising 7 agricultural and 
food processing plants, 3 chemical ones, 3 for mechamloal and electrical 
equipment and k  for printing.
114. Ibid. P. L22. The introduction ef an export tax of 1096 on the assessed 
value ef oattle has reduced recorded, and increased unrecorded, exports. It is 
estimated that only about a third of all cattle exports are actually recorded.
112. Europa Publication, op.cit. P. 5U0.
113* Afrioa Research Bulletin. P. 2181 A.
11U. IMF. Op. olt. P. 14*3.
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Industrial growth appears to be impeded principally by the limited size of
the domestic market and competitive difficulties from imports and from newly
established industries in neighbouring Countries* For example, the Malbasa
cement works - the largest industrial enterprise in the country - operates at
less than full capacity* Although annual capacity is 30,000 tons, production
11?has been about 20,000 tons* The low utilization of capacity limits the 
operation of scale economies and increases the unit oost*
In addition to narrow domestic market-base, Niger has other problems, 
particularly with respect to transport* Production in excess of local consump­
tion cannot be sold in neighbouring countries because of high transportation 
costs, not to mention competition from lo%N»oost producer neighbours* Most of 
Niger's foreign trade is transacted through the ports of Cotonou in Dahomey and 
Lagos-in Nigeria* Lagos forms the natural outlet for the trade of South-Central 
and Eastern Niger beoause this route offers cheaper transport costs than shipment 
via Cotonou*11  ^ Also, in 1959, a common venture - the Dahomey-Niger Railway 
and Transport System - was formed to handle the transit trade of both countries, 
which also subsidised it* These arrangements, however, have solved the problem 
of outlet without Solving the cruoial problem of long haulage costs*
In these circumstances, Niger's industrial achievements have so far been 
very modeit*
(ill) TRADE AND PAYMENTSt As noted elsewhere, Niger's foreign trade is
only partially recorded by the authorities due to smuggling and difficulties of
115. Ibid..: P. h2*: ' ■ ■ -1-’- ■   " '' ' '
116. Ibid.. p. U3U* I* 1968 more than 2/3 of Niger's exports were transported 
through Nigeria*
border policing. This readers the existing statistics patchy aad incomplete.11  ^
Nevertheless, recorded trade indicates that exports grew over the past decade
(l960-70)» an annual average of 5.5%. Over the sane period imports outstri-
1 1 Qpped exports, increasing at 7.9^ psr year. ~ The growing trade deficit has been 
net by increasing foreign contributions.
Few countries could depend more on external financing than Niger. Between 
i960 and 1968, official aid totalled 29,000 nillion CFA francs (a yearly average 
of about 3,700 nillion). This includes project aid, budget subsidies fron 
France and the Conseil de L'Bntente, techincal assistance and price support 
measures for groundnuts and cotton introduced by the SDF to aid crop diversifi­
cation. The one salutary aspect of this relatively large volume of foreign aid
is that the bulk of it is in the form of grants; hence the public foreign debt
119has remained fairly manageable.
The topography of Niger seriously affects its balance of payments. Whereas 
Niger is a landlocked country, transportation and insurance costs represent a 
heavy burden on the balance of payments. The oountry relies chiefly on foreign 
aid and grants to offset the persistent deficits on goods and services account. 
This reliance has so far paid off but it cannot be denied that the oountry's 
balance of payments base is far from secure.
(It ) DEVELOPMENT PROSPECTS AND OUTLOOK> Nearly all Nigeria* public lares- 
tnent is financed by foreign aid. Local private capital finamces nalnly a 
fraction of the building of homes and various transport needs (namely lorries).
In spite of Niger's 1961 liberal investment code, and unlike the Ivory Coast,
117. Ibid. p. LBh.
118. Europa Publications, Or.cit.. P. Sk2
119. IMP# on. olt.. P. 1*95.
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foreign capital has not been forthcoming, except for the mining of uraniufc, 
owing mainly to the unprofitability of industrial ventures in the country's 
basic conditions*
In the past, Niger, as already noted, had been luoky in one respect* Almost
all foreign aid, until recently, had been supplied in the form of grants so that
the debt burden remained slight* At the end of 1966 foreign debt amounted to
less than 6% of the GBP, whilst current interest repayments accounted for a mere
3«f$6 of export receipts* However, there has been a tendency, in the last few
120years, to resort to sostly public private loans (commercial credits)* This 
has weakened public finance and, thanks to income from uranium*
Indeed, faced with adverse geographical factors, the future of Niger invaria­
bly hangs on the exploitation of its uranium reserves and, possibly on the 
discovery of other minerals* The present prospects for a rapid economic 
development appear to be minimal* Amd the Sahel drought has further aggravated 
the situation* The virtual collapse of much of the subsistence seotor has been 
accompanied by a projected 2 %  decline in population, due both to death : as
a result of famine, and to large-scale migration to the south into Nigeria
121and Dahomey. Evidently, the effeots of this devastating drought are likely 
to be felt for many years to come.
120. Europa Publications, On.cit.. p. 5U2.
Sandwiched between Dahomey and Ghana, Togo is a tiny Strip of land nearly 
U00 niles long. At its widest, it extends to about 100 miles. It comprises 
no more than the eastern § of the pre-1911* German colony of Togo which was, 
until independence in 1960, administered by France. Divided into the East amd 
West in the colonial scramble, Togo is divided into the north and south by its 
geography and population of 1.8 million. With the conoentration of population 
and economic activities in the south, this has & profound influence on the 
econonic and political life of the country.
(i) AGRICULTURE: Like other African countries, agriculture is of fonost 
important in Togo. About 78% of the eoonomio&lly active population is estimated 
to be engaged in agriculture, mostly as self-employed workers! and the value of 
agricultural production (lndluding the output from animal husbandry, fishing and 
forestry) accounted for UJft of the country's GDP in 1969 and for § of its
exports - although only some 2Cfft of the land area in Togo is cultivated at any
4.4 122 one time.
Food orops - cassava, yam, rioe, maize, beans, millet, and sorghum take 
up approximately 89% of the cultivated land| the rest is devoted to industrial 
or export orops - cotton, groundnuts, ooffee, and coooa, With the exception of 
yam, the output of food crops has in recent years risen fuite considerably. 
Over-all production of food orops generally satisfies domestic consumption and 
provides some surplus of maize, cassava, yams amd so^hum for export - mainly toA
neighbouring Ghana, Dahoney and Upper Volta.
122. IMF, Qpaclt.. p. 618.
The only exception is rice, which at present is an expensive import*
Coffee, cocoa, aad palm keraels are the priacipal export crops* Other crops
iaclude groundnuts, cottoa, copra, caster beaas, sheaauts aad kapok* The real
rate of growth for exports over the period 1920 - 19*>9 was about 2*596 a year*
But this growth was largely achieved be twee a 191*8 aad 1960, with aa
average growth rate of 7%*"^
However, export trade has continued to grow since 1961 chiefly because of
the lucky disoovery of phosphates at Akoumape, with reserves of 100 aillioa toms.
Productioa exceeded 1,350,000 tons ia 1968 aad represeats l*5?6 of Togofs exports*
Other Togolese minerals, including mow finds are iron ore with reserves of $00
million tons, bauxite with reserves of 1 million toms aad the same total for
chrome-ore, dolomite aad limestone* Aa American Company, The Frontier Togo Oil
Company has had encouraging results ia its search for oil* Also ia 1969 copper/
sulphide deposits were found ia the Paline region* But further test work exple*
12*5rations were continuing to ascertain the commercial profitability of the finds*
The relative importance of mining has increased over the past decade | it 
contributed more than 696 to GBP in 19^9t and may well provide a suitable 
launchingwpad to faster rate of economic development*
(ii) INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION (Table 2*5) Togo has almost the same eoonomie 
structure as its next door neighbour, Dahomey* Industrial and commercial 
activity on modem capitalist lines is still very limited* Even so, manufacturing
in 196 9 , contributed 10% of the GDP, compared with 6.696 in 196U (Table 2s5)*
123* Jeune Afrique tod*) Africa* 1971* Africans Publishing Corporation* New
Tork,, P.396*
12l*. Buropa publications, op* cit*, P. 81*8.
125* See ECA, Summaries of E0onomic Datas Togo, 1970, P*2 also see Jeune
Afrique, Op* cit* P* 39U
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Manufacturing is geared both towards exports, with edible oil plants, coffee 
processing units, and cotton ginneries, and towards hone markets demand (foot­
wear, soap, textiles, ready-made clothes, plastic goods, phantaoeutio&ls, 
pesticides, washing machines*)
More rapid industrial growth in Togo, as in Dahomey, appears to be frust­
rated nainly by the limited sise of the domestic market and the difficulty of 
selling in neighbouring markets because of competition fron imported goods amd 
from newly established industries in those countries. Poor infrastructure has 
also impeded greater economic activity, especially in the mining sector*
Planning is seen as one of the essential instruments of development, although 
Togo entered the sphere of planning late compared with most African countries. 
Togo*s first Five-Tear Development Plan (1966-70), which was approved by the 
National Assembly in July 1965t came into operation in 1966* Its three key 
priorities were! Hto ensure national independence, to establish the structural
basis for development, amd to take both immediate and longwterm actions which
126will eliminate disequllibria and promote expansion.**
In order to attract foreign and domestic private imvestmemt, am Investmemt 
Code was promulgated on July 21, 1965* The Code embodied mot only generous 
offers to prospective investors but also contains special tax benefits for newly 
established "priority enterprises"• Actual investment during the plan period 
really exceeded the plan target* As of June 1969 a total of 29*5 billion CFA 
francs had been invested, a figure olearly in exoees of the total planned 
investment of 28*6 billion CFA francs* Most of this sum wemt to the fimamcimg 
of infraetruoture, especially the construction of the deep water port of Lome,
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••■plated by 26 April, 1968* A second five-year plan, to eever the period 
1971*759 i* currently in operation* Although it plaeen enphasie on the rural 
sector and the expansion ef production, infrastructure will still absorb the 
larger part ef investment mostly owing to the execution ef ongoing projects*
(ill) TRADE AND PAYMENTS* Over the last decade, Togo's annual average value 
•f exports has been 6,500 million CFA francs and imports 9,300 milliom CFA frames 
(of which 1,000 million was due directly to oapital expenditure by the mining 
industry)* This clearly shows an annual deficit of about 2 - 3  billion CFA 
francs in recorded trade (there is a fair amount of unrecorded border trade, 
mostly with Ghana and Dahomey)* But while it could be said that the 1960s, on 
average registered defiiits on visible trade, Togo infact drifted from huge 
deflolts in the early to surpluses in the late 1960s* The country's trade posi­
tion neved from a staggering deficit of 2*5 billion CFA franos in 1965 to a 
comfortable surplus ef 1*1 billion francs in 1969*12^
The improvement in visible trade balance during the late sixties derives 
partly from increased expert receipts, and partly from a downturn in the growth 
of Imports* Between 1962 and 1968 recorded experts more than doubled in value 
following the rapid expansion ef phosphate and some agricultural experts* The 
value of cocoa experts grew steadily between 1962 and 1967i reflecting a favour­
able combination of voluno and world market prices* Imports, on the ether hand, 
grew mere slowly after 1965»12^
On the oapital accounts sldo, Togo's balance of payments is maintained only 
with a growing level of foreign aid* During 1962 - 69, actual disbursements of 
foreign financial assistance to Togo in the fom of grants averaged about 2*1*
127. Ibid., 678.
128. Ibid., P. 681.
billion CFA franca a year) whilst total aid disbursements were estimated te 
amount to 3*6 billion CFA francs in 19*>9. The volume of mom-repayable assist- 
anoe relative to the sine of total, aid demonstrates that the burden of national 
debts oust be fairly light. The najor donors are France and the SEC. French 
aid consists mainly of investment grants, technical assistance, and, until 1967* 
budget aid. But XSC aid mostly finances agricultural development and 
diversification and infrastructure •
(iv) DEVELOPMENT PROSPECTS AND OUTLOOK Tog© ie a late "starter" in 
planned development! it is also a micro-state and peer with limited resources 
for investment. However, the Togolese government is pegging its hopes on 
developments in the mining seotor to provido a solid launohing-pad to a rapid 
econonic Advancement. Indeed, the spate of recent mineral discoveries in Togo, 
discussed above, oeuld - subject te the known volume ef reserves - act as a 
catalytic agent in stimulating and fostering econonic activity. Furthermore, 
the governnent is making good progress in its policy of agricultural expansion 
and diversification.
But the oountry's problem is a let mere. Unemployment, until very recently,
has net been a serious problem in the cities, but some 6,000 persons were
129registered in Lome as searching for jobs in 1969* far more frustrating
is the obvioue development limitations imposed on Togo by its she re physical 
size. "Slacks" in the economy cannot bo easily utilised because the narrowness 
of the domestic market sets a ceil ling on the level and range ef econonic 
activities. Thus it is difficult to see under the status qua how Togo could 
rapidly industrialise unless sen© form of integration could be arranged with one
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129. Ibid., P. 65
or more neighbouring oountries, evem at some oest to sensitive matiomal pride,
Togo is veil aware of its size problem aad already belong te a number ef
loose eoomoMio groupings (discussed in ohapter six). Not surprisingly, the
cement factory, which was opened in Lome in 1971» is designed to produce
local cement for the Kmtento countries, Te seme degree Tego's epem door
eoonomic policy with nom-discrimimation in sources of supply ef geeds and im
import requirements is a reaction to its difficulties. Currently, am eoenomie
130co-operation agreement is being negotiated with Nigeria,
In the final analysis, whether or not Togo oan pull itself up by its own 
bootstraps will depend upon its ability to ensure a wider market for its 
new industries than is available within its borders,
6, UPFSR VOLTA (Table 2it)
One ef the poorest ef the peer veuntries ef the world and lying between the
Sahara Desert and the oeaetal lowlands ef the West k f r iea, Upper Yalta - like 
Vigor - ie oompletely landlocked. Its shortest distance te the sea is about 
800 kilometers (500 miles) through Ivory Coast, The whole of the country is 
in the tropical climate some. With the exception of the areas in the southwest 
and along the rivers, its soild are generally poor and are subject to erosion 
by heavy downpours in the rainy season. For the 5*3 million of Upper Yalta, 
the problems inherent im their country•e geographic position - high cost of
factors of production, the effects ef transport caste and dependence en
130. See' Africa Research Bulletin* P, 2UoiiC. Vigeria and Togo have agreed, in
principle, to set up an economic community between them, whioh would eventually
form the nucleus of the proposed West Afrioan Community, The main areae of
co-operation would include transport, telecommunications and other links, trade 
liberalisatien and industrial harmonisation, The other West African countries 
were to be invited to join the mew community. At this early stage, observers 
are keeping their fingere crossed, watching the reaction ef other West African 
countries and real actions on the part of the foundation members to back up 
their offieial resolutions.
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neighbouring coastal oountries for their supplies and for the despatch of their 
products - act as a brake on development*
(i) AGRICULTURE (Table 2<5) The population of Upper Volta ie almost 
entirely made up of farmers amd cattle men) 90% depend on agriculture amd stock- 
rearing* The rural sector Also accounts for about 5C% of the GDP, with crop 
production generating more than half of this* fven so, Upper Volta is mot self­
sufficient in the production of basic agricultural foodstuffs* Consequently, 
there has been considerable official emphasis on growing more food crops*
Because of the slow rate of growth of the principal food crops (sorghum, millet, 
amd maize) the donestio consumption of exportables (mainly groundnuts, sheamuts 
amd sesame seed) is considerable end must be met before the surplus can be
exported* For instance, during the 1966/69 crop season only 7% of the total
131groundnut production was exported*
Livestock dominates the Voltaic export market, mostly intra-African trade*
It countributes over 50% of the value of exports and generates some 10% of the
GDP* The estimated livestock population consist of about 2*3 million head of
oattlo, 1*5 million sheep, and 2*3 million goats* In reeent years herds have
been increasing at am average annual rate of 2*3%, but future growth rates of
supply and foreign demand are expected to dYteed 3% and 5% respectively* To
exploit this growth potential, the governmentfs development strategy tries to
132integrate stock-rearing into an expanded agriculture*
Mining is still unimportant; and Upper Volta is not rich in mineral resources* 
Apart from the manganese deposits, which have been discovered in relatively
131. IMP. 0*.eit.. P. 2693.
132. See Africa Research Bulletin. P. 21*193.
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oonmerfial quantities, only traces of other Minerals hare boon f o u n d . T h o s e  
include geld at Gang&ol (northeastern part), copper at Gaoua (in the southwest), 
bauxite, and lead. Studies are currently under way to detemine whether these 
minerals exist in commercial^ exploitable quantities.
(ii) INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION Production in the second sector is snail and 
rudimentary. The sector's contribution to the national preduot is of the order 
ef 5J6. In 1966 there were 36 industrial plants ef any respectable else, all 
located in the three nest inportant towns (Ouagadougou, Bebe Dieulasso, and 
Koudougou) along the railpay which links Upper Telta to I Tory Coast. As weuld 
be expeoted, nest ef the plants were engaged in processing denes tic agricultural 
oonnedities and in producing inport substitutes. The leading industries are 
cotton ginning, vegetable oil prooossing, tanning of hides, Manufacture ef 
leather preduots, assembling ef bicycles and netercycles, and produotien af beer 
and soft drinks.
Liko Niger, its landlocked neighbour to the northeast, Upper Volta's industria­
lisation progranne has been conditioned by its physical and geographic factors. 
First, the poor state of the oountry's infrastructure makes oonpetitien with 
the Ivory Coast diffic\At. It is true that the railway line, which has since 193U 
linked Ouagadougou to the Coast is likely to be extended as far as Dori (& dist­
ance of 333 Jot), if manganese is to be mined; and that the road network of 
16,900 kn is far fron negligible. Tet the Voltaic infrstruetural system is far 
less developed than that of the Ivory Coast. For example, electric power in 
Upper Volta is still very expensive, averaging 8 US cents per KWh compared with
133* Traces of uranium are also reported to have been found (see Europa 
Publications, P. 879).
* J
lu13 cents In Ivory Coast.
Secondly, In several plants established to serve a aarket larger than that 
ef Upper Velta, produotion has fallen below capacity, partly because neighbouring 
oountries have established snilar industries, and partly because ef relatively 
high unit and delivery costs (see "Bulletin Be L'lfrlque Noire", nos. 586 and
591)* j
Thirdly, all LDCs in varying degrees suffer from the shortage of skilled 
labour. Upper Velta is no exception. What is irenleal in the case of Upper 
Uelta is that econonic stagnation renders the effective employment of the existing 
force of trained personnel extremely difficult, and they are mostly obliged te 
emigrate to Neighbouring countries.
finally and most importantly, Upper Velta is naturally resource peer.
Ths foregoing development problems ef Upper Velta are understood better than 
the solutions to them. However, co-ordinated development planning had already 
begun. The country*s first developnent plan (1963-67) ef the partial variety 
focussed nainly on (a) increasing water supply; (b) soil preservation; (e) 
introduction of modem techniques through the agricultural extension services; 
and (d) the rehabilitation of the read network. A more all-embracing plan was 
soon to fellow.
13U* Economist Intelligence Unit, et al, Or.cit..Vol. I, P. 15*
135* As discussed earlier, the majority of the immigrants fron Upper Velta go 
te Ivory Coast where they work mostly in the coffee end cocoa plantations. This 
large outflow (about 1 million - see foetnote 69) has beem a mixed blessing. 0r\ 
the one hand the migrants have contributed significantly to the high growth rate 
of the Ivory Coast whilst Upper Velta has paid the price of alnest total stagna­
tion. On the ether hand the outflow has not only reduced unemployment in Upper 
Volta - which would have otherwise reached alarming proportions - but also 
contributed to the favourable balance of payments in recent years because ef the 
remittances by the migrants to relatives in Upper Velta.
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In August 1967 the government ef Upper Velta launched its first comprehensive 
Development Plan (1967-70), based en a total investment expenditure of 33 
nillion CFA francs and covering all aspeots of the oeuntry's economic life. 
Infrastructure and rural developnemt which is the key to further growth, received 
60% of the projeoted investment, with 18% and 15% going to the social and manu­
facturing sectors respectively. Implementation figures at the end of the plan 
period are not readily available but it would appear fron available indications 
that the plan - whioh expected 81*% of its total financing to cone fron external 
sources - could not realise that much. Infact, the rate ef implementation 
declined fron 69% in 1967 to 1*6% in 1968.1^
However, neither the official development pelley nor the investment 
distribution pattern has ohanged. The 1972 budget devetes 73*2% ef Its entire 
expenditure (as against 73% i* 1971) to public services (see Africa Research 
Bulletin, P.2186l). A special Rural Development Fund Project (RDF) prepared by 
the National Developnemt Bank with Frenoh aid envisages, by the tine it is 
completed, the provislem of about 500 wells for water supplies, 700 wareheuses 
for equipment necessary to agriculture, seme 190 snail projoots for farm amd 
water development amd about 70 km of sorvioo roads. The pregramme will cover 
mast regions amd will finally benefit 1*50,OCX) persons (Afrioa Research 
Builetis, P. 2M9B).
(ill) AMD PAYMMTS A large parties ef Upper Volta's external trade
is still largely unknown. Hero as An Niger, unrecorded trade consists largely
of livestook exported on the hoef to neighbouring countries, which is usually
exohanged for ^ood products and other consumer items that are then imported
clandestinely. Consider that oattle and other livestook products aooeumted for 
134. See IMP. 0d . olt.. PP. 702-70^1
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53% o r recorded experts in 1968, compared with 55% im 1962 - despite the fact 
that cattle production had increased steadily over this period at an 
rate of 3%«
The other area of narked export improvement relates to cotton production. 
Expansion in cotton and eottonsood exports in recent years has contributed 
greatly to Upper Volta's improved t£ade position. Ginned ootton exports rose 
fron less than 0.2 billion in 1962 to about 0.9 billion CFA francs in 1968; and 
those of cottonseed also increased markedly, together accounting for 20% of the
total export value in 1968. Exports of sheanuts, groundnuts and sesame see^have
137also registered satisfactory increases.
But these improvements in export trade have net ensured a surplus on current 
trade account. On the contrary, Upper Volta has boon running persistent deficits 
on its visible trade, principally because of the inability of export income to 
finance Imports. During the deoade, 1960-70, the country's trade deficit 
averaged 5 billion CFA francs. Thanks to aid. This deficit figure corresponds 
roughly with the amount of external aid committed annually ever the per led.
On non trade transactions, the pioture is much brighter. Apart fron offioial 
foreign assistance, there are other unrequited capital inflows, including 5 
billion CFA francs which France pays annually to some 2,000 Voltaic veterans, 
remittances by emigrant workers fron Upper Volta (mainly in Ivory Coast) valued 
at 1* billion CFA francs per year plus other miscellaneous receipts. Thus Upper 
Volta manages to offset the deficit en current account hy a net inflow on the
capital movements side.
137. Ibid.,"P. 7i*0
138. Europa Publications, Op.oit., P. 880. In 1966 export receipts financed 
only 1*2*8% the imports.
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The over-all balance of payments surplus, which was 0*8 billion CFA francs 
in 1966, rose to 1*2 billion CFA frames in 1968.1^  And the burden of public 
aid, although it claimed 8.7% of the 1972 budget, compared with 6.8% in 1971 
(see Africa Research Bulletin, P.21862) is still within confortable limits.
(iv) DEVELOPMENT PROSPECTS AND OUTLOOK As we have demonstrated above, 
the developnemt difficulties facing Upper Volta are almost overwhelming. 
Industrialization is bedevilled by the country's physical remoteness, poverty 
in natural resources, weak infrastructural framework, heavy reliance on foreign 
aid and narrow and poor consuming population. The agricultural export base is 
equally not very strong; despite recent export improvements, less than half of 
the value of imports is covered by export receipts.
The harsh truth that emerges from the assessment of the economic situation 
of this austere country is that it cannot oopo with its labour force. Emigra­
tion is an indispensable safety valve. But this is a blessing in reverse.
Many of the best men are lost to ths country, and this brings particularly 
aoute problems in the field of regional development.
However, given the right leadership and right econonic policies, the 
present economic picture could be considerably improved. The existing resources 
could bo mobilised and fully exploited. For instance, the manganese deposits 
at Tambao in the northeastern part of the country could be exploited. A U.S. 
Company, Union Carbide Corporation has expressed interest in exploiting these 
deposits provided the present railway linking Abidjan (ivory Coast) with
139. IMF, Op. olt.. P. 751.
Ouagadougou vould be extended to Tamabao so as to facilitate the shipment of 
the mineral*1^ 0 Sxpert earnings fron this source alone eould Increase the 
present level hy 60%*
Still it nay seen difficult for Upper Volta to save itself by its own 
efforts* For one thing9 the Voltaio econony - like that of Niger - was soriouslj 
damaged by the recent Sahel drought* The laok of rain led to a drastic decline 
in the output of subsistence orops and oner-used and over-grazing of land 
created an ecological inbalance which nay take years to rectify* The brooding 
of livestock in the north and east of the county was particularly affected) of 
a livestock estimate of 3 nillion cattle, 2*1 nillion sheep and 2*7 nillion 
goats in 1971/72, at least 2($ diedf^  por Upper Volta, it nunt indeed bo 
said that, to a great extent, the future nust rest on the formation of & 
large econonic grouping*
7 INTEGRATION AND MARKET SIZE (Table 6*9)
One important conclusion one could draw fron the above review is that nost
of the oountries of the survey have serious development problems* Anong those
is the question ef "small" econonic size with its concomitant narrow national
markets* Although the faet that a country is "large" by no means ensures its
rapid eoememie developnemt, it is fair to assume, a priori, that largo econonic
size is at least an advantage! hence development opportunities would be better
with integration than without it* 
liiO. Ibid. P. 699
11*1 • See Barclays Bank, Country Report on Upoer Volta, 11* May, 1975*
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Table 6 .9  preseats soae selected indicators which highlight the six ecoaoaies 
under consideration. As indicated earlier, the economically weaker states ef 
Dahomey, Togo, Niger aad Upper Volta have very limited home markets. The 
consequence of this is that they oan hardly establish large-scale iadustries 
aad, ia some oases, medium-scale industries based exclusively ea domestic 
markets. If such industries are established ia defiance of hard economic reali­
ties they would inevitably operate below their optimum oap&oity. Even ia the 
case of Ghana aad Ivory Coast, whioh are relatively richer judging by the 
economic indicator presented ia Table 6.9» the ease for a larger domestic 
market is equally strong.
As we noted ia chapter 2, a sizeable proportion of industry ia the area
operates at less than full capaoity, particularly the existing breweries amd
bicycle assembly plants la the Entente and the Akosombo and Aluminium Smelter
1U2projects in Ghaaa. Given the existence ef a wider market, it would bo 
possible for these iadustries te reap the benefits of economies of soale. But 
it must be emphasized im view of the existing level of industrial duplication 
within the GECS that a certain amount ef rationalization and mobilization of 
the existing level ©f excess-capacity through vertioal specialization of 
production processes between plants In the same Industry would be neoessary 
if any integration scheme in the region is to achieve the desired purpose. The 
'fVdf>er and poorer nenbers alike will benefit from rationalization and speciali­
zation since eaoh will specialise in, and supply the entire union, those commo­
dities in which it has the greatest comparative advamtage, subject to a common 
equitable distribution strategy.
11*2. See also E.I.TJ. Vol. I, On.cit.. PP. 1J4*-153*
Furthermore, it is anticipated that increased specialisation im production 
would discourage further chauvinistic tendencies or anti-integration legislation, 
like the Ghana’s Allens Compliance Order and the Business Promotion Act, 1970 
which barred several categories of citizens of neighbouring West African 
States from residing in Ghana or working in certain sectors of the economy]^
Of oourse the Ghanaian action must be viewed from the standpoint of its 
development dilemma. Periods of high unemployment and inflation at home often 
create a fertile ground for nationalistic adventures.
Besides important-substitution industrialization seems to be approaching 
its limit. One important consequence of import substitution, and the demand 
for imports it generates in the new import-shbstitute industries, is that it 
creates further scope for more import substitution. The establishment of 
domestic capacity to produce the inputs (and the equipment) needed by the domes­
tic final consumers1 goods industries often proceeds very slowly. The result 
la that there is too much capacity at the fimal and too little at the inter­
mediate stages of production; this disparity calls for the importation ef more 
inputs than anticipated, and when the foreign exohange to pay for these imports 
is mot available, it leads to the umder-utillzatlon of capacity at the fimal 
stages of productiom thereby creating the impression of ’import substitution 
grinding to a halt*. Ghana appears to be in this situation and needs access to 
supra-national markets to stimulate domestic production.
Ghana’s growth rate of the GDP merely averaged 2.6% from 1960 through 1970 
whilst Ivory Coast registered a phenomenal growth rate of 7*5^ oVer the same 
period. Although Togo, as showm in Table 6.9, topped the list in the growth
11*3 See Chapter 2 (footnote 3U) of this thesis.
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league, its economy is not in the same cemparable class with those of Ghana and 
Ivory Coast* The growth figures of the others have barely managed to keep 
paoo with their rate of population growth*
Again, Ghana’s share of intra-GECS trade is only 10.5#» although its GNP 
accounts for about 1*2# of the GECS total but the Ivory Coast, whose GNP im 1973 
accounted for no more than 32# of the area's total, eemtributed 1*1# of its trade*| 
(Table 6*9)* The Ghanaian low figure reflects not its ecoaomio strength vis-a- 
vis the Ivory Coast but the absence of a common trading arrangement between it 
and the Entente States*
Niger and Upper Volta, both landlocked, depend heavily on intrazonal trade 
since they export mainly live animals om hoof to, amd import simple manufactures 
from, their Immediate neighbours; amd their shares of 15*8# and 16.1*# respectively 
demonstrate this. To them the formation of a trading block with their neighbours 
will be a welcome mews. For Togo amd Dahomey their shares of intra-zonal trade 
fairly reflect their size amd strength.
The Ivorian high figures indicates its dominant position within the Entente, 
which will bo challenged with the entry of Ghana. Like Ghana, the Ivory Coast 
already has its own problems with Import substitution industries. The letter's 
fast growth im the 1950-70 period oan largely be attributed te the successful 
development ef several major projects including the enlargement ef the pert of 
Abidjan and the building of tho Vridi canal, and to the post-independence policy 
of building up import substitution industries. The slowing im tho Ivorian 
eoonony im resent years cam be partly explained by the failure ef private 
investment to switch from import substitution where there is am assured amd 
protected market for thoir products to commodity based export processing
industries where the instability of commodity prices makes a profitable return 
less certain*However, since under an econonic integration scheme an 
assured and protected Market can be offered to minimise the degree of unoertaimtj 
private investors in the region have very little to fear*
Meanwhile, development plans of the GECS countries eontlnue to emphasise 
investments in industry, some of whioh meed a regional rather than a national 
market* Over the plan period shown against eaoh country in Table 6*9 a size* 
able proportion of the total planned investments went to industry; for instamee, 
the amount earmarked for industry accounted for im Dahomey, 16*5# in 
Ivory Coast, and each in Togo and Upper Volta. The grovrfch of budget 
expenditure of these oountries further reflects this trend* With the exception 
of Ghana^^ amd Niger, the annual budget figures of the GECS members Bhow a 
substantial increase from 1972/73 to 1973/7U fiscal year, particularly Ivory 
Coast (Table 6*9)* In the Ivorian oase the growth in government spending fron 
tf.S £3U9*5 million to Df*S £599*5 million in a single year respresemted an 
increase of 71*5$* Even if this were indexed to the rate of inflation, it would 
still represent a phenomenal growth in public expenditure*
Surely, investment plans and policies of individual countries are a 
function of the long-term benefits they expect to derive fren them because
planning assumes its full significance in the long term* By the sane token, the;!
1Uiu Fer further discussion on this see Barclays Bank* Country Report on Ivory 
Coast, 6 May, 1975*
11+5* These percentage shares were obtained fron other computations not shown in 
Table 6*6 (See Table Souroes)*
11*6* But for the financial year 197U—751 the National Redemption Council budgeted 
for a record expenditure of well over £551**01 nillion out ef whioh £21*6 nillion 
was devoted to development projects* This was the largest sum sver voted by a 
Government of Ghana in a single fisoal year for developments, rspresenting 14**I# 
of tho total budget expenditure (See Afrioa Resear oh Bulletin* Vol.12, No* I*
28 Feb. 1975).
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need for the co-ordination of planning among members of a grouping must be 
directly related to the importance of the benefits which the individual members 
of the grouping expect to derive from the integration scheme* In other words, 
plan aad policy co-ordination among the GECS need bo closely related to the needs 
of their intra-zonal trade* This would be necessary in order to fully explore 
aad utilise the opportunities for the exploitation of tho eoonomies of scale 
and oapital economisation through the diminution of projeot duplioation.
Economic integration — either across the board or in specif io export—oriented
industries - represents a necessary policy for many least-developed amd inter*
mediate-type developing countries which aspire to a fair share im the common
effort to expand exports of manufactured and semi-manufactured products not only
to intra-union members but also to third countries with the help of Generalised
11ftSystem of Preferences* Indeed, with particular reference to central Vest 
Africa, one oould assert without exaggeration that, having regard to the 
irratlom&l imbroglio of small national States (of the Togo amd Dahomey variety), 
the poor landlocked ones (like Niger amd Upper Voltajand the developing oountries 
(such as Ghana end Ivory Coast), the group is one of the areas in the world where 
eoonomic co-operation or, at least, the avoidance of disintegration is nest 
imperative for eoononlo development*
11*7* Project studies carried out recently in South-East Asia on the cost curves 
of sone of tho basic industries such as chemicals and potroohenleala, machinery, 
glass and newsprint, show that the unit cost of production can be reduced by as 
much as or incases, even more, if capacities are doubled or trebled to
cater for an integrated narket of three or five countries (See UNCTAC, Current 
Problems of IronoMic Iateioratlon. N.T., 1971*, P. 29 (TD/B/1*71). Similar 
conclusions are likely to be arrived ad if similar studies were to be carried out 
in West Africa*
11*8. Ibid,
CHAPTER SEVEN 
METHODOLOGY AMD INTEGRATION INDUSTRIES 
This chapter focuses on two n&in lssuess the methodology we want to employ 
in measuring the gains or losses fron economic integration between Ghana and 
the Entente states and the analysis of the selected Integration industries* In 
ohapter 1* we reviewed a number of reeemt attempts to quantify the oosts and 
benefits of integration, including the Anilos-Desser model* The weaknesses of 
the various approaches have been touched upon; henoe their utilisation requires 
sone nodifloation or qualification to suit the purposes of a particular exercise.
I. METHODOLOGY
The for® of integration envisaged in this study would be based on chosen 
"regional1* industries1 which are already in existence* The gains or losses 
involved in the operation of the regionally-oriented industries are to be 
estimated and the approaoh we want to follow is to adopt a modified form of 
the Andiss-Dosser equation of industrial location* As discussed in ohapter four, 
the Andlcs-Dosser model was designed to test the feasibility of proposed regional
industries in terns of their net welfare benefits, subject to sone agreed
2distribution criteria* The point of departure in the present study is that we
are mainly concerned with existing regional industries for which data are
readily available* We therefore employ the Andios-Dosser model as a building
1* These refer to projects which require supra-national markets to fully utiliao 
their oapaoities or to expand their production to a point vdiere they oan 
appreciably exploit eoonomies of scale (see section 2 of this ohapter)*
2* See Andie, et al, On* cit.* P. 39
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block but redefine the factors it employe to suit our case* The ldgic of the 
exercise is to assess the net welfare benefits of fully utilising hitherto 
existing excess capacity or expanding then within the fraaevork of econonic 
integration*
Our nethodolegy redefines the factors represented in the Andies-Dosser 
nodal as fellows (which are applied to all the industries considered)t
Aw - A1 - AT ♦ AF - A*
where
W as a neasure of welfare derived fron the full capacity utilization
er expansion of existing regional indu3try9 
I « integration-induced value-added directly attributable t# such
industry,
7 * national incone loss arising out of trade diversion (i*e* the
switch in consusptien fron efficient extra-union producers to 
inefficient intra-union producers)*
F r= total value of actual current inports of ths substituted commodity
ninus the inpert content of hone production ninus the imported
3 1content of specially required social overhead capital corrected by 
the estimated foreign exohange savings based on the shadow prioe 
of foreign exchange*
K » the user oost of the unused portion of the regional industry's
capacity and/or the cost of expansion te m particular country's
account (seo Section 2 (v) ef chapter 8)*
3* The nature of overhead expenditure referred te hero covers only suoh unavoi­
dable overhead cost which the full utilization or expansion of industrial capacll 
brings about (e*g* buying a generator to provide electricity in an area where 
power supply is unavailable or irregular), hence such expenditure is treated as 
an integral part of costs to the entrepreneur*
So■« contents met now te made In connedon with the aheve formula.
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Aw is a dependent variable reflecting the values of all the independent
variables in the right-hand side of the equation* Therefore, as indicated 
earlier, it aust show the net benefits of an integration industry positive if
and ignores their iadireet effeots through linkages and ocmplenentarltles* Ve 
will in our oaloulatlons disregard the Indirect cffcotc of regional industries 
but vould qualify our oonelusions accordingly to taks account of this*
added* That is, the sun ef non-industrial oosts (like rent, consumable tools 
and parts) and net output (comprising labour and operating surplus)* But, as
the contributions of autonomous improvements im labour productivity and teohaieal 
advance to rapid economic grevth* Ths implied assumption in this kind ef 
reasoning is that ths opportunity cost of factors is uniformly aero* This is an 
unrealistic assumption, even allowing for the alleged lov/aero marginal> produo- 
tivity ef labour in LDCs (Arthur Lewis, 195U)« However, this assumption, whioh 
is difficult to avoid, is made hero for our present purposes* Furthermore, 
since the effiolemey of factors of produotion is bound to vary fron industry to 
industry and fron oountry to country, it ia exported that the gross valve-added 
would not neoess&rily be the sane in the sane or different industries ia the 
sane ef different oountries* This has obvious implications for the prielng ef 
the produets of integration industries and, loso facte* for the distribution of 
the oeats and benefits of integration* This probltm will bo oonsidored in 
ohapter 9*
implied is ths integration-induced valued-
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The estimation ef / V  will employ input-output tables sinoe under 
protection prices ef inputs amd outputs incorporate tariff* The familiar 
relationship is given ast
▼j - XJ - ^iij 
where Tj * value added fer industry j (under preteotiea)|
Xj m domestic value ef output of industry j (under protection)
Mij m domestic value of inputs purohased by industry j  from
industry i (under protection)*
Perhaps net value-added^ would have given a dearer picture of the real 
contribution of integration industries to welfare* But there are no 
disaggregated figures available9 showing gross value-added aad not value-added 
separately for the countries under review* Sesides9 differences in classifica­
tions and methods ef estimation in the area render problems of disaggregation 
on the basis ef available data diffioult* Nevertheless9 gross value-added does 
indicate an order of magnitude with respeot to the contribution of integration 
industries to GBP*
The measurement of , like that of (aWe), employs imput-outpnt 
tables* We also apply the concept of effective rate of protection* Effeotive 
rate of protection is defined as the difference between the value-added in a 
sector of industry under protection and the value-added that would exist under 
free trade9 expressed as a percentage of free market value-added* This will 
be discussed further in the next ohapter*
1** Ve refer to gross value-added mdt ef noneindustrial costs (i*e* payments 
te labour and operating surplus)*
Grubel, H*G* and H*G* Johnson, "Nominal Tariffs, Indlreot Taxes and 
Effective Rates of Protections The Common Market Countries 1959%
Economic Journal (19^7)» 77t P* 7^1*
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With respect to the assessment of the value of F, it is important to 
estimate the amount of foreign exohange saved, if any, consequent upon the 
fuller utilisation of existing industrial capacity or the expansion of regional 
industries9 which, it is assumed, would oapture part or all of the domestic 
(union) market in the production of certain eemaodities previously imported 
from other sources* However, a separate estimate of F, though it would be made 
for purposes of comparison and emphasis only (see chapter 8), would involve 
double-counting since our estimate of value added would take care of the foreign 
exohange sagings* Even so, in view of the high opportunity oost of foreign 
exchange in most LDCs, we want to assess the difference between the shadow 
prioe value and the world prioe value of domestically produced imports* The 
difference would be treated as additional foreign exohange savings in our model* 
To be able to estimate the value ef F, wo redefined it as the sum ef the aotual 
import values of the substituted commodity, say, in a typical year, or an 
average figure (for some years), net of the imported input components and of 
the import content ef required social overhead capital^ (SOC)*
6* The Andies and Dosser (Op*cit* P* 38) define F te include the aotual value 
of imports plus any other reduction in imports through lews ting of real national 
income adjusted for import content of direst input* aad for the import content 
of required social overhead capital* We have excluded "any ether reduction 1m 
imports through lowering of real national income” because of the complexity of 
this concept* First, it implicitly assumes a constant demand for, and constant 
supply of, the imported commodity without substantial prioe changes hence it must 
olaim a fixed ratio of the import bill* But the assumption of non-existence 
of fluctuations in imports in the real world is net a very compelling logic| and 
only the aotual import figures oan reflect the real trend* Seoondly, the factors 
responsible for fluctuations in real national income are net always the direct 
result of a policy action* Sometimes, natural causes oan explain this* Therefore 
there is no reason why the propensity to import should not be tailored to the 
aotual import capacity ef a country rather than a supposed capacity to 
import* However, where projections to determine future import values are involve* 
as we shall do later, an estimate of the elasticity of demand for the produet(s) 
would be made* Also, for practical purposes, we define SffC as comprising 
transport and power* The wider concept includes "those basic services without 
whioh primary, secondary, and tertiary productive activities oannot function" (A* 
0* Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Development* Tale Hhivorsity Press, 1958 ^
3U0
Finally, there is the task of estimating K. This is relatiTely easier 
insofar as we are concerned with the capital oost of unused portion of the 
regional industry's capacity and/or the cost of its expansion to a particular 
country's account in the absence of a oonnon regional bank or a union oapital 
market*
low, one more important point about estimating the value of K« This
concerns the transport cost component of K. In a region such as West Africa
where the network of communications is relatively underdeveloped, the role of
transport oosts in industrial location is a very important one. It is doubly
7so when the level of inter-country transport development is very uneven.
Some summary data illustratimg transport oost differentials among the oountries 
under discussion are given be low t
TAM* 7.1
(P.B) Cenf P»r To»s! UpperYalta Higer Dahomey Togo Ghana
Road 5.6 6 7.6 2.7 2.8 2.6
Rail 2.1* 2 m 2.1* 2.1s 2.1
Sources S.I.U. and Assoolate, 1970 P. 1*3
The prioes given in the above table relate, as far as possible, to the transport 
of similar goods (miscellaneous products of average value) and to local factors.
As vould be expected, the prioe of road transport depends on a large number 
of factors! distance covered, goods carried, routes followed, load factor,
possibility of handling return freight and the like. It is therefore
P. 83) - would include certain non-quantifiable elements whose actual oontribu- 
tions to production, in relation to our study, are uncertain.
7* This was discussed in some detail in chapter two*
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not surprising that road transport oosts are nuoh higher in the landlocked 
oountries (Upper Yolta and Vigor) than in the coastal areas. In the former,
higher prices are attributable largely to the cost of petroleum products and 
spare parts and the state of the roads.
Road transport charges in Ivory Coast, in relation to other coastal states,
Q
are very high. This could be explained partly by load factor (i.e. high ratio 
of heavy products, such as oenent, machines and equipment in total road freight) 
and partly by tho relatively higher oost of living in the country.
In Togo and Dahomey tho rates are different according to whether er not the 
routes run between towns served by both road and rail. On routes where there 
is a rail link, the prioes of road transport are aligned to the rates for rail 
transport, or asm generally slightly lover, while on the routes served only by 
road, the rates in force are markedly higher.
Ghana's road transport prioe is the lowest (Table 7*1 )• In a way
this is a reflection of the healthy competition between the publio and private
9seotors in road transport service."
8. This dees not necessarily mean that in absolute terms Ivory Coast produces 
and/or imports more heavy products than Ghana, although in relative terms the 
former carries more heavy road freight than tho latter. Also Ivory Coast has 
more road-km por capita than any other oountry in Vast Africa. With a population 
of million, it has a system of 30,000 km of primary and secondary roads.
The oomparable figure for Ghana is 32,000 km in a population of over 8 million 
inhabitants.
9. The Ghana State Transport Corporation (STC) owns and operates a fleet of 
coaches, competing with the private sector in most major trunk roads. The road 
transport price (quoted in Table 7*0 has been taken ffon private transporters 
as the STC rates were under review at the time. However, the difference between 
the STC and private charges has always been very marginal. Currently, plans are 
underway to develop the largest man-made lake in the world, created by the 
Volta River Scheme, an an inland waterway.
Also s good communications network by Afrioan Standards has something to do 
10with it.
Insofar as rail transport prioss are ©once rued, the inter-country prioe 
differentials are quite snail. One possible explanation here is that rail 
transport is more important in official inport-export trade than in passenger 
freight. Thus rail transport prioes tend to be no re standardised and fixed 
than road transport charges. Fron the standpoint ef integration, this augurs 
well for transport harmonisation.
Ths picture that energes fron the foregoing illustration shows that 
differences in transport charges between different parts of a region could 
affect industrial locations aad output prioes. Oeing back to our model, K is 
defined as the oapital coat of the unused portion of a regional project to a 
given oountry. The inplied assumption thus is that the value of K includes, 
anong others, transport oosts of input valued at factory prioe* Put another |
way, we are mainly interested in ex-faotoxy oosts of produetion, assuming that
the distribution oosts are borne, partially or wfcelly, by the final oonsuner
12rather than the producer. Any one of the familiar projeot evaluation 
techniques could be modified and employed to determine the value of K.
10. In addition to a large road system, Ghana has 1,288 kn (80$ miles) of rail­
way, the so - called "golden triahgle," which provide a good link between the 
major population centres. The road system , however, remaims the moot Important
transport network, although it has recently suffered fron r, lack of proper 
maintenance.
11. Transport costs axe sometimes only a small part of total oosts of production 
The major oost factors are generally the fixed and variable elements. But 
transport considerations acquire greater vt£v respect to distribution.
12} Even if distribution costs enter into production oosts, adjustments oould 
be made to take account of this. In that oase, K would be valued at border or 
consumption point prioes.
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The Camoy^approach is perhaps an improvement on the conventional "discounted
present value formula" (i.e. *3)isoounted Cash Plow1) of project evaluation. Is 
noted earlier9 the great advantage of the Camoy technique is that it recognises 
the transport problems of many LDCs and tries to give adequate weight to them 
in project appraisals from the standpoint of integration.^ It concerns itself 
with the welfare gains or losses involved to intra-union consumers in the 
son sump tion of products of "optimum" industries vis-a-vis those of "non-optimum" 
industries. In thie way various alternative location points and consumption 
points were assumed and their cost differentialsf especially in terms of 
transport9 carefully weighed against importing from third countries.
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13
13. Op.cit. This method of evaludtion is relevant to both new amd existing 
but underutilized industries.
1ii. This is not to underplay the weaknesses of the model some of whioh have 
been pointed out heretofore. The model dedis with only a few isolated industries 
rather than with the economy as a whole (see Camoy9 Op .cit. P. 36). Thie IM 
exposes it to all the limitations inherent in partial equilibrium analysis. 
Ideally9 all industries and segnents of the economy should be sonsidered within 
the framework of a general equilibrum system, so that both direct and indirect 
impacts of economlo integration could be measured. There are also such other 
questions like, the degree of data reliability, the long-run value of prioe and 
oost estimates based on oeteris paribus assumptions with respect to changes in 
prioes and costs.
1*1 THE TRANSPORT - OOST FACTOR
However, the employment of the Camoy techinque falls outside the compe­
tence of the present study# Neither the range of data required nor the
computations involved could he adequately dealt with within the seope of this 
15study. For our own purpose, we have to eone to terns with what is available 
or could be done within our own limitations. Available information - for use 
ia thie study - suggests that the appraisal of the selected regional projects1  ^
was based on the 'Discounted Cash Flow1 (DCF).1  ^ And although the DCF is still 
the oommomest method of project evaluation in West Afrioa, it takes into aocount
only the aggregate ex-factory costs of production (dk) but does not adequately
deal with distribution costs, which for an area like Central-West Africa could 
substantially increase the unit cost of the final consumer (Table 7.1). Te 
take account of this, we introduce a transport-cost factor in our original
evaluation function.suoh that our welfare gains/losses as represented by
clcould now vary bo tween two different locations of plant.. A
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15. It nay be noted that the study on which Camoy based his (ed.) Industriali­
sation in a Latin American Common Market took olevem research imetitutioms over 
five years to complete (1963-68). Even in a codified form ef it, ome ie boumd 
to come up against non-existing data.
16. See seotion 2 of this chapter.
17* X21 the conventional sense, the DCF technique provides a tool for comparing
different inflows and outflows by expressing then, through the known rate of 
discount, in terns of a single figure which takes account of the total amounts 
of inoone and expenditure, the pattern in whioh they are spread out over tine, 
and the life span of the project (OECD, Mannual of Industrial Pro.ieot Analysis 
in Developing Countries. Vol.1, 1968, P.Tl^JV^Very recently, two refined^ 
approaches to project evaluation in LDCs have been published - one by the OECD, 
X.H Little and J.A. Mirrle.a, Manual o f lnduatrial Project - innlyaia In 
Developing Countries. Vol.II, Paris, 1969, and the other by the United Nations 
Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), Guidelines for Pro.ject Evaluation 
in Developing Countries, nineo (1970)» forthcoming (1972) UNIDO Publication. 
Little amd Mi rr lee a refined, developed and brought the DCF formula to a mew 
stage. Although most of their innovations are more apparent than real, their
Oar final •valuation function is thus as follows!
A“ -A? - A1 ♦ A' -A' - A1
Ideally, the transport-eost factor should be treated as /\T 0 but ia realityA* could be sere under certain circumstances. Such a situation free, the point 
ef view ef the producer night include casest (a) where there is no geographic 
spread of narkets (i*e., markets concentrats around ths industry) henos delivery 
costs are marginal er even zero) (b) where the ooet ef distribution is entirely
home by the final consumer) (o) where the distribution oost is boms by thsA
stats through subsidy*
But with the exception ef the first oase (which in any ease is rare), 
transport oosts whether borne by a public authority or the consumer represents 
a cost or loss to the society and should form part of welfare looses*
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ideas have stirred up so much interest and so much dustJ (Sea the Symposium 
on the Little-Mirrleeb Manual ef Industrial PpOject Analysis in Developing 
countries, Buriatia, yf th« Oxford CTnlyyyj.ijy of feonoaloa, aad
Statistics* 1 (3h)* February* 19721* The meat important - alee the most 
controversial - innovations put forward by Little and Mirrlees is their notion * 
that all prices used in project calculation should be world prices* This 
applies to both traded and non-traded inputs (such non-tradables as electricity, 
construction, local transport, and labour)* Critics of the Little-Mirrleea 
methodology have beam quick to point out that in most LDCs, it would be similar 
and sufficient to uses (a) world prices for the actually traded major capital 
amd current inputs, and for the outputs) (b) domestic factor costs (at either 
shadow er market prioee as judged appropriate) for the mem-traded impute) amd 
them to oonvert these foreign and domestic values into a single ourrency by 
resort to am exchange rate (official or shadow) deemed remsemfcble (DOT, Finance 
and Devalopment* (1), 1972, PP*16-21)* The UNIDO approaoh unlike the OECD 
manual approaches ths problem ef projeot evaluation from a different angle, if 
only slightly so* The point of departure in the UNIDO approaoh to projeet 
evaluation lies in the fact that it recommends measuring benefits amd easts im 
terms of consumption* According to this modal ths value of a projeot depends 
upon the eonsumers1 "willingness ts pay" for the "met output" sf ths project*
In other terms the presdnt aggregate consumption is the operational numeraire*
But like the OECD Manual, it believes that valuing goods and services in terms 
ef market prioes is inadequate in reflecting national benefits and oests, hence 
both balk at the use of market prioes but recommend instead the use ef appropriate
Because of the range and quality of available data we have not employed 
an Advanced technique in estimating the value of (See Chapter 8)* But 
it is intended that the results would indicate useful guidelines for poliey 
action similar to those of Camoy* T o r the produets examined elsewhere in this 
ohapter, data have been available on their ex-works prices, road or rail trans­
port charges per ton/km, the road distanoes from different production and 
consumption points as well as annual output figures* Given the annual volume 
of demand for each particular commodity for which estimates are available the 
delivery costs of the commodities from alternative locations are computed in 
chapter eight* The transport element is clearly demonstrates the difference 
between the ex-works costs of produotion /\K end the fimal consumer prioes*
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shadow prioes to measure the soeial value ef benefits and costs* Also both 
recommend the use of present value as the eorreot oriterlon to use in judging 
industrial projects* The two approaches, however, divercje on the issue of 
choosing a numeraire* The OECD model uses investment (expressed in free foreign 
exchange) as the unit of measurement in place of consumption favoured by the 
UNIDO approach* The choloe of the numeraire ie, of course, largely a natter of
convenience and need not by itself necessarily make much difference to one's
judgement about the teohnioal feasibility or desirability of a project (0*TJ* 
Bulletin*op*cit*. P. 1+2)• What matters, though, relates to the differences in 
assumptions and concepts* Por instance, whereas one is discounting aggregate 
net benefits expressed in terms of consumption in the UNIDO model, one is
discounting net benefits expressed in terms of imvesilbl* resources in the OECD
ease* Here lies the reason why the two rates of discount might be different amd 
why the counting rate of interest might typically be greater than soeial rate of 
discount* In terms of empirioal application both approaches generally have their 
advantages and pitfalls, some of which have been noted* If the commercial poliey 
of a nation were efficient (i*e* free fron restrictions) it would be perfectly 
oorreot to value tradable goods using world prioes, as the OECD approach recommend 
but typically the trade policies of LDCs generally nre, in this sense, imperfeet* 
The UNIDO, given a "free trade" situation>vould make a similar recommendation*
In praotloe, it is difficult to see how the exclusive reliance on world prices 
can faithfully register the social benefits and costs involved in the use of 
tradable commodities in LDCs* Although the UNIDO model is, im a way, taxonomie . 
and provides a greater degree of freedom in its choice of assumptions, both models 
do not appear to have very bright prospects for immediate use in West Africa until 
some of the controversies amd difficulties they involve are xkm solved*
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1*2 Weighting of the Evaluation Function Fact or a
Yovf we return to the question of weights applied to the evaluation 
funotion factors discussed earlier in this ohapter. Structurally, the eoonomio 
problems of development im West Africa, like those of most LDCs, are many but 
their magnitudes vary from oountry to country. Some of these problems, which 
we are primarily conoemed with, have been discussed in some detail in the 
previous chapter. To minimise repetition, only summary comments intended to 
emphasise the relative weights of the factors are intended here.
Given the sluggish performance of the primary export sector, it is now 
generally agreed that industrialisation, and more specifically the development 
of manufacturing, is the pace-setter of eoonomio progress upon whioh a higher 
standard of living oan be achieved. Consequently^ industrialisation geared 
towards import-substitution has been embarked upon but the experience of 
different oountries has been mixed and varied. Development has produced its 
own by-products - if only ironically - to warrant the focus of concern and 
policy.^ high level of unemployment co-exists with capital-intensive techniques 
of production! over-stretching of limited financial resources has led to budget 
deficits,and foreign exohange bottlenecks have cheoked the rate of eoonomio 
growth itself. What is more, unusual transport difficulties are not uncommon.
Thus the measurement of the welfase effects of eoonomic integration which 
takes into account the relative importance and effects of the above variables 
on each individual country requires a system of weighting. But weighting five 
different items some of which are highly variable (i.e. relative weights change 
with bouts of fluctuations in the economy) in six different economies introduces
t .Tr\.some complications.
Firstly, all items cannot be weighted squally by assigning equal values amd 
taking simple averages because the relative importance of each item varies not 
only among other items but between different oountries* In other words, eaoh 
item should be differentially treated (oountry by country) according to the 
critical shsoiMce gaps and development bottlenecks in eaoh economy. For examplei 
as we noted earlier although it could be said that all the countries under 
review have foreign exohange problem, it is more acute in the poorer states* 
Secondly, given the urge to safeguard against total concentration of industries 
in one country, any meaningful weighting system should '.wt integrate a distri­
bution formula lmto it* Thirdly, if we assume that the eoonomic fortumes of 
some of the oountries under discussion fluctuate all too frequently, especially 
those highly dependent on one major export orop, it is necessary to apprsel&te 
how quickly the bases for determining any system of weighting can become out 
of date*
Nevertheless, the idea of weighting our evaluation function factors serves 
to emphasise the dominant economic gaps in any one country within a prospective 
union ax any particular time*
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2 INTEGRATION INDUSTRIES
2.1 SELECTION OF INDUSTRIES
Choosing integration industries for study within the limited soope of this
thesis poses special problems. Ideally one should foeus attention on those
industries whose produets are strategic to the rapid eoonomic development and,
perhaps, integration of Ceneral-West Africa. These weuld chiefly comprise
capital goods and heavy industries, in whioh eoonomies sf scale and strong
interindustry linkages could be more easily realised. But, im reality, technical
and resource problems render investments in these industries difficult.
Besides, the desire te establish these projects does not neoesearily coincide
with the national interests of governments and industrialists in the area.
On the side ef oonsumer goods seotor the problems of projeot seleediom ere
still not very simple. For ome thing, the question of non-homogenaity ef
products in a region, where different weights and measures as well as produet 
18qualities exist, could militate against the expansion ef sales - though thie 
is not really a serious problem as it oan be easily overcome overtime through 
standardization. More importantly, there is the wider question of national 
versus international priorities with respeot to projeot selection and industrial 
expansion on the one hand and the eoenemio feasibility ef individual pro joe te on 
the ether. In so far as the former is concerned the rationale for integration 
industries may be satisfied if more than one oountry provided markets for the
produo te of a chosen industry. But with respeot to the latter a very extensive
18, In Ghana galvanised sheets are sold in 2.U; metres by 61* CM eeetiene whilst 
in the Entente they are 2 metres by 0.9* It is mot only a question of standards 
but also that of taste. The enamel-ware bought in Ghana is lighter than in 
the Ivory Coast, while in Togo it is lighter still. Tiny oensidsratisns of this 
nature are particularly important in relation to consumer goods.
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study, covering most of the probable projects would have to be carried out to 
ascertain the qualifying industries. However, tine limitations, data problems, 
limited resources and the soope of this study cannot adequately oope with am 
exercise of such magnitude. Thus we shall be guided by a careful examination 
of the existing industrial potential of the region and of the various industrial 
projeots under consideration, including those already in operation within the 
six countries.
19An inquiry ' into the policy of industrial development in Central-West 
Afrioa within a purely national framework, based primarily on import substitu­
tion of large scale consumer produets, seems to suggest that its potentials 
are almost cooing to an end. The main noteable exception is the processing of 
agricultural products of local origin. Really, if import-substitution has led
to inward-oriented development policies, and if the limits of “autarchic"
20import substitution are now obvious, a more outward-bound policy conceived 
on a regional or multinational scale would provide new opportunities for import 
substitution in respeot of a range of finished products. Also it will make 
possible the manufacture of intermediate produots and thus encourage the 
formation of an economy with a regional structure and the development of 
inter-industry and inter-country trading.
Yiew&tfrom this perspective aad our own limitations, the examination of 
existing industries and industrial projects enables us to select four main 
product groups for special study. These are cement works, chemical fertilisers, 
Leather and shoes and petroleum refining.
19. See B.I.U and Associated op. oit.. Yol.1. PP. 91-15*3. Also see the 
section on Industrial Survey in Chapter 3«
20. I.B. Kravis, uTrade as a Handmaiden of §rowth* Similarities between the 
19th and 20th Centuries**, Economic Journal. December, 1970. Kravis assets that
the Post-war industrialization strategy of Import substitution is now 
reaching its limits for many LDCs.
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We believe that (a) these commodity groups relate to intermediate or final
products whose national markets are clearly too limited to permit a full
utilization of existing oapacity and realisation of eoonomies of scale, and
(b) these industries j in whioh surplus capacity exists, can be shown to be quite
21economic to make the feasibility of net gains for co-operation a real one.
Also we assume that they offer prospects for the exploitation of economies of
22scale within the oontext of a wider market in the Corden sense, subject 
to some qualifications to bo considered below.
Indeed, our assumption of the existence of economies of scale is central 
to this study since it is one of the key sources of gain from economic 
co-operation (chapter 3)« Similarly, the conventional trade creation (within 
limits) and trade diversion concepts are still relevant. For instance, the 
expansion of intra-union demand which will be supplied from intra-union sources 
provides opportunities for the exploitation of economies of scale and trade 
creation. This will in turn load to fuller utilization or expansion of existimi 
production capacity, as the succeeding industrial survey shows.
However, the Corden*s sJLngle-homogeneous-product two-country-union model 
is not exactly the same as our complicated multi-product multi-country 
approaoh. Furthermore, where, as in our oase, there are two or more countries 
producing a given commodity amd where also there is a deliberate unlom policy
to keep some less efficient produoers in business in the interest of balanoed
21. S«e 0.. olt. (Vol.. 1-3^.
22. W.M. Corden, "Economies of Scale and Customs Union Theory". Journal of 
Political Econony. vol. 80, Ho. 3 (1)» May / June, 1972, PP. 1*65.- 7!>« This 
article appears to assume eoonomio integration among developed countries where 
a greater degree of intra-union competition is most likely to exist than in
''regulated" customs unions among LDCs suoh as we have here. Accordingly the 
relevance of his analysis to our ca3e requires some qualifications.
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union development, the opportunities for the exploitation of economies of 
so ale as veil as trade creation may not be as great as in the simple Corden 
model.
Even so the extent of the GECS market oan still provide opportunities for 
the exploitation of economies of eo&le im a regulated sense. Although Ghana 
and Ivory Coast are self-sufficient in the produotlon of the commodities 
reviewed below (henoe there is no trade between them in those products), each 
of them still exports to some or all of the other four countries. In this 
way they and other intra-uni on exporters enjoy tho advantages of economies of 
scale. Also domestic consumers/whoseAless efficient producers cannot adequately 
cater for? could be allowed under union arrangement to import part of their 
requirements from other more efficient intra-union sources, thereby oresting 
opportunities for limited (if only rationalised) trade ere&tlon. It seems, 
indeed, that, given the various, aad sometimes conflicting, objective functions 
(including industrialisation, rapid growth, employment and balanced development) 
whioh most groupings im LDCs want to maximise (both collectively amd lndlvlduall 
lly)> the best they oam hope for at this stage is some form of incomplete 
specialisation and trade ereation.
Ve provide below as far as data oan permit a more detailed survey of the 
state of produotlon and future possibilities in the region with respeot to 
the four product groups singled out for special study.
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2.2 CEMENT IKPOSTOT CSITCt 661 I.S.I.C. 33li)
(i) PRODUCTION PROCSS8ES.23
Cement manufacture ia mad# up of two products - clinker aad cement itself. 
Clinker ie the mixture of chalk or limestone and clay which emerges from a 
rotary kiln fired by pulverised coal or oil. The substances are first crushed 
and ground, and then mixed in proportions suitable to the chemical composition 
of each, thdsfe proportions being, im general, 1 %  limestone and cl ay. A 
powder, whioh is fired from a vertical or rotary kilns at about 1,1*00°, is then 
obtained. The product taken from the discharge end of the kilm, when cooled, 
is hard and blackish, and ia oalled clinker.
Clinker is, in fact, "cement11 in small pieces, The clinker, when ground 
with a small quantity of gypsum^usually from 2-69^ aad sometimes pozzelana or 
other substances into fine powder, produces cement. It ie therefore technically 
quite normal for tho full range of operations to be Carried out in one plant. 
Squally too, imported olinker can be ground but not produced at the same site.
The cement industry of the region consists entirely of olinker grinding 
plants, except in the oase of Niger (Malhazs). These plants (Table 7*2) of 
whioh there are two in Ivory Coast and two im Ghana, are located in ports 
(Abidjan, Tena, Takoradi (see Communications map) and prooeas clinker imported 
from various European countries, mainly Scandinavian. The reasons for preference 
for ooaetal locations will be discussed later.
23* This sub-section draws on E.I.U. and Associate op.cit. see also C.F.
Prat tern, Economies of Scale in Manufacturing. O.U.P., 1971# PP* 8® —89*
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All the factories in the region manufacture a single product - portland 
cement* Thus the economies of scale arising from reducing variety and 
achieving long production runs and large outputs of individual products are not 
open to this industry# since variety does not exist in the first instance* 
Therefore the key dimension of scale for determining eoonomies is simply the 
output capacity of cement factories* Even so substantial economies could be 
reaped from capacity expansion* Indeed# the following tables illustrate that 
costs aad scale of cement production follow a curve-lintor function*
TABia 7.3
(ii)
COSTS AMD SCALE FOR CEMENT FACTORIES
CAPACITY OF WORKS (000 netrio tone p.a)
33 66 100 200 Uoo 500 1,000
Fixed inxeatnent per 
to* of oap&cltyi
V, Geniut 0 U8
(index; (200) , 35x (1U6)
29
(1$U)
2U ,(|00) (79?
U.S.A. 0
(index)
65
(120)
5U(100) (83)
U3(80)
30
(56)
LABOUR REQUIREMENTS 1
U.S.A. Hunber per 100,000t
(index;
75
(156)
U8
(100)
32
(67)
30
(63)
15.
(31)
Unit Coste per ton of 
Cap&aityt
W. Gernanjr 021 
(index) (150)
17(121)
16
(11l»)
11*
(100)
12
(86)
U. S. A. 0
(index)
22
(116) 19(100)
17
(89)
16
(8U)
12
(63)
Source I C. F. Pratten, Eoononlee of Seal* In Maanfaoturing Industry. COT, P.91
TABLE 7.L
ESTIMATED COSTS* FOE NEW U.K. gKMEHT WOBKS
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CAPACITY (000) 100 200 500 1,000 2,000
Ho. of KJLIkb and Hills 1 1 2 2 2
INDICES OP COSTS
Fuel, Power and Materials 100 98 97 96 95
Wages and Salaries 100 70 55 W> 35
Depreciation and Return on Oapital 100 80 70 58 hi
Overheads 100 90 82 75 70
Average Total Costs 100 85 77 69 62
Talus Added 100 80 69 58 1»9
Marginal Cost I DO 70 72 61 55
aHo<tei The Coets of transport and distribution are exeluded.
Courcet C,F, Prattenf Op, cit*, P, 92
Table 7•& demonstrates the main relationships between oosts and soale vA)ifrs
PLrespect \o labour and fixed investnent in the United States and Western 
Germany, The eoonomies of scale achieved are reflected in the Inverse rela­
tionship between the unit costs per ton and production capacity. In the oase
of Britain (Table f m h ) the figures for average total costs underline precisely
25the sane relationship. These statlstlosf whatever thpir defeots, bring heme
the important message that the manufacture of cement oomfoxms with the
2l*. In part9 the substantial difference between the U,S. and German estimtes 
of oapital oosts is aoooumted for by the exclusion from the German data certain 
cost items - land and land clearingy opening up of the quarxy9 power generating 
equipment and the like. These are included in the U,S, figures. Relative 
price differentials in the two oountries might be another explanatory faster,
25* C,P, Frwtten (Op,oit«P,92) based the Tables7*3 and 7»1* upon his findings 
from firms im the industry and an earlier study published by the United Nations 
which was not quoted in detail.
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micro-economic theory of decreasing unit costs as capacity inore&ses until 
an econonic optimum scale is attained.
As shown in Table 7*3 the major sources of eoonomies of soale are capital 
oosts and direct labour inputs. There axe also sone economies to be derived 
from utilities amd feeditook.
With respeot to oapital costs9 the eoomomies of soale stem from the 
operation of a simple rule of thumb that is used by engineers to relate fixed
oapital oosts to soale aad this principle is operable in respeot of eoment
2dproduction. This is tho 0,6 rule, Tho exponent varies for different types
of plants and over the range of sises of individual types of plant. However,
because of tho defects of tho 0,6 rule, the orities (Woodier and Woolooek)
argue that a bettor of tho eoonomies of scale emanating from oapital
oosts oould be obtained if oapital oosts were split into throe, estimated
separately and weighted before establishing a general rule.
These aret (i) items of equipment e,g, the control room, the total eosto of
which are the same whatever the sise of plant or are hardly affected by
scale. Another example of expenditure falling into this group is design
ohargos, although In practice the oost of designing a large plant nay be greater
than for a small one but hardly so proportionately, (Exponent - say 0,0 - 0,U)|
(ii) items of plant (suoh as columns, vessels, pipe work or heat exehamgers)
whioh oan bo made bigger or smaller as reguired and for which tho number is
therefore independent of plant mize, (Exponent,say O.U - 0,8),
26, C.F, Prattem, Ibid, P, U1* The 0,6 rule states that if capacity is 
multiplied by a faetor X, the oapital oost is multiplied by * 0.6 . -
X  •  A .D o
Woodier and J.W, Woolcook in a paper on the 0.6 rule (European Chemical lows, 
Supplement 10 Sept., 1965, P* 7; have drawn attention to the danger inherent on 
relying on such a rule. They argue that a breakdown of oapital costa into 
categories to bo assessed separately would give a bettor estimate of total 
oosts than the so-ealled rule of thumb, /
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The assumption here of course is that the exponent applies over the range of
sizes of units of plant which are within the range of sizes normally built; o a l
(iii) items of plant for which costs are nearly proportional to scale* ▲
good example of this type of plant is the fumaee section of a large unit*
Technical problems limit the size of individual cracking fumanoes and as a
result, a large plant has many furnaces* (Exponent between 0*8 and 1*0)*
Direot labour, supervision and overhead costs are other souroes of soale
economies* It is a well-known fact that, on purely technical grounds, it is
not often neoessaxy to have more operating personnel for a large plant, though
in practice unions would insist on this* Even so the index of wages and
salaries in relation to soale, as shown in table 7*U is fairly typical of
oement industry* It is even so in Central Vest Africa ms the technique of
production, even when factor costs would have dictated otherwise, is very
similar* Table 7*5 below highlights this point* Though the level of
sophistication of manufacturing in the U«S* relative to West Afrioa hardly
provides a very strong foundation for comparison, . the table brings out
the relevant point at issue* It is simply that industries which are oapital
intensive in DCs tend to operate, with slight modifications, along similar
lines in LDCs, if only because the same company or its subsidiary nay be
27directly or indirectly involved in the operations in the two regions*
27* For example, the principal shareholders of the Vest Afrioan Portland 
cement Co* are the Blue Circle Group of the TT*K*f whilst the Tunnell Portland 
Cement (UK) is a shareholder in the Nigerian Cement Co* at Nkalagu (Eastern 
Nigeria* )

Certainly, the employment figures of the Vest African cenent plants are 
generally comparable to those of their sise in the US, except in the ease of 
landlooked, semi-desert Niger, where human transport and remoteness might 
explain, in part, the relatively high labour intensity* Ironically, the two 
plants in Ivory Coast are by fax more capital intensive than their U? opposite 
number*
Finally, economies of seals could be reaped from feedstock raw-m&terlals 
and utilities (eleotrlolty and water)* In general, the sise of purchases of 
these inputs may determine or, at least, affect the prices paid by the consumer
(111) THB STRUCTURE 0 COSTS 
Again, the structure of costs in cement production cam be more clearly 
illustrated with the U*K* case ^ for which detailed data are readily available*
TABU 7.6
AT»r«fi» .tes P-tSf.. r *  **
• Average Costs , per ton
As % sf 
, Total Costs
i (Per oeat)
Kiln fuel and Electric Power 1.1*5 25
Wages and Salaries 0.65 11
Maintenance Materials 0.1(8 8
Vorks Overheads 0.3U 6
Depreciation 0.30 5
Interest at 10^ on Capital Employed 0.70 12
Other Costs (lndludimg raw Materials) 0.58 10
Delivery (Transport) Expenses 1.01 17
Sales Expenses and Containers 6 0.1(0 7
5.90 100
Source t C* T * Prattem, on* clt* P* 90
a r a .  7,7
AVERAGE INPUT COSTS OF CBMSMT MANUFACTURE IK 
LANDLOCKED AREAS OF CENTRAL-VBST AFRICA
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Country Capacity Direct Materials ' Fuel and Power Labour
of
Plant Cost Per ton(|)
As % of
total
Costs
Cost ner 
tom(jO
As % of
total
costs
Coat par
to*(«
As % of
total
costs
Niger 30,000 1*60 U.1 17.20 1*5.8 U.70 12*5
Upper
Volta 60,000 1.60 5.3 11.50 37.1* U.60 15.2
Sourcei B*C*A*, Prospects of the Cement Industry in West Africa, July, 196U,p*36.
Here we are mainly concerned with certain items of cost which are of
immediate interest to our investigation* These are two, both clearly noticeable
from TableS7«6 and 7*7* The first relates to the relatively small share of
raw material costs (exoludlng fuel) in total* In Britain, this phenomenon is
explicable by the fact that the main raw materials used in the production of
cement, chalk or limestone and clay, are obtained on the site at most works*
The same is not true of most of the works in West Africa, although, as Table 7*7
shows, the landlooked states of Niger and U^per Volta conform to this paAtaxm*
Some qualification, however, has to be made here* Cost analysis in Niger and
Upper Volta assumed the local availability of raw materials* For the former
this assumption has worked (Table 7*7) but with respect to the latter, where
production is still at the planning stage^not much can be said* The limestone
deposits at Diouri in the north-eastern part of Upper Volta are not easily
accessible whilst the deposits of the Boho Uioulasso area have been found to be
28uaoultabla for c e m e n t maaufaotuxo._________________________________________
28* See S*C*A*, A Development Programme for the West African Cement Industry,
S/<aU1l|/lHB/t17/Add.1, 1966, P. 1*6
Thus the low figure for raw material costs in Upper Tolta is yet a piece of 
paper work*
The Ghanaian and Ivorian plants inport their raw materials and components 
from Europe| hence these items are more likely to form a bigger share of total 
costs than would otherwise be the oase if raw materials were locally available* 
Generally 1*6 tens of limestone and 0*3 ton of clay are required per ton of 
cement* The transport problem and costs involved in the movement of such bulky 
materials is of considerable importance9 which is why cement is essentially 
a resource— 'tied product* la the absence of local supplies of raw materials 
four out of the five plants (Table 7*2) in the area are located very near the 
Coast to reduoe both the transport costs of raw materials and the cost of 
distributing the final product since the major consumption points (cities) in 
this region are not very far fron the coast*
Although, in terms of pure location theory, cement should be passed as a 
resource-based industry, the share of distribution to total production oosts is 
quite considerable (Table 7*6)* Indeed, both elements of transport oosts exert 
considerable influence on the unit price of the final product* The import prices 
of clinker ground in the region vary according to the general acononic situation, 
conditions and the sources of supplies! the average o*l*f* price varying 
between a low of J(12 and a high of ^15 per ton?^ Of this transport costs
account for ffU per ton, though variable according to origin* As clinker is
2 3 . Ghana seens to be the exoeptlon* Because a Norwegian cement - manufacturing 
group has an interest in the factories at Tena and Takoradi, the clinker reached 
the Ghanaian works at $10 a ton* Despite this Ghana's ex-werke price ($27*0 per
ton)is not cheaper than the Ivory Coast's price of $26*5 per ton* However,
dunping tendencies likely to have adverse effects on the price of cenent must
be kept in eheok* In 19<>7» Israel sold 121*,000 tons of eememt to Ghana at
#6.2 per ton (see E.I.U * A Associate, op*clt* Vol.II, P*l*39)«
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exempted from customs duty by countries which import it9 freight chargee must 
be the major contributory factor to the high ex-vorks prioe of oement in 
landlocked Niger (See Table 7*8) •
Unlike clinker, oement ie protected in GBCS* In Ghana, it is subject to 
duty at^35 * ton (about 30# of the c*i*f* prioe)* In the countries of the 
Entente, the total customs duties and labour dues UC# in the Ivory Coast, 
51# in Upper Yalta, 1*0# in Niger, 5W in Dahomey, 35# in Togo. The effects of 
these duties are refleeted in the prioe differentials both within and between 
the oountries shown in Table 5*9* But it is not duties that mere than 
deuble cement prices in Niger| it is freight charges*
TABU 7.8
CBMSKT PRICES IN CETOUL-WBST AFRICA
p b l S e
Ivory Coast, Abidjan Sx-werks *26.5
Whele-sale local cement *28.6
" " imported " *30.0
Upper Volta, at Bebo-Dioulasso e w e  » *58.0
Niger Ex-works, Malbaza *56.0
Niamey wholesale (leoal or Imported) *66.0
Zinder s e e *62.0
Dahomey Wholesale *33.1*
Togo Wholesale *32.5
Ghana Sx-werks *27.0
Seuroet 1*1 *U* * Associate, (▼•!* n ,  P. 1*39)
According to the United Nations Xeonemie Commission for Africa,to 
transport a ton of sonont fren the pert of Cotonou (Dahomey) to Niamey (Niger), 
a distance of some 1,000 km (625 miles) the freight charges are mere than twice 
the e*l*f* price of the cemmedity at Ceteneu* The prices noted in the above
table bear eloquent testimony to this point*
The reasons why the transportation and handling of imported cement (both 
finished and in the form of raw materials) in the countries of Vest Africa axe 
so expensive axe net hard to find, especially in the land-leeked countries*
To start with, all the means ef transport have high freight rates* Maritime
transport, although the nest suitable for such a bulky material as cement,
becomes costly due to high terminal charges} the underlying cause being the 
inadequacy of port facilities* Coastal sea transport is expensive because ef 
the small volume ef coastal trade, and in any case this means ef transport is 
met available to land-locked countries*
All the important ports of the area (Abidjan, Tena, Takeradi, Lome and 
Cetomou) are linked to the interior by rail lines. But only the Abidjan lines 
cross a national frontier into Upper Yolta* Thus, unlike thelast African 
loenemic Cenmuhity members, there are no rail linkages connecting all the six 
countries* Such linkages would have rationalised transport and reduced eests* 
Bead transport, which is far mere expensive (Table 7*1) than rail transport, is 
the most widespread means ef distributing cement* River transport, though 
slower than read and rail truffle, is comparatively cheaper and promises to be 
an inpertamt means ef transport in the future* Even so, until substantial 
progress has been made towards the inoroase ef the navigable lengths ef the 
rivers ef the region, this will remain a pious hope*
•  3 61* -
30. UNECA, Ou.Cit*. P. 32.
It fellows from the foregoing that traitepert costs are an important factor 
influencing net only the unit prioe Vat alee the leeatiem and else ef oenent works* 
The eeeend inpertant ceet elenent in oenent production concerns the ratio 
ef fuel and eleotrieity costs to total costs. Tables 7*6 **d 7*7 shew that fuel 
and peuer inputs represent a substantial share ef aggregate operating costs in 
the naaufacture ef eenent. But it nay be that Table 7*7 exaggerates this point 
on two main grounds. First, the fuel and power supplies in the landlocked 
countries ef Vest Africa are net Tory typical ef the general supplies in the 
region. Certainly, pewer and fuel supplies in Ghana and the Ivory Coast hare
always been better, both in terns ef relume and price, than either in Upper
11Yalta or Vigor. J Secondly, the BCA study on which the Table is baaed was nade 
in the early sixties and therefore seens to be largely out ef date. Table 7*6, 
although dealing with UK, seens to be much no re lndi entire ef the share ef fuel 
and pewer in production costs. He were r, the cardinal point still remains that
the pewer and fuel input oe-efficlents ef costs in oenent production are high.
12The oest ef fuel is by far the najer item in the component^ and appears
to account for erer two tines the cost ef power. But we oenslder pewer tariffs
first. A Table ef oenparable eleotrieity tariffs is provided below.
31 • Table 7*9 gives a more up-to-date, comparative, electricity charges in the 
region. The average high prices in Niger and Upper Yalta confirm our impression 
that the two land-locked countries oeuld be treated as high-cost producers. 1
32. This is mainly due to the large quantities ef fuel required. Generally 
200-250 kg ef oeal and 250-300 kg ef ell are projected per ten ef oenent 
produced. A breakdown ef fuel consumption prices on inter-country basis is net 
readily available.
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COMPiBATIYE TABLE OF ELECTRICITY TARIFFS* - HIGH TSHSIOH - 1967
Ivory
Coast
Upper
Telia Ii*»g BsjaagSasp Ghana
fixed annual charges 
per KWh in $ 11.9 11.5 11*. 1 28.8 18.8 7.2
Proportional tax per KWh 1.56 5.1
Used* in cents per KWh 3.56 7.53 9.1* 5.1* 5.6 1*6
Average price per KWh* Including 
fixed charges and proportional tax 
in oents per KWh U.13 8.0 9.2 7.2 6.8 2.1
Votes a m charges here apply to industrial uses* 
Sources S*I*U* and Associate, Qp.oit* (Vol. I|f.l5).
The relative cheapness of power in Ghana (Table7*9) is easily under­
standable* The Akosambo Dam Project, opened late 1965 with four generators 
able to produce a total of 512*000 kilo-vatts, supplies electricity to 
industries at one of the cheapest rates in the world* With the coming into
operation of this project the total amount of installed oapaeity in the country
33trebled* thus creating excess capacity.
Ivory Coast* too* is meeting its power problem* In recent years* consump­
tion of electricity has grown rapidly at about 30# per annum* Tet production 
is fairly keeping pace with demand* although prioes are not as cheap as in 
Ghana* Apart from a sharp rise in total production from 276*000 kilowatt-hours
33* The main economic justification of the Volta River Project (VRP) had been 
the existence of the Volta Aluminium Company Smelter at Tama* In fast* the two 
projects were inter-linked right from the planning stages and to-day they are 
inter-dependent* for without power from the Dam* the Smelter cannot operate* 
and without the Smelter* the Dam cannot pay its way* Current power purchases 
by the Volta Aluminium Company Smelter (VALCO) amount to over 200*000 KW and 
this is expected to increase to 300,000 KW by the end of 1972* To meet this and 
the extension of power supplies to parts of Togo and Dahomey* plans are under 
way to expand the Akosonbo Power plants generating oapaeity from U units of
in 1966 to 372,000 kilowatt-hours in 1968, outstripping demand, an extensive 
hydroelectrie project - consisting of & large dam, power station and distribution 
system on the Bandama River near Kossou (Northeast of Bouafle) - was initiated 
In 1969.314
In tipper Volta and Niger - the Soeiete Africaine d'Electricite (SAFELBC) 
under its charter of 1961* - has the responsibility for the production and distri­
bution of eleotrieity* Again, the high average prices for the two countries have 
their roots in high input costs, especially for transport (Table7*9)* The state- 
owned Compagnie d'Energie SLeotrique du Togo (C*E*S*T*) has the monopoly of power 
supply in Togo, whilst production and distribution of eleotrioity are the respon­
sibility of the Compagnie Centrals de Distribution d'Energie ELectrique (CCDE).
Generally, except in Ghana, the cost of eleotrieity is still very high* It 
is even prohibitive in four of the five countries of the Entente (ivory Cost 
excepted) for medium-sise eleotrioity consuming industries* And an improvement 
in tariff rates appears difficult in the countries of the interior* On the other 
hand, Togo and Dahomey would be able to benefit from Ghanaian supplies with more
aeceptable prices* The prospects that the former would buy eleotrioity from
35Ghana are, indeed, good at the moment, and this will render the Volta Dam 
Project more viable*
512 M*V* to 6 units of 768 M*V* (See C»B.S** Economic Survey. 1969. >.8o).
Thus at its maximum level the VRP's generating capacity would be equivalent to 
about 80# of Nigeria's Kainji Dam Project of 960 M*V*
3U* See IMF, Op. cit** P*2£0* One Company, Bhergie ELectrique de la Cote 
d'lvorle, has the monopoly and distribution in Ivory Coast*
35* The Volta River Authority (VRA) - a statutory body invested with the full 
powers to generate and distribute eleotrioity in Ghana from the Dam - has 
received a loan of ^1*75 million to cover the cost of constructing 180 miles 
transmission line to the Republics of Togo and Dahomey, and its related engine­
ering services, as a result of agreements reached in August, 1969 between the 
Volta River Authority and the Governments of the two RepubliOB for the supply of 
eleotrioity (CBS, op.olt.* P*80* 1969)* TEA will construct a 161,000 Volt 
transmission line up to Togo border and will hand the supply over to the
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Turning nev to the costs of hydrocarbon* the picture is even nere serious* 
Only two (Ghana and Ivory Coast) ef the six countries have their exn refineries* 
Of the ether four one (Upper Volta) gets its supplies ef refined petroleum from 
Ivory Coast while the others import their oil from outside the region*
Ironically* the Ghanaian refinery at Toma operates at 60# ef oapaeity* This 
anomalous mituatiom is likely to oontinue as long as the large margin of unused 
capacity (1*0#) remains untapped* The Abidjan refinery already operates at full 
oapaoity and cannot any longer meet the expanding needs ef Upper Volta which 
it had been supplying* And because ef transport oosts* especially given the
inability to import from nearer source s* current prices in Upper Volta and
36Niger are naturally higher than in the other countries of the region.
Of course, it must be equally noted that prices in Ghana are markedly 
lower than those in the Ivory Coast, Togo, and Dahomey* For petrel, kerosene 
and gas, i: primes are slightly lower in I very Coast than in Togo and 
Dahomey, if only because transit fees are collected in the latter countries 
by the storage companies.
On the whole, the problem ef power and fuel supply viewed from regional
integration standpoint could eventually provide an opportunity for a reduction
in tariffs for industrial uses, if the existing capacities could be adapted te
the needs, and fully utilised by the countries, of the region*
Communaute d'Electricite du Benin at that point* This suprapnatiemal 
authority will be responsible for transmitting the supply across Togo and 
Dahomey and handing over to the local distribution companies (See K*I*U* - S5DB8, 
op.Pit., T.l, 1, P. 27)
36* It is slgnlfleant to note that, at least as a temporary measure, the 
handicap cf high oil transport eosts has enmouraged the use of groundnut • shells 
as fuel, thereby making eemmerdial uee of a by-product hitherto considered 
commercially without value* But there are long-term planst toe* The possibility 
ef supplying all countries in the region from the two existing refineries is 
under consideration (l*I*U* SEDXS, Ibid, P* 29).
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To conolude this section, one or two words can be said about the labour
component of cost# Costa of production are sensitive to the labour component
of cost# But, as shown In Tables 7*3 and 7*7* labour input oost is a decreasing
function of the size of operation# In other terms, labour inputs per unit of 
output fall sharply as soale increases# A United Nations study on Vest Africa
gives a rough indication of production labour requirements as fallowst
M B L L J O
Annual capacity Number of workers
of plants fin tons) required per thousands tona
50,000 1,1* - 1.7
100.000 1.1 -  1#U
200.000 . 0#9 - 1.2
Sourest Studies in ficonomios of Industry, UN, 19&3.
The above Table (7.10) can really only serve as a rough guide# In the
Tinal analysis much will depend on the degree of mechanization and the
differences Among countries in wages, supply of skilled labour, organizational 
and industrial arrangements# The most that could be said i3 that, given the 
limited scope of labour-intensiVC formsof technology in oement industry which 
by implication in the Vest African oontext means the employment of a high 
proportion of skilled (to Unskilled) labour likely to be imported from high* 
labour-cost countries abroad, the ratio of labour component of cost to total 
remains not insubstantial#
Whatever happens, the growth in demand for cement will continue as 
demonstrated in Table 7.11. Cement is almost an indispensable material in
all types of construction activities* The reasons for this arc simple#
Because of its special function in feno-conorete conctSmction cement finds 
extensive utilization in a wide range of structure si from ordinary houses to
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m u l t i - B t o r e y  buildings* It resists chemical, vermin, weather and other 
similar attacks which undermine the durability of construction materials in 
general.^ Furthermore, it displays properties which makes its utilisation 
relatively more extensive than other structural materials such as steel and 
timber* It follows therefore that in a developing region where Industrialisa^- 
tion is top on the priority list extensive utilisation of cement in the 
construction of factories is to be expected* Indeed, the high rate of growth 
of cement consumption as observed in Table 7»11 tends to confirm the general 
notion that there must exist a close correlation between the rate of 
consumption of cement and the rate of economic expansion*
2.3 CHEMICAL FERTILISERS (l.S.I.C. 311)
(S.I.T.C 561)
(i) PRODUCTIOK PROCESSES 
The characteristics of the fertility of Vest African soils show that the 
organic matter content and exchange capacity of these soils are generally very 
low* As a remedial solution, fertiliser application would supply the missing 
nutrient requirements of plants in this region* Potasslc, nitrogenous and 
phosphorus fertilisers are mainly required to meet the solid deficlenoes*^
And the production of these fertilisers would, a priori, be much more protlfable 
on a regional framework*
37, See, 8CA, "A Development Programme for the Vest African Cement Industry",
3 August 1966, P.3U-U2*
38. EGA, Soil Fertility and Fertilisers in Vest Africa, B/CN. 1i*/m/70/Rev. 1.
The manufacture of fertilisers in Central Vest Africa is yet^ lfce very early
stage. So far only one factory has been built at Abidjan (ivory Coast)) a
second fertiliser factory at Koeme (Togo) is still in the planning stage. The
construction of the Abidjan plant vas reported in 1968 (investment 1,500 million
francs C7A) and the plant was expected to go into production in 1970.^
In the first stage, the Ivory Coast factory will produce!-(a) ammonium
sulphate from liquid ammonia and sulphuric acid, the latter being produced
on the spot with imported sulphur) (b) single superphosphate from natural
phosphate from Togo and sulphuric acid) and (c) binary and ternary fertilisers
from the plant's own or imported simple fertilisers. The projected production
capacity during the first phase comprises 20,000 tons of ammonium sulphate,
12,000 tons of single superhate, and 30,000 tons of binary and tptnary
compounds.^® Veighed against the Ivorian total consumption of 53fOOO tons in
1970/71 (Table 7*12), the factory cannot cover all the needs of the domestic
market and it will still be necessary to import some fertilisers to be used
unprocessed. It therefore follows that the Ivorian factory will not apparently
compete with the project planned in Togo which is intended primarily for the
production of triple superphosphate for export outside the region.
(ii) THB DIMENSIONS 07 SCALE
The output of particular produots over time, the size of plants and the
size of firms are generally the most important dimensions of scale for purpose
of achieving economies of scale in fertiliser manufacture
39* EC A, Summaries of Economic Datai Ivory Coast. 1970. P. 10.
1+0. E.I.TJ. and’■p SEDBS, on.oit. P. 1*08 (Vol. 11).
1*1. C.F. Pratten, On. olt. P. 1*0
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Furthermore, scale economies could be enchanced by grouping plants together to 
use common services and facilities and by linking the production of various 
chemicals in one plant to avoid the duplication of equipment.
Because different Vest African plants and soils, as noted above, require 
different fertilisers manufacturing plants must be designed to adapt easily 
to the needs of the market in order to keep pace with the foreseeable changes 
in the fertiliser formulas appropriate to each orop or soil. For instance, 
single superphosphate is only used for groundnuts and only in the dry savannah 
area where it helps to remedy the lack of sulphur. Triple superphosphate is 
almost exclusively used for palm-trees and, similarly, ammonium phosphate is 
the main component of binary HP mixture widely used for cotton orops - to 
mention a few (HUT and SHDES, Yol,11, P,1*11), Thus, to fully exploit the 
economies of soale long-term output capacity of each product has to be 
expanded - involving the expansion of the size of plants or firms or both.
In the particular circumstansoes of Vest Africa the pattern and direction 
of expansion would be dictated by the structure of future demand. Table 7*12 
depicts the future trend in demand. It can be seen that the consumption of
h2 *different types of fertilisers var^ between different countries due to 
differing soil conditions; and that the scope for eoonomies of large scale 
production is good. Total present consumption level will more than double 
over the next five years and will quadruple by 1980, This shows a remarkable 
growth - indeed an admirable take-off in the use of fertiliser in central 
Vest Africa,
1*2. H m Nitrogenous; P. 205 » Phosphatic; K^O = Potassic,
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However, * a caveat must be entered here* The projected figures in Table 
7.12 are based on the hypothesis that oflloial fertiliser campaigns strongly 
supported by incentives and practical field demonstrations through extension 
services will persuade local farmers to increase their consumption of 
fertilisers* If there is no aotivfc fertiliser policy on a national soals, the 
projected future trend in consumption migit be reversed* In such circumstances, 
the operational fertiliser plants in the region might be unable to attain 
scale economies through full?»capacity utilization*
(ill) THB STRUCTURE OF COSTS 
Generally, the most important features of the struoture of costs for 
ohemioal industry of which fertiliser is a part arei- (a) direct labour costs,
(b) research and development expenditure; (o) selling and marketing oostsf and 
(d) transport costs* We shall now consider the extent to which these costs 
apply in the manufacture of fertilisers with particular reference to Vest Africa* 
The coet of direct production labour comprises! net salaries paid to 
workers| required social payments| and all other benefits, such as salaries in 
kind, housing, or meals* As in oement manufacture (Tables 7*3» 7*7 and 7*10), 
labour input cost is a decreasing function of the size of operation* However, 
the share of direct production labour in total production costs in the 
manufacture of fertilisers in the region depends not only on the size of plants 
but also on the types of workers and the processes in which they are engaged 
and on whether they are imported or locally reoruited* There are a number of
aslabour intensive activities in fertiliser production such^testing and packaging 
operations. To the extent that a chosen technical feasibility co-efficient 
permits, the utilization of cheap labour might further lower unit costs*
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expenditure on research and development is not expected in the immediate 
future to form a substantial part of fertiliser production costa in Central 
Vest Africa*^ This is mainly because it has been historically easier and 
oheaper for countries in their early stages of development to borrow advanced 
technology from the more advanced countries, though the adaptation of imported 
technology to suit African conditions may require some research*
The case of selling and marketing, whose costs are also quite varlablf, 
presents a different picture* Because the expansion of fertiliser consumption 
within CES depdnds largely on the success of a massive population oampaign 
outlay on selling and marketing of this commodity would be fulte considerable* 
Both the state and the fertiliser producers will find sufficient scope for 
Important contribution to this sales campaign*^
Official bodies or agenoies could concentrate on researoh on soil
fertility and fertilisers - designed to increase land under cultivation - and
extension services* Also a price subsidisation scheme for fertilisers is
probably the most efficient method in the hands of the government to increase
tfeels type* Happily enough, various forms of subsidy already exist in certain
parts of the area, especially for cash orops* Cotton cultivation in the Ivory
Coast as well as cotton and groundnut production in Niger benefit* from large
subsidies under the BDP production assistance programme* The Ghana government
1*3* Even in TIN, where I.C*I alone invested 30 million annually during the 
mid-sixties in researoh and development, total expenditure on research and 
development in relative terms is quite small* Por the UK ohemloal industry 
as a whole, research and development expenditure represented only 2*<96 of 
sales in 1968 and no more than of the value added by the industry (see 
C.F. Prattan, Op.cit.. p. 1*1)
has very recently established a subsidy amounting to 60# of the fertiliser 
purchase prioe#
Private fertiliser producers on their part will be concerned mainly with 
publlolty and the basic organisation of fertiliser supply to the farmers#
Viewed against the background of the underdeveloped state of transport and 
credit f&ollltles in the region fertiliser distribution could be all the more 
an expensive operation# Apart from publicity and advertising oosts9 producers 
render some services to their customers# Private firms can provide experiment* 
atlon and demonstration courses for farmers and they can develop new markets 
for their products# Sales could sometimes be organised on a credit basis# And, 
where a public agency cannot set up a revolving purchasing fund to encourage 
consumption by small farmers, firms could st^in to offer such a service.
I /
Thus, in general, marketing overhead is a vital portion of production cost#
Finally, ve come to the most important cost item of all**transport#
Transport oosts of course vary, not only with the varying properties of
fertiliser products but also with the geopraphlc distribution of markets#
UU# Here, as in other branches of eoonomic activity in LDCs, the dividing line 
between the role of the state and that of the individual producer firm is blurred# 
In advanced capitalist countries, the state is unlikely to be involved under 
normal circumstances in a sales campaign for the product of a particular private 
produoer# But because of the obvious weaknesses of the sooio*eoonomic infras­
tructure in LDCs the Soheumpeterian model does not fitj instead we find the 
state Intervening from time to time as the agent of development and progress 
(see H#C# Wallich, "Some Notes Towards a Theory of Derived Development" in A#N# 
Agarwala, et al, (eds.), The Xconomios of Underdevelopment# OUP, 19&3, F#189)«
U5. EIU and SKDES, Oe.clt. Vol. II, FP. h02 * 1*05
1*6# In Latin Amerloa the average share of marketing overhead of chemical
fertilisers is about 23# of production oost (M# Camoy, Qp.oit# PmM).
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Like cement, fertiliser prices are markedly lower in the coastal ports than 
in the landlooked areas mainly because of the cost of transport* In 1968, the 
prioe of imported ammonium sulphate was #52 a ton o*l*f* at the coastal ports 
but #80 a ton in Upper Yolta, #100 to #11*0 a ton in Niger* Ironically enough, 
the savanna countries with their poorer soils need more fertilisers than the 
coastal areas* Consequently, fertiliser consumption on anything approaching 
the expeoted level requires government subsidies in these savanna sones*
Indeed, it could be said without exaggeration that trade possibilities in 
fertiliser products within the cenSvqL*west area of Africa hinges on transport 
improvement* Consider this* freight from Abidjan to Aocra, Lome and Cotonou 
oosts the same - about *12 a ton but the cost of transport from the same point 
by rail as far as Ouagadougou and then by lorry to Niamey (Niger) amounts to 
#80* This high cost results from the expenses and formalities of transit 
through Upper Yolta* $y lorry, the same transport costs could be reduced to
I ry ,
#60 a ton* If one takes into account the fact that the operational ex-factory
price of fertilisers at the Abidjan Jlant is estimated at between #1*8 and #52
for simple fertilisers and between #72 and #92 a ton for compound fertilisers^®
then it is difficult to mee how the Abidjan factory could compete on an even
keel with imports* Sven so, the coastal countries in the east of the Region
oould be supplied from Abidjan only if a partial equalisation of ex-factory
prices was made together with a reduction of freight cost which could result
from the creation of a coastal tramp shipping service*
8ITT end SBPES. Qp.clt. P. 1*10
1*8. Ibid.
However| tine appears to be on the side of intra-regional production
of fertilisers* As we have demonstrated in Table 7*12, the future trend in
oomsunption is very pronisingi and increase! attention is being directed
to the construction or improvement of aix international road iihks affecting
k 9the Entente states and Ghana, especially the one along the coast between 
Abidjan and Ghana* The expected upswing in future demand coupled with further 
transport development would not only permit large scale production but faster 
and cheaper transportation! all leading to lower transport costs per unit of 
output* Furthermore, given the prospect of intra-regional tariff outs on 
intra-regionally traded commodities, fertiliser production within the area 
would prove reasonably competitive*
2.u AMD 3KDK IMDPSTRY (i.S.I.C. 291)
Among the industrial products which could benefit from a trade liberali­
sation scheme within GJSCS is footwear* For one thing, shoe manufacture
responds to the economies of scale* The most important dimensions of scale
50are the length of production runs and labour productivity*
The primary market for goods produced by the leather and shoe industry
is in the form of footwear* OtherS,, such as travel goods and garments, have
at present a very limited market in West Africa* For that reason, this
discussion in confined to footwear*
See SCA, Report of the Second Meeting of the Technical Committee of 
Experts, Tunis, February, 1971 (l/CH*1l|/5l2-13), paragraph 1$3t Indeed, the 
Abidjan plant needs other Entente and Ghana fertiliser markets to operate from 
the starx at 80 or 9<9& of its oapaeity (SIU and SEDES, op, oit** P. M3)*
50* C*A* Pratten, o p, oit. P* 21*6*
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Presently, footwear consumers in the region are res trio ted to only a 
small segment of the population. Indigenous people outside the cities and
outside the money eoonomy either do not wear shoes regularly or they use home
sandals* On the other end of the inoome scale, resident Europeans and other 
foreigners time their footwear purchases to coincide with travel to their 
home country* This virtually leaves the comparatively small group of indigenous 
wage earners and urban residents as the major market for foot-wear.
Data on current consumption of footwear are shown in Table 7*13* It is
evident from the Table that the exchange of shoes within the tone corresponded 
to only 10# of their total consumption whilst imports from outside the Sntente 
accounted for one-third* Local production is mainly concentrated* Of the 
6,1*32,000 pairs consumed in 1967 the Ivory Coast produced slightly over $1# 
locally, most of which came from its BATA Company at Abidjan.
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IK PAIRS IVORYCOAST
UPPER
YOLTA
1 ♦ 
NIGER DAHOMEY TOGO
1
ENTENTE
LOCAL PRODUCTION 3,1*50,000 - 200,000 m - 3,650,000
IMPORTS WITHIN ENT* - 11*6,000 200,000 127,000 7U,000 51*7,000
IMPORTS PROM 
OUTSIDE ENTENTE 1,153,000 122,000 518,000 80,000 362,000 2,,35,ooo
TOTAL CONSUMPTION 1*, 603,000 268,000 918,000 207,000 U36.000 6,1+32,000
Sources Bulletin !!>e L'Afrique Noire, No. H 4 ,1970).
The increasing monetisation of the Efatente economies has demonstrated 
itself in many ways* The increase in demand for shoes is one* In response, 
production is growing too* 5y 1968 new shoe * factories had been builtj the 
SONIPL& at Niamey (Niger) (Capacityt 360,000 pairs^ ) and the plastic plant of 
Upper Volta (MPHV) at Bobo-Eioulasso (Capacity! 80,000 pairs a month)*
Domestic consumption in the Ivory Coast alone had shot up to 6 million in 
1970, with domestic production accounting for 70$ ^
In Ghana the supply of footwear has maintained a steady upward trend*
In fact, the output of shoes has more than doubled in two years* In 1967 
the value of gross output of shoes was U/1*8 million but by 1969 it had 
rocketed to UjQ+O million.^2
A study of the trends in demand and supply of footwear in West Africa has 
been made* Based on a set of assumptions regarding increases in per capita 
income, population growth and expected decreases in the unit price of shoes 
due to increases in the amount and efficiency of domestic production, the study 
made market projections for 1975 and 1980* The results are tabulated below 
(Table 7«1U)» The projections assumed a per oapita income growth of approximate'
2% per annum, on top of a projected growth rate in population of nearly &  per 
annum* It was assumed that Increased domestic production would continue to 
reflect itself in lower per-unit prices for shoes, which would - in turn - 
enable more of the low-inoome population outside the wage-eamer group to 
become purchasers of commercially produced footwear*
5t« See Marches Tropicaux Et Mediterraneans, "ivory Coast, 19&-19701 Ten years o\ 
Economic and Social Development", No.1355, 30 Oct* 19719 P*73 (SPEcial English 
Edition).
52* Government Printer, One Year Development Plant* 1970-719 Aosra, 1970*
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53. ®CA, Rfgqrt 911 Stqfly
Industry in West Africa to 1?80, 1%
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The overall average growth rate derived from the three variables noted above 
la 1% per year* Hates vary from a low rate of 1$  for the relatively low per 
capita Income countries (such as Niger and Upper Yolta) with no significant 
domestic footwear production to a high rate of 9# for the relatively rich 
countries (like Ghana and Ivory Coast) with high per capita income and well- 
established domestic production of footwear*
The utilisation of the data yielded by the EGA projections may be liable 
to some qualifications, nevertheless - until more recent data are available 
to permit new estimates - they generate useful indicative material for our 
purpose and would be utilised in our later calculations*
TABLE 7.11*
'•T* v • ' '• '_ > PROJECTED MARKETS FOR IN CENTRAL WEST AJRICA
UP TO 1980 (In '000 Pat**S/ •
1967 (Actual) 22 SI m . M
TO £1 REGION
Production Capacityt 1*»500 80 360 y - 2,500 7,1*1*0
Consumptiont U.603 268 918 207 1*36 1*,000 10,1*32
Bxtra-Regional Imports t 1 >103 122 518 80 362 1,500 3,685
1976 (Estimated)
Consumption! 8,000 2,1*00 1,600 1*70 1*50 5,l*oo 18,320
1980 (Estimated)
Consumption! 10,000 3,600 2,10 0 700 600 7,200 21*, 200
Source»* BCA, Report on Prefeaalblllty Study of an Stranded lather and
Shoe Industry in  Wast Africa to 1960. 1966. 1/CK.11*/INR/H*0.FP. 17 
and 25 and Bulletin De L'Afrique Noire, No.586 (1970)
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In discussing market trends in the footwear industry in the area, a condi- 
deration of the structure of prices deserves special attention. Any definitive 
statements relating to production costs, of course, must necessarily be linked to 
a specified product mix, designated location and time period, and an engineering 
study taking all these parameters into account. This is more so since the Tables 
above deal with aggregate output figures, without a disaggregation of the products 
according to types. Even so much wide differences as have often existed between 
the unit oosts of production in the ooastal areas vis-a-vis the savanna regions 
have been mitigated, in this instance, by the comparative advantage which the 
latter enjoys ever the former due to the availability of hide a and skins locally. 
However, aa a first approximation in obtaining a picture of the cost structure y 
the data In Table 7*15 have been derived.
TABL8 7.15
Pnlt Cost Structure la Footwear Motion In Central Vcet ATrlqi
Haw Materials 
Interest and depreciation 
Labour, Overhead, Profit 
Vholesala prioe
Wholesale Prioe
B«&t. .EftAy
60
Parcant
75
75
IS
80 100
Percent
Vholesala Price 
Distribution 
Markup Profit
80
U2
j l
61.5
32.3
6.2
100
Sourest EC A, Ibid. Estimates are based on Prices.
3SU
To obtain comparative figure* for the unit prices of inported footwear
caof the sinple type under consideration , calculations based on the data 
obtained from the BCA study have been made. The results are presented in 
Table 7*16.
TABLE 7*16
Country Customs Duties
m .
Wholetale
(to t l
Batail
M il
Dahoaey 28.6 1.29 1.37
Ghana 100.0* 2.00 2.08
Ivory Coast 28.0 1.28 1.36
ligsr 20.$ 1.21 1.71
Togo 28.0 1.28 1.36
Upper Volta 25.0 1.25 1.75
♦More recently, there have been frequent tariff changes in Ghana*
Sources Computations based on BCA data* The figures for tariff charges were 
extracted from IMF, Surveys of African Booaoniea, Vol*3» Qp*eit»
J&# Although shoe manufacturing plants do not usually limit themselves to one 
type of footwear, the bulk of products concerned here are chiefly sinple 
manufactures including plastic shoes,which are mostly consumed by the 
peasantry, hence their apparent cheapness*
The calculations presented in Table 7*16 assume an average import value of U.S. 
^1.00 o.i.f. per pair of shoes for the whole region^subject to differences 
in transportation or distribution costs and allowing for disparities in customs
duties. The price of U.S. M  .00 is based on an 3CA estimate covering the area
55under review. ^  The seemingly low price of this type of shoes depicts their 
low quality. As noted already, we are concerned Sot with sophisticated 
footwear but plain shoes consumed largely by the common man; and they could be
produced more easily and cheaply at home.
The first eolumn of Table 7 ^^6 shoving the tariff rates indicates that the 
tariff charges of the GSCS on this commodity fairly comparable, with the 
notable ezoeption of Ghana and Niger. Ghana’s tariff rate is about three and 
half times more than those of Dahomey, Ivory Coast and Togo, exactly four times 
more than that of Upper Tolta; and roughly five times more than that of Niger. 
Almost surrounded by the Entente low-tariff states, Ghana's high customs duty 
on this particular commodity demonstrates the degree of protection accorded to it.
The wholesale prices reflect the differences in tariff charges because 
in each ease the wholesale prioe incorporates the o.i.f. value of, and the 
tqjplff Imposed on, the commodity} henoe Ghana registers the highest wholesale 
prioe In all. Vlth respect to the retail prices, other cost elements enter
into the calculations. Markup profit is Included in all cases whilst trans­
portation costs are added in the case of the landlocked states of Niger and 
Upper Yolta. This differential treatment is based on the ^sumption that
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transportation is a Tory important element in determining the deliver*) prices 
of imports in the inland countries whilst in the coastal areas it can be largely 
ignored since the major distribution centres are mostly located near or along 
the coast. This assumption can be criticised on certain grounds, for instanoe, 
even in the coastal areas some consumption points/villages are very remote & oon 
the centres. Nevertheless, the assumption seems unavoidable where a set of as 
common distribution points has to be chosen for comparability purposes.
Evidently, the inter-country price variations in Table 7*16 are due 
primarily to differences in tariff charges and distribution costs. The latter 
mainly explains the relatively high retail price of U.S. #1.71 in Niger and 
of U.S. #1.75 in Upper Volta but the former is responsible in the case of Ghana. 
Juxtaposing Tables 7*15 and 7 ^ 6 1 it is easily seen that the prioe of imported 
footwear - whether at wholesale or retail - is higher than the locally produced 
counterpart, a factor which angurs well for the future expansion and d 
development of the industry.
Inter-country comparison of unit costs (Table 7*15) reveals roughly no 
divergencies because, as noted earlier, the landlooked countries (Niger and 
Upper Volta) have their own plants which are supplied with cheap hides and 
leather from local Sburoes. Also the plants in oonformlty with conventional 
location theory are located close to the centres of consumption since the final 
product gains weight.
As for the coastal areas of Ghana and Ivory Coast, better transport 
facilities and larger markets reduce delivered prices. To some degree, general 
transportation availability and relative closeness to the markets should remain 
the governing factors in considering the establishment of shoe factories.
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In the case of Togo and Dahomey, though, market si#e rather than trans­
portation seems to be the major consideration. The anticipated sise of the shoe 
markets in both countries does not appear to justify the establishment of 
nultiple-produot eoonomic factories in the near future. Of course>the price 
differential between the retail prioe of imported shoes (which is TJ.S. #1*37 
in Dahomey and U.S. • 36 in Togo) and the estimated retail price (of U.S. 
j£l.30) of the intra-GECS produots is only 7 cents and 6 cents in Dahomey and 
Togo respectively. Tet for large figures the gains from importing from intra­
union sources would be quite appreciable since full capacity utilisation is 
expected to reduce the unit cost of local products and widen the gap between 
local and import prloes. (For instance, a reduction of the local unit cost, 
by say 20 cents (i.e. ffcom US jft.30 to US jfl.10), through full capacity 
utilisation and consequent exploitation of economies of soale will for Dahomey 
and Togo imply savings of up to US jfl 89,000 and US 56,000 respectively by 
1980 (Table 7*11*)^  t Besides, lntra-zonal production has its other benefits. 
Evidently, it seems that it would be in the interest of the development of the 
region if these two countries were to get their supplies from their more 
viable heighbours within the framework of economic integration.
2.5 PETROLEUM REFINING (i.S.C. 321)
The development of the petroleum industry is a recent phenomenon in the 
entire West African sub-region. In as much as exploration, in some countries, 
has lasted for well over thirty years (for instance, in Nigeria since 1937)* 
the production of petroleum was first started in 1958 and up till now production 
of crude petroleum takes place only in Nigeria. But refineries have been
established la a number of countries*
But within the GECS, two refineries cane into operation by the end ef 1965*
One was built at Tema (Ghana) in 19&3l **** the other whioh went into operation
in August 1965 was built at Abidjan - Vridi (ivory Ceast)^* The Ivorian plant
operates at alnest full eapaolty (93# in 19&7s Table 7*17) but its total output
of refined produets has been outstripped by the velune of demand in the Entente*
It supplied 76# ef the oil needs ef the Entente States in 1967 but it has
tended to produce mainly for the expanding market of the Ivory Coast ever
slnoe* Consequently9 the Entente oountrles whioh had hitherto imported some of
their petrelun requirements from the Ivory Coast would now have to import more
oil from outside the ECS and less from within*
Unlike the Ivorian plant, the Ghanaian plant f&ees a different picture*
The latter used only 62# ef its oapaeity in 19^8* And as Table 7«17 shows
the growth of consumption in recent years has not been very spectacular* Thus,
there is a considerable margin of unutilised eapaolty that oeuld be exploited
in the event of in tra-zonal trade liberalisation*
To say that the growth of consumption in Ghana in recent years has been
relatively slow dees not mean that consumption in the region generally has not
shown steady upward trend* Imdeed9 growth has boon remarkable (Table 7*17)*
Petroleum eonsumptien is influenced by the particular clroumstanoes in a
country* Some can be mentioned here* The availability ef other souroes of
56* Outside the GECS area, oountrles like Nigeria, Senegal, Guinea, Liberia and 
Sierra Leene have built their own refineries*
57* The Tema plant is owned and managed by Ghanaian Italian Petroleum Co* Ltd*
(GHAIP) whilst the Abidjan « Vridi is owned and managed by agroup of 
petroleum companies under the name ef Ste Ivoirlenne de Raff inage (SIR)*
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energy affects the consumption level of each individual country* This, 
ironically, operates in two hut opposing directions* The availability of substi­
tute energy Bourses like natural gas reduces the demand for petroleum products 
(be it gasoline, kerosene, fuel eils, lubricants or asphalt)* But, on the other 
hand, power plants are heavy oonsumers of these preduete*
7.17
MABEKT TOR PBTROLZUM PRODUCTS* IN THE RSGIOH 
( m  '000 netrle tana)
IC 21 U  DA TO
1967 (Aetual)
Production Capacity 692 » • - «
Aetual Prcduotian 653 . - . -
Censunption JJ05 33 46 lti» 57
1970 (istimated)
Production Capacity 725 - . - -
Ccnaunptien 495 50 55
1975 (latiaated)
Ccnaunptien 694 70 77
1980 (Kstlmated) .
Production Capacity 1,400 . . . .
Ccncunption 1,000 120 120 11(0 130
80
112
75
1.250 
711* 
698
1.250 
764
1,650
1,430
1,9l»2
1,367
1,283
1,975
1,519
105 1,069 2,127
3,050
2,91(0
Scuxccst Extracted from (a) l.I.V. and SEDBS, Oc.cit. Tel. 1, PP. 127 “ 128 
(b) BCA, The Petroleun Industry in the V.et African Sub—ration, 
VCH.1li/IIIR/110| (o) Bulletin Be 1'Afrlque Voire, Bo.591 (March 18, 
1970)) and (d) larches Trspioaux st Mediterraneans, le.1355» 30
(October 1970, PP. 119 - 120).
♦Chiefly, these include, Gasoline, Keroslne, Fuel Oils, Lubricants and Asphalt.
Another important factor is that the demand for petroleum is inoone 
elasticity* The growth in personal income* especially among the high-income 
group increases the demand for private and transport vehicles which consume 
fuel* Similarly* the increasing modernisation of African economies has 
stimulated Investments in petrochemical industries* Again* petroleum products 
furnish part of their inputs* Taking these factors into consideration* the 
above Table assumed an average:'rate of growth of petroleum consumption of 
T% for the period IQTO-SO^*
The existing refineries are quite modern* They have been constructed 
for easy extension in anticipation of rising demand* As we have noted* the 
Ghanaian plant has an exoess capacity of the order of Output can therefore
be increased to that extent at little extra cost* Even in the Ivorian case 
where there is virtually no exoess capacity* an expansion programme had been 
launched* In 1972 new installations were being built with a view to raising the 
production potential of the plant from 725*000 to 1 *200*000 metric tons before
1976. 59
However* pending the completion of the expansion programme at the Abidjan
refinery* it follows from the foregoing that the Tema plant can play an
important role in fostering in tra-zonal trade in petroleum produets* The
extent to whioh Ghana can export these produets to the Entente Countries at
competitive prioes will depend primarily upon the comparability of its ex-factory
prices with those of the Ivory Coast. Below are comparative data on unit
ex-finery prices for petroleum products in the two countries*
58* EGA* E/CH.U4/IHR/HO* op.cit*. P.52. For the world as a whole, a smaller 
figure of %  is forecast over the same period* The estimate contains the 
usual bias due to the assumption of constant co-efficients*
59* Marches Tropioaux et Mediterranees* Op* cit** P* 120
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Unit Ex-refinery Cost of Petroleum Troducts* Valued at 1970
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TABLE 7*18
Average s<£«£. .22 Regular Kerosene paa Oil
Abidjan (irory 
Coast) 3U.1*3 1*2.29 37.89 36.31* 21.18
Tana (Ghana) 1*1.1*3 U7.U9 1*1.58 1*0.88 35.79
Extra Cost in Ghana 7.00 5.20 3.69 1».51* 11*.61
Notes The Abidjan prices are for the home (i*e* Entente) market only}
Export prices are somewhat lower (e*g* #39 for Super 95)•
Sources EfU and SKDES, Qp*oit** II, P. 513
The major obstacle which Ghana might face in taking over from the Ivory 
Coast as an important supplier of petroleum products is glaringly demonstrated 
above (Table 7*18)* The high production cost in Ghana is principally attribu­
table to two main factors* High input costs is one* While the Ivory do&st 
has besn importing the bulk of its crude oil from Gabon, Ghana until verj  
recently depended on the Soviet Union for its supplies of crude oil* The high 
ratio :Of freight charges meant an inflated unit cost of delivered crude oil*
The other, and perhaps more important, factor turns on low capacity utilisation 
which has obstructed the operation of economies of scale* It is therefore 
hoped that access to the Entente market would open the way to full-oapacity 
utilization which in turn would lower the unit cost*
A tentative estimate of the unit export prioe of the Ghanaian plant 
assuming full capacity utilization reveals considerable unit cost reductions* 
Detailed data are not immediately available but Table 7*19 epitomises this 
point for two refined products (Super and Regular)* The table shows the 
estimated FOB prices of petroleum products exported to various Entente countries 
from Ghana*
TABUS 7.19
Prioe Per Ton for Refined Petroleua Export■ 
<Sv« (<n ?|h t |f)
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TTooer Volta KUew y Toko
Super 38.5 - 39.0 39.0
Regular 36.0 37.0 37.5 37.5
Average 37.2 37.0 38.2 38.2
Sourest B.I.P. and SEDKS. Qp.olt.. P.5lli.
These prices would be coupe tit ire since they are comparable to the export
60base prices of the Ivorian plant whioh already operates at full-capacity*
They would also be attractive to Ghana's immediate Sntente neighbours thus
giving a practical impetus to the idea of integration* It should indeed be
possible for GHAIP to sell certain quantities to the Ivory Coast itself 9
although by 1975 the SIR expansion programme will have been completed* By this
timev of course , it is likely that GHAIP will be reaching its oapaeity limits
and in tumf Ghana could well Import from the Ivory toast*
On the basis of the prices shown above (Table 7*19)# the following volume
of exports to the Sntente from Ghana has been estimated* The following are
the results* TABLS 7*20
Pn— lhlis tamai C M  TP Potrol Saloo to the Entente 
Betweea 1970 - 75
snpro 95 
Quantity (tons)
Ex-refinery 
Talus (ff'000) 
o.i.f. Talus (I'OOO)
BIPOLAR
Quantity (tons)
Ex-re finery (jf'000) 
o.i.f. Talus (jf'000)
UPPER
TOMA n k k r DAHOMEY TOGO total
1,328 - 1»310 1,380 14,018
51 51 5U 156
93 - 66 61* 223
6,000 13,01*6 19,216 10,018 1*8,282
216 1*83 721 361 1,781
360 913 91*6 1*50 2,669
Sourest K.I.U. & SEDES, Ibid.
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In value terns, these suggested sliles amount to #1*9 million at 
ex-refinery and £2*9 million at c*6*f* prices, eaoh year* Viewed from the 
angle of their impact on border trade, these figures are impressive*
Of course, it can be pointed out that the Ghanaian prices (Table 7*19) are 
still relatively dearer than those of imports* As illustrated in Table 7*21, 
the average e*i*f* price of imported petroleum in Togo and Dahomey in 1970 was 
j*31#00 per ton* In Ivory Coast the figure was even higher at ^35*2 per ton) 
although average cost of crude oil was jfl9»8 FOB*^1 But, when account is taken 
of further cost reductions via economies of scale and exchange rate adjustments, 
Ghana could be expected to be competitive in the production of the commodity 
and would eventually displaced other extra-union producers*
asa.2t21
Average, Unit c*i*f* Price of Imported Petroleum 
Products (Valued at 1970 Prices)
Country o*i.f. 
in tJS *
(in ton)
Cuttons 
Duties
Delivered 
Prioea i
Dahomey 31 59# U9.3
Togo 31 5796 1*8.7
Ivory Coast 35.2 n.a n.a
Niger 36 - -
Upper Volta 36 u rn 52.6
Sources Computed from figures obtained from (i) E*I.U* and 
SEDES, On*oit* and(ii) Marches troplcaux, Op.clt.
60* See, E.I*U. and SEDES, Oo*clt* Vol*2, P. $11*. 
61* Marches Tropioaux et Mediterraneans*
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While, still exploring possible cost — reducing methods of production, a 
substantial reduction of the import tariff of the order of 5 W  which Ghana 
faces in the Entente market would go some way in reducing the de lire red 
prioes•
All told refining, if not very profitable y  has other beneficial 
aspect8 to the economies of the region* It creates linkages# The backward 
linkages may be limited beoause of low inpul? of local materials and factors 
but the forward linkage effects are quite strong# Refineries produce 
petroleum products whioh supply petro-ohemical industries# Aside from the 
saving of foreign exchange to whioh we shall return later, the multiplier 
effect of salaries end wages paid to local staff could make some positive 
oontribution to the domestic economy# This, of oourse, is bound to be small 
since the Ivorian plant employs only 150 people whose salaries amount to 
^31,000 annually - although Ghana employs more#
62
62# This may not be easy in a highly capital-intensive industry#
2.6 POTKHTIAL INDUSTEIKS F01L0WHFG UNION 
The foregoing discussion has been concerned primarily vlth some chosen 
existing industries upon which economic integration could be initially based.
But there are many more potential integration industries - old and new alike - 
which in order to produce efficiently would need larger markets than provided 
by the domestic markets in the individual GECS countries.
Until the early 1960sf when the attention of the governments of newly 
independent Vest African states turned increasingly to the development of 
heavy Industries» the small size of national markets, so long as industrial 
development was confined to light consumer goods industries# was not considered 
a major obstacle to progress. Vlth this shift in emphasis , planners and 
entrepreneursf as noted earlier, have had to faoe the problem of small national 
markets in relation to the optimum scale of operation of plants. Evidently, the 
establishment of some large-scale plants in different countries of the region 
has become a matter of prestige, and governments have sometimes offered 
incentives to investment in such enterprises in disregard of their countries* 
development priorities. This trend towards competitive development has
encouraged the proliferation of high-cost national plants sheltered by
63protective devices, especially in Ghana, Ivory Coast and Upper Yolta. Thus 
one of the aims of integration in the area would be not only to enable the 
members establish new large-soale plants following integration but also to 
ensure the rationalisation and mobilisation of the existing level of excess 
oapaeity through some form of agreed specialisation.
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TABLE 7.22
Co-operation between Ghana, Ivory Coast, Upper Yolta, 
Higer, Dahomey and Togo, Vols. 1 - 3 #  1970.
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In view of this we present in the euceeeding paragraphs a brief review of 
the more important projects which would provide scope for broadening the base 
of economic integration in the area (see Table 7*22).
(i) PAPER AND BOARD INDUSTRY 
Neither cellulose pulp nor paper is presently manufactured in the region. 
The only industrial activity dependent on this branch of business is the 
converting of inported paper and board for the manufacture of packaging.
Vith the exception of the Dahomean plant, all the paper conversion 
industries are Situated in Ivory Coast and Ghana. The largest Ghanaian 
enterprise ([*,000 tons) situated at Takoradi, has a more diversified
manufacturing ranges packaging oases and cardboard boxes, paper and polythene
6hbags, paper napkins and tissue paper • Ghana has other three smaller plants 
while Ivory Coast has three^each vlth a total capacity of 10,000 tons and 
could supply the entire needs of Ivory Coast and Upper Yolta. Surely, all 
cannot operate economically$ hence the different promoters should reach soae 
agreement between them.
On the other hand, the manufacture of paper from pulp and, more still, 
the production of pulp, would be of much greater economic uses The Ivory 
Coast has been trying for some years to promote a project in this sector by 
using the abundant raw materials provided by its forests. But the prof itTearn lag
61*. See B.I.U. Op . clt. Yol.3 P. 57
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eapaolty in this case would only appear at a very high level of production - in 
the region of 150,000 to 170,000 tone of pulp, which would be far in exoess of 
the total intra-GJBCS demand up to 1975^* It le, however, envisaged that, 
while supplying the raw material needs of the paper conversion plants, part 
of this will be retained for local paper manufacture*
(ii) TIRES FOR TVO-WHSELgD VEHICLES 
Ghana and Ivory Coast produce and supply medium and heavy tyres for oars 
and lorries to their home markets and they are jointly in a position to supply 
their entire GSCS market*
The picture with respeot to light bicycle and motorised bicycle tyres is 
different* The existing market for this commodity offers possibilities for 
the immediate launching of a production unit* The projected demand for the
produet in 1975 is of the order of 3*900,000 units (tyres and inner tubes)
66or 1,800 tons* Three-quarters of this is expected to be ooneumed in the 
Ivory Coast and Upper Volta, demand from these two countries being roughly the 
same; Ghana absorbs less than 1/5 and Togo, Dahomey and Niger, the small 
proportion remaining*
The high level of demand in Upper Yolta and Ivory Coast suggests that 
it would be economically wiser to locate the factory in either of them* But in 
the interest of balanced regional development it will be more advisable to 
locate the new industry in Upper Yolta since Ivory Coast qualifies for other 
projects*
65. Ibid* P. 58
66. Ibid. P. 61
(iii) &A|£
The demand for salt in the GKCS oountrles vlth the exception of Ghana, has, 
up to nov, been almost exclusively covered by imports from Europe and other 
sources. Although elsewhere there are several artisan workings of mineral salt 
or sea salt, Ghana is the only country which possesses large salt pans whioh are 
rationally operated on a substantial scale. Production varies, according to 
•llmatic conditions, from 30,000 to 50,000 tons per year. Industrial demand Is 
small (2,000 tons) and almost the whole output is therefore destined for food 
needs.
Given the estimated present and future needs of the whole area 
(80,000 - 100,000 tons), further investment in this Industry is needed.^ And 
Togo, like Ghana, enjoys the advantage of favourable climate for the extraction 
of sea salt. Studies and evaporation experiments have taken plaee in Togo in 
connection with the salt project and, once a decision is taken, there will be 
rokm for the two producers (Togo and Ghana) in the markets of the other GECS 
countries. Although, to ensure reasonable profitability of the operation in 
Togo, markets might be sought in Nigeria as well.
(iv) MANUFACTURE OP HAND TOOLS
The only known project in this field is that for manufacturing matchets in 
Ghana. It is planned for the domestic market and has a capacity of 1,000 tons 
per year. If it were expanded to meet the needs of the six countries in the 
region, its capacity could be doubled (2,000 tons) and it could produoe more * 
cheaply.
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Most of the other agricultural too 15and various hand tools for use in
workshops, on building sites and in the hone, represent a market big enough, on
a regional level, to envisage manufacture* The main outlets would be in Ghana
and Ivory Coast, and since the raw materials and rough pieoes would arrive by
sea, the industry would necessarily be set up in one of these two countries.
But since Ghana has already begun producing matchets, it seems that a factory
producing several different types of tools, apart from matohets, should be
built in the Ivory Coast to produce for the entire GSCS. Bach of the two
oountrles would then trade vlth each other as well as with the other GBCS members.
(t ) HAMJFACTURE o? PARTS FOR CYCLES ASP POWER-ASSISTED CYCLES
The assembly pleats in the Ivory Coast, Upper Volta and Dahomey are limited
to using oyole parts which are almost entirely imported. Some parts are, of
course fmade on the spots frames, mudguards and spokes, but all the mechanical
parts come from Europe. Certain oountrles have thus considered local production
of the parts used by the assembly plants^. Viewed on a national level, this is
out of the question if only one country is concerned, since the quantity
produced at national level would fall significantly short of that needed to make
manufacture feasible. But looked at in the context of the region and taking
account of the total requirements of the assembly plants and repair shops,
70production oould be of the order of 2,600 tons by 1975 » which would certainly
justify making the parts looally. Admittedly, demand seems to be greater - at
the moment - in the west of the region (ivory Coast and Upper Volta) but
69. See The manufacture of Cycle Parts in the Ivory Coast* a SEDES report, 1966. 
70* E.I.U* et al, Op.cit. P. 75
considering the need for spatial distribution of the benefits of integration
the factory should be built in Dahomey#
(ri) CLOCOSg PROJECT
Glucose in the font of syrup is an intexnediate product usable by other
industries in the region* particularly by confectionery manufacturers whose
71needs will be around 1*200 tons in 1975 • It would seen that a local factory
could be conpetitlTe at a production level of 1*000 tons a year* but only in 
speoial conditions whioh Togo can offer* that is to say attached to an existing 
enterprise#
Glucose can be extracted fron malse or manioc* There already exists a 
starch factory using manioc at Gannve in Togo* The production of glucose could
be added to this plant involving limited investment (^200*000)* very few jobs
72(20*25) and low overheads • Raw materials should be obtainable from local 
sources in Togo* However* it might be useful to look for supplementary markets 
in Nigeria to increase the profitability and further expansion of the project*
(vii) w a x  m a m
The populations of the region consume milk from local herds particularly
in the cattle-rearing zones of the interior* but is still smallf and the
marketing and processing are disorganised* The needs of the urban 0 an tree and
those of the rural populations in the forest sons are covered by imported milk
products* Sometimes these are delivered directly for consumption (tinned nilk*
cheeses* preparation with a nilk base ete)| sometimes they are processed and
packaged in local factories (one in Ghana* the other in Ivory Coast)* The raw
material then consists of sacks of powdered milk of Bur ope an origin* It is
envisaged that the lalfM particular!T Niger could eventually provide
71* Ibid. g T 5
72. See Ibid*
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the region with nilk (both for outright consumption and for industrial use) 
from improved herds. Already, the UNI CEP is assisting in the establisment of a 
milk factory at Niamey in Niger^.
(viii) BASIC CHPgCAL PRODUCTS 
There is no knowledge of projects of this nature in any of the countries 
in the area. Ghana is currently interested in establishing a basic chemical 
plant. It has the raw material, salt, and eleotrio power in great quantity and 
at low price from the hydro-electrlo station at Akosambo. 'Hie Ghanaian 
authorities have Already received a feasibility report made by a German firm
ie|
on the project but no information is immediately available on the exact 
o on tents of the report.
However, there are dear meeds which a chemical plant can fulfil in the 
region. Regional industries meed intermediate chemical products such as soda 
and chlorine derivatives, BBC, chloride and sodium hydroohlorlde - and it is 
possible to find uses for the by-produo to - calcium carbide, chlorine of lime, 
sulphuric add - whioh would result from such an industry.
(ix) CERAMICS
Ivory Coast and Ghana plan to produce floor tiles and wall tiles, sanitary 
ware and also; probably; crockery. But, to ensure a profitable production level, 
it is neoessary to go beyond the domestic market within each country. Given the 
overall regional demand for the above products, whioh has been tentatively put
•ftat 6,300 tons by 1975, It will be econonioally rewarding to build a regional
73. Ibid. P. U7 
7U. Ibid. P. 63 
75. Ibid. P. 68
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factory vlth a large eapaolty either la the Ivory Coast or Ghana, while a 
second one could be built a few years later in the other country*
Basically, both the Ivory Coast and Ghana have deposits of raw materials 
of a suitable quality and in a favourable geographical position near the am in 
centres of consumption. Indeed, a brief comparison between the two sites showed 
little to choose between them, although Ghana had a slight advantage where 
profitability was oonoermed. The solution obviously lies on the two countries 
reaching some agreement between them, after consultations with the other GECS 
members*
From the above brief examination of some of the potential integration 
industries in the GECS region, one can easily appreciate the role and 
rational of economic integration* It is, to say the least, Important not only 
to stimulate the growth of new large-soale industries but to promote a more 
effective and affiolent use of the existing industrial oapaeity in central-west 
Africa* However, vlth respect to certain industries, such as iron and steel and 
some others mentioned above, it nay be necessary to seek markets beyond the 
confines of the GECS either through special in ter-governmental arrangements or 
pursuing an "aggressive" open door policy towards other neighbouring West African 
Stated ►
ESTIMATING THE REAL GAIKS FROM INTEGRATION IN THE G1CS 
Chapter four discussed the Measurement ef the effeote of eoomemio Integra^ 
tlon arrangements in LDCs and the methodologies which hare been applied in 
quantifying the gains er losses ariaing from such eohemes* As a point ef 
departure, the present chapter applies the reconstructed and redefined Andlos- 
Dosser model in quantifying net the real gains or losses resulting from the 
establishment of new industries per so hut rather these from eld and under* 
utilised plants in which economies of seals exist , whioh would justify an arrant 
genent for gradual trade liberalisation in the products of such industries*
Within the G5CS area, the obvious - though realistic - assumption is that the 
demand for the commodities (l*e* cement, fertiliser, shoe and petrolmnm products) 
under consideration is given* The main task thus is to explore the effeets of 
trade liberalisation based on these produots * if anj - on the member state 
economies and to assess their wider policy value*
TRADE LlggPALIZATTOW 
The evaluation of gains or losses from integration could bo pursed with 
particular referenoe to, at least, two ferns of common market, namely* (i) 
complete liberalisation of trade either by way of a onstems union or free trade 
area; and (ii) co-operation for the establishment of selected new industries 
er the expansion of old but partly used ones whose products would enjoys "free" 
circulation within the grouping* Evidently, our discussion in chapter 5 on the 
performance ef existing integration schemes in the West African iubregiom 
reveals that the latter has brighter prospeot of realisation then the former type
of integration arrangement, ' Indeed, given the primary desire of many LDCs to
o"capture the commanding heights" of their eoononies and to retain a considerable 
degree of eoononio sovereignty, the indications, both in relation to existing 
arrangements, and in nev initiatives, are that increasing attention and 
emphasis are likely to be focused on product —  based integration schemes in the 
immediate future.^
Product-based co-operation introduces the issue of product coverage. For 
the participants, the question of product coverage under trade liberalisation is 
an important natter indeed. Because any group of countries wanting to 
liberalise mutal trade as a means of enhkncing^their rates of economic develop­
ment might wish to consider in advance whether the linear method or the 
selective approach to trade liberalisation is the right course fot them, Under 
the former method, prospective members of a union agree on across-the-board 
basis to reduoe by a given percentage their individual tariffs, normally when 
an agreed list of industries to be accorded special treatment has been decided 
upon. But under the latter, member governments merely indicate their willingness
1, Conceptually, it may of course be possible to super-impose a co-operation
scheme based on the products of specific key industries on an existing 
customs union or a free trade area without neoessarlly disorganising the 
latter,
2, As exemplified in the recent Insurance Amendment Decree whereby all 
insurance companies must sell at least 1*0# of their shares to Ghanaians,
this old major policy aim has been rekindled in Ghana (See The Financial
Times Survey, January 10, 1973)*
3, Although "product integration or project co-operation could be viewed 
as a partial and restricted form of integration or as a "second best" 
solution, it may be easier to achieve. It may also constitute a preamble 
to overall integration since it might give rise to foroes whioh mould 
lead the countries concerned to integrate at some latter date*
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to reduce tariffs applisd to individual commodities and/or to rslsx non-tariff 
restrictions if thsy obtain from their partners concessions on their expert 
products whioh they oonsider to be equivalent*^*
In the oontext of the GECS where the poorer land-looked countries axe 
somewhat suspicious ef the richer coastal states, the item-by-iten method, seens 
more practical and workable than the linear approach* For experience points 
to the conclusion that sons of the relatively less-developed menbers may net wish 
to commit their entire industrial development policies to a multinational set-up* 
For example, the majority of existing industries in the region are to be found 
in the two most highly populated coastal countries, the Ivory Coast snd Ghana, 
whioh are also nurturing most of the new industrial projects (Table 7*22)* In 
so far as import substitution of products for final consumption is concerned they 
are near to exhausting the possibilities of this kind of industrialisation within 
their national frontiers*'’ When they embarked on this policy, they found outlets 
in the land-locked states of Upper Yolta and Niger and to a lesser extent, in 
Togo and Dahomey, but the latter group, in turn, has set up a certain number of 
competitive ventures - soap products, beverages, textiles, etc* - so that they 
are self-sufficient in these producets* To this extent the poorer countries 
have reduced the number of outlets for faotories in neighbouring Ghana and 
Ivory Coast*
1*. See UN ECA, Economic Co-Operation and Integration in Africa. Op.cit**
ST/EC A/109, PF* 6I-IS3 and B*W*T* Wutharika. Towards Multinational Economic* 
Co-operation in Africa. Praeger Publishers, London, 1972, PP.210-1fl*
5* See Chapter six, section 7«
The selective method has other advantages* In view of the limited 
number of products on which the GECS oountrles can willingly commit themselves 
to trade liberalisation, they might be prepared to initiate the process even 
on an ad hoc basis* And a chance of a fruitful exchange of commodities even 
on a selective basis night land to measures toward mors comprehensive economic 
co-operation agreements* With regard to those goods that are already subjeet 
to tariff concessions or trade liberalisation - aa in the ease of Sntente 
Council with respect to their members - the Sntente countries night undertake 
not to impose any new import taxes or other chargee with the exoeptlon of 
charges reciprocally applied on their goods in Ghana* In formulating any trads 
liberalisation agreement, it would also be essential for the GECS members to 
agree not to apply say other restrictions or prohibitions sxospt prohibitions 
lmpossd for suoh noneconomic reasons as public ssourity, health protection, or 
public morality* It is assumed that full intra-monal trads liberalisation 
needs the establishment of a common external tariff not only to buttress it 
but also to eliminate the intractable prpblen of policing of the liberalised 
trade to ensure that goods originating from third oountrles imported under 
preferential arrangement are not re-exported to oountrles outside the sons with 
whon there are no preferential arrangements* In addition, the products meant 
to be protected would enjoy adequate and equal tariff protection from the 
re st-of-the-world•
Surely, the normal procedure for de terming the level of the common external
tariff— which is to average existing national tariff ratee^ - might not work
7satisfactorily in the circumstances of Central West Africa*'
6* For problems associated with averaging tariffs see chapter six (2*7)*
7* UN ECA. Economic Co-operation and Integration in Africa* Op*sit* P* 62
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first, this procedure would be difficult to follow in Yiew of the various 
preference systems in French Vest Africa* Second, the averaging of existing 
tariffs would be unable to meet one of the purposes of a common tariff, namely 
the provision of an adequate degree of protection to the industries whose 
products are liberalised* Perhaps, a more appropriate procedure in the case 
of the G5CS would be to establish a coomon tariff on a product—by-product 
basis in the light of the degree of protection needed by a given Industry in 
its early years of operation* But the conventional method is preferred for 
reasons of data in this study*
In effect, we are thinking in terms of gradual establishment of trade 
liberalisation in Central Vest Afrioa, moving from the present position (of 
intra^-regional trade restrictions and barriers) to a "managed" free trade 
area based on the products of selected integration industries* Within the 
context of these products, we are in the realm of free trade which progressively 
could be more broadly-based* In other words, the present intra-area trade 
situation, whioh we can denote as stage Xt I® unsatisfactory and the concern 
of this chapter is to evaluate the advantages of advancing from stage X  to 
stage II, which will be characterised by "limited" free trade from where further 
advancement to stage III, a period of "unlimited" Ilberalidatlon of trade and
Q
factors in the distant future, can be contemplated*
In practical terms, however, any form of integration package deal method 
is likely to raise a number of economic and political problems* This viewpoint 
has been confronted with a good deal of evidence in chapter fine*
8* This study does not cover the 3rd stage*
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On the economic side, the development ef joint venture raises the 
problem ef the intreduction ef multinational planning embracing all vital 
industrial seeters in order to take care of linkage effects as well as recon­
cile conflicting national interests and policies* But even in countries where 
comprehensive planning has been adopted by Central Planning authorities, as in
seme Bast Burepean countries, it has been difficult to effectively introduce
9regional planning for purposes ef ensuring effective trade liberalisation*
In seme regions ef the LDCs where trade liberalisation has been experimented 
upon - such as Bast Africa and Latin America - member governments have attempted 
to introduce techniques aimed at avoiding these problems* Per instance, the 
Central American governments adopted a method ef allocating at least one 
multinational industry to each state initially, followed by the subsequent 
distribution ef the remaining list ef industries in turn for each country* 
Although initially this method appeared attractive and successful, in subse­
quent allocation rounds difficulties arose because the countries still main­
tained their freedom to select and establish any industries they l i k e d * A s  
already noted, the experience in the Bast African Common Haricot has net been 
markedly different*
On the political front, countries often find it difficult to accept any 
kind of blueprint for the allocation of basic industries among partner states 
because this would imply tying Bhnir hands in certain areas ef vital importance* 
Haturally, countries would hesitate mainly because ef uncertainty as to whether 
such allocation ef industry and the consequent pest-integration pattern ef 
trade and production would be in their best interests*
9 . B.V.I. Mutharika, Qp.olt* PP. 210-211.
10. Ibid*
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In faot, this is also true of advanced countries. It can be contested that 
the hesitation of a section of the British industry prior to the British entry 
into the SBC stoned primarily from uncertainty about the effeots of the 
applioation ef the SBC rules and regulations, the real benefits of enlarged 
trading opportunities and, even more importantly, the wider structural implica­
tions of entry for industry.11 Where establishing or expanding an already 
existing Multinational industry nrlna facie appears to jeopardise a national 
eoononio interest, the country involved would tend to hesitate to grant the 
products of the multinational industry free aoeess to its market because of 
the fear of disrupting economic life.
Thus as demonstrated earlier, the liberalisation of trade in an area, like 
Central West Africa where oountries have different development levels end 
divergent re sour oe endowments, puts into motion the process of polarisation, 
a process that gives to those who need relatively more less and relatively 
more to those who need less. To forestall this natural process and arrest the 
dlsequllibratlng neohanism of free international trade, a workable geographically 
modest integration arrangement in the GBCS, should comprise, in addition to an 
agreement providing for progressive trade liberalisation, some - and possibly 
all, in the long-run - of the following elementst a regional development bank; 
a regional mechanism for financial settlements and for monetary policy 
co-ordination; a regime harmonising incentives for regional and external private 
investment; an instrument for the promotion of industrial specialisation by
11. See Derek Bsra, "positive benefits to Industry will largely depend on its 
own efforts", THE TIMES. January 2, 1973* London. These faetors also 
provided ammunition for the Labour Opposition.
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agreements and a formula* for tha equitable distribution of customs revenues 
and other taxes, vlth special consideration being given to the development 
needs of the most backward participants* To put it in a nutshell9 the thorny 
question of the distribution of gains and/or losses from integration in a way 
considered equitable by all the participants must be squarely faced* The 
disoussion of this problem will be the main subject of the next chapter! no 
mere than a mention of the above elements in general terms is intended here*
In what follows 9 attention is devoted to data*
2. DATA and CALCULATIONS
As already stipulated, the empirical estimate of the effects of product
market integration which is the main concern of this chapter applies the
12following algsbrAls expression*
Aw - A ?  - A t  ♦ A t - A *
In its original form1 ,^ the Andies and Dosser enunciated the formula as a
conditional equation for evaluating the eligibility and feasibility of
regionally-based projects* According to them, only those industries whose
A w  is positive would be chosen subject to "distribution" weights* The point
of departure in our methodology here is that it applies the above evaluation
formula not for screening potential integration industries but for assessing
the real welfare benefits * defined as the sum of the values of the above
evaluation factors - of already existing and operational industries*1**
12* The symjtols used in the equation have been carefully explained in the
previous chapter and are not repeated here*
13* See Chapter U*
11*. Although by no means complete, there seems to be more information on
existing than on planndd projects in Vest Africa* To this extent, it is easier 
to study the former than the latter* It may be noted here that the Andies and 
Dosser ran into trouble with data in their application of the model in the 
Caribbean - hence they stopped short of what their original Intention implied 
(See Andie, et al. Qp.oit).
These Industries should hare capacity for expansion and their produots would 
require access to markets beyond their national frontiers.
In view of the complex mature of the variables involved in estimating the 
values of the independent parametersf the values of the latter will be estimated 
separately under appropriate assumptions snd later summed up. That ls9 for
i
eaeh of the four industries studied9 we will assess the value of welfare^> 9
derived by adding up the values of the variables on the right-hand side of the 
following expression (with the exception of £  which would be treated as part 
of I9 though separately discussed for emphasis only (Section 2 )(Y) )i
i .*
A y t  - A * *  - ;
The results yielded will be totalled for the group and analysed.
Before we proceed further9 some general assumptions relating to all the
independent variables earn now be more formally and explicitly state^ namelys 
(i) the value of eaeh factor will be based as far as data can permit on a 
benchmark years) (ii) the four industries of our interest owe their feasibility 
to the absence of import barriers by all the prospective common market member^) 
and (ill) the estimation of the integration-induced TAB assumes virtual import 
replacement and full utilisation and/or expansion of existing capacity in the
15. Welfare could be defined in a variety of ways depending on ones approach. 
Caraoy’s welfare analysis of integration discussed earlier attempts under restr­
ictive assumptions to determine whioh country or oountrles within a grouping 
have an absolute advantage in producing given products for the purpose of arrlvini 
at "optimum" loeation upon whioh "ouatona union" price will be determined. Both 
Johnson and Denison approach welfare effeots of integration from the point of 
vlow of resource allocation effoots of reducing trade barriers (See R»Hilton9 
Or.cit. P.237)* In our case welfare is defined as the improvement in material •
well-being due to more efficient use of available resources. The measure !
adopted for this is value Added. But YAD is not all gain. It is by definitiion 
ths sum of non-industrial oosts9 labour income and operating surplus. However9
in the case of the labour surplus economies we assume that the opportunity 
cost of extra factors needed to fully utilise capacities which had already been 
Installed would be minimal. !
16. In other terms9 footloose and shiftable industries9 which by definition
industries concerned so &s to be able to meet the expanded hone demand.
It aust however be admitted that, with respeot to certain products which 
are non-homogeneous in nature, the assumption of total import replacsmsmt can 
be challenged, even in highly industrialised countries specialising in the 
production of such commodities. The production of footwear (one of the indus­
tries of interest to us) is a case in point. Footwear i m  eleariy lens homo­
geneous than the other three industries examined in the previous chapter 
(oil refining, cement and fertilisers). It would therefore ordinarily require 
a different treatment. But, in our particular case, the type* of footwear 
considered, if anything, are different "brands" of the same typo in terms of 
quality, sophlstloatiom and pricej hence they can be treated alike. They are 
worn by the bulk of the population of the region, the exception being those 
imported by the tiny sophisticated/elite consumers, whose consumption in 
relation to total in this part of West Afrioa is more or less insignificant.
Bven when allowance is made for the small group, its impaot on value-added 
is likely to be very marginal indeed. Bven so, while retaining the assumption 
of total import replacement on the above grounds, the resulting estimate of 
value-added, for this and other reasons mentioned elsewhere, can only serve 
as an order of nagnitude.
can be justified by national denand alone, and those industries, which would b# 
primarily expbrt-oriented, fall outside our consideration. As noted at an 
earlier stage, the economies of soals have their limits but the case for exploi­
ting scale economies is compelling here. For opinions on the limits of seals 
economies, see H.G. Johnson, "The Buropesn Common Market - Risk and Opportunity?" 
Weltwirtschaftliohes. Archiv. 1957.
(1) KSTJflm OF .TABU. - ADDED
There are at least two alternative approaches to the estimate of value- 
added (TAD)* One involves the employment, as indioated previously» of a 
complete input-output system* The second alternative method entails the 
application of the standard equations
to a subset of Industries, provided data en inputs into such industries are
the effects of integration mill operate through all sectors by way of inter* 
sectoral relationships* But the great disadvantage of a complete input- 
output system is the dearth of up to-date data, not to mention its complexity* 
Of the six countries of our immediate interest, only Ghana and Ivory Coast 
have constructed input-output systems of any sort* The first input-output 
system for Ghana was a 10 X 10 transactions table* It was prepared in 1960 
under the sponsorship of the Ghana Academy Sciences* In addition, tables of 
the order of 11* X 11* were constructed for 1 9 6 6 and 1968 by the Central Bureau 
of Statistics for the use of the Planning Commission* The latter tables vhioh
were regarded as "no more than preliminary rough estimates* have not been o
1 fiofficially released* As for the Ivory Coast, which established its first 
input-output table in 1958, the problem is much the same* Although since 
1960 annual tables have been compiled on the basis of annual survey of enter­
prises, it is not however clear whether the tables established annually after
17* See* G. Basevi, Op.oit*, P. 11*8 (footnote 1*)* Also see H.G* Johnson, "The 
Theory of Tariff Structure, with Special Reference to World Trade and Develop­
ment," in Trade and Development* Geneva, 19^5*
18* SCA, Problems and practices of African Countries in the Compilation of 
Input-output Tables, S/CH*1l*/feAC/l*3, 1 June, 1973*
-  M5 -
1960 represent an updating of tha table for that year. Tha input-output
tables for i960 and 1965-69 have bean established at 1965 oanstant prioes but
the study is not at present distributed, pending a review of the methods of
19calculation employed. If we must employ a complete up-to-date input-output 
system for each of the six GECS countries it will mean constructing six 
different tables. Unfortunately, limitations of time and resouroes prevent this.
In these oirouastances, it is necessary to limit ourselves to the perspec­
tive assessment of the effects of integration on the manufacturing sector 
alone which in any case monitors the pace of structural transformation of 
LDCs economies more than any other single eoonomic sector. This would imply 
the adoption of the second approach. Because the method is not only more 
realistic but also more likely to utilise more recent figures. The application 
of this method has yielded the data presented in Table 8.1.
Pending the availability of more refined industrial census data, the 
Table shows the corresponding values of output and YAD in eaoh industrial 
subgroups under consideration. The figures were computed, in the case of
Ghana, by the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) and, for the Entente States,
20by the Economic Commission for Africa. Taking 1969 as a benchmark year, 
the figures in each subsector of the four industries (291, 311, 321 and 33U) 
in which we are primarily concerned were obtained. For purposes of sensi­
tivity analysis, two sets of figures were usedt 1969 figures and 1965*69 
average figures. The advantage of the latter is that it provides weighted 
trend figures for comparison.
19. Ibid.
20. Central Bureau of Statistics, Economic Survey. 1969, PP» 76-77 end ECA, 
Summarises of Boononlc Bata. 19<>9-71 on individual Entente States.
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As Table 8*1 illustrates, the values of gross output and value added -
21all valued at current pre-union prices in individual countries - of eaoh 
industry are shown against it. The ECA and CBS, as Mentioned above, applied 
the standard input-output equation and Atilised the current pre-union unit 
prioeb in individual countries in their calculations. The output values 
were obtained by Multiplying the volune of output by the unit values. The 
VAB values were similarly derived whilst their oo-efficients were expressed
in percentage. The inputs in eaeh subsector of the industries were calculated
22by subtracting the VA3) from the values of output.
The ECA-CBS method of estimate and its implied assumptions affect the 
quality and usefulness of the results. Aside from the usual statistical 
imperfections in this area of analysis, one or two weaknesses of the TAB 
estimate can be noted. The use of ourremt unit prices in estimating gross 
output and TAB is more often than not likely to exaggerate their real valties 
in individual countries where inflation existed. This, in turn, rsduoes
- M 7  -
21* The CBS and ECA souroes referred to in the preoeding footnote did not 
specify the prices ussd but it is unlikely that they were uniform 
throughout the six different countries. In our own estimates for 1975 
and 1980, ws shall indioate the unit prices we wish to apply.
22. Vs are of course mainly interested, in the relationship between the gross 
output and TAD. Since the input-output co-efficient is by definition a 
constant hence the latter ratio * can be ignore^ without altering the re­
sults in this particular consideration. (For the basic assumptions of 
the input-output system, see H.B. Chenery end P.G. Clark, Interindustry 
Economics, John Wiley, end sons, New York, P*. 33-3U)* It may be noted 
that symbolically the fraction of the value of the output of an industry 
(the jth industry) which is represented by the value of the inputs to it 
from another industry (.th industry) is conceptually assumed to be a 
constant, aij. Thus if aij is the demand of eaoh industry j for eaoh 
product i end Xj the total output of the industry, Xij * aijXi.
the comparability value of tha rasuits sinca the rata of inflations, if any, 
is unlikaly to be tha sane in six different countries* Furthermore, there­
to nolindication from tha souree material about what assumptions vara made 
regarding foreign ownership of capital and its affect on VAD. At our present 
stage of development, payments to foreign factors of production (oapital and 
skilled labour) still claim a relatively large portion of ViJD in certain in* 
dustries*
However, the problem of foreign ownership of capital in  the industries 
of our interest i s  n ot a serious one* For none of the four industries con­
cerned is w holly foreign-owned| Indeed, the governments of the area have
23acquired controlling interests in these establishments and complete nationa­
lisation cannot be ruled out in the long run* Thus, to the extent that 
we are concerned with the long-run effects of integration, the issue of 
foreign ownership of capital in the short run can be largely ingnored*
N otw ithstanding the statistical pitfalls associated with the data 
presented in Table 8*1, some of Its features are remarkable* The TAD co­
efficients generally are much the sane in all six countries* This can be 
explained partly by the similarity of techniques of operation on the one hand 
and partly by common structural characteristics of the economics on the 
ether* There is also the fact that a sizeable proportion of the raw materials 
used in manufacturing in Central-West Africa is imported* The high percen­
tage share of VAD in relation to the gross output of petroleum products 
merely demonstrates the unique nature and oapital intensity of oil refineries* 
It also suggests high productivity of the factors employed, some of which are 
imported, for oil refining usually requires heavy capital investment and
23. See et al, Qp.cit* Yol, 1
specially trained personnel. As noted earlier9 the repatriation of income 
paid to foreign factors of production will, in the short-run, affect the 
inpaot of VAD on the domestic economy to the extent of foreign participation 
in the Industry. But, in the long ran, which Is of greater eonoezm to us, 
this problem will progressively disappear as the drive towards complete 
nationalisation gathers force*
The results presented in Table 8*1 basically aim at presenting a back­
ground comparative data on the relationships between the pre-union figures 
sad estimated post-union values of TAD and gross output* The latter will bo 
shown in Table 8*2* And this is the main link between the two Tables*
(U) TOS XKTgaATIOB-nroUCE) mss^  A  I)
Vow, we want to guage the TAD under a free trade (l*e* post-union) 
arrangement over time* But in doing this ears should bo oxoreised to ensure 
that the chosen future period is reasonable. Economic measures and arrangements 
require sometime to shew their effects but at the sane time predictions ever 
long periods euro often too speculative for pelioy and application purposes*
Thus, 1980 is considered a reasonkhle terminal period, with a mid-point 
estimate for 1975*
Before we fe further, it la important to specify at this stage the 
assumptions which underlie our projections ef integration— -induced TAD and 
output which are presented in Table 8*2* They can be stated as fellewst 
(i) A uniform unit cost of production of eaoh produet In eaoh country 
is adopted, irrespective of the number ef firms in a given industry, 
and their leeatiensf This assumption however will bo modified in 
our later discussion of the operational pricing policy of the region* 
(ii) The reference price for computing the TAD, which was applied, is 
the ex-factory cost of production*
Added to the above are the already etated assumptions of intra-union tariff
disarmament in the produote of the industries concerned and of the virtual
replacement of inports by local products through surplus capacity utilisation
and/or expansion; hence intra—zonal production from the regional standpoint
must satisfy aggregate demand. Bearing in mind these assumptions, estimates
of the total value of consumption together with the integration-induoed VAD
2liobtainable in 1975 and 1980 for etch country have been made* Table 8*2
presents the data.
The Table has three sets of figures under eaoh country and with respect
to eaoh product. The first column shows the gross value-added (i.e. gross
production less industrial costs). It is obtained by multiplying the total
volume of estimated consumption (see Tablesi 7*11» 7»12, 7*1U * 7«17) i»
25each case by the relevant reference prloes, given our assumption of total
import replacement.
In the second column we have the so-oalled integration-indueed VAD which
is the most important consideration here from our viewpoint. It is that
26portion of VAD "assumed" to be directly attributable to integration - the
by-produot of integration itself. In other words, the integration-induoed
2k» It may be noted that the estimates whioh follow utilised the demand 
projections for the individual products discussed in the previous 
chapter. Whereas demand elasticity for the products in question upon 
which the projections were based has been discussed, further discussion 
of it here is considered repetitive and unnecessary.
25 The unit reference price, whioh includes the cost of production and 
normal profit, is ^0.88 for footwear, ^or ffcel in Ghana but
jtf3U.U3 in Ivory Coast, jf27.0 for Cement in Ghana and #26.5 in Ivory Coast 
whilst it is /6U.0 in Niger, for fertiliser of course it is #>0.0 for 
simple but f(62»0 for compound fertiliser (Chapter 7 (2) )•
16. Ve use the term "assumed" because we have ignored some other non-economie 
factors, like technical and organisational Improvements which, as argued 
in chapter three, can also contribute to value-added.
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VAD - assuming that the possible contributions of other independent factors 
to VAD are negligible - is the additional output brought about by the expansion 
of existing industries to take adrantage of enlarged markets, which, in turn, 
has been the direct result of market integration* Without integration this 
additional produotion would not have been undertaken and ipso facto no 
additional increase in VAD generated by integration* But with integration 
opportunities for the exploitation of the economiee of scale were created*
Indeed, as argued in chapter three, the enlargement of the size of the market/
for firms producing below optimum capacity prior to integration normally sets
the economies of soale working*
It oould of course be argued that the total VAD shown in Table 8*2 is
not dependent on integration alone since the assumption of complete import
replacement implies an increase in own domestic consumption through the 41 ver­
sion of that pre-union portion of hone consumption whioh was imported from 
third countries to domestic— "based sources of Bupply* That ist part of our 
estimate of VAD eould be obtained simply by pursuing an independent policy of 
import substitution without integration*
Undoubtedly, it is evidently probable (though not very oertaln) that am 
independent policy of import substitution would yield net VAD for any country 
or group of countries* But what is not olear is whether this would surely 
be the case here* Firstly, one is bound to question the wisdom of making any 
sharp distinction between integration and integration-led assumption effects 
on VAD* Obviously, since integration goes with the assumption of import 
replacement, whioh le necessary to ensure the full effeots of integration,
any attempt to distinquiah between the effeots of integration and import-repla- 
ceuent assumption on YAD seems arbixary and unnecessary, Secondly, and more 
importantly, even if this distinction has to be nade9 the relative contributions 
of the two effects to poBt-union VAD cannot be determined a priori. Much 
depends on the relationship between pre-union domestic production and aggregate 
domestic consumption. If prior to union some domeatic producers were virtually 
self-sufficient in the production of the commodities concerned those producers 
would (assuming no dramatic increase in post-union consumption) tend to export 
virtually all the post-union additional production (less industrial costa)) 
hence for such producers the estimate of this production would fairly represent 
the Integration-induced YAD, The GECS situation is akin to this,
Ghana and Ivory Coast9 who between them would produce and export all but 
a negligible proportion of the additional produotion9 are basically self­
sufficient as regards those products. The proportion of additional demand to 
be net from other intra-union sources is really very tiny and can be ignored 
(chapter 7 (2)), ThttS it seems reasonable to regard the estimates presented 
in Table 8,2 as an approximate value of the integration-induced YAD,
The "integration-created" VAD ia derived in each case by substraoting
27the estimated pre-union net production of eaoh product from the projeeted
o f t
post-union consumption level (Tables! 7*11t 7,12f 7*11+ &&& 7*17) whioh would
be met by local producers at a given point in time. The result is then
multiplied in each case by the relevant reference price (see footnote 25)•
271 The estimates for 19^9 from ECA and CBS sources were utilised for thia 
purpose (see Table 8,1 sources)*
28, The method and problems associated with the demand projections in these 
Tables were fully discusses in the previous chapter.
- UZh -
The reference price varies from country to country. But, as stated earliery 
a uniform reference (ex-factory) price has been applied in each country. Where 
two plants or more existed in one country, the average ex-f&otory prioe was 
adopted as the reference price for purposes of our calculation. The assumption 
of uniform reference price will however be relaxed when we come to discuss ths 
regional pricing policy.
The third column furnishes data on integration-induced TAB expressed as 
a percentage of total output.
Table 8,2 thus attempts to show the national and regional values of 
demand against the product of each country. For individual countries the 
figures represent consumption, and they roughly add up to total regional 
production, given our assumption that regional consumption fairly approximates 
to regional production. Against each non-producer of certain products the 
output-VAD figures are underlined to indicate that tha countries ooncemed 
import all their supplies from other intra-union sources. Thus, while the 
total regional consumption add up to total regional production in these oases, 
the consumption figures of producers - as the Table shows - do not.
For the region as a whole, the integration YAD, whioh, pending the 
availability of more refined and reliable data, must be treated as tentative 
will amount to ff33«l5 million by the end of 1975 and nillion in 1980,
In percentage terms, this would be 199^  of the value of total output of the 
industries considered or about U,6% of the entire manufacturing sector im 
both oases. Evidently, figures for individual countries in Table 8,2 vary 
very widely - though less so in percentage terms - due to differences in the 
productive capacity of the various economies. As would be expected, the output
- 1*25 -
and YAD values in Ghana and Ivory Coast are relatively substantial^hut the 
corresponding figures for Bone of the lesser states (Niger and Togo) are 
quite negligible.
In order to appreciate the usefulness as well as the shortcomings of the 
data shown in the above Table, sone of its relevant assumptions need to be 
re-emphasised. It is assumed that the integration-induced YAD is the direct 
oonsequence of free trade arrangement. Without integration there would be no 
expansion of production booauso of limited domestic market, higher unit cost 
due to under-dtillsation of capacity and the availability of relatively cheaper 
imports from outside the region. But with the dismantling of tariff barriers 
or tariff reductions, a virtual complete switch in imports away from extra-area 
sources toward intra-zonal suppliers, it is assumed, would cotoria paribus 
take place. In effeot, the expansion of industrial production in the subsectors 
under discussion is attributed primarily to the stimuli imparted by integration. 
Obviously, this is a key but contentious assumption. It ean be pointed out 
that such factors - like variations in input nix, changes in donestlo and fiscal 
policies and socle-economic upheavals - whioh may have very little or nothing 
to do with integration can affect the value of YAD. Conceivably?it ean also 
bo argued, as noted in chapter two, that the consumption potential in each 
country has not been fully exploited given the tenuous nature of their 
distributive network. Hence transport improvements alone could increase the 
volume of consumptions of oaeh product within its national frontier. But the 
more important critloism of Table 8.2 emanates from the conventional criticisms 
of the input-output system. These inolude, among others, the assumptions that 
factor proportions are constant and that production is governed by constant 
returns (implying also constant prices) to scale.
These heroic assumptions are seldom valid in practice. Nevertheless) they are 
sometimes necessary for computational purposes and the data yielded in this 
particular instance provide useful indicative material for our analysis*
To explore the welfare implications of the Bvitch in trade away from third 
country sources toward intra-rsgional markets, we need to assess the trade 
diversion effect,
A
(lii) MEASUREMENT OP TRASS DIVERSION EFFECT ( Al)
One of the important hallmarks of Jacob Viner#s pinoneering work on
Customs Union theory - discussed in chapter 3 - remains the contrast he esta-
. >
blishes between the welfare-raising effects of trade creation with the welfare- 
reducing effects of trade diversion* The latter occurs where and when the 
tariff discrimination in favour of partner oountrles leads to a shift in the 
source of supply away from cheaper third oountrles towards the parties* By 
implication, this necessarily reduces the welfare of the importing countries 
because the fact that the imports were bought from third oountrles in the absence 
of discrimination suggestes that their cost of production is lower there*
Once more, this raises the question of protection whioh permits domestic 
industries to operate with a value added higher than that on the world market 
and/or under free trade, thereby providing incentives for the movement of 
domestic resources (land, labour and oapital) into protected industries*
Consider this, the average o.i.f* price of simple footwear in the region under 
study is $ft*00 and the proxy value added is \\9fc of the o*i*f* price (see Table 
8.1 )• This means that the oost of Its material inputs on the world market is 
55 cents, corresponding to a value added in shoe manufacturing of U5 cents*
A 2 tariff on footwear will raise the domestic price of the product to 126 
cents (Table 7* 16)> while, say, a 1096 duty on the material inputs increases
material eoets to the domestic producer to 60*5 cents* Protection will thus 
enable firms to operate with a value added of 65*5 cents, whioh is the diffe* 
rence between the domestic prioe of footwear of 126 cents and the material 
cost of 60*5 cents* And when we compare the world value added of k5 cents 
with the domestio TAD of 65*5 cents - the margin of 20*5 cents whioh is the 
effective rate of protection of the domestic footwear manufacture - the 
percentage excess of domestic over world market TAD will be
It is easily observed from the above example that the value of the 
effective rate of protection (ERP) represents an extra cost whioh the intra­
union individual consumer is called upon to pay and tto m  the viewpoint of the
A-* i • 4 s '•-> •-. • :.'d 'f ,kI* *' '4, V  ^ >'# 1 4 .v--v \x' '■ . ,,•£ * TJ v-society this entails a considerable loss of welfare* But central planners
wanting to maximise other objectives could regard this as a necessary
saorifice* Consumers may be called upon to sacrifice some portion of their
immediate welfare in the hope of greater future welfare*
Be that as it aay9 the effects of protection on eoonomio growth needs
qualification. High levels of protection may have positive or negative effeets
on economic growth depending on the circumstances of any particular situation*
Protection may lead to increases in profits but unless such profits are in
29* Although we defined the effective rate of protection (ZRP) in Chapter
Seven9 it is necessary that the distiction between the ERP and the nominal c 
rate ef proteetion (NRP) be kept sharply in foous here* Whilst the ERP 
is denoted as the percentage excess of domestic VAD9 obtainable by reason of 
the imposition of tariffs and other protective measures on the produet and 
its inputs9 over foreign or world market TAD9 the RHP of a particular commodity 
is the percentage emcees of the domestio prioe over the world market prioe9 
resulting from the application of protective measures* Thus9 the major difference 
between the two is thiss the NRP pertains to the product and affeots decisions 
taken by consumers but the NRP indicatestthe Joint effects of tariffs on the 
product Itself and on its inputs, and it influences the producer's ohoioe 
(see Bela Balassa and Associates, The Structure of Protection in Developing 
Countries* The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1971# PP* 3-U)*
turn reinvested, the static cost of protection due to inefficiencies in 
resource allocation reduces the amount available for reinvestment.^ Ipso 
facto, this affects growth and consumer welfare. Furthermore, although import 
substitution in nondurable consumer goods may ensure rapid growth until imports 
have been replaoed, progress thereafter becomes increasingly difficult as the 
oountry enters the next stage of import substitution. As noted earlier, two 
of the countries under study - Ghana and Ivory Coast - are already in this 
situation. The limitations of domestic markets do nok permit the exploitation 
of large-scale economies and, in the absence of effective competition, there 
is little incentive for improvements in product quality and in technical 
methods. Lastly, discrimination against exports could display an unfavourable 
effect on economic growth since the slowdown in exports, by way of backlash, 
restrains the increase of the country's import capacity.
However, these limitations should be carefully weighed against the salutary 
aspects of protection. Aside from ploughing back profits, the employment and 
technological spin-off effects of protection are crucial for developing economies.
Whatever the net effect of protection, trade diversion is one of its 
traditionally acknowledged important by-products. As demonstrated in chapter 
3, trade diversion is also assumed to represent in a static sense an "impact"
CL.welfare loss. The weaknesses of this priori assumption have already been fully 
exposed (chapter 3)* For instance, trade diversion is a benefit to the exporting 
country not a cost. Meanwhile, we retain - for computational purposes - the 
assumption that the switch in the source of supply away from cheaper third 
countries towards intra-union sources reduces welfare. Our task now is to 
assess the degree of welfare loss steaming from trade diversion involving the 
four commodities under consideration.
30l ibn. pp. 15155
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We shall do this In two stages: first, we shall assume a hypothetical 
autarkic situation where no trade existed between the GECS states and on 
that assumption calculate the national income loss effect of trade diversion 
(Table 8*3). In the second stage we shall relax the unrealistic assumption 
of autarky to enable us determine through the use of intra-union trade 
matrix (see Table 8*1+) the actual amount likely to refleot the national 
lnoome loss involved (Table 8.5)»
One method of assessment ef the income loss occasioned by trade diversion 
has been used by Williamson^1. According to Williamson the diversion effect 
can be measured by the tariff differential whose emergence provokes the 
swltoh in trade. This implies the difference between the "protective" common 
external tariff (CXT) and the free tariff rate. He contends that the 
average tariff differential to provoke a shift would be half the CXT. Thus 
as this approach suggests we cam arrive at the estimate of /\y by simply 
multiplying half the CXT by the volume of trade so diverted.
However, the Williamson formula is not new. Indeed, it is a commonly 
accepted formula and Johnson had at a much earlier date applied the same 
technique under different assumptions in estimating the United Kingdom gains 
from freer trade with Europe. Professor Johnson argues that the "maximum-loss 
estimate" arising from Free Trade with Europe would be (approximately) the 
value of the difference in exports to Europe due to the Free Trade Area, 
multiplied by half the proportion of the relevant tariff rate in the final 
prioe (since the price reductions required would have to offset the full
■52weight of the tariff only in extreme cases)^ •
31. John Williamson, On Estimating the Income Effects of British Entry to the 
EEC. University oif Survey, Guildford, No. June 1971V !>•
32. See H.G. Johnson, "The Gains from Freer Trade with Europet Art Estimate"
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This method is both simple and plausible, especially in riev of the paucity ' 
of data in tha area under study to permit the application of more sophisticated 
techniques. Fean the approach applied by Balassa, as shewn above, requires 
disaggregated domestic tariff charges on imports for individual products. But 
this type of data, is not immediately available in the region.
Moreover, since we have already obtained the value of the extra regional 
trade under protection due to union (Table 8.2) 9 an estimate of the matlonal 
income loss brought about by trade diversion would now be relatively easier.
Thus9 we apply the Johnsonian foxmmla here; and to obtain an estimate 
of the national income loss occasioned by trade diversion we reduce the 
tetal value of the integration-Induced trade within GKCS under full protection 
by half. The results of this oomputation9 which at this stage assumes the 
absence of lntra^zonal trade (i.e. each country produces what it oonsumes)9 
are presented in Table 8.3*
It is pertinent here to underline the assumptions relating to the tariff 
rates on whioh the computations shown in Table 8*3 were based. The following 
matlonal free trade tariff rates were appliedt footwear, 19$; fertiliser, 0$; 
petroleum, 27$; and oement, 21%, These free trade rates have been arrived 
at by reducing the assessed CKTs by half; the actual CXTs were 38$ for foot­
wear, 0% for fertiliser, 3 $  for petroleum, and 1*2% for cement.
in P. Robson CedV. International Economic Integration Op.olt.. PP.30U-3U7.
The Andies and Dosser applied the sane formulas
w - i (1 ♦ t) (Mt - Mp)
where V * trade diversion welfaro loss;
t 4  t ■ average height of tariff;
T
* Present import; Mp » Free trade
import (Andios and Desser, Op.olt. P. 151)•
The introduction of the free trade rates nay be helped by a number of factors. 
First, preference systems are already in existenoe within the Entente states 
(ohapter 6). The tariff rates whioh the Entente countries apply to themselves 
in their intra-union trade are roughly half of those levied on goods 
originating from outside the Entente. Thus the introduction of the free 
trade rates will not altogether appear strange, and rather than embark on new 
arrangements the existing administrative machinery can, nutatis mutandis, be 
utilised. Second, the range of products involved in the liberalination 
exercise are such that the revenue effects would not be very severe, although 
safeguards, whioh will be discussed in the next ohapter, can still be 
provided, especially to the weaker partners. Third, sinoe the tariff rate 
is calculated on produot-by-product basis, it has been possible to take into 
account the degree of protection needed by a given industry in its early 
years of operation. Where necessary, further assistance under an agreed 
union paokage deal could be offered, for instanoe, by way of guaranteeing 
certain industries some specified level of purchases over a specified period 
of time.
With the exception of fertiliser, tne height of those tariff rates in
q)view of their protective as well as revenue purposes is understandable.
Generally, fertiliser preduets are not treated as dutiable goods in the region
33. This im effect is essentially the sane thing as multiplying the value 
ef the difference in trade between protection and freer trade by half 
the operational CXT level.
3*4. For a discussion on this, see chapter 6.
- U33 -
as a part of tho OToraXl programme of agricultural development. They are 
indeed heavily subsidised in seme oountrles. Subsidy rates in Ghana and 
Niger ef 60# and 32# respectively are known te eperate y but it would appear 
that the precise figures in these eases need further confirmation before they 
ean be applied in quantitative estimates hence for purposes ef computation 
sere rates have been seasidered safer.
Granting the accuracy of the above figures for purposes ef discussion, a 
word may be said about the subsidy rate ef 60# for fertiliser in Ghana. On 
the face of it this nay sound as a staggering rate ef subsidy granted te a 
bunch ef inefficient local farmers who cannot survive without the support 
ef the Central government. But this dees not seem te be the case.
The simple fasts about the matter are straightforward. Ceeoa is the 
principal agricultural crop of Ghana. It has a single buyer who also arbitra­
rily fixes its domestic prioe - usually far below the world prioe and retains 
the difference as profits. This single buyer is the Ghana Ceeea Marketing
Beard. It is the responsibility ef the Beard te subsidise fertiliser
purchases by individual farmers out of its funds on behalf ef the state.
Although in recent years the FAO has supported various experiments in 
the use of fertilisers on subsistence crops suoh as maize9 yam9 sorghum,
tobacco and sugar sane and these efferts9 it is hoped, will progressively
36lead to rapid expansion in the consumption of fertilisers in Ghana, meanwhile
35. See B.I.U. and SEDES, Op.elt.. Vol.II, PP. U02-U01+. Other sources have 
omitted these figures and it is not very clear from the above source
whether these figures have just been proposed or have been operational
and if so, when? Zero rates have therefore been assumed.
36. Ibid.
- U3U •
••••a farmers remain the primoipal consumers. Thus the subsidy rate, though 
high, appears te be no more than an offsetting peliey - returning through the 
baokieor a portion of that part ef peasant farmers' income whioh had been 
directly expropriated through state monopoly.^
We now return to the rationale of Table 8.3. The Table assumes, as 
already noted, that the national consumption level equals national production) 
hence me adjustment is made in the computation ef the national ineeme loss 
(NIL) effect of integration with respect to that portion of a given country's 
o on sumption imported from imtra-umien sources. Since trade diversion is a 
benefit rather than a cost from the standpoint of the exporting country, 
failure to adjust the NIL for experts in the ease of exporting oountrles 
would really exaggerate the NIL. This is indeed the angle from which the 
data presented in Table 8*3 must be viewed.
As it stands it presents data on NIL under autarky, and serves two main 
purposes. First, it shows what the NIL would have been if every country wore 
te replace its imports from its own internal sources. And these figures eeuld 
be compared with what really obtains in our situation where some ef the oount­
rles obtain part of their total consumption from their union partners (see 
Table 8.5) • Second and no less important, the Table forms a convenient first 
stage in our assessment of the trade diversion effect of integration. Te 
this extent the Table dees not furnish any oenolusive evidence on the natter 
and its detailed discussion must necessarily be deferred until the seoond 
stage ef the calculation is completed.
37* For the oontroversy; which is not our concern here,over the fiscal role 
of Marketing Boards in West Africa, see H. Who than and Associate (eds.) 
Re_adi.ngs in the Applied Economics of Africa. Tel.2, Cambridge University 
Press, 1967* PP* 71-93* Also see C.K. Eiecher and C. Lledholm (eds), 
Growth and Development of the Nigerian Economy. Michigan State University 
Press, 1970.
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The second stag* of the computation involves adjusting the data for ex­
porting member countries to take abcount ef their exports to other intra-union 
partners. But to de this we eu6t first of all construct an intra-zonal trade 
matrix, which would include the four products concerned, in order te know 
who buys what and free whon. Table 8.U shows the results ef this exercise.
The Table (8.U) is constructed from the estimates of intra-regienal 
imports of the commodities in question discussed in section 2 chapter 7 and
also fron the data presented in Table 8.2. The simple projection, whioh is
38not further explained here , is based on a number of assumptions, some of 
whioh hare boon stated earlier. They includd the followings
(l) that the uniform unit oest of production of eaeh product la applied 
in eaoh country;
(li) that the ex-faotory cost of production is the reference price; and 
(ill) that a uniform dellTered/transfer prioe has been adopted in eaoh 
produotlon/exporting point (i.e. a multiple basing^point system) 
since there are more than one plant in each industry. The maim 
advantage of the uniform delivered price is that the gains or losses 
arising out of trade diversion is distributed in proportion to the 
respective countries consumption of the product (s).
The evidence presented in Table 8.1* has been obtained by multiplying 
the estimated volume of imports in eaeh importer member country by the rele­
vant delivered price. What clearly emerges from the Table is that Ghana and 
Ivory Coast are the major producers and exporters ef the commodities under
38. The nethod of demand projection has been discussed in the previous
chapter. Ve are merely using the figures here.
review; and neither of then imports any. Of the 1975 total regional import* 
of about #U million, Ghana supplied #2.37 (i.e. 59%) whilst Ivory Coast 
furnished another 33%* That is both supplied 92% ef the imports of the 
imports of the area in 1975? the figure of 99% (&i% and 35% respectively) 
for 1980 is even higher.
For all practical purposes, the other four countries (Dahomey, Rigor,
Togo and Upper Volta) buy from Ghana and Irory Coast. Although, with the 
notable exception of Togo, every member has something to offer, the contri­
bution of Dahomey, Niger and Upper Volta are very negligible indeed.
The import figures of individual countries, though in themselves an 
unsatisfactory indicator, reflect the relative strength ef their economies. 
Togo is the largest single intra-group importer, followed by Upper ^ Volta 
and Dahomey in that order. Niger has the lowest import figures (#0.55 
million in 1975 aad #0.78 million in 1980). For the region as a whole,of 
course^the value of intra-zonal trade la exceedingly small. The estimated 
values of this are #3*99 million in 1975 aad #5*78 million in 1980, These 
eeuld be described as suns hardly worth bothering about. However, it is 
oenoeivable that a more broadly based integration scheme could develop' 
from these small beginnings.
Continuing witb the second stage of our assessment of the NIL, we adjusted 
Table 8.3 for the value of exports of the intra-union producers. For Ghana 
and Ivory Coastfof oeurg^the problem ef trade diversion does not arise in this 
particular tase because beth export but do dbt import ahy *>£ the products 
from other intra-union sources.
Computed 
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This tnraiM was »Ui possible by the use ef a disaggregated data eeaplled 
ea a preduct - by-produot basis* Beeauss of spaes aad eeareaiemee, saly a 
country-by-country siinry ef these data has beea preseated ia Table 8*U*
The results yielded ia the exorcise are sboUto ia Table 8*5 as our 
estimate of the NIL effeet ef iategratiea* Put smother way, the Table preseats 
evidemoe of the degree ef NIL vhieh eaeh releTeat uaioa a^trtaer will suffer*
It reveals that ia the year 1975 the NIL origimatiag from imtegratiem-led
39protection of our four imdustries uader investigation will aaouat te #3*52 
ailliea whilst the eorreepeadiag figure for 1980 will be ef the order of 
#>•79 ailliea* Per the regiea these sums ef aeaey eaanot be regarded ae 
erippliag but ia a relative sease they represeat seas lees ef welfare* It ie 
erea mere ee whom viewed from the etgadpeiat of a wider raage ef produets*
For individual countries the raage of welfare lose epitomises the diffe­
rent# & ia import eeaeuaptiea oapaeity* While Ghana aad Ivory Coast do met 
suffer may NIL (because eaeh of then, as noted earlier, ie aelf-euffieieat ia 
the preduetiea ef the eeaaedities concerned) the NIL for the rest in 1975 
raagee from #0*65 million ia Daheaoy to #*(77 million* Tho projected figures 
for 1980 reveal similar disparities. Although these figures ia view ef our 
8eeniagly weak statistical base must be treated as teatative, they aeverthelese 
represent, at least, an order ef magnitude upon whieh polity decision regarding 
the NIL effeet ef iategratiea eould be based.
39* Balassa aad Associates apply a difftreat method la assessing the "cost" 
of protection ia a selected aunber ef LDCs (see Balassa aad Associates, The 
Struotur. of Prot»ctl»m U  D»t«1op1»k «ouatrl8B. 0p.«it.. PP.80-82). A aiuma- 
tlea of all the five elements employed yielded the net cost of protection. 
Although this method indicates the east attributable to eaeh of the five 
elements, sad while this may. serve netful comparative purposes, the technique 
utilises detailed input-out^3 tat isties for individual industries. Because we 
de not possess these data, we have adopted a different approach. It ie not 
surprising that Balassa aad Associates did not include any African country 
ia their investigation.
- 1*39 -
But, as we shall soon see the static trade diversion effects er NIL 
arising fron "inefficient specialization" nay be counterbalanced by the 
dynanic effects of protection. Foreign exchange savings where the net value 
is positive are eertaihly one of these and the succeeding subsection deals 
with this aspect.
(^0 ASSJL- SING l*X)xlEIGN E X C ' o  AVIh C ~ L A S )
The concern of this subsection is twofold. The first is to isolate the 
foreign exchange question and treat it as an independent iten fron the YAD 
estimate only for purposes of comparison and emphasis, in view of the critical 
role ef foreign exchange in the eapital formation of LDCs. But since our 
estimate of VAD has taken ears of the foreign exchange savings the figures 
in Table 8.7 will not enter our final calculations. They serve to demonstrate 
under given assumptions the foreign exchange savings effect of integration.
The second but more important issue here is to assess the difference between 
the shadow price value and the world price value of domestically produced imports.
Prior te integration eaeh country maintained ite own tariff rates and 
conceivably, depending on individual tariff levels, imported some quantity 
of the products under examination. But integration la assumed to unify the 
protective structure of the Union tariff levels which consequently eliminated 
supplies from third country sources and reserved the entire market for 
intra-union producers.
It is necessary to note that a priori import substituting industries are 
expected to save some foreign exchange without the benefit of economic 
integration and this is one of the important arguments on whioh the ease for 
import substitution in individual LDCs rests.
SOURCE* 
ECONOMY 
OF 
GHANA, 
VOL. 
1 
, P. 
85
Note! 
I m 
Value 
ef 
domestic 
sales 
of 
final 
use 
in 
tine 
t 
valued, at 
current 
world 
prices;
F ■ 
Foreign 
Exchange 
Savings 
In 
tine 
t.
CcnpuW/^
n based 
cm 
Table 
8«^L
8
-A
VO
- 4
NO
8V A V A
ro -A  
O  V A
ON -P"
VA - *
P " VA 
VA VA
p -  O  •  •  
a  -a O O
—tO -I • •
VA VA Ot> -4
w  ?
_A _A
03 O
ro - a  • •
V£ VA OO *4
Va) IO
on ro-4  oo
ro - a
-4  - i  
VA - *
ro
Va) VA 
VO Va)
VA VA
r o  - k  • •
VA "4  
ro p -
P ” w  On VoP“ -»
VA
F  F
g  g
va • •8 8
P" Va)
&  g
W  N> • •8 3
ro ro
0 0  o
V A  V O
O O • •
8 8
o  o  • •
P " ro 
VA ro
o
fe
o
8
VA
Va)
ON
oo p ­ro
ro oo
ON NO 
V O  - k
NO ON
p --4
vo vo
g  01
NO -4  
8 8
-4  VA • • 
ro p ­
O  O
VA W 
8  8
p -  ro 
8 8
o o • •
o o • •
ON V A  
- 4  r o
o  o
OO ON 
- k  V A
o o
ON P "—A vo
a» y
Va) Va) VA VA
Va)-4 o 
O n  - a
Va)
NO NO 
0 0  - 4  
O  V A
*k -A • •
- 0  - ko o
•A O r o r o
• • • •
r o 0 3 ON o
0 0 r o r o Va )
8 8
- a  o • •
r o  - 4  
O  V A
o
k
o
rv>
o
o
o
3
o o • •
00 8
o  o
to
ro
o-4
o o
- k  o
ON V A
o o
- k  o
ON V A
O O • •
i o  8
p -  t o
IO  Va ) 
IO  OO
Va )
—k -4 
ON OO
NO
NO NO 
0 3  —4  
O  V A
Va )  IO
o  o
Va) IO  • •
O 8  
ro -a
V *  5 ?
8  8
-4 O • •
ro o
r o  - a
- A  P "o  o
O  O •A
-a oVa) P" 3  s
o  o
Va) r o  
V A  Va )
O O
r o
ON
o  o
ON P "  
V A  O 0
O O
8  k
-A 00
r o  v a  O -a
0 D  ON • •S 'si
O M 
O  CO fc) M 
M  CO
o
H
►
►
o
o►
£3
a
M
O
w
w
HI
o
o
o
w
H
o
w
o
a
I
CO
“4
- W *  -
Thus ve axe concerned not with the aggregate foreign exchange sawed by the 
establishment of the industries being studied but with the difference between 
the total and that portion which would hare been saved anyway without integra­
tion* Put precisely, ve are interested only in the savings of foreign exchange 
nade possible by integration*
For laek of data on current input-output eo-effiolents pertaining to 
the individual countries, and industries under discussion, we adopt a datum 
derived fron the inter-sectoral accounts ef the eeoneny ef Ghana as a rough 
estlnats of the input eo-affieieat in the four industries (see Table 8*6)*
The 19^0 inter-sectoral accounts of the economy ef Ghana indicate that the 
"production matrix" co-efficient for imported inputs in the manufacturing 
sector is of the order ef 0*25^°* Table 8*6, whioh is provided mainly for 
general interest, illustrates the inter-sectoral relationships in greater 
detail*
Thus to guage the amount of foreign exchange saved as a result ef 
integration-induced expansion, we have obtained the results presented in 
Table 8*7 by Bolving the following equations
1*0. The aotual oo-efficient (see Table 8*6) is 0*227 but it is thought
that given the trend towards oapital intensity and industrial expansion 
the share of imported over domestic inputs might have slightly increased 
since the input-output table was constructed*
W*3
where 1^ = value of domestic sales of fimal use in tine t (i,e. 1970,
1971-80) (valued at world prices)|
■ imported inputs in tine t '
Ft * foreign exeh“ ?* “ Tln^  ln «** *•
Table 8.2 furnishes data on the value of the variable 1^ at any one tine and
having obtained the inported input eo-efflelent, the ealeulatlen beoane nore
or less straightforward.
Against eaeh produet the aaount of foreign esohange saved speaks for
itself. Petreleun tops the list ln the foreign exchange savings league,
followed by oenent. As Table 8.7 demonstrates, foreign enehange savings on
petreleun lnperts will anount to £10 million and £13*8 million in 1975
and 1980 respectively. The corresponding figures fer oenent will be about
£6.7 million and £9*5 Million. Savings on the import of shoos would also bo
substantial * £6.1* million in 1975 £8.U million in 1980. For tho wholo
region, total foreign exohange savings mads will add up to £21*.9 million in
1975 and £3i*.8 million in 1980.
Based on world prices, wo have shown abeve the aneunt ef foreign exohamgt
that weuld be saved. These figures cannot of course form part of tho benefits
ef integration as they have already been counted as part ef the integration
YAD. However, given the assumption^1 that shadow prices are in certain
circumstances higher than world prices, it ean be shewn that world priees
1*1. See H. Jeshi, "World Prices as shadow Prices* A critique”, Bulletin of 
the Oxford University Institute of Economics and statistics. 3i* (l)» 
February, 1972, PP. 53-72*
- I M  -
understate the domestic value of fereigm exchange. The seoend part of this 
sub8ootiom trios to dotormlmo tho difference between the two prices with a 
view to adjusting our estimate of integration— -induced YAD te take account
ef it.
The distinction between shadow prices and world prices of course arises 
from criticisms of the little-ttirrless model of project appraisal. Im our 
earlier discussion, we noted that Little and Mirrlees considered "world prioes"
to be the appropriate "shadow prices" for project evaluation since the ferner
1 ?represent a country's aetual trading Opportunities. But the Little—
Mirrlees view has been widely contested. In particular, it is argued that there 
are ways in which economies may diverge from tho model in whioh world prieoo 
are the correct accounting prices. Joshi contends that "the use of werld prioes 
as shadow prioes is strictly only applicable in an open economy, perfectly 
competitive in world markets, with fully employed domestio capacity, and it is, 
strictly speaking, incorrect to use world prioes te value goods which have
I ^
limited access to world markets.
Surely, West African economies are neither perfectly competitive nor are
idtheir domestic resources fully employed due poor internal inter-sectoralA*
integration o f  these economies. Furthermore, since the products ve are
concerned with have highly limited aooess to world markets, it is unlikely
that world prioes would adequately reflect the value domestic consumers place
on then. Thus we want to go beyond the acceptance of world prioes as correct
accounting prices.
1*2. See Chapter 7, Footnote 21.
1*3* H. 3oshi, Qp.cit.. P* 56
- M*5 -
Of a number of recent attempts^* to determine the shadow prioe of foreign 
exchange for project evaluation purposes one is particularly nere relevant to 
our case* It is the study oarried out by Dr* J.C. Leith in whieht as at
end of December, 1967> he nade oaleulations to detemine the shadow prioe of
\Xforeign exchange in a selected group of LDCe* He notes that the shadow prioe 
of foreign exchange is the internal valuq ef a unit of foreign exohange hut it 
is not neceeaarily the equilibriun price of foreign exohange* Conceptually, 
this is understandable* It is often noted that given the complexity of 
objectives and constraints in any actual economy, it nay be difficult te devioe 
the entire simultaneous problems* Hence the only shadow prices which have 
theoretical validity are these associated with the exaot solution of the general 
equilibriun optimum problem.^ Thus the shadow price of foreign exohange 
with whioh we are concerned here is at best * approximately right" and while 
it nay oo-ineide with the equilibriun price of foreign exchange, we offer no 
theoretical guarantee that it must*
According to Leith, the shadow prioe of the Ghana cedi, whioh was the
I •*
only West African currency in the list, was US #1*20 - implying a rate of 
divergence of ever and above its world/official price of US #1*02 at the 
time* The calculation assumes that the elasticity of supply of foreign exohange 
is one-half the elasticity of demand for foreign exohange* We have in the
absence of nere reliable data used the above rate of divergence in our own
» ■ <aj: tkiMJtuv .f-i f .  rvO U _. ^  r o f  C -f •• J* Clark Leith, "The shadow Price of Foreign Exohangei Conceptual Framework 
and Estimates for selected countries", Canadian International Development
Agency (CIDA), Report* 1969*
1*6* See V* Jeshi, "The Rationale and Relevance of the Little-Kirrlefcs Criterion" 
Bulletin of the Oxford U-iversity Institute of Economics and Statistics,
Vol. 3 h (1), February 1972, P. U.
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estimate8. For one thing, the devaluatiom of tho Ghana oedi ia July, 1967 
helped to rationalise its official prioe* Pro— -1967 and post— 1970 rates 
ooeaod out of tune and artificial for purposes of analysis* Thus ve hare 
adopted the 1967 rate of divergence in Ghana as tho proxy data for the rates 
of divergence operational within tho GECS over tho sane period*
Our results are presented in Table 8*8* Tho calculations are very sinple* 
Table 8*7 already eon tains tho integration-induced TAB estimates which were 
based on world prices* To arrive at the shadow prioe ef eaeh iten we norely 
increased its value at world prioe by 18#, the rate ef divergence being the 
difference between the dhadev prioe value and the world price value*
Although, as Table 8*8 shows the difference with respect te individual
products is not much, the sane cannot be said ef the total er overtine* 5y
1979 the rate of divergence will amount te about US ^6 million and ever 
US j£8 million by 1980* And no the range of products entering imtra-somal market 
widens the figures would continue te increase - all things being equal*
(▼) SVALUATIOK OF THE CAPITAL COST OF PROJECTS ( A x ) .
Unlike foreign exchange savings, the oapital costs of integration
' I Aprojects in the original Andies - Dosser nedelu were treated as a negative
iten in the welfare sense because in the absence of a Common Development
li9Bank members would invest large suns of money competing for alternative
U7« The other countries covered in the exercise includet Kenya vlth a diver­
gence rate of 11*2#j Tanaania, 11*7%; Uganda, 9*5%! Jamaica, 9*1# Trinidad, 7*2#| 
Ceylon, 10*7#f Malaysia, 6*2#| and El Salvador, 8*0# (see J*C*Leith, Op.sit).
1*8* See Andie, et al Op.clt** P* 39*
li9* Surely, this dees not imply that capital raised through a Common Develop­
ment Bank has no opportunity eost* But the availability of leans fron sush a 
bank would free oapital generated from internal sources for other competing uses*
-  1*8 -
ends in the new integration projects* But in our own case we described A X
as the capital cost of the unused portion of the regional industry*s eapaolty
and/or the cost ef expansion to a particular country*s account (chapter 7)#
In the cases we examine the industries hare been established already and the
costs incurred and the industries ceuld continue to exist with er vitheut
economic union of any kind* Henoe the effeotire use ef that portion of the
oapaeity of existing plants which hitherto had been idle should be soon, even
allowing for the "user" cost arising out of plant maintenance, as a positive
rather than a negative contribution to welfare*
But, given our definition of I (as integration-induced VAD) and our
assumption of complete import replacement, this contribution to welfare must
have been allowed for in the estimate of VAD (which includes non-industrial
costs, labour inoome and operating surplus)*^ It therefore follows that in
order to avoid the error of double-oounting the estimated value of A l  will
not oeunt towards the determination of Aw* Nonetheless, the issue of oapital
requirements and utilisation moods to be fully indicated in this subseetien for
its importance with particular reference to establishing financial institutions
for promoting integration industries within an integration scheme*
In the particular case under review not all the industries, as ve shall
soon see, have enough excess capacity to produce the additional output required
to supply tho entire regional market up te 1980 in the absence ef extra-area
imports* The inference from this is that some plants will be expanded at an
additional oost in order to meet the level of intra-zonal
50# Both the benefit from fuller utilisation of existing capacity amd the 
attributable oost of mow oapital with rospoot to the expansion of existing 
oapaeity have been taken care of in the estimate of VAD and cannot justifiably 
be counted again as part of
- i*9 -
demand* This additional oapital oost of expansion since it is integration-led 
is a loss item to a givon country's account* Thus whether A l  would be positive 
or negative in this case cannot be determined a priori: it all depends on 
whether the assessed value of the excess capacity of plants mobilised is 
greater or smaller than the additional expenditure incurred im the expansion 
of plants* Needless to say, where both Values are equal, AlC would be sere*
Based on the 1970 world prioes, the estimates of the capital oest of 
individual projects have been made (Table 3*9)* Our estimates utilised the 
data on industrial studies provided im the previous ohapter* As Table 3*9 
illustrates, the figures in the first oelunn represent the estimated oapital 
cost of each plant in each country but the data in the second column where 
such existed are the assessed values of the unused portions ef existing plant 
eapaolty* The figures ia brackets mill be explained later* The initial values
  CMof the projects were obtained from U0-S&DES studies^ whilst tho Freese 
capacity" value in eaoh ease was arrived at by multiplying the total value of 
each project by the percentage of ito capacity that is uautllisod* The results 
reveal the structure cf utilisation of capacity in tho industries revolved*
The degree of under-utilization of existing oapaeity varies mot only from 
plant to plant but also from country to countxyl But it is more pronounced im 
Ghana than in other countries* The relatively higher level of oapaeity 
utilization in
51* dee 2*I*U*, et al, Op, oit** Vols. 1-3* ‘The information obtained from thim 
source is tentative as the authors had difficulties in trying to esess-
cheok their figures fron official files* However, this ie the enly source 
of information readily available on this*
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the Irory Coast may bo attributable9 ia part, to tho else of its exports to tho 
other Sntente states* Sise of plaats also aooouats for tho lover level of 
oapaeity utillzatiea ia Ghana for the Ghaaaaiaa plaats f oxoept ia the ease 
of foetwear9 are uniformly higher than the Iroriaa ones* la the other GSCS 
countries however under-capacity utilization eould be biased ehiefly oa 
demand factors*
Given tho assumption that eeemenio integration would ultimately lead
to full utilisation of existing plant eapaeity9 we have examined our ease
ia the light of this presumption* The demand projections discussed ia tho
previous ohapter indicate that the capacity of existing plaats to produce
the additional output required by all intra-union consumers, if all imports
were domestically produced9 varies* The oil refineries and the fertiliser
plants have enough capacity to meet intra-union demand up to 1980^ whilst
the other plants ean only supply the union narket up to 1978* This means
that the footwear and cement factories will be expanded after 1978 to meet
the level of intra-area demand up te 1980*
Because the end of 1980 is the terminal date of our demand projections9
the additional cost of expansion required to moot the projected consumption
level up to 1980 with respoot to the two products noted above must now bo
estimated* In view of the small volume of additional output required over
a two year period, 1979*80, it would be economically wiser to concentrate
expansion in one plant in mash industry, since, as wo noted in the previous
52* It ean be argued that some additional resouries, namely recurrent
expenditure would be required to fully utilise, the oxeess oapaeity of 
these plants* This is certainly true* But, given tho highly capital 
intensive nature of oil refineries, the additional cost of fully utili­
sing the plants in relation to their value would, in this ease as in 
all the others be very marginal indeed - henee we are ignoring this 
particular consideration*
• h5$ -
chapter, theee plants were constructed for easy expansion# Considering 
also the need for equity and diffused development within an integration 
shhene, we decided on a careful examination of Table 8*9 that the following 
plants should be expanded! the footwear factory at Abidjan (ivory Coast) 
and the cement plant at Malbaza (Higer). To guage the cost of expansion in
oach case, ve multiplied - in the absence of aetual expansion data - the
53unit cost of eaeh product by the quantity of it needed over a two-year 
period to arrive at an indicative estimate of the cost of expansion* Both 
the unit price data and the additional demand figures were obtained fron 
the data supplied in the preceding chapter* The results, whioh are ff0*3 
million for the footwear plant in the Ivory Coast and #0*35 million for the 
oement factory in Higer, are presented in brackets in Table 8*9*
Ve contended earlier that whether l \ K  is a positive or negatlge item 
depends on whether the value of excess capacity (l*e* the value of the unused 
portion of the imtial oapital expenditure) is higher er lower than the 
additional cost of expansion* In this case all the relevant data are pre­
sented in Table 8*9* As the Table clearly shows the value of A t  is uniformly 
positive in eaoh ease* The only notable exception concerns the footwear 
industry in the Ivory Coast, where the cost of expansion canecls out the value 
of unutilised oapaeity* That is, if we deduct £0*30 million being the assessed 
value of the unutilised portion of the footwear plant from jfo*30 million which
53* The unit cost here includes raw materials, interest and depreciation, 
labour oest, overhead and profit*
- 1*52 -
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it the additional oost of expanding the plant* the net ralue ef A k  would 
be zero* With re epee t te the eenent plant in Niger* the teat ef expansion 
(#0*35*) ie lees than the ralue of the unuaed part ef the plants oapaeity 
(#0*1+0 million)* henee the ralue ef in this oaee would bo #0*05 nillion*
In the other cases where nc expansion costs were incurred the ralue of the 
unutilised portion of plant capacity in oaoh establishment automatically 
became the ralue ef A k *
For purposes of comparison ve disaggregate in Table 8*10 the 1970 
estimates of A k * We are specifically interested in kmeving the different 
values ©f A k  in 1975 **d 1980 respectively. This certainly calls for two 
different assumptions with respect to the lives of projects since the lives 
of projects determine the rate* of depreciation of plants* In ether words* 
te determine the 1975 *md 1960 values of A k  fron 1970 figures* we assume 
project lives of 5 years sach to arrive at the 1975 value but 10 years IS* 
assumed for the estimate for 1960*
Disaggregated Emdlaate cf cout of Projects in US £*.
t Ghana Jv«y Ceast Niger L Upper Veita Daheaer Teg® [ Regie*
1970 15.20 2.1*0 0.05 1.20 19.85
1975 3.02 0.1*9 0.01 - 0.23 - 3.75
1980 1.50 0.25 0.00 - 0.11 mo 1.85
Seurees Calculated from Tablo 8*9
Given these assumptions the corresponding compound depreciation ratebfer 1975 
and 1980 would be 1U#87% and 7*16^ respectively*^ These are rates that would 
reduce an/ given value y when applied9 to sere after a stated tine period* We 
applied these depreciation rates to ebtain the figures in Table 8*10.
The abeve results are eensistent with oonen experience• Plants depreeiate 
in value as they grow older, hence the value of /\g depends on tine.
Before we conclude this ehapter9 a consideration ef the transport factor 
is important* Of sourcef as in the ease ef capital, the results obtained fren 
the following analysis fall outside our estimate ef the welfare benefits ef 
integration because ef the danger ef double counting* Our earlier estimate of 
TAD took the transport-cost faeter into consideration* Nevertheless, a quanti­
tative assessment ef the transport problems ef the region would help te feetis 
attention eft the effects ef transportation on prices and investment locations*
(vi) THK TRANSPORT-COST FACTOR
Chapters 2 and 7 have discussed various aspects of the transport problems 
ef the region* Here we merely want te put a figure on these earlier discussions* 
Per the purpose of this estimate, we assume two production zones for eaeh 
industry! the Southern Zone (comprising Ghana, Ivory Ceast and Togo) and the
5U. For the formula and conpmunding rates ef growth/depreeiatiea, see H*T*
Burley, Growth Rate Tables. Cambridge University Press, 1966 PP* 10 and 23»
- U55 -
Northern Zone (comprising of Niger end Upper Volta) It has boon shown in 
the seetion on industrial studios that, given a similar seals of operation, 
produotion and distribution oosts within eaeh sens will reveal marginal diffe­
rences. Similarly, the average o.i.f# prioe of imports in tho coastal areas 
are eonparable to the average ox-works prioe ef loeal products at the eoastal/ 
southern produotion points (see Tables 7*6, 7«1£» 7*18 end 7*21). Since there 
is little or no marked difference between the average ex-werks price ef southern 
produets and tho average o.i.f price of the imported ones we cam obtain am 
imdioative estimate of tho additional transport cost of homo production vis-a- 
vis imports and/or tho additional oost of northern vis-a-vis exclusive southern 
produotion simply by comparing the two semal prioes. Cost differentials in 
seme products vary very widely between tho two semes. This do doubt arises ffen 
the existence of sons suboptimun produotion points# Viewed from the regional 
standpoint this entails seme measure ef welfare lose, though there nay be 
offsetting political considerations* But our eonoem is economic#
Having assumed for analytical simplicity two production-consunption pride 
zones, the average consumer price in eaoh zone has been determined as the 
effeotlve zonal price# Tho difference between the prices of any one eennodity 
in the two sonee forms a part of the eost of integration# And^in tho eireums- 
tanoes of tho region, this is principally attributable to differences in
55« It is assumed that it is a matter of indifference whether plants are
scattered throughout a "similar coot" area er eonoemtrated im ome place. 
Prom a practical polmt of view a spread rather than a concentration of 
plants is preferable,although costs nay not be seriously affostod#
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transport oosts and tariff charges (Table 7*0* When the unit price 
differential is Multiplied by the total volume of imports by the high oost 
consumers,^* the total regional coat per commodity is derived* This has been 
done in relation to the oonnodites shown in Table 8*11* Evidently, the table
shows what the region would be lossing at any point in time if the high cest
producers and consumers maintained their prioe levels*
As we noted earlier9 unit price differentials in footwear are very meglible
and fertiliser products axe subject to heavy subsidy in 3oae countrios* Fer
lack of accurate data on the subsidy levels and price distortions created by
the subsidy itself, the estimate of real prioe differentials here has not boom
deemed of much explanatory value* Even so, the volume of tills prod\ict entering
the regional market can only uake a marginal difference*
With respect to the rest, especially cement, the difference is phenomenal*
Per cement it is #32*00 bnt only #i|.80 per ton for petroleum. Tho operation
of these suboptiaal prices will involve additional transport/production cost of
#2 .15 million in 197? ancl will progressively increase to #3*07 million in 1980*
The operation of two wide-ranging sets of prices within a group - one ef
which is pptimal from the regional viewpoint and the other sub-optimal - raises
a crucial question for members. This question is: Can a single delivered price
operate throughout the unified market irrespective of cost differentials? The
obvious answer to this key question^ which is yes, teucheB upon all fac^ fe of tho
56* In our situation, the high cost consumers are also the high oost produc£Lx£> 
hence the two terns are used synonymously* The upland states of Higor and 
Upper Volta are very remote from the sea* And whether they import consumer 
goods produced in the eeastal countries or import inputs from tho rost-of-
tho-verld, long land haulage from the sea will increase their unit price*
- U58 -
wider questieni Hew oan the eeete aad benefits ef eeenenie integration be 
equitably distributed among the participants? This problem has for some tine
t jengaged the attention of sene experts in this field^' whs attached speeial
inpertanoe te it* Indeed9 as demonstrated in chapter 5» the sueeess or failure
ef any regional grouping depends upon the acceptability ef the formula offered
in solYing the equitable distribution problem by all the parties eencerned*
Because the next ohapter will be devoted to a full diseussion ef this issue
with a riew to offering policy quids line s9 we h&Ye only posed the question here
without answering it* But it may be asserted that a pricing policy written
into the common market agreement ean by offering subsidies - financed from a
common pool - te the high cost intra-union importers maintain a single deliYered
price for eaeh oonmodity throughout suoh eeenenie community9 even if this
means operating two sets ef prices - one for intra-union trade and the other
for extra-union transactions*
3. RESULTS AND SUMMARY
An estimate ef the benefits and oests of integration to central-west
Africa has been made in the foregoing section* The results are summarily
presented in Table 8*12
The net welfare gain from integration, as shown in column 6, is derived
from the expansion ef the four industries studied* This benefit is the sum ef
value-added (eel*2) and foreign exchange savings (eel*3) minus the national
57* See Peter Robson, "Current Problems of Economic Integration", Op*elt*
PP* 1$-37l H*S* Bhanbrl, "Customs Uhiens and Underdeveloped Countries", 
i» SoomoMlo Iatermaaloatde, (GemeYa), Vel.XV, Ne. 2, Kay 19*2, PP. 20 a*4 
221 M.S. Wlomotelc (a*.), goenoalc .Co-Aeration in. Lati* America, Africa 
and Asia. On*citi and D.M*Schydlowsky, "allocating Integration Industries 
ia the Andeaa Groups, J w m l  ef Ceamon Market Studies. Vel. 9 (U),
June, 1971•
A.
• 1*59 -
income lean (Table 8.5)• Columns U and 5 are culled from the intra-union 
trade matrix in Table 8.1** That columns 1* and 5 are equal is hardly 
surprising. This is because under our assumption of complete import replace­
ment the total value ef intra-union experts and imports must be equal (eol.l*)* 
Similarly, whereas the "concessions" column represent the benefit of trade 
diversion te the exporter (i.e. the "received" sub-column refere8 to expert 
receipts ef the intra-union exporter), and the equal and opposite cost of trade 
diversion to tho importer (i.e. the "given" sub-column relates to the expendi­
ture ef the intra-union importer), the sum ef export receipts aad aggregate 
expenditure on imports im this east are bound to be equal. Thu% the two columns, 
though supposedly different, offer the sane information here. With respect to 
the first column aone allied economic indicators have been shown net only te 
refleet the relative strength and consequent impact of integration on the 
individual economies but also for comparative purposes.
Prom the standpoint of the impact of economic integration on the economies 
ef GECS, we are more interested in the last column ef Table 8.12. As it 
clearly shows, the bulk of the net welfare gain gees to Ghana and Ivory Coast. 
Por instance, by 1980 about half of the regional total will go te the former 
alone whilst another third will go to the latter. Only about 1/6 will accrue 
to the other four weaker menbers. The welfare benefit fron integration for 
the GECS as a whole, of course, will amount te slightly ever £35 million in 
197$ a*d about £1*9 million in 1980. It is of the order ef 10.2# ef the 
forecasted value added in manufacturing ln 1975 aad would progressively account 
for 11.9^ by 1980.
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This would imply am integration-induced improvement in tho region* s growth rate 
of GNP of 0*7)6 in 1975 and 0*9)6 at the end of 1980. In other terms, with 
integration, the average intra-group rate of growth would be of tho order of 
5*7)6 in 1975 and of 5*9)6 in 1980* Without it, tho rate would tend to atagnato 
at around 5)6 over tho period 1975-80*
The weakness of the at&tiatioal foundation of our estimates notwith­
standing, it is clear to see that ooonomio Integration holds out the prospect 
of improvement in the eeenomic performance of tho region* This conclusion 
becomes all the more inescapable when produot market co-operation ia extended 
to a wider range of produets im whieh intra-union trade ia both feasible and 
profitable* Aside from the four industrial products studied, potentials for 
intra-zonal trade exist in several other manufactures (Table 7*22)* Ghana esuld 
further expert the following to tho Sntente state at semi-finished natal 
produota, blankets, enamel u^ksll£ , stocks and stoakimgai and could, on tho 
other hand, Importt cotton textiles, synthetic fibres and garments, sisal cord
C-O
and rope, fibre sacks aad leather, and, in the longer term, bicycles • The 
expleitatien of these potentials, no doubt, would substantially increase tho 
contribution of economic integration to the economic growth of the rogiom*
The structure ef industrial produotion would also benefit from integration* 
In the first place, there would be a certain degree of specialisation involving 
considerable rationalization of the existing structure and adherence to the 
"doctrine** of comparative advantage* Im consequence, wastes would not only 
be minimised but also there would be a greater emphasis on heavy industries with
• 1^ 61 -
58* See B*I*U and SEDES, Op * cit** Tol* III, PP. 85-88.
regional integration than with six separate national markets* Over tine it 
weuld not be unreasonable to oxpoet tho share ef industrial produotion im GHP 
vie-a-vis agriculture to increase* Furthem o r e  integration-led industrial 
expansion means, subject to the techniques employed, more jobs. Given, as 
noted earlier, the level of unemployment in the region, job creation is an 
important economic as well as political policy goal* The available data on 
employment in the industries reviewed are Bketchy to permit any satisfactory 
estimate on which to base firm conclusions. Nevertheless, the patchy informa­
tion (BXU & S3DSS) indicates that the full utilization and/or expansion of 
the industries under consideration will generate an additional employment of 
350-1*50 workers between 1975 **d 1980*
In conclusion, one can say that, in an era when many people from tho LDCs 
are beginning to think that insofar as their future development was concerned 
they have to pull themselves up by their own bootstraps, economic integratiom 
between LDCs offers seme nom-quantifiable psychopelitical reassurance and 
satisfaction* But^if such satisfaction is to last, as ve shall show in tho 
sucoeeding ohapter, the distributive mechanism of the integration scheme must 
stand the test ef time*
- U62 -
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The previous ohapter identified aad quantified the prlaeipal sources 
ef gain* er losses arising fron the various effects ef economic* Iategratiea* 
But it la act necessarily the magnitude ef these benefits and/er easts that 
ensures the effectiveness aad cohesion of Integration arrangements* It is 
rather the establishment aad effective implementation ef a fair aad 
acceptable distribution fcrania. Experience suggests that ia already 
existing schemes where inadequate attention has been given to the problem ef 
equitable distribution ef the fruits ef iategratiea tensions have arisen* 
Indeed, as we have 3hown earlier, some arrangements have been unanimously 
dissolved as in the ease ef TJD3A0* Others like the UDEAC have broken down, 
whilst seme itere, such ac IAFTA, have become for all practical purposes weak 
prefenential trade nenes whioh are lafcgely ineffective umbrellas ever the 
heads ef several groups with conflicting immediate interests* ‘ Sven the 5ACM 
which is the nest successful integration experiment en the African continent 
te date was in Marsh 19&U narrowly salvaged fron disintegration whioh had 
threatened it* And the crisis was rested in the glaring inequality in the 
distribution ef the common market benefits* In this chaptsr we review the 
major causes ef friction and uneven distribution of the benefits of 
integration vlth a view to nuking some recommendations.
1* See M*S* Vionczek (ed*), Economic Co-onoration in Latin America, _*friea
and Asia* Op* eit*, P. 11
1 . ctrsTOKs REmros iffbcts ato the
ACTUAL DISTRIBUTION OP COSTS AHD 
BENEFITS
One of tho problems which countries entering an integration oeheme has 
to face is tho prospective loos of customes revenue« This is a matter of 
eonsiderable importance to many LDCe, especially these of Africa South of tho 
Sahara where customs duties normally account for a largo share of total
pgovernment revenue and also whore tho raising of revenues fron other souroos 
difficult* Indeed, since revenueduties are primarily levied on manufactured 
goods, and whereas the objective of integration sohenfo is the progressive 
replacement ef manufactures Imported from outo&do tho i&togratod market by 
goods produced within it, tho loos of customs revenue io likely to be quite 
large if the seheme succeeds in its purpose.
However, in the eases considered in this study, it is not thought that 
the loss of customs revenue will deal a crippling blew (Table 8.5) • But thin 
is because we have considered only four products* When the product coverage 
of integration industries starts te widen, aa it ie hoped, the effect would 
be quite considerable. Thus the problem must be thoroughly examined and a 
specific solution formulated from the oufcset.
• 2*6U •
2* See Table 6.2 for the cases under review.
The loss of custom* revenue hat? two dimensions. It oconrr. both la ths
countries that eetabllrh industries te replace imports from outside the
integrated market end ln their partner countries that import their products.
Viewed from the aide of the producing countries, governments will - albeit 
3small — gain revenues fro* the tares paid by the producing firm and the 
manpower it employs (ohapter 8)f which, it is hoped, will compensate in 
varying degrees fer the less of customs receipts, whereas the governments in 
the importing countries might not have offsetting increments in tax receipts*^ 
Also from the standpoint of the intra-union importing partners trade diversion 
quite often *eans not only loss ef customs revenue but also, at least In the 
short-run, more expensive goods than those from third oountrles, Because the 
weaker importing partner countries would pay higher prioes for similar goods 
hitherto Imported from third oountrles, the balance of trade and payments of 
these oountrles would consequently be worsened.
3* Tax receipts fro* income and company profits usually form a oaall portion 
ef government revenue in nest LDCs, Between 1965 end 1968 the average 
value of tax receipts fron these two souroes accounted for only 12% of the total 
public revenue in the I very Coast, 10% in Dahomey, 0% ln Vigor, 13% in Togo,
16% in Upper Yolta and 18% in Ghana. Over the cane period the computed average 
share ef import duties in total public revenues ef these oeuntrlss was 1+9*3%
(see IMF, Surveys of African Economies. Vol. 3, 1970 as well as Table 6.2). It 
is dear fron these figuresthat extra receipts free direct taxes following 
economic integration oan only nitigate rather than offer an adequage coiapensatiea 
fer the oerrespoading lens ef customs revenue.
1+. As we noted in the preceding footnote, extra direct tax receipts nay net 
be large enough to offset tho revenue loss fron customs duties. Bven ss, 
there is no reason why union members may not permit those most badly hit im the 
overall interest of the grouping to introduce substitute revenue duties (such 
as consumption and salts taxes) on a nom-dlscriminatory bails (i.e., levied 
equally en domestic production, imports from partner countries and imports from 
third countries). The extent to which members suffer from the revenue loss 
effect of integration depends on tho typo of compensating arrangement worked 
out in a given situation (See D.N., Current Problems of gpononlc Integration. 
"The distribution of benefits and oests and integration among developing 
countries," V.T., 1973 (T2/B/39l+)» P* 17*
Of course, each member ef am integration scheme will eventually beoone 
both a producer of exports to its partners and an importer ef the latter* s 
exports (Table 7*22), so that eaoh government will have some additional tax 
receipts from enterprises supplying the subregional market te compensate fer 
losses of eustons revenue | and this customs revenue loss in our ease is taken 
to be about twiee^ the real national imeene less oesasioned by trade diversion 
(i.e. double the cost of trade diversion) which was estimated in the previous 
chapter (Table 8.5)* Bven so, to the extent that the more developed eenmorn 
market partners will tend to attract a disproportionate share ef new industries 
fer reasons previously mentioned, they will tend to become net exporters ef 
manufactures to their less developed partners (Table 8.1+) and they will be 
able to offset losses ef eustons receipts by additional tax revenues from 
productive activities to a greater extent than the less developed member 
countries.
Although, conceivably, the less ef eustons revenue constitutes a leas of
real resources fer the importing country, it canvas already noted, be
recovered through ether fiscal arrangements. Fer it dan be argued that the
elimination ef import duties, like the remisslen ef any ether indirect tax
paid by the citizens of a country, simply reduces the share of income obtained
5* This is consistent with eur earlier definition and assumption relating
to the computation of the national intone less (See section 2(iii) and
footnote 33 of ohapter 8).
6. Fer a useful exposition ef this idea, eee P. Robsea, Fiscal Compensation
as a Means of Cpntributing.J;q an Eftiutab^ of the Costs and
Benefits Associated with Economic Groupings of Less Developed Countries, 
Geneva, 1970.
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'by the government* The government eould in theory offset the loss of customs
revenue, fox example, by imposing am excise duty or domestic sales tax on
certain categories of goods regardless of their origin (footnote 1*)» Io
practice, collection of such taxes nay be administratively difficult and 
7expensive* Hence an alternative means ef compensation for the revenue loss
may have to be devised*
However, before ve go on to suggest alternative means of eompensation
for the loss ef revenue, it is pertinent at this point to recall the estimate
of the magnitude of the NIL arising from market integration in the specified
products which ve presented in Table 8*5* Based on tho intra-union trade matrix
the estimate of tho NIL was obtained for oaoh country, oxoopt Ghana and
Ivory Coast for vhich no losses are involved since they de not import any of
tho commodities examined*
Table 8*5 figures depiet the NIL, vhieh, as ve neted above, is only 50%
of the eustens revenue less* That 1st the magnitude of the latter vould be
twice that of the former* In practical terms, this moans that for tho GECS
group tho customs revenue less will amount to about US #7*0 million in 1975»
increasing to US ^11*58 million by 1980* Although for tho group as a whole
the magnitude of this loss vould not be particularly crippling, it is neither
fairly distributed individually nor bome by all. No doubt, for tho four poorer
members of tho grouping to bear such a loss in four products alone vould hurt
their eeenonies individually and eelleetively - hence the need fer some action*
7* See UK (ECA), Economic Co-operation and Integration in Africa, Op, eit*
P* 32* Bpt, even if revenue lessee ean be recovered, the cost of trade
diversion vould still remain*
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Fron the forego 1mg it fellows that losses have boom imourred aad the
eardinal question mow is how to offset or mitigate them* As we have repeated
eOrlier9 given the apriori reasoning that imta-regional trade expansion will
generate additional tax reeeipte fron the expanding subregional enterprises
o
aad additional labour employed, part of these losses could be offset* But 
generating additional tax receipts is one thing and quite another te ensure
their even distribution within the integrated area* Thus, herein lies the ease
fer a regional formula for mitigating the eests, and fairly distributing the 
benefits, ef market integration*
The formulation ef a possible equitable distribution aeohanisn, of course, 
must meeessarily start with aa examinatiom of the aotual distribution ef the 
coats and benefits of market integration in the designated products* Tho aotual 
or what wo might call "laissez fairs’', distribution of these oosts and benefits 
was sunnari8sd in column 6 of Table 8*12*
▲ close examination of the Table reveals some important features* The 
gains or losses whioh result fron market integration are not evenly distributed 
within the integrated area* The more advanced countries (i*e. Ghana and 
Ivory Coast) have a very disppoportiomate share of the total benefits* The
two oountrles combined would obtain 8U*£^ of the total net benefits ia 1975 *nd
a slightly lower figure ef the order ef 83«3fc in 19&0* Individually, shares 
of Ghana and Ivory Ceaat would account for 51*1% and 33*2# respectively in 
1975 end similar ratios would be maintained by 19$0*
6* Although this argument is fairly true in the ease examined here, it requires 
sens qualification. Expansion of produotion where underutilisation ef labour 
has persisted nay not lead te substantial additional enploynemt of labour, if any*
The sane will be true if the technique of produotion changes in favour of
oapital intensity*
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This means that the combined shares ef the ether four countries would account 
for only some of the total net benefits all the tine*
Another interesting feature ef this distribution pattern is that the 
shares of the poorer menber states, both in relation te costs and benefits, are 
fairly more even relative to those of the richer members• This Implies that 
the foous of attention in regard t© distributional equity would be mostly 
concentrated on the gap between the "rich* and the "poor"*
Thus, the most Important conclusion one ean draw from Table 8*12 is that 
the distribution of the envisaged benefits and costs of market integration in 
the GECs states would be disproportionately skewed in favour ef Ghana and 
Ivory Coast to the disadvantage ef the already poorer states* When, as we 
shall do later, the aetual pattern ef distribution is compared with a nere 
equitable distribution proposed in this study, the unfairness implied in the 
aeutal distribution will become nere glaring*
Because in terns ef eeenenie development the members of the proposed 
GECS common market fall into two categories - the poorer and* the more advanced • 
any feasible solution to the problem ©f equitable distribution of costs and 
benefits, especially the revenue less issue, must reflect this phenomenon* 
Conceivably, this would inply granting certain concessions to the 
poorer members in respect of freeing of trade* It nay be in twe phases*
During the first phase the poorer members could be allowed four ef five
years than the more advanced countries to eliminate tariffs, even if the letter's
gains would be reduced*
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That iat they will have until 1980 te de ae instead ef 1975? When the first 
phase is over and tariff has been eliminated the aeutal problem ef uneven 
distribution ef the leas ef eustons revenue will oene te the fere*
Te deal with the problem a fern ef oonpensatery tax ean be devised 
whioh we shall call "Offsetting Tax" (OT)* Beth in feature and orientation 
this will be very similar to the devioe which has been introduced in the 
Central African Customs and Economic Union (UDEAC), the ee-c&lled wtaxo unique11* 
The tax unique, whioh is tantamount to an excise duty, la collected on 
finished produote at the Bourse ef production in return for the exemption ef 
manufactureb fron import duties on raw materials and equipment coming fron 
third countries*^ The rates ef the OT, like the "taxe unique", would be 
considerably lower than the import duties and taxes on equivalent imports and 
the proceeds fron this exeise tax would be transferred to the treasuries ef 
member countries consuming products of regional origin covered by this fisoal 
arrangement*
The principle aim of OT is te compensate fer a fall in fiseal revenue
resulting fron the elimination of duties on goods from intra-union sources
and te distribute the revenue fairly) but it is capable ef achieving two
other important goal si (a) to encourage the leoal manufacture ef consumer
goods) and (b) to ensure sufficient control ever exemptions granted en imports
9* This kind ef concession is not uncommon* Under tho subregional Agreement 
of tho Andean Common Market Bolivia and Eouador, whioh are relatively un­
derdeveloped, enjoy special treatment and oeneessions* The logic ef lose skewed 
development demands this treatment* See W*P* Avery and J.D* Coehranoe, "Sub­
regional Integration in Latin America; The Andean Common Market," Journal ef 
Common Market Studies, Beoenber, 1972, Tel. XI, No, PP. 85-102.
10. M*S. Vlonczek (ed*), Economic Co-operation in Latin America. Africa and 
A»la, Op. oltt. P. 235.
ef raw materials or equipment used in looal manufacture while encouraging the
infant industries concerned.11 The efficient operation of the OT would require
eloae administrative co-operation between Ghana and the Sntente States in the
field ef tax eolleetiom* Also some co-ordination of investment policies would
be desirable to avoid serious distortions in conditions of production* A
common investment regins weuld net only provide fer the incorporation ef regional
enterprises needing aecess to the regional narket into OT scheme but it would
also provide for the oo-ordination ef foreign investment regulations which
contain differences in incentives offered in different part of the region*
Suoh oo-ordination would not necessarily imply uniformity9 as differences im
the incentives offered to foreign investors night be desirable in order te
offset the relative disadvantages ef some locations over ethers and to help
a flow ef investment into the partner countries in accordance with the regional
strategy of diffused development* However, such matually agreed differences
must be sharply dlstinquished from differences based on historical aeeident
er refleeting unilateral eonpetitive decisions of the partnere to secure
12investment at each other9s expense*
11* The Bast African Common Market Counterpart of the OT is the transfer tax
whieh is one of the important provisions ef the 1967 Treaty* Under the
transfer tax previsions it is permissible under certain conditions for the 
industrially less advanced union members to impose what is in offset a tariff on 
imports of manufactures fron their more advanced partners fer the purpose of 
protesting their own manufacturing industries* See P* Hobson (ed*) 
lat.raatl.nal Booaoalo Int.gratlon. On. elt. P. 1*27.
12 Tho political difficulties of formulating a co-ordinated investment scheme
could be very formidable indeed* In spite ef their reasonably good record
the three nenbers (Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania) of the EAEC have not as yet boon 
able to reach agreement on this natter* The Kampala Treaty merely includes a 
declaration of tho partner States "that they shall use their best endeavour to 
agree upon a common sfeheme***N (See Article 19 ef the Treaty fer last African 
Co-eperation reproduced in M.S* Vionezek (ed*) Op* cit** PP. 168 • 233*
Im a way the applieation of tho OT arrangement should bo soon as a medium - 
tors solution* Im tho very long-run It would bo advisable on practical grounds 
for tho governments of tho GECS states to consider a general tax reform: of 
their tax systems with a view to redueing their dependence on revenue duties 
through the introduction of a system of consumption taxes. Unquestionably9 
this would eventually become necessary even in the absence of an integration 
scheme, since national import-substitution policies wouldf in any event9 reduce 
the importance of customs duties as a source of governasnt revenue•
2. POIARISATIO* O f BCTEOPMEHT IK 30MS ASMS 
The geographical distribution of the dynamic effects of integration-induced 
growth requires a more broadly-based approach than nere fiscal adjustments.
And in order to devise & meanigful formula for the exercise9 a closer look at 
the factors responsible for polarisation is called for.
Integration enthusiasts are prone to assume that a free trade area or 
common market will further economic equality. Apprently, this view is based 
on elements of several theories.^ One is that rising levels of national income 
(fostered in this case by the common market) will naturally lead to more 
equality within the GECS. A second theory is that increased trade 9 by reducing 
disparities between factor prices, will help to equalize incomes. The third is 
that a common market will create new opportunities, whioh being new and open te 
utilization by new investors er entrepreneurs, will lead te a wider spread ef 
wealth.
13. See M. Edel, "Regional Integration and Income Redistributions Complements 
sr Substitutes?" in R. Hilton (ed)f Op» olt.. PP. 185-199*
• U72 -
- 1*73 -
Although each ef these effects eight if the circumstances are right9 develop as 
posited, the reverse effects are also possible aad can he demonstrated.
That inoene distribution boo ones more equal during eoenonic development 
is something of a tenet of faith among seme Influential economists.1^ * It is 
hinted at im Bestow1 s dynamic of a universal drive toward a nass-consumption 
economy (although this dees net imply universal equality as much as an enlarging 
ef a middle olass).1'’ Mere recently, frofesser Samuel son writes t Advanced 
economies shew less lm-equality of inoene distribution than de pro industrial 
eoehemies - contrary to the dire predictions ef scientific socialists that tho 
rich get richer and the peer get poorer under oapitaliom. The mixed economy 
shews greater equality.1^
Undoubtedly, this view can be confronted with some factual evidence • There 
is a less equal distribution of income (as measured by shares aoeruimg to the
top aad bottoa fifths of the distribution) im many LDCs than there is in
17Western Europe er the United States.
But there are exceptions, and these correlations do met prove causality. 
Indeed, tine series evidence on income distribution within singlo countries is 
less consistent with the hypothesis of increasing equality. Historically, 
there was seme narrowing of the gap between the share of inoene aoerulng to 
the highest and lowest fifths ef the sise distribution in the United States 
between 1929 and tho end ef World War II. Since then, however, relative 
111. R. Hilton (sd.), Ibid. P. 186*
15. V.H. Rostov, The Stores of Roononio Growth. C.B.P., P. 963, PP. 73-82.
16. Paul A. Saauelson, Roononicat An Introductory Analysis, 7th Edition,
MoGrav-hAll Book Coupany, New York, 1967, P.111.
17. Hiltsn, oo. olt.. P. 187.
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income ratios have remained approximately constant* Im the United Kingdom,
concentration of lneemes has also decreased ever time. But in Germany
18relieving unification, there was an increase in inequality* Sinoe German 
development was, in a way, the by-product ef eoonomio integration, this 
might be more relevant precedent fer to-day1 s LDCs* And what little data has
become available on income distribution on currently developing areas points 
to the conclusion that industrialization increases inequality, at least^or a 
time* During the 1950's, imeome disparities widened both in India amd 
Mexico*^ Thus it 9eems doubtful that economic integration would, in the 
normal course of events, generate an automatic mechanism fer ensuring the 
equitable distribution of the gains that accrues to it*
A second prep ef the argument for the income - redistributing effects 
of integration turns on the theory ef faeter^price equalization* This familiar 
trade theory holds that free trade will equalize between regions the returns 
te any factor ef produotion, a proposition based on the view that a factor 
will be acre highly renuerated, before trade, in that country in which it is 
relatively soaroer* Perhaps, whan free trade is attained, the prioes of 
factors will tend towards the international average* But the nen-attainment of 
a thorough-going laissez fairs preoludes the effeetive operation ef the eccalled 
factor-price equalization mechanism in the process of industrialization*
A third way in which a common market may affeot income distribution is 
through the creation of new opportunities for money-making activities* That 
is - to the extant that the wider market breaks down monopolies, or oreates
18. Ibid.
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the possibility of new limes of production, or removal to mov areas of industries 
formerly restricted to the one country vhieh had enough of a market to support 
them9 it may open mew channels of nobility whioh in the end lead to greater 
equality. Severer, if the opportunities created are eueh that only the already 
adrantaged ean benefit from them, then the geographical distribution of income 
may worsen*
The oridonee as to which effect will bo strongest rests on tho particular 
circumstances of a case* Backward members of an integration group hare sometimes 
progressed relatively nere rapidly, as seems to be the case within the EEC 
where Italy has lately been the fastest growing member* Mere often than not it 
is felt that capital, which is normally mobile across borders, will be drawn to 
the region in vhieh wages are lowest, thus helping to reduce the differences*
Bren so, there is no guarantee that this will always be the case* On the 
contrary, there seen, over long periods in a ooumtry or region9 s development, 
to be strong tendencies fer industry to concentrate in the already meet 
industrialised locations* As noted in chapter 3?tfceee effects - often loosely 
described in terms of "polarisation19, "dominance" or "backwash" effects - need 
to be fully explored in theory* But they appear to hare a basis in economies of 
scale in infrastructure, external ecenomies in tho labour market and elsewhere, 
and mutual support of market demand created in adranoed subregions, when trade 
throughout the region, oven when free of tariffs, is subject te transport costs*
The story of international common markets among LDCs is replete with oases 
of polarisation* The reshaping of the EABC in 1967 was precipitated largely by 
disputes arising from Kenya9 s attraction of a proportionately greater share of 
industries* Vithim the Arab Common Market Egypt occupies an analogous position.
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The Central American Coaaon Market has been af fee ted partially by polarizing 
growth* In this oase, the most advanced country9 in terns of incone levels9 has 
net been the neet rapid in its growth* But if Cesta Riea has been growing nere 
slewly than Guatemala, Nicaragua, and SI Salvador, all four ef these countries 
have greatly widened the gap between their level of ineone and that ef the 
poorest and nost slewly growing nation, Honduras*
▲ more general survey ef regional inequality in national development, by
20Villianson to which Edel refers, indicates that increasing disparities are 
customary throughout at least early phases ef develepnent. Thus while regional 
inequality beoenes stable and eventually falls in the mere developed oountrles, 
for countries at the African level of development the net effect of eeenenie 
integration on regional economic growth might be te increase disparties between 
the nenber states, at least , until deliberate offsetting provisions are instituted*
3* EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION STRATEGY
(l) THE COHCSPT OF EQUITY AMD PRICING POLICY 
Before we go into the mechanics of the aotual formulation of a distribution 
system for the GECS, it is only necessary, as a preliminary, that the concept 
of equitable distribution be discussed* The conceptualization of equity er 
fairness in relation to the sharing of integration benefits involves a two-fold 
problem* The first task is to determine what is to be meant by fairness* The 
seoend difficulty is to develop an operational framework for determining, by 
reference to the agreed criteria, the extent to vhieh a particular formula Con­
forms to the criteria* There is perhaps a third problem*
20. Ibid,
This might arias from ths issues involved in the trade-off which usually hfts te 
be made9 between considerations of equity on the one handf and those of eeenenie 
efficiency, en the ether, which is an important corner stone on which the 
argument for economic integration anon# LDCs rests*
With reference to the concept of equity, a useful starting point nust be 
that an integration arrangement will generate net benefits both to the group 
as a whole and to each individual member* By implication this means that each 
nember of the group must be at least as well off as a member as it would be 
if it had not joined the scheme* It is with the distribution ef these net I
benefits after this oondition is satisfied that equity and fairness are involved* 
Since we are concerned with the equitable distribution of the net benefits 
(i.e. total benefits minus sun of the benefits which would have aeorued to eaoh 
member state outside the integration scheme), it seens difficult to posit sm 
objective criterion for determining the equity or fairness of any acceptable
, i
arrangementa or their outcome* What seems compelling - if polloy-oriemted 
negotiation on integration is to be fruitful - is that there should be a 
substantial measure of initial agreement among the participants as to the 
general principles or considerations on whioh a judgement on the acceptability 
of an arrangement could be based* Furthermore, these bread principles should 
be capable of being referred to as standard guidelines for negotiation*
However, those guidelines will oontalm some "political* and "non-polltloal"
constraints whioh may become necessary in the light of the development objectives 
and strategy of the participants in order to accommodate the aspirations of 
nember states ? individually and collectively*
Article 7 of the Convention establishing the UDEA0 illustrates the kind of
accommodation neant here* With reference te the origin principle the article 
says: "Product originating in the Union nay neve without restriction within
the union* In order, however, to remedy any economic disequilibrium whioh night 
result in a menber state, quantitative res trie ti one nay be imposed by that state, 
on condition that it notifies tho council of Ministers of tho UBien forthwith"*2 
Tho safeguard clause which empowers am intra-union importer te impose quantitative 
restrictions for remedial and/or protective purposes takes care of the individual 
policy objectives which the members may have* Indeed, such a provision must 
be necessary in the context of the OSCS in order to compensate fer the structural 
deficlenees ef the relatively weaker economies ef Upper Volta., Niger, Dahomey 
and Togo and allocation of the resources necessary for the achievement ef the 
objectives which the enviiaged union Agreement night embody in their interest* 
Another important issue relating to the distribution of the costs and 
benefits of integration concerns the pricing policy of regional enterprises*
Since integration industries (existing or prospective) eater both for their 
national and extra-national consumers, the formulation of an intra-union 
pricing policy ie crucial to the distribution ef the oosts and benefits of 
integration* In this exercise the unit oosts of produotion of such products,
21* Per detailed discussion, see ohapter five*
22* See M* S* Wionczek, Economic co-operation in Latin America, Africa and 
Asia, or*cit** P.280. Also Article 26 ef the ECOWAS Treaty, referred to 
earlier, empowers uenber states, in the event of serious disturbances 
occuring in their economies, to take the necessary safeguard measures
pending the approval of the Council of Ministors*
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including a normal profit* may mot necessarily bo indicative of thoir selling
prioe* although* of course* the c,i,f, price of competing goods from the 
rest of the world will set an upper limit to the prioes which will be charged 
after allowing for any tariff differentials* The unit costs of distribution 
of regional plants will evidently be an important determinant of the distribution 
of costs and benefits of agreed specialisation*
Furthermore* the prioe policy adopted will determine the tariff preference; 
if any* whioh nay be required te implement the specialization arrangements 
with respect to future projects on the trading side. These preferences* in 
turn* will provide one indicator of the direct oests imposed upon the partici­
pating countries by the arrangements, £ach country will have to consider these 
costs in conjunction with any benefits it derives fron its ability to purchase 
other products at favourable prices* and the net balance after taking this 
into account will in turn have to be looked at in the light ef the costs and 
benefits associated with the investment in the industries which are allooatod 
to it*
However* in the partieular case of existing industries examined here 
investments im the plants have already made. Our concern at this point 
therefore must be to formulate a pricing policy capable of mitigating inequities 
arising from the distribution of regional products within the grouping.
The determination of an operational intra-union prioing polity of oourso 
raises some complex problems. The two most important elements to be 
considered in the prioe poliey ef regional enterprises ares ex-factory unit 
oosts of produotion and unit oosts of distribution to the designated intra­
union markets. It is also necessary to take into account the difference 
between the delivered/transfer price and the price of competing goods fron 
tho rest of tho world. Other factors worth remembering include the exlstonee
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•f more than one plant in tho sane industry located at different places in
one er different countries, A further related problem concerns a possible
situation where tho local product falls short of satisfying tho regional
demand. In such a case* if excess oosts (l,e, local preduets are dearer) er
benefits (i«e, imports are nere expensive than local products) are involved fer
the regional product* some agreed basis would necessarily have to be
adopted fer dividing up the cost of purchasing fron expensive local sourees
or fron third countries. In that event* intergovernmental agreement on prioe
policy backed up by an allocation principle will be imperative.
Despite the complex nature ef the considerations involved in negotiating
a regional price pelloy* the particular case of the Industries reviewed in this
study seens less oonplioated* if only because of our assumption ef total import
replacement and the small volume and value ef imtra-umlem trade Involved,
A useful starting point ln proposing a uhiom pricing policy for tho GXCS
states with respect te the products of our interest must bo a restatement ef
some of our earlier assumptions relevant to this discussion. Our calculations
in tho previous chapter assume* among other things* the operation of a uniform
unit cost of produotion in eaoh country regardless ef the number ef plants in
each ooumtry, A uniform transfer price wan also assumed.
However* these assumptions require slight nodifieation as implied im the
computations presented in Table 8,11, That is* fer the purpese of determining
the eost of distributing the preduets ef regional industries* we recall the earliei
23assumption of two productlon-consumption price zones throughout the GECS states.
23. See ohapter 8* section VJ#
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These of eourse are the northern and southern zones. This assumption is based 
on the presumption that the delivered price differentials in eaoh zone are 
marginal and oeuld be ignored! and the zonal delivered price has been based on 
the average consumer priee of eaoh product. The difference between the prioes 
•f any one commodity in the two semes is regarded as a part of the cost of 
integration and transport easts account principally for this difference.
▲s Table 8.11 presents* the prioe differentials between the northern 
and southern zones with respect to fertiliser* whioh in any ease is heavily 
subsidised* and footwear are very negligible indeed and have been ignored.
As regards oement and petreleun products the story is quite different. In 
both oases northern prioes are fer reasons of distance and poorer transport 
system much higher than the soiAthem ones. Petroleum product consumers in 
the north will have to pay an extra ffU*80 per ten whilst the cement consumers 
will pay a price differential ef jf32.00 fer eaeh tan. With the former 
group this will imply an additional expenditure of jfc.71 million and jfl.15  
million in 1975 and 1980 respectively! and higher figures would be involved 
as regards the latter group (flh.UU million in 1975 and jfr»92 million in 
1980). These eests have already been taken ear# of in our computation and 
distribution of the integration - induced YAD. What ia important here ia 
te identify and isolate this element ef Integration-induced oost for the 
purpose ef framing common policy. But the nature ef distribution of this 
oost one suggests at any one tine aotually depends on the particular circums­
tances of eaoh case. Such factors as the difference in unit cost of local 
product as compared with inported product* the range of preduets covered* the
• 1*81 -
volume and value of trade involved in relation to total and)above all} the 
aetual estimated costs9 must always be carefully considered*
Because of the small range of preduets oevered, the tiny volume ef the 
estimated GBCS trade and the estimated limited costs involved, the adoption 
of a two-tier pricing system seems capable of dealing with the distribution 
cost problem here* The oests to eaoh country will evidently depend upon eaoh 
oountry9s consumption oapaeity of the regional products* 11though the oountrles 
ef the northern sone (Vigor and Upper Yalta) will pay more per product unit 
consuned9 it must be remembered that this vould have boom the oase9 anyway9 
even if the integration seheme did mot come about* And, oo long as the 
landlooked oountrles use the port facilities ef the inland states oharges in 
respeot of their imports of all types plus the inland transportation easts 
(Table 7*1 )t the differential between the north and south will continue to 
exist with er without market oo-operation* Indeed, as demonstrated in chapter 
79 prises within eaoh of the two zones reveal marginal differences but not 
between them* Disparities between the unit o.i.f* prioes of imports and tho 
ex-works unit prices of the local products reviewed in the south are very 
negligible* Ironically9 within the northern sone the pivture is the sane, 
subject to the nature of final products (l*e* whether weight-gaining or foot­
loose)* But in this oase the reason is different and it has to do with local 
transport oests* The existence of these9 mere or less, two "natural" but 
distinct prioe "regions" more than anything else explains our adoption of tho 
two-tier price syston which oonoelvably must form an integral part of a pricing 
package deal mutually agreed upon from the outset*
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(ii) Soto Equitable Distribution System.
Ia discussing the appropriate equitable distribution formula for the
2liGECS three possible criteria come readily te mind, maaelys
- aa Overall Equal Distribution of net benefits;
• » P r p J M g t i o , D . L ^ £ i ^  FjaSKdft ***
• a Cjpjgenaatory. Equity, DlstrlbuUqn. Criterlpn>
Let us take them one by one* By am overal equal distribution (OLD) ef 
net benefits we mean a distributive mechanism that guarantees equal share to 
each participant irrespective ef the size and actual oentribution ef individual 
member states* Undoubtedly, this can hardly cennand popular support ner 
be treated as fair among the six statee under discussion* As demonstrated 
earlier| the GECS members vary considerably in sise, population t, per capita 
income and the relative inpertanoe of their nodern eeoter with particular 
reference to manufacturing (chapter 2)* Tho imnediato implication of this 
divergence is that the markets which eaoh offers to the others, and from 
which benefits largely accuxe, will assume different sines* The relatively 
lush markets of Ghana and Ivory Coast cannot bo compared with those of the 
micro states of Togo and Dahomey* Given the heavy "weighting" whioh Ghana 
and Ivory Coast have and considering also that jointly they account for about 
of tho population and no less than 75^ > of the GDP ef the GECS, it is 
21;* I owe this Idea to my Supervisor, Professor P* Robson*
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highly improbable that they will regard the OED mechanism ae fair amd just* 
It is likely to be seem as asking too much fron tho rolatlvely rich members* 
Thus even allowing for tho desire fer balance in lmtra-reglomal trade aad 
development opportunities, it is very doubtful whether the present aggr 
arrangement can provide a lasting solution*
Our second criterion is tho proportionality distribution formula (PDF)* 
This envisages a distribution system im whioh eaeh member state gets just 
that proportion of tho not bonofits genorated by it* Tho immediate problem 
the adoption ef this principle raises is how to estimate the eontributlom 
of each member state* Te deal with this issue, the share of eaeh country 
in the total regional market might be adopted ae the appropriate indieater* 
It is also possible to apply the market ratio ef individual members ef the 
produets of selected regional industries* The oonbined ratios of Ghana 
and Ivery Coast as deduoed fron Table 8*12 will account for 81$ aad 83# In 
1975 and 1980 respectively* But this will tend to re info roe unequitable 
distribution of the gaimB fron trade*
Alternatively, the shares of member oountrles in the regional GDP or 
the shares of eaoh country in the total value added in manufacturing could 
be employed* Given the structure ef the economies under review, it appears 
that the proportional distribution of bonofits whioh would bo indicated by 
the choioe ef one rather than another of these possible indicators may mot 
diverge markedly* However, where the shares indicated by one or ether of 
these indicators wore to differ greatly, an average of two or more or some 
other form of combination might bo used*
- 1 * 8 1* -
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The features of the PDF are appealing* It la non-redistributive. It 
is neutral* If this ie what equity is all about, it is commendable* However, 
in a grouping like the GECS there is a strong concern fer balanced development 
of the region through a reduction of inteivregienal disparities of income and 
growth so as to diminish the gap between the richer and tho poorer members*
Besides, eoonomic integration by its very nature imposes some constraints on 
policy-making vhieh may be more ehsrply felt by the peer members* It is 
therefore in the interests of the eehesion ef the grouping that every member 
should derive substantial net benefits te offset the oonstraints* If this 
implies that the poorer members should got proportionally more than tho riohor 
countries, a measure of generosity on tho part of tho richer countries towards 
tho poorer members would bo required* This of course will depend upon political 
solidarity and moral philosophy of tho grouping} economic reasoning would bo 
of limited guidance here*
The third principle is compensatory equity distribution erltorion (CED) 
which we define as a sharings— out method in which there is a trade-off between 
tho first and second criteria (i*o* a restricted merger of OED and PDF)*
In other words, tho present criterion is a oompromise formula which incorporates yj
elements of OXD and PDF* This will ensure that the weaker members resolve more 
than their mere net contribution whilst not substantially reducing the net
benefits could be shared out according to tho principle of OXD whilst % will bo 
shared in accordance vlth PDF*
benefits derived by the richer members* To effect total met
The determination of the ratio to he allocated according to eaoh principle is 
somewhat arbitrary but reasonable* Ve have been guided by earlier discussions 
which suggest that the percentage ef total benefits to be distributed according 
to OSD should be less than half whilst that to be shared according to PDF 
principle should be more than halft if the CED is te be readily acceptable to all* 
To allooate anything nere than a third of total net benefits to be evenly
idistributed night not find favour amongst the richer neaber states* On the 
other hand, given the political will and concern for balanced regional develop­
ment, it seem3 likely that the richer members could be persuaded to allow a 
third of the fruits of integration to be equally distributed provided that the 
rest is distributed aooording to each stated contribution.
Thus far ve have indicated three alternative criteria of equity vhieh 
could guide negotiators in determining the best way of distributing the fruite 
ef integration within the GSCS. But whether asy of these would be unanimously 
accepted as fair or equitable in the olroumstanoee o f  the region depends on 
the prevailing climate o f  political opinion and psychological meed o f the 
members at a given time* Nevertheless, erne thing 1b certain. Because of the 
unequal sise and strength of the GSCS economies the first criterion vhieh 
envisages equal distribution of the net benefits vould be regarded as unfair 
by the more advanced members (Ghana and Ivory Coast). In the same vein the 
application o f  the second principle of proportionality distribution might mot 
be popular among the less advanced economies of Upper Volta, Niger and Dahomey.
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Thus the third formula which ia a compromise solution is sore likely to appeal 
to both camps* Im what follows the CED will be applied im distributing the 
projected benefits of integration im the area*
(ill) DISTRIBUTISM OF THB GATMS Of IHTBORA'TTOU 
Tha distribution of the benefits and/or leases arising fren integration 
has two principal aspects. The first relates to a fair distribution ef the 
benefits generated by existing regional industries whilst the other eeneerne 
an orderly reduction ef the disparities between the eoeneniee of members through 
the application ef an agreed formula for distributing future regional industries* 
A satisfactory solution to the distribution problem therefore must give 
adequate attemtiom to thee# two aspects*
(a) Distribution of the Bemefits generated by Existing Regional Industries* 
Now we take up the first aspect of the distribution problem* In the fore* 
going subeoetion9 we opted to oombino under the CED seme element ef QKD (whioh 
would bo i )  end some clement of PDF (whioh would account for §)• Tho former 
is very easy to apply once tho oTerall quantity of the benefits to bo shared 
is known but with respect te the latter we have to choose the best method 
from among the ones suggested above of ascertaining what the individual state 
oontribute s before ... we ean apply the PDF component* Given the pattern ef 
production and trade in the GECS the appropriate measure ef this would be the 
share of eaeh country in the total regional trade (Table 9*1)* This is probably 
mere realistic than other indicators* The shares of member oeuntries in the 
regional GDP will obviously exaggerate the contributions of Ivexy Ceast and 
Ghana and lose facto the benefits accruing to them* Similarly, the shares ef 
eaoh country in the total YAD in manufacturing, as shown in tho Uth row of
• m  -
Table 9*19 i» subject to error* For example, tho 1*1$ share of Ivory Coast 
alone represents a very heavy weighting* The corresponding share fer Ghana 
is only 16*5%* The existing lew level of trade between Ghana and the Intents 
States explains this low figure rather than the slow growth ef the manufacturing 
seetor in Ghana as oompared with the Ivory Coast* For Upper Volta and Niger, 
the figures are 22% and 10*7% respectively while it is in Dahomey and just 
3$ in Togo*
But with the adoption of tho shares of total regional trade as a measure 
of the oontributions of members we obtain nore balanced ratios as in the 2nd 
row of Tablo 9*1* They range from 35# im Upper Volta to %  in Dahomey*
Although the gap between these figures is still very vide, it is much sleser 
than that ef the share ef manufactured products* Thus the share of the. 
individual nember in total regional trade serves as our yardstick for measuring 
its sontribution*
Applying the distribution system articulated above in sharing the fruits 
ef Integration presented in Tablo 8*12, wo obtain two different seta of 
figures* Both tho aotual and proposed distribution results are summarised im 
Tablo 9*2* Tho aotual distribution, as noted earlier, is basemen individual 
members' production/consumption oapaeity of the designated produots* With 
respect to the proposed distribution the share ef eaeh menber is made up of 
two elemental a third of the total net benefits divided by the six in 
oonpllanee with the principle of OSD, and the rest (two*thirds) divided 
according to the percentage share of cash country in total regional trade*
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Although 1b nost oases these figures a n  met particularly very large 
and are unlikely im the short-rum to make a profound differemoe im the GNF ef 
the countries concerned, it is expected that im the long-run the dynamic 
benefits ef integration would be substantial as produet ooverags widens te 
justify a union policy on the subject.
A careful comparison of the two sets of figures reveals some interesting 
features of the implied redistribution. One of these is that the redistribution 
has clearly given more to the poerer9 and less to the rioher9 union members than 
their aotual shares would suggest. On the one hand, for instance, Upper Yolta 
will rooeive under the proposed equitable redistribution an amount approximately 
6 times its aotual share both in 1975 **d 1980. During the two periods the 
corresponding figures for Niger and Togo would be mere than 2 times their 
original individual shares| Dahomey will get about 2 times its normal shares. 
Ghana and Ivory Coast, on the ether hand, will individually receive less than
their aetual allocation. This is particularly serious with respect to Ghana,
who will lose more than #12 million in 1975 **d over #17 million in 1980 as a 
result of the redistribution. As regards the Ivory Ceast it lessee are relatively 
narginal and tolerable.
Another feature of the new allocation principle is that it is intra-GBCS 
trade biased. Consequently, countries with high imtra-GSCS trade in relation te
their total international trade have received far more than those whose volume ef
intra-union is very snail. To this extent, our distribution formula has a 
Bpeoi&l appeal to the poorer amd landlocked countries. The relatively large 
amounts obtained by the Upper Yelta elearly underlines the inpertamoe to it
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ef intra-region&l trade. While its im t ramregion&l trade as a percentage ef 
total imtermatiomal trade ia of the order ef 2fl^ , *he equivalent ratio is 
1.3# for Ghana, 2.5% fer Ivory Coast amd 5.6^ 6 for Niger (Table 9*1 )• But the 
high percentage shares of the landlooked countries im regional trade which, 
given our distribution formula, Keans relatively high shares of tho fruits 
of integration should net cause disquiet among ether member states. This ie 
beoauee intra-regienal trade of the GSCS as a percentage ef their international 
trade is around 3.1^ (Table 9*1) f hence the actual muss of money involved are 
not very large.
Furthermore, the envisaged expansion of intra-regional trade following 
the inception of eoonomic integration vould necessitate a constant review ef 
this distributive mechanism to assure eaoh zkeaber state that it is getting a 
fair deal. But even so such reviews will continue to accord tho least developed 
and the landlocked countries some special treatment as an integral part of the 
strategy ef diffused regional development. Indeed, any fora of !,Laisses fairs11 
formula fer the distribution of the met benefits ef intogratiem based on the 
interplay of the forces of supply and demand is bound to exaggerate the existing 
disparities in the level of development ef these economies which might in turm 
force the poorer members out of the union.
(b) Allegation of future Indmtrlaa
As noted earlier, a fair and equitable distribution package deal should 
incorporate a system of industrial allocatiom with particular reference te 
integration industries. This would normally involve assigning virtual 
monopoly rights, by licence, for the production of certain industrial 
commodities to the favoured country.
• U93 -
Experience suggests that in order te make the assignment ef industries te
member countries easier and more acceptable it has te be based on am agreed
2<list ef 8peeified industries.
The principal rationale fer any assignment ef monopoly rights lies in the 
presumed existence ef economies of soale. Indeed, if suoh economies characterise 
am integration industry, it can be asserted that am outright allocation ef 
monopoly rights will be eeenemieally mere profitable than allocation through 
the market mechanisms, since the latter implies the appearmnoe ef many smaller 
industries vhieh would gradually drive eaeh other out ef existence until the 
largest surviving erne would be the only supplier in the market. Aloe, it cam 
be argued from the standpoint of optimum location that if the industries are 
allocated "correctly”, the convergence process of the market will have been 
speeded up and the comparative advantage ef the member oountrles will be given 
immediate expression vlth the consequent saving ef real resources.
The benefits te be derived from the alleoatiem ef industries will depend 
primarily on the care with which the allocation if made, i.e. if the industries 
are allocated to the countries which are "meet effiolent" in the respective
• ' ’ Mt; .■ , 1 t.-f* y Jr ■ t V* , J. T ■ * ' -Sii- ' '•’*'* f . v t» , * '■'*'/ *•' * '** ••>>> •- i> iaL;
preduet, then preeunably the gains te the union an n whole will be maximised.
If the industries are allocated to their worst producers, then the gains will 
be substantially reduced. The fundamental questions therefore are (i) hew to 
distribute the industries between nember countries in order to maximise the 
gains te the union, end (ii) to distribute the benefits to be derived fron the 
union in a "fair" manner.
25. See Artiole 23 ef The Treaty ef fer East African Co-operation In M.S. 
Vlemesek (ed.), Oo.eit.. P. 181*. Also nee Chapter 7, section 2.6.
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To tackle this problem ome must first begin vlth am ldomtlfioatlom of
the benefits of the "programmed" Industries to the union as a whole and to
26eaoh of the participants, vhieh Is mot undertaken here. The results of sueh 
an exercise will provide tho negotiators with useful material vlth respeot 
to differential bonofits and oosts of Individual projects to Individual members.
On the basis of these data the members cam mutually agree on a distribution 
arrangement.
But the application of only economic principles sueh as location theory, 
comparative oost and eeemonles of scale is unlikely to produce a sufficient 
measure of agreement to solve the problem. Because tho GECS members may have 
differing notions about equity and place differing social value on the apparent 
cost ef sub-optimal produotion ln determining their national political strategies. 
Thus before arriving at the final allocation eystem negotiators vlll take into 
account particular objectives and vishes ef individual countries, for instance, 
seme nay be villimg to "trade off" employment against income, er income im 
one part ef the country, as against income in another part of the ooumtry.
Of course such problems like inter-state differences in employment 
opportunities cam be taken care of through the institution if imtra-unlom 
mobility ef labour. As noted in chapter 6, a considerable amount ef intra­
union mobility ef labour already exists within the Sntente. When the GSCS 
comes into being it can within seme bounds be extended to Ghana. Bven so the 
institution of intra-union nobility of labour te compensate for inter-state 
differences in employment opportunities will at best be a short-term solution.
26. This study has limited itself to the evaluation ef the costs and benefits 
of existing integration industries for whioh seme data are available.
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▲ thorough-going’ and satisfactory allocation arrangement will guarantee 
eaoh member a  "fair” share of the new industries and since sueh allocation 1 b  
not "based on purely economic considerations alone, the benefits to the union io 
unlikely to be maximised. In general, the distributtonally constrained alloca­
tion will imply an effioienoy loss, for industries will not always be installed 
where they produoe the highest benefit for the group as a whole. A ’•trade-off" 
Solution is therefore sailed for here. For the sake of stability and success 
ef the schene, a sub-optimal allocation may be acceptable but a skewed 
distribution of the benefits to members ia intolerable. However, an equitable 
distribution system neoessarily requires some institutional arrangements te 
guarantee its implementation, a matter to whioh ve new turn attention.
(o) Inatltutlomal Arraa/reaantg naosssary to Iaulsasat 
tho Kqultahlo Platrlbutloa Paolap
A regulated distributional system such as vo have suggested by ifts 
rory mature is an interventionist approach, which inevitably requires 
permanent institutional arrangements to enforce it. These arrangements, whatever 
they /xv are, must be unanimously agreed upon from the outset and clearly 
written into tho union agreement.
The appropriate institutions required to implement an allooatiem system
71depend largely on the particular circumstances of a given ease.
27# In three different economic groupings some twelve, and sometimes different, 
measures directly related to the distribution of the benefits and eoats of 
oeonomio integration among participating oountrles have been tried, including 
six in BA1C (industrial licensing, distribution of fiscal revenus, allocation 
of industrial activities, tho development bank, community corporations and the 
transfer tax), three in UDIAC (the tax unique, the solidarity Fund and fiscal 
incentives) and three im CACF (integration industries, the development bank aad 
fisoal incentives). Fer a detailed analysis ef these measures (some of whioh 
have beem briefly touohed upon earlier) see UM, Current Problems of 
Iategratlom. Op.clt., TD/B/39U» FP 59-88. Although thoao Measure* aim at a
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Certain factors, like the type ef integration scheme im operatiem, the range 
ef preduo te involved, the amtieipated ralue of met benefits (benefits minus 
oests) vis-a^vis the aimimistratire oosts, the leoatienal pattern ef integration 
industries, the inpaot of intra-union trade on individual nember?s total 
external trade end the pelitieal feasibility ef any chosen institutions, nust 
be ears fully considered in eaoh ease*
Our maim concern here is to propose the setting up ef seme machinery 
likely te ensure the realisation ef the distributional equity (CED) vhieh 
has been suggested* The problem, as already noted, has at least, two dimensions! 
(l) the institution of machinery fer the distribution ef benefits and oests 
generated by existing integration projects (corrective measures) and (ii) 
arrangements fer the allocation of future industries with a view te influencing 
the distribution of their impact effects on members9 economies (preventive 
measures)*
With respect te the first aspect a special machinery oeuld be set up
in the GSCS te execute the CED system* Conceivably, this vould emtlal the
establishment of a special evaluation unit to be called Benefits Redistribution
Unit (HRU) and a Union Compensation Fund (UCF)* These should be established as
semi-independent agencies within the Administrative Secretariat ef the Union
balanced distribution of integration benefits and ultimately even development 
of their economies, they vary quite considerably both in orientation, scope and 
effeetf and they have been devised in each ease te suit a particular sohene*
Tet problems still remain in all the three groupings - an evidenoe that these 
measures have net proved quite adequate and that the search fer mere adequate 
measures should oontinue*
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but empowered to roport directly to tho Council of Ministers, 
vhieh shall ia turn, be responsible to the Authority of Heads of State* The 
BRU should draw its personnel froa econoaic aad statistical experts froa the 
aeaber states, making sure that OTsry state ia ropreseated ia this Unit, 
though not neeossarily oa equal basis. The principle responsibility ef the 
BRU will be to assess the aotual costs aad benefits of integration to the 
union on annual basis aad to make specific recoaaendations to the union on 
the redistribution of tho not bonofits according to the CED criterion.
Sinoo the CED principle will involve a measure of ineoae transefore 
froa the "winners" to the "losers" in the regulated distribution sense, it 
will bo neoessary to sot up tho UCF as an integral part of the allocation 
package arrangements to physically oolleet the refunds and make payments 
out of its reeeipts to the net losers as roooaaended by the BRU. Surely, 
the establishment of the UCF vill go a long way to oliainate the periedio 
eries whioh had often bedevilled members of a grouping where the operational
fora of eoapensation involved direct income transfers of one kind or another
28froa the rioher to the poorer partners. The Fund will bo able to deal
directly with individual partners on natters relating to eoapensation refunds
and disburseaents on behalf of the union and vill be singularly vellplaeed to
detect possible sources of friction for union action before they erupt. It
ean also handle other probloas related to its aaln function whioh the union
28. It can be argued that the diesatiefaction of Honduras vlth CACM, the 
withdrawal of Chad froa the TJDEAC and the displeasure ef Tanzania and 
Uganda with the way EAEC now operates all originated froa the inadequacy 
and laek of smoothness of the redistribution system (see Ibid).
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night fron time to time assign to it. Vith the full eo-oporaticn of
the union members, it is hoped, the BRU and UCF will satisfactorily handle
the redistribution of the met benefits of Integration within the GSCS.
As regards the preventive measures they present serious difficulties of
measurement, since the laok of the required information makes it necessary
te quantify the effeots by neans of projections. This means that any
measures takem ex ante facto will havo to be takon on the bacls of somowhat
speculative estimates. The preventive measures will therefore have te be
such as to allow for great flexibility in their application, so that they
ean be rexhSWed in the eeurse of Integration, which implies, te seme extent,
converting preventive into corrective measures. Even so preventive measures
must be adopted since corrective measures alone cannot grapple with the
distribution problem.
In the particular ease under review a system of industrial licensing
could be adopted for the distribution ef future industries. The lloemaing
system, as noted earlier, will prevent ruinous competition and operate as
a monopoly concession for the enterprise and the country that obtained the
lioenoe. But, to ensure an accelerated and orderly diffused industrial
development of the area through the application of the industrial licensing
29system, other supportive measures would be necessary.
29* Perhaps, because of insufficient supportive measures, the licensing system 
in the KAEC did not havo the desired effect of accelerating industrial 
development as a whole, nor did it favour the lesn develepod countries, Tanzania 
and Uganda. Among other things, it did not provide for a regional distribution 
of industrial activities; it did not include any procedure to enable the 
authorities responsible fer applying the system to promote the establishment 
ef new industries; afcd, above all, the initiative in applying for licences was 
lsft with prlvats entrepreneurs who wers disproportionately concentrated ln 
Kenya (see Ibid. P.61).
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There should be well-articulated guidelines for tho granting of liseaoes, 
including an agreed list ef industries and these guidelines should be biased 
in favour of diffused regional development. Mere importantly, there should be 
an incentive scheme te back up the gram ting of licences. Under the BABC 
Industrial Licensing Ordinance requests for lioensss could be rejected if the 
applicant lacked sufficient capital te establish the industry.^ If this 
capital quail float ion were rigidly applied, as it seems, meet #f the applicants 
from the less developed member countries would surely net qualify and tho 
ultimate result would be greater uneven development ef tho region.
Im the CBCS area it would be necessary to rectify tho oapital shortage 
problem through the establishment ef a Development Beak te which we re fared 
earlier as a means of financing industrial development. This bank should 
be known as tho Development Bank of West African. It should bo established 
and organised along similar lines as the Bast Afrlean Development Bank.
Its principal objectives should be*
(l) te provide financial sad technical assistance to promote tho 
industrial dovelspmemt of the GECS member states)
(ii) to give priority, ln accordance with the union strategy, to 
industrial development in the relatively less industrially 
developed partner states, thereby endeavouring to reduoe the 
sustsntial industrial imbalance between them)
30. Ibid. P.60
31 • Per the Charter of the Bast African Development Bank, see M.S. Vienosek
<*d.)t Ob. olt.. PP. 500-521.
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(ill) to further the nine end aspiration of the GBCS community by
financing, singly er in eo-eper&tion with ether interested
institutions, whenever possible, projects designed te make
the economies ef the GSCS member States increasingly
complementary in the industrial fieId.
Provision should be made fer subseriptiem by approved institutions
and organizations provided tho total holding of the six member states doss not
fall bslew the conventional majority share sf 51#«
However, whether the Bank will fulfil the hopes of its founders ia
bringing about the growth and equitable distribution of industry will depend
on two main faotorsi (l) the extent te whioh the establishment ef the bank
results in the prevision ef additional finance fer the region and net merely the
diversion ef funds which would otherwise be available through direst aid
or oapital raised by the six countries acting separately, and (ii) the
extent to which finance is a ksy constraint en industrial dsvelepmsnt in the
Central-West Africa area. It is difficult te form an ex-ante judgement on
the first aspect of the question) the bank's ability to attract additional
funds will be bound up with the reputation it earns. And it takes seme time to
establish solid reputation. Im the shertrun therefore its Impact is not
likely to be very large in the field of attracting additional finance.
32, These objectives represent a slightly modified version of the East African 
Development lank objectives (see Ibid.)
The Bank's contribution thus suet be evaluated primarily im tozaa of 
the constraint of finance and the contribution to balanced development which 
nay result from its investment policies* But oven here the extent te vhieh
fircroe is a constraint on industrial development varies ln the six States* 
Surely, it is least important in Ivory Coast, relatively important In Ghana 
but most important in the core backward states, especially the landlocked 
and the now drought-*stricken members, Upper Yolta and Niger*
The bulk of finance for large-scale industries in the region has 
hitherto come fron the NSC countries, especially Franee7and North America*
Given a congenial political atmosphere, finance oapital has often been readily 
available for viable projects and it seens development finance from outside vill 
continue to flov, oven if at a decreasing rate* The implied corollary is 
that the contribution of a Development Bank to balanced development vill be 
limited if, as it should, the Bank finances only economically sound and 
technically feasible projects*
Nevertheless, the scope exists fer the backward countries to derive 
some gains from the operations of the Bank, although these will be less by ths 
amount of their own contributions* In eonoluslon, it can be said that the 
establishment of a development bank has a useful role to play in an integration 
scheme* Although this may bo limited, anything that will enehanoe the diffused 
and less skewed development of the Integrated economies must bo seem as a 
veloome phenomenon*
SBIHHLHi
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The main purpose of this thesis is to explore whether there is a strong 
case fer economic 3 o-ope ration im Central Vest Africa, and, if so, what 
benefits, if any, would be derived, their magnitude aad hew they eeuld be 
equitably distributed; and against this background to offer seme policy 
suggestions for future action# It is hoped that this study may provide seme 
insight into the possibilities and problems of the projected eoenomie 
grouping between Ghana and the Xntomte States in particular and ether 
integration schemes ia Africa South of the Sahara in general#
The driving force belling the widespread interest for economic 
integration in Afkioa, ao in easy other LDCs, is two-fold# The first motive 
is politicals Colonialism is Africa left bohind it a geo-political configu­
ration of divisions and fragmentations# Many of the new African States, 
although nominally independent, are so small and weak both politically and 
ooensmically that they havo very little prospect ef rapid economic development 
on their own# The achievement of economic integration of one kind or another 
is therefore seen as a mesas through which th? goal of rapid economic 
development and African interdependence car be attained# The ether and mere 
important reason is economic# At the present stage ef econemie development 
In most African Countries, industrialisation auat be based en import substi­
tution# Beyond a point import nubstitutimg form of industrialisation 
ean no longer be economically profitable within the context ef microfttates 
and small national markets# Regional integration offers the prospect of a
larger market, specialization and greater rate of economic growth aad 
development. By basing import substitution on regional, rather than a 
national market, integration should increase the feasible rate of growth of 
manufactured output for any given level of protection. In this way it could 
bo expected to contribute te ooonomlo growth directly and indlreotly.
Indeed, we have in ohapter 3 shownempirically that integration could, 
and in our oase does, make a positive not contribution to eeononio growth.
Tho dynamic aspects of integration highlighted in chapter 3 create opportunities 
for economic gains, which in turn affect the rate of growth of the GNP of parti- 
oipcvting countries. Those aspects specifically includes (i) tho opor&tion 
of tho economies of sealo brought about by the enlargement ef the size ef the 
market for firms producing below optimum oapaeity prior to integration; (ii) tho 
existence of external eoonomies which shift specific cr general oost curves 
downward; (ill) the effect on the volume and location of investment; and (It ) 
the inpact on economic efficiency and smoothness of trade transactions duo te 
change in the degree of competition and change in uncertainty and unilaterality 
ef trade policies of individual countries#
The problem, however; is not so much whether or not integration contributes 
to growth as how to bring it about - in the first instance - in a region like 
Vest Africa and ensure its success# The recent history of eoomcnle co-operation 
in the region reviewed ln chapter 5 throws some lic^ ht on why the past and present 
attempts at regionalism have not been very successful#
One important factor seems to centre around the question of national 
sovereignty# Vest African leaders wish to safeguard their newly worn 
independence and do not want to tie their hands#
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They recognise that integration involves a conscious surrender or, at least, 
pooling of a measure of national sovereignty in policy formulation and 
execution, which nay be difficult to reverse# It nay even entail a willingness 
to rely on an ether country for eseentlr.l services as Togo will now 
depond on Ghana to a great extent for its supply of eleotrieity# Svem where 
sens integration schemes managed to survive their first few years ef life 
they continued te exist thereafter as ineffective co-operation arrangements#
The UTEAO is a case in point# One of the reasons why it was finally scrapped 
in 1972 is that, as the revenue needs of the nember states exacerbated due 
to disparities in inter-country incomes, it became impossible to adhere 
strictly to the community principles in the face ef divergent national policies 
and priorities# It is therefore net difficult tc understand why the enchant­
ment generated by integration has only been equalled by the degree of caution 
with which Vest African countries have, in reality, approached it#
The other major obstacle to integration in the region is the groat 
francophone-anglophone "divide,f# This artificial division bequeathed by 
colonialism has, unfortunately, proved durable# Because of external relation­
ships and pressures, the francophone states tend to regard themselves as a 
separate en tity  within the subregion# Despite a measure of linguistic 
affinity the sane cannot be said ef the Anglophones. More recently, though, 
some progress has been made in the drive towards greater West African unity#
The establishment o f  the ECOWAS whioh binds together all the 1$ states of 
West Africa as a single economic community ropresemts a major landmark im 
tho crusade against artificial barriers in the region# Ivon so, tho 
community up to the time of writing legally exists on paper (chapter 5)«
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It is yet to function since none of its organs provided for under its Treaty 
has been set up* the Secretariat has net even been cited. Net surprisingly, 
it is alleged that a major initial division has arisen between the two oanps 
on the question of membership.1 It is now known that President Senghor of 
Senegal, a prominent meuthpieoe ef the Francophones insists that seme Central 
African countries, particularly Zaire, should be offered the opportunity te 
join the BCOWAS. But the Anglophones led by Nigeria hold that it vould be 
better not to expand the community at this stage until it overoomes its 
initial problems, a stand which is in oonsenanoe with the QAU decision that 
any economic grouping in Africa should first begin en the regional level. 
Although this difference nay soon be resolved, it nevertheless reflects the 
general attitude of the tFrancophones (born out of susplelen aad fear of 
domination) that their own internal unity is as important, if not nere crucial 
than a wider west Afrieaa unity. It is hoped that, given time and g measure 
ef political goodwill, a thaw o&n bo achieved between the two camps te 
permit a common endeavour. Also language, in spite ef the eemion notion to 
the contrary, need raise me particular problem. A grouping with only two 
official languages is surely easily manageable, considering that the SBC has 
four.
Another difficulty in maintaining and promoting integration centres on a 
system of equitable distribution of benefits - which in practice means an 
acceptable distribution of industrial development.
1. New Nigerian. U November, 1975* See also Vest Africa. 3 November, 1975l 
and section 5*7 (ill) of ohapter 5*
From the vantage point of individual oountrles, industrial development within 
the nation state is more important than rapid economic development on a 
region-wide basis* Recent events in the region bear eloquent testimony to 
this* The rejeotien of Houphenet^Biogny's Convention on dual nationality
and economic harmonization by his Entente member colleagues ean be attributed
2largely to the fear of economic domination and polarisation* Under the 
Convention immigrant labour force from other Entente countries in the Ivory 
Coast were to enjoy citizenship rights both in the Ivory Ceast and in their 
own countries* Other Entente countries, especially Upper Yolta, opposed 
the idea on the grounds that, given the relative prosperity I and opportunities 
whioh the Ivory Coast offers, immigrants from other Entente countries vould
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2* See seotion 5.U of Chapter 5. The uncompromising attitude of the less 
developed members of any partnership of unequal partners ie often rooted 
in this understandable fear of economic domination* Consider, as referred 
to earlier, the 1ABC case* Despite its longevity and relatively good record, 
its very existence is onoo again being threatened* It has just boon reported 
that meetings of the National Executive Committee of TANU (Tanganyika African 
National Union) and of tho Tanzanian cabinet have been held and that aa a 
result reconnendations have been made to President Nyerere that a break should 
be made with the SAXC and that an economic union should bo forged instead with 
Mozambique (see AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL, Yol* 16, No* 22, Nev* 7, 1975). What 
happens next is anybody's guess* Meanwhile another review commission (one, the 
Kejid Philip's Ccnnission was appointed in 19^5) headed by Vlllian Denas, 
President of the Caribbean Development Bank has been appointed"th find out 
why the Community has not been working properly and make lasting structural 
recommendations to put matters right" (ibid*)* This commission has beam 
specifically asked to submit its report within 12 months with off cot from 
Novembor 13# 1975. But it is foarod that tho eommlsslom was appoimtod too 
late - given the degree of Tanzania's economic and political disenchantment with 
the EAEC as well as the de facto division that has already taken place, 
especially with respect to the three key community corporations, the railway, 
harbours and pests and telecommunications - aad that all it cam do now io to 
preside over the dissolution of the community as it exists to-day (ibid*)*
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tend to sottle in it* This in turn vould not only deprive tho poorer states ef 
the ore an of their labour feroe but also an important element in their balance 
ef payments account - receipts in fora of transfers fron tholr nationals 
working in other parts of the Eaton to* This further underlines the need to 
incorporate a mechanism for making possible an acceptable balanced development 
im any integration soheme*
The magnitude of gains from integration is another factor whioh prospective 
members ef a union would want to consider before entry* Although, as we 
demonstrated in ohapter U» these gains are very difficult to quantify, they 
look rather modest - if our investigation is any guide* Estimates made in 
ohapter eight suggest that, in the etent of the GECS coning into being, an 
additional increase ef the GNP of the area of the order of 0*9# by 1980 might be 
attributable to integration* Anti-marketeers in the region may chuckle and 
ask whether this estimated Imtegr&tion-induoed growth rate is worth the 
price of integration (i*c* the loss of a measure of flexibility and 
autonomy in national policy making and oxoeution)* Vo would ef course reply 
that they reflect the magnitude of tho short-torn gains since they wore based 
en four produots only* It is hoped that once integration gets under way 
product market would be extended te a vidcr range ef produots in whioh 
regional trade is both feasible and profitable, hence in the long-run the 
contributions of integration to economic growth vill increase considerably*
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Therefore, if integration is considered te be ultimately advantageous - 
even if its short-term benefits may net be large — an early start may be
*■’ . ' ' ' > : * & " •  j i  • • r. a  r Y . * *’ W /Jf ■*.-v . ■- • •-1 * • * >3 ; .. •
desirable since it be much more difficult to bring about integration later* 
It ean be shewn that onoe high oost industries are established to serve national
J*. u 'V •- . ■* ^ V .- i,i'-'V’ f1?. V — "v '• > . it *• >.C*•. fk /  ^ * *\ ' i-' -
markets, the countries concerned may be understandably reluctant to subject
them to outside competition later* As Sidney Dell has clearly summarised the
point 1 “Experience in Latin America shows that once a ooumtry begins to move
along the path o f economic self-euffioiency, it becomes very difficult later
on to change direction* It would be much easier today to got agreement on a
reasonable division of labour in Latin America if there had not already been
substantial autarkic development in many parts ef the continent* In this
respect Afrloa has an advantage ever Latin Amerioa - its need for am integration
of markets may be less immediately pressing, but integration nay be easier
now than at a later stage, when vested interests beeeme nueh stronger*”^
3* Sidney Dell, Trade Blocs and Coraion Markets* Constable, London, 19^3,
P. 215.
1. m a ss amp a h b i
1* Ve have demonstrated in this study that opportunities exist in Central - 
Vest Africa for fruitful eoe^ic oo-operation based in the first instance on 
the expansion of existing industries whose capacities havo hitherto been 
underutilized* Under a produo t-b&sed scheme the produots of the integration 
industries would enjoy "free" circulation within the grouping* Once a start has 
been made and habits of oo-eperatien developed, it nay be possible to broaden 
the base ef the oo-eperatien arrangement te inolude, among others, the 
establishment of new regional industries.*4 Given that genuine eonmitment te 
very bread and far-reaching groupings ie yet te be proved - inspite of the 
fexmation ef ECOWAS - the logio of the Vest African situation demands a 
praetioal approach in form of less ambitious schemas* Since the objectives 
of less ambitious arrangements are limited and specific, effective decisions 
are more readily taken and implemented* Furthermore, substantial benefits 
can be produced and, above all, the price individual member a are called upon 
to pay la highly limited* No deubt, to exponents ef comprehensive regional 
planning, which requires scarce administrative and entrepreneurial resources 
and data, less ambitious but realistic arrangements may represent a seoomd-best 
solution in terme of path and scope* But a second-best solution with 
reasonable results is surely better than any other type ef solution without 
tangible results*
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1** Presumably along the lines suggested in ohapter seven*
2. The promotion ef eoenemio oe-eporation in the reclan nay alee be further 
helped If geographically smaller arrangements are allowed to co-exist with 
wider groupings. Ter example, it would still bo advantageous to encourage 
the retention ef existing or the emergence ef smaller schemes ln the area among 
geographically contiguous states with special problems, like the Mane River Unicm, 
the Niger River Commission er the GSCS provided sueh organisations are "comple­
mentary" in their objectives and policies. Fortunately, the BC0MA8 Treaty 
reoegnises this problsn and specifically pemists member states te belong to 
ether eeonomie groupings so long ae their obligations under the Treaty of such 
groupings are net inimical te the letter and spirit ef the Treaty ef BC0H1S 
(Art1ole 20 (3) )•
3* The system of equitable distribution ef the benefits ef integration - 
corrective end preventive measures alike - vhieh we have suggested will, hope­
fully, take ear# of the intractable problem ef fair distribution of tho gains 
from integration. In a region whore intra-regional disparities ln development 
are considerable, tho CXD criterion, whioh weights tho balance ef benefits in 
favour of tho relatively weaker economies, trios to narrow down tho disparities* 
Bat whatever tho merit of the CW& formula its acceptability vill depend on the 
political disposition cf member states at the initial period. And oven if it 
is acceptable it will necessarily be reviewed from time to time to take account 
of changing political scenes aad alignments in a region that ie promo to coups 
and counter-coups•
With respect to the establishment ef now industries, any 
allocation arrangement mast start with an agreed list of
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eon tain lag at least one project for every member ooumtry* Also & regional 
development bank may be able to make some contribution to the achievement of 
regional balance, especially if finance has been a major brake on investment 
and if the bank has special resources from which it can assist projects in 
the lagging regions.
k* The policy of balanced regional development will surely involve* the 
establishment of tone •sub-optimal" Industries in the lagging regions.
Although this nay be difficult to avoid, it could be minimised through the 
encouragement ef an acceptable level of intra-union mobility of labour. Sine# 
employment opportunities are not evenly distributed, intra-union mobility ef 
labour vill not only increase the competitiveness and productivity of labour 
but also its efficiency. Prior te independence, West Africa was an area vhieh
offered considerable freedom ef movement to its people. But, in recent years,
5notably because of the Busia Government's action against "aliens" in Ghana, 
tho picture has altered. Bven so there is still a considerable movement of 
workers and traders over tho whole area, and of professional people inside the 
two main language area. Given a harmonized flexible immigration polios a 
healthy intra-regional movement of workers will surely come into being.
5. To ensure the effectiveness of regional trade, the problem of intra-union 
payments arrangement vill require serious consideration. The two currencies 
(the cedi and CPA franc) currently im use in the region are net freely 
5« See Chapter two, footnote 29* See also Vest Africa. 17 December, 1973*
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convertible between than nor is there an "appropriate" exohange rate within 
the area. As noted earlier >the advantages of a currency union nay be many 
and fascinating but they require a high level of intra-union trade te be fully 
realised. Besides, it is not easy to establish a currency union. At this early 
stage a moderate payments arrangement, whioh eould concentrate, among ethers, 
on exploiting the opportunities for multilateral off-setting ef surpluses and 
deficits among the participants, will be easier te aohieve. In the long rum a 
more sophisticated payments system will probably emerge. It nay veil be that 
Vest Africa through its association with the BBC under the Lone Convention vill
g
benefit from the current neves for uniting Buropean currencies by 1980 and 
for reforming the international monetary system.
6. Finally, given a firm commitment to the idea ef integration, Vest African 
oountrles may find that international support has seme important role to play 
in at least tvo directions. Firstly, international support is nenessary to 
ensure that the rules hitherto applicable to international trade by these 
countries whioh are members of GATT vill not hinder economically seumd regional 
Integration so he me s. Typical among such rules ares the unconditional nest 
favoured nation treatment in relation fo tariff| and the principle ef nen- 
discriminatory application of quantitative restrictions. These rules could 
really be an inpediememt to regional groupings if they were te be strictly 
enforced.
6. Douglas Dosser, "Tax Harmonization in the Buropean Community".
The Three Banks Review. June 1973t 98, P. 55*
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Mere recently, however, the climate of international opinion with respect
to the formation Of discriminatory trading arrangements among LDCs has been
more realistic and favourable# Not only did the UNCTAD Conference of I96U
recommend that regional integration should be promoted among LDCs but also
less Inclusive forms ef co-operation received support#^ It was also
recommended that developing countries should net be required to extend to
developed countries preferential arrangements ln operation among themselves
and this principle ia also enshrined in the Lome Conventien (Article 7 (1) )#
Similarly, the Trade Development Committee of GATT later conceded that the
establishment of preferences among LDCs appropriately adminstered, and subject
to the necessary safeguards, can made an important contribution to an expansion
of trade among those countries aad to the attainment of the objectives of the
o
General Agreement1*# These favourable developments point to the conclusion 
that the door is now more widely open for the formation of less inclusive 
integration arrangements among LDCs#
Secondly, external support may be important on the financial side# The 
principle of equitable distribution of the benefits of integration necessarily 
involves, among other things, tlie creation of an appropriate infrastructure 
whioh will permit investment in directly productive activity# Consider, for 
example, the extension of the Dahonean railway system to Southern Niger# The 
resources required for such strategic investments in infrastructure may be 
generally lacking fron within the region.
7. P. Robson, Economic Integration in Africa. Op.oil;.. P. 309
8. Ibid.
If developed countries and international agencies could be pereuaded to assume 
some responsibility for helping the LDCs to deal with this problem either 
through the provision of fimamolal support te regional development banks er 
financing infrastructure investments in one form er anothert the move towards 
integration might be further accelerated#
2 .  ts u a m m
Whereas a major policy goal im Africa is rapid economic development and 
since the problem ef aoeelerated development must be viewed from a wider 
perspective, regional economic integration should, definitely, be part ef the 
solution# Boemomio analysis asm c\S> far as possible provide guidance as to 
the benefits and eostsof a given scheme but it is incapable ef telling whom 
a particular proposal will get off to a good start# Ve need to leek beyond 
economics for a fuller answer* Im a region that ie passing through a 
historical phase of political instability, nothing is certain! anything ia 
possible and everything depends on everything else# Time aleme will tell#
We have shown that eoenomie integration ef a modest mature based on the 
produots of seleoted industries, fer a start, between Ghana and the fetemte 
States will not only bring about am additional increase im the rate ef growth 
ef their GKP ef about 0#9# by 1980 but also will provide the foundation 
for a wider amd mere intimate grouping whioh, it is hoped, will bring greater 
benefits# But we cannot be sure how readily sound eeenenie advice will be 
accepted and implemented due to the trade-off between economic amd political 
considerations# This ia particularly serious where politloal changes are 
rapid amd regimes and alignments cam alter overnight#
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Indeed, the inpaet of political instability ean be eafely regarded as one of 
the obataelea to the orderly development of eoenemio integration in West 
Africa.
Nevertheless, this should net give cause for despair. Given a measure 
of determination, the limited form of integration for the joint promotion 
ef solooted regional projeots, which we have advocated, can still be achieved 
amd once a foundation has been laid the mere existence ef a scheme might 
create opportunities for 'learning by doing** But, if small schemes involving 
about half a demon contiguous countries with comparable economic systems cannot 
take root, then it must be nere difficult te get the newly-formed heterogeneous 
SCO WAS to function effectively.
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